A YEAR
ON
THE PUNJAB FRONTIER,
IN 1848-49

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BHAWUL KHAN



MY ALLY

DEWAN MOOLRAJ



MY ENEMY

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BY

MAJOR HERBERT B. EDWARDES. C.B.

H.E.I.C.S.

IN TWO VOLUMES

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VOL. II.

WAR

A YEAR IN THE PUNJAB

BY WAY OF *CARTE DU PAYS*

THE scene of this volume is the province of Mooltan, and its theme is the suppression of the rebellion of Dewan Moolraj, the last Governor of that province.

A short account of both the province and the rebellion may not be amiss before we enter upon either.

The province of Mooltan, as held by Dewan Moolraj in the spring of 1848, extended from the district of Kuchee on the left bank of the Indus, on the north; to the eastern frontier of Sindh, on the south; and from Chichawutnee on the Ravee, and Tibbee on the Sutlej, in the east; to the Soolimanee mountains, Trans-Indus, in the west.

In the map attached to this book, I have defined the whole boundary of the province of Mooltan by an orange-coloured line, so as to give the reader at one *coup d'œil* a just notion of the vast extent of country which

Moolraj had at his command when he commenced the war.

There may be mistakes of a few miles, more or less, in the tracing of the eastern boundary, as it has been done from memory, and not records; but it will be found generally correct, and quite sufficiently so for our present purpose.

The province may be naturally divided into three tracts: one Trans-Indus; a second in the Sindh Sagur Doab, between the Indus and Chenab; and a third between the Chenab, the Ravee, and the Sutlej.

I have passed through all three in the course of military operations, and had a chief hand in wresting them from the rebel Governor; after which they remained under my charge, till the cessation of hostilities permitted permanent arrangements to be made for the civil administration of the whole Punjab.

With the leading features of the country, its resources, and the character of its people, I am consequently acquainted; and such a general idea of the *carte du pays* as enabled me to carry on the war, will probably suffice the reader wherewith to "fight it o'er again."

I. To begin with the Trans-Indus:

As the province of Dera Ishmael Khan (treated of in my first volume) forms the Upper Derajat, so the Trans-Indus dependencies of Mooltan compose the Lower. Runjeet Sing annexed them to the Punjab in the years 1820-21.

Under the Sikhs they were divided into two districts, Sungurh, and Dera Ghazee Khan. Under British rule they are united into one, called by the latter name; and the civil charge of it has been appropriately given by Lord Dalhousie to General Van Cortlandt for his admirable conduct during the rebellion.

Sungurh and Dera Ghazee Khan differ very much in natural features. The former being in the heart of the Derajat is strongly marked with the characteristics of that tract, and closely resembles the country of Dera Futteh Khan, the southern border of which it joins. The Indus on the east, and mountain streams on the west, give a scanty irrigation to its borders; but the central and larger portion of the district is entirely dependent on unfrequent rains.

Dera Ghazee Khan, on the contrary, lying at the southern end of the Derajat, where the Indus is inclining to the west, has nearly half its breadth irrigated by that river; and the whole character of its productions undergoes a change in consequence.

No longer corn, but sugar, indigo, and cotton, are here the staple crops: and stately date groves meet the eye in every direction. Dera Ghazee Khan itself is one of the most lovely spots I have seen in the Punjab, and might well be called the City of Palms. And the farther south the richer the country, till it reaches its acme in Mithunkote, which I have only seen at a distance from the river, but is said to be luxuriant. Here, however, the fertility seems to end, for in 1849 Lieutenant Young found the country between Mithunkote and Sindh both thinly

peopled and miserably cultured. This had hitherto been owing to two causes: its remoteness from the seat of government at Mooltan, and its proximity to the hills of the Bhoogtees and Murrees. The incursions of these desperate robbers extended up to the very walls of Roojhan, and confined all cultivation to a space of about five miles between Roojhan and the Indus. The style of architecture of the walls of the village, eighteen feet high, well loop-holed, and forming a square of three hundred and eighty yards, sufficiently proclaimed the kind of life led by the inhabitants.

The people of both Sungurh and Dera Ghazee Khan are Beloochees, but of different tribes.

In Sungurh are the Nootkanees and the Kusranees. The former claim to be lords of the whole of the soil, by virtue of a grant, as reckless as munificent, made in the palmy days of the Delhi kingdom, to a Nootkanee woman who nursed a boy in the royal harem. The present representative of the Nootkanees is an old man, named Ussud Khan, who behaved very foolishly during the rebellion. His sisters were so beautiful that all the neighbouring chiefs (Bhawul Khan of Bhawulpoor, the Nuwab of Dera Ishmael Khan, Kowruh Khan, Khosuh, &c.) made war on him successively, to obtain one in marriage, as a bribe to march away again. The Kusranees are only tenants of the Nootkanees, but they have far outgrown their masters, and are now the most powerful tribe of Sungurh.

Their headquarters are in the Soolimanee hills, but their plain possessions are so extensive as to put them quite at the mercy of the Government.

There is a tribe, however, which is inclined to give much trouble on the Sungurh frontier—as a precaution against whose fitful outbreaks the fort of Mungrotuh has always been carefully kept up. These are the Boozdars, whose mountains overhang the district. They are about six thousand fighting men, and very predatory; and General Ventura and Dewan Sawun Mull (Moolraj's father), after in vain attempting to carry destruction into their fastnesses, ended by paying for peace.

The tribes of Dera Ghazee Khan are Loonds, Lugharees, Khosuhs, Goorchanees, Gopangs, Mudarees, Dreeshuks, &c.

Of these the principal are the Khosuhs and Lugharees; addicted rather to cattle-lifting and thieving, but good subjects on the whole, as times go on Asiatic frontiers. They live about Dera Ghazee Khan Proper.

The troublesome tribes are the Ghoorchanees of Hurrund, and the Mudarees of Roojhan.

The Ghoorchanees are half reclaimed only from the hills, a vain and captious race, ever ready to take offence, and never to be relied on. There was no fort at Hurrund until a Kardar of Sawun Mull's one day abused some Ghoorchanees in open court. The tribe rose to resent the insult offered by a Hindoo, besieged the Kardar's house, dragged him out and staked him. After this, Sawun Mull built an excellent brick fort there, in which an officer of Moolraj's held out during the whole war of 1848-9; but surrendered when Lieutenant Ralph Young, of the Bengal

Engineers, had run a sap close up to the walls. This fort stands at the opening of the pass from Kandahar, and should be maintained. It was described to me by Lieutenant Young as "a regular polygon of sixteen sides of seventy-five yards each. Total circumference one thousand two hundred yards. Height of walls twenty-six feet, and of towers thirty-one feet. The towers sixteen in number—one at each corner. Two counter-guards to the two gates. It is only three miles from the hills.

The Mudarees of Roojhan are if possible more barbarous, quarrelsome, and ignorant than the Goorchanees. Their country is described to be full of swamps and jungles, from the overflowing of the Indus; and Sawun Mull, unwilling to involve himself in operations there, put a nominal revenue on the district, then gave half back to the zumeendars in the shape of rewards for service, and expended almost all his own half in establishments.

It is said that the Mudarees are such bad Muhommudans, that they ridicule the genuflections of a "true believer;" saying, "Is he mad to put his head on the ground, and his tail in the air?" They are continually fighting with their mountain neighbours, the Bhoogtees and Murrees.*

*The former of these tribes has been greatly humbled by that best of irregular cavalry regiments, the Sindh Horse, and that best of border wardens, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob. Lieutenant Merewether, at the head of a detachment of this corps, killed upwards of three hundred Bhoogtees in one raid. The Murrees, I believe, have as yet never come in contact with our arms. They are accounted the most powerful tribe in this part of the Soolimanee Range, and are much feared by all their neighbours, from having four guns—probably rattletraps, but still guns.

The revenue of Sungurh was nominally a lakh of rupees per annum, but seventy thousand rupees was, I believe, as much as was ever realized.

That of Dera Ghazee Khan was four hundred and thirty-five thousand rupees a-year.

Moolraj's total revenue, therefore, from the countries Trans-Indus was five hundred and five thousand rupees a-year; or rather more than £50,000.

II. The dependencies of Mooltan, between the Indus and the Chenab, comprised very nearly the whole of the Sindh Sagur Doab, between the Sutlej and the Salt Range; the only exceptions being the district of Kuchee, opposite Esaukheyl on the Indus, and the narrow irrigated tract on the right bank of the Jheylum, which was attached to the province of Jhung.

If the reader will put the map before him, I will tell him what this delta is like in a moment.

It is a triangular desert, with a fringe of rich cultivation to its two sides, but not to its base.

From the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej, all the way up the left bank of the Indus to Kuchee, is a low, narrow slip, or fringe of alluvial soil, tacked on to a great delta of sand. The delta of sand is the original country, which once formed the left bank of the Indus; but that river has for years been taking a more westernly course, and throwing up on its left what it cuts away on its right. This deposit is much below the level of the original sand; is overflowed by the Indus when in flood; and irrigated by

canals from it all the rest of the year. Consequently it is highly cultivated, and very productive. Its breadth gives the exact distance that the Indus has receded; and the edge of the sand which terminates everywhere abruptly, and generally in the shape of a high bank, preserves a slowly crumbling record of the ancient bed of the Indus.

On the eastern side of the desert the fringe of cultivation is due to the irrigation of the Jheylum and the Chenab; and for a few miles, at the apex of the triangle, the Chenab and the Indus cultivation meet and occupy the whole space between the rivers. Nothing can exceed the richness of the tract where this occurs; and indeed as far north as Khangurh it is a sheet of cotton, indigo, and sugar; "a land of fatness."

The people of the great delta which has been sketched above, are inferior tribes of Muhommudans. In saying this, I use the language of the border, where the height of pride is to be a Puthan (or true Afghan); to be a Belooch is mediocre; and to be a Jut decidedly low.

In the southern Sindh Sagur Doab there are no Puthans; and the Juts are more numerous than the Beloochees. Blood and pretensions go together with Muhommudans, even more than with other races; and consequently the people between the Indus and the Chenab are comparatively tame. The only tribe among them from whom I ever got a soldier worth his salt are the Bedwals. Peace being desirable, so much the better.

The country I have described has only one town and one stronghold of any consequence. The town is Leia,

remarkable for two things: its trade with Caubul and its bigoted Hindoo population.

The stronghold is Munkhera; and its importance is more historical than real. It was built, I believe, by Hafiz Ahmed Khan, the Nuwab of Munkhera, and is described to be "of mud, with a citadel of burnt brick, and surrounded by a dry ditch and *faussebraye*."* It stands in the very centre of the Sandy Desert; and the Nuwab, to add to its security, built four outpost forts round it at the distance of twenty miles, and filled up all the wells round Munkhera itself to the distance of ten or twelve miles.

Notwithstanding these precautions, Runjeet Sing encamped against it on the 18th of November, 1821, and received the Nuwab's surrender on the 12th of the following month. Runjeet had a very high opinion of Munkhera as a stronghold, and it is very remarkable that it never was entrusted to either Dewan Sawun Mull, or his son and successor, Dewan Moolraj, though occupying such a conspicuous position in the province under their charge. Consequently Munkhera was not in the hands of the rebels in the war of 1848-9, but was occupied by a Sikh garrison, whose neutrality I secured by never asking them to any service, and never putting it in their power to do any harm.

The revenue which Moolraj derived from the districts between the Indus and the Chenab was one

*"A Memoir, Historical and Political, of Transactions in the Punjab," by Captain William Murray, formerly Political Agent on the north-west frontier.

million one hundred and forty-four thousand rupees a-year, or upwards of £114,000.*

III. It remains only to describe that part of the province of Mooltan which lies between the Chenab, the Ravee, and the Sutlej.

This is the tail-end of that delta of the Punjab which is called the Baree Doab. The centre of the Baree Doab, like that of the Sindh Sagur, is high and arid, but it is a jungle, not a desert. Its edges, which lie along the banks

DETAIL.	RUPEES.
*Munkhera, &c.	475,000
Seethpoor	
Inthoee	
Dhaka	
Ghalooan	
Shuhr-i-Sooltan	437,000
Khinjer	
Araee	
Mahmoodkee	
Nouabad	
Maharajghur	
Ahmedpoor	
Rungpoor	
Mooradabad	232,000
Sompteh	
Futtagurh	
Khangurh	
Total	1,144,000

of the Sutlej, the Ravee, and the Chenab, are either irrigated by those rivers or canals cut from them, and are highly cultivated. For its extent, this was the richest portion of the Mooltan province, yielding a revenue of one million and thirty-five thousand rupees a-year, or upwards of £103,000.*

By far the greater part of this revenue is due to the vast canals which successive Governors have caused to be

DETAIL.	RUPEES.
Loodhen	
Tibbee	
Mylsee	
Kuror	
Nalee Sirdarwah	455,000
Buhadurpoor	
Kotlee Adil	
Punjani	
Ghazeepoor	
Mooltan Proper	
Khanpoor	
Khaee	
Shahpoor	
Secunderabad	580,000
Shoojabad	
Sirdarpoor	
Sidnye	
Tolumba, &c.	
Total	1,035,000

opened in this corner of the province, and to whose names they have given a just and enviable immortality. It is observable, however, that in general they have been the works of Muhommudans.

I had a Mooltanee Puthan officer in my army (named Gholam Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee), who had a remarkable talent in this line, and had brought large waste tracts of his native country into cultivation, without possessing any pretensions to science, or indeed much education of any kind. The Hindoos of Mooltan used to tell a joke against him, without any apparent consciousness that the story was very much against themselves. Dewan Sawun Mull, Moolraj's father, offered one day, in open Durbar, to give ten thousand rupees down, and permanently raise the pay of any of his servants to forty rupees a-day, if he would increase the revenue of the barren district of Khaee, by irrigation, from six thousand to forty thousand rupees a-year. Moostapha Khan accepted the offer, and received the district in farm for five years, on the following terms: He was to pay first year, twelve thousand; second year, twenty thousand; third year, thirty thousand; fourth year, forty thousand; and fifth year, fifty thousand rupees.

A man must have had considerable confidence in himself before he took a lease upon such conditions; but the result justified his calculation. For the first and second year Moostapha Khan rather lost by the bargain; but the canal which he had cut worked better every year, and in the third year the district yielded thirty-two thousand rupees. Now comes the point of the joke: Sawun Mull, seeing that the canal was now complete and reproductive, cancelled the

canal-cutter's lease; and when asked for the promised reward, laughed heartily.*

The agricultural population of the country round Mooltan is exclusively Muhommudan, and in general of the humble Jut tribe, who seem to have been settled here for a thousand years at least, and to have been continually falling; for in "Brigg's Ferishta,"† we read that Mahmood the Destroyer had a great naval fight with a horde of Tartars, named Juts, of the same stock as the Getae, on the river opposite Mooltan; fourteen hundred boats, armed with spikes, being ranged on the side of Mahmood, and four thousand on the side of the Juts!

The Juts of Mooltan are now reduced to cultivators; their landlords being either the rich Hindoos, who are the chief inhabitants of the towns, or else the small but powerful tribe known by the name of Mooltanee Puthans.

Of this latter race was my chief officer, Foujdar Khan, Alizye, and many others of my best soldiers; and as a body, they rendered us such good service during the rebellion of Moolraj, that it would not be out of place to recall their history here, even if an account of Mooltan would be completed without it.

*In the East, where public peace and quietness depends very much on the good-humour of rulers, a "hearty laugh" from the throne settles all accounts, closes every debate, and is considered to exhaust the subject under discussion. In the present instance, Sawun Mull having laughed, considered that he had in fact "paid" Gholam Moostapha. In like manner we find in all Oriental jest books, when a criminal is about to be executed for murder, if he can only say something witty, the King "laughs heartily, and forgives the offence!"

†Vol. I, p. 81.

When Ali Merdan Khan, the Persian Governor of Kandahar, gave up that province to Shah Juhan in A.D. 1637, the Afghan families hailed with satisfaction its transfer to the hands of the Moghuls. But their joy was of short duration.

In A.D. 1648, Shah Abbas the Second marched from Persia against Kandahar, and besieging it in winter, when the communication between India and Cabul was cut off, retook it before Shah Juhan could send Aurungzeyb to its relief. The Kandahar supporters of the Moghuls fled from the vengeance of the Persian conqueror to the advancing army of Aurungzeyb; and took part in the several unsuccessful attempts made by that Prince and his brother, Dara Shiko, between 1648 and 1653, to recover Kandahar. At last they abandoned their country, rather than submit to the yoke of Persia; and Aurungzeyb, in grateful acknowledgement of their aid and fidelity, established them as a colony at Mooltan, giving the chiefs military service, and their humbler fellow-countrymen certain immunities from customs, and some profitable monopolies of trade.

At Mooltan, under Suddozye Governors, the exiles throve; relations and friends joined them from their native land, and at the end of a century and a half the Mooltanee Puthans had become a distinct and formidable power, which long resisted the arms of Runjeet Sing.

It was the Mooltanee Puthans who formed the noble garrisons of Mooltan, Shoojabad, and Munkhera, in 1818 and 1821. At Mooltan, their men of greatest note died with Mozuffur Khan, the Governor in the breach. At Shoojabad they only surrendered at the bidding of their

master's eldest son. And from Munkhera they marched out with military honours, after a siege of nearly a month, directed by Runjeet himself.

On the fall of Mooltan the surviving Mooltanee Puthans fled, and abandoned their lands, until the Sikh conquerors should have forgotten their resentment. After a year or two they crept back, and found some of their lands given away by the new Hindoo Governors of Mooltan to Hindoo favourites, and others in the hands of their own Jut tenants, who refused to give them up, and easily bribed the Governor not to interfere in favour of such enemies to the Khalsa as the Mooltanee Puthans.

The Puthans betook themselves to Lahore, and demanded justice from Runjeet Sing, who had never contemplated the confiscation of the lands. Sawun Mull was now Governor of Mooltan, and Runjeet issued written orders for the lands to be restored. Sawun Mull put the orders in his pocket, and told the petitioners to take care they never appealed again.

And thus the majority of this noble race were actually dispossessed of their lands in the province of Mooltan without even the authority of the Sikh Sovereign; and by officials playing into each other's hands, were kept so from 1818 till 1849, when by one of those strange passages of retribution which the page of history reveals, another siege of Mooltan gave the death-blow to the Sikhs themselves, and the sons and grandsons of the Mooltanee Puthans who garrisoned that fortress in 1818, were now seen foremost in the ranks of the besiegers, and re-entered in triumph their ancestral stronghold.

The story may be concluded with a real instance of poetical justice; for on the Mooltanee Puthans petitioning, after the war was ended, their services and peculiar case, were, I believe, deemed by Lord Dalhousie to justify a departure from the rule, which sets a limit of twelve years to suits for land, and the British Courts of Justice were thrown open to them, to prove their title to the estates if they were able.

Thus, after thirty years, Mooltan has recovered its landed aristocracy, and the Juts have once more relapsed into a state of servitude.

There are many thriving towns and serviceable forts in this part of the province of Mooltan; but Mooltan and Sirdarpoor are the two principal; though the latter is insignificant in comparison with the former.

A ground plan of the fort of Mooltan will be found elsewhere in this book; and from it the reader will be enabled to judge of its undoubted strength.

It would require, however, an acquaintance with the ultra-Muhommudan races on the Indus to understand fully how the intrinsic security of the fortress was heightened to impregnability in the superstitious estimation of the people by the charm shed over it by the Great Musjid and sacred shrines of Shah Rookn Alum, and Bhawul Huk, whose noble domes surmounted the citadel before the war.

Two out of the three are now a heap of ruins.

The city of Mooltan joined its walls on to those of the fort. It contained, I should think, thirty thousand

inhabitants, and was celebrated throughout Central Asia for its Cabul trade and silken manufactures, as the fortress for its strength and shrines.

Mooltan is surrounded by groves of date-trees,* and the most beautiful gardens, which are doubly pleasing to the eye, as both adorning its appearance and bearing witness to its wealth. The mangoes produced in these gardens are, perhaps, the most delicious in India, except those of Mazagaon at Bombay. Oranges, pomegranates, and peaches, are likewise produced in profusion, and better than in Hindoostan.

Mooltan probably owes these fruits to a sun ever burning above, and canals ever flowing below. Its heat is immortalised by some malicious visitor in a miserable couplet which no translation can spoil :

"Churchyards, beggars, dust, and heat,
Are the four best things at Mooltan you'll meet."

The churchyards, beggars, and dust, are not to be denied by the most patriotic Mooltanee; but are explained away into evidences of sanctity, wealth, and traffic. The heat, which is equally incontestible, is thus accounted for. Once upon a time there lived at Mooltan a holy man, called Peer Shumsh. His thoughts were in heaven, so he kept no kitchen; but when he happened to be hungry, he, in all simplicity, begged a dinner. One day he was seized with

*The people tell that these dates first grew at Mooltan from fruit-stones left on the ground by the army of Nadir Shah, a legacy of wealth and beauty such as conquest seldom leaves behind.

hunger in the city very near a butcher's; he begged, and received a chop; for the butcher was a good Muhommudan. Peer Shumsh went on to a cook-shop, and laying his chop on the girdle, said in an absent way: "Cook that for the love of Muhommud!" The cook was a bad man, and did not care a sheep's tail for Muhommud; so he just took up the chop, and threw it into Shumsh's face! There is no doubt if the out-raged Shumsh had prayed for the whole city of Mooltan to be swallowed up by an earthquake, it would have happened; but to his everlasting honour he did not. He mildly picked up the chop, and turning his eyes towards the sun, implored that luminary to supply what man denied. The sun, to the consternation of all Mooltan, descended three degrees, and cooked the chop of Peer Shumsn to a turn; after which, as an everlasting punishment to the city, the sun never went back; but continues to the present day, a burning example to all young Muhommudans, three degrees nearer to Mooltan than to any other city in Asia!

But the reader must not suppose that Peer Shumsh has spoilt the climate.

It is the universal experience of India that a hot place is not an unhealthy one, even to Europeans, if the commonest precautions be taken against exposure to the actual rays of the sun, and ordinary accommodation be provided. And as far as my own experience and inquiry goes, Mooltan is another instance of the rule. When the rebellion broke out in April, 1848, the climate of Mooltan was represented to the British authorities as malignant in the extreme; and the supposition had a very considerable and proper weight in the decision against a hot-weather

campaign. But there is reason to believe that these representations were made designedly by a Court which, whatever professions it might make, was always glad at heart to see the British involved in difficulties, or suffering a slight.

In my force, which was encamped, with bad accommodation, before Mooltan from July till the following February, there never was any sickness; and in General Whish's army, in September (the worst month in the year), the hospital returns showed a sickness of only four per cent, which was probably less than in any barracks in India.

But it has been said that 1848 was a very favourable year at Mooltan, and that the sickness was very severe there in 1849. The facts are correct, but the inference is wrong. The year 1848 was one of drought, and that of 1849 one of flood; and *therefore* the one was healthy and the other unhealthy. But whereas years of drought are the rule at Mooltan, and years of flood the exception, so I believe it will be found in the long run that Mooltan is a healthy place. The natives should know something about their own climate—and they tell you that "Mooltan is healthy except when it rains;—but it *never* rains!" Never is a long time; but when I arrived there, I think I was told that it had not rained for four years.

A cursory account like this is not the place for even a sketch of the by-gone history of the province of Mooltan; but we may remark *en passant* that it has been a possession of importance, and its great fortress a stronghold of renown, both in the ancient and modern world.

The great Assyrian Queen, Semiramis, two thousand years before our Christian Era, coveted it in vain, and was

driven back from the Indus; Darius, the Persian, is supposed, from the narrative of Herodotus, to have included it in his dominions; and Alexander the Great found Mallithan, or the Place of the Malli, not unworthy of his arms. In the close of the tenth century of the modern world, Mooltan was invaded and plundered by Subuktagin; in the beginning of the eleventh its people were almost annihilated by Mahmood the Destroyer; in the fourteenth it was overrun by Timour the Tartar; the fifteenth saw its Viceroy ascend the throne of Delhi; and in the sixteenth it fell under the sway of the Great Moghuls.

Mr. Elphinstone says the province of Mooltan "was taken from the great Mogul by the Persians, and fell to Ahmed Shauh on the death of Naudir.*" But in the treaty made with Nadir after the sack of Delhi in 1739, it is doubtful whether more than the dependencies of Mooltan, westward of the Indus, were ceded to the invader.† In 1748, however, Ahmed Shah wrested the whole Punjab from the King of Delhi, and put a Governor of his own into Mooltan. Ten years later, at the invitation of Adeena Beg, the Mahratta army marched into the Punjab, drove Ahmed Shah's son Timour across the Indus, and once more changed the government of the Mooltan province. In 1760, Ahmed Shah regained the Punjab.

In 1772 occurred one of the strangest of the vicissitudes which this province has undergone. Ahmed Shah

*Elphinstone's "Caubul," Vol. I, p. 234.

†See this point discussed by Lieutenant R. Maclagan, Bengal Engineers, in "Fragments of the History of Mooltan, the Derajat, and Bhawulpoor, from Persian MSS."—*Journal As. Soc. Bengal, November, 1848.*

was dead; and his son Timour had farmed the government of Mooltan to a Hindoo named Lala Dhurm Das, and a Muhommudan named Mirza Shereef Beg jointly. The Muhommudan killed the Hindoo, and spoiled him; and then, in fear of his master's vengeance, betrayed his important trust to two Sikh Sirdars, named Chunda Sing, and Gunda Sing, who thus, early in the dawn of the Sikh power, became masters of the province and fortress of Mooltan, which seventy-six years later was destined to prove the ruin of their dynasty and nation.

In 1779, according to the MSS of Lieutenant Maclagan, and 1781, according to Mr. Elphinstone,* Timour Shah found leisure from the distracted affairs of Cabul to recover this valuable dependency of his kingdom; and having expelled the Sikhs, he appointed Nuwab Mozuffur Khan, the Soobuhdar of Mooltan, and "gave a lakh of rupees for the repair of the fort, and city walls, and houses of the people"† that had been injured during the siege.

This was the last, and it may be added noblest, of the Muhommudan Governors of Mooltan. He ruled for thirty-nine years, during which he performed the great pilgrimage to Mecca, and added to his many titles the valued one of Hajee. I have myself sat under the shade of a rare tree, which he brought back, a slip, from Mecca, and planted in the Huzooree Bagh at Mooltan. In March, 1818, Runjeet Sing commenced his last and successful siege of Mooltan; and on June the 2nd, the grey-headed Nuwab,

*See "Elphinstone's Caubul," Vol. II, p. 303.

†Papers of Lieutenant Maclagan, already quoted.

after a defence which the Sikhs to this day consider the most desperate they ever encountered, died sword in hand in the breach. Thus was the province of Mooltan annexed at last to the Sikh empire.

I have before mentioned that many of my best officers during the war of 1848-9 were sons and grandsons of the officers of Mozuffur Khan. They remembered well, as children, running in and out of the houses of the citadel during the siege of 1818, and taking refuge at last, with their high-bred Afghan mothers, in the Jumma Musjid, or Great Mosque, whose dome alone proved able to resist even the pewter shells of the Sikh mortars; and many were the anecdotes they used to tell me of the prowess and fidelity of their ancestors. I will only trust myself with one, which is characteristic of the lofty spirit of that "illustrious garrison".

Amongst the chief officers of the Mooltan Governor, Khooda Yar Khan, Alizye (grandfather of my chief officer, Foujdar Khan), was remarkable for his daring, both in council and in action. His talents had raised him to the honourable post of *Moosahib* (Squire) to the Nuwab, a choice which he justified by dying at his side. When the garrison were preparing to receive the last assault, and it was known that the Sikhs must triumph, the stout old soldier went to bid his wife a last farewell before he took up his post upon the battered walls.

He found her busily engaged in concealing her jewels in the ground. "Woman", said he, sternly, "do you wish to be mistaken for the wife of a Jut zumeendar? Adorn yourself, that you may be known for a Puthanee. Of what

use are jewels to her who has lost her husband?" The rebuke is still related by his grandson with pride; and similar anecdotes have been handed down in every family of the Mooltanee Puthans, serving to keep alive among them, in exile and distress, a chivalry and dignity of arms which distinguishes them from all other soldiers in the Punjab.

Great was the descent from the high-minded Afghan Soobuhdars of Mooltan to the petty peculating Kardars of Runjeet Sing. There is something quite ludicrous after reading of Mozuffur Khan, in passing to Lieutenant Maclagan's memorandum of the old Nuwab's successors.

"A. D. 1816. (A mistake probably for 1818). Lala Sookh Dyal. *Deficent in his remittances. Was imprisoned and displaced.*

"A. D. 1819. Sham Sing, Kashmeeree. *Imprisoned and deposed after six months.*

"A. D. 1819. Budun Huzaree. *Failed in his accounts. Confined and removed.*"

I happen to be acquainted with Budun Huzaree; and should this book ever meet the eye of my friend Maclagan, he will be gratified to learn that the ex-Governor of the province of Mooltan was in 1848 alive and well, and performing very indifferently the exalted functions of Magazine Storekeeper in the fort of Lukkee in Murwut, for the consideration of one ruppee per diem. He is as mean a little man to look at as ever I saw; of neither rank, parts, courage, nor education, and one might suppose was put into the government of Mooltan as a joke, if he had not found it a very serious affair.

At last poor Budun Huzaree was superseded, and Runjeet Sing drew forth from his quiver a man of mind, Dewan Sawun Mull, father of Dewan Moolraj, who was appointed in 1821 with the becoming title of Nazim, and held the Government till his death, in 1844.

During these twenty-three years Sawun Mull, by his great executive abilities, raised the province of Mooltan to a higher state of prosperity than it had perhaps ever before attained; and while giving satisfaction to his Government by regular remittances of revenue, he contrived to accumulate an enormous private fortune for himself, and still to be beloved by the people for his general justice.

Doubtless the rule of Sawun Mull had every advantage of comparison with that of former Governors; for Mr. Elphinstone says that "nothing could be worse than the government"* when he passed through the province in 1808; and it is not likely to have mended under Sookh Dyal, Sham Sing, and Budun Huzaree.

Still he must have been a great Governor, and as native Governors go, a good one; and from all that I ever saw of his country, or heard of his acts, he more closely approximated to the rulers of British India than any of his countrymen. For instance, it was the distinctive character of his government to protect the poor. If there is any class in India who can complain of British rule it is the native aristocracy, to whom immunity from law is the breath of life. Consequently, under us, they fade away and disappear. Like wasps, they die when they have lost

*See "Elphinstone's Caubul," Vol. II, p. 234.

their sting. It is pleasant, doubtless, to see their hoards diffused; a village rise where a palace falls; and mantles of khim khaub and shawl cut up into jackets for the poor. But it would be better if we could keep both classes in the order and law of nature. Perhaps we shall educate and rear in time a rank of Indians that can be rich without vice, powerful without oppression, and capable of sharing in their country's government, yet of resisting bribes. I have heard that, in the Isle of Wight, a race of cats, without tails, has been perpetuated by one who had been docked. Then why despair?

What in us is an imperfection, in Sawun Mull amounted to a vice. He could not tolerate a gentleman. A low-bred man himself, he hated any one who had a grandfather. Rich merchants he loved, and called around him, for they earned their money as he did himself; but inherited wealth he regarded as contraband, a thing to be seized and confiscated wherever found. Thus the same man who would lend money to a Jut to buy a plough, or dig a well, would keep a Mooltanee Puthan out of his estate, and think he did God a service. Between the poor he did justice with great pains and impartiality; but a rich man, even if in the right, never got a verdict from Sawun Mull, without paying for it.

With all this, he was respected by both rich and poor. One of the ablest natives I ever saw told me "he served Sawun Mull for three years, and sat before him in Durbar where he transacted business every day during that period, yet never heard one foolish word come out of his mouth." On reflection, he said: "Yes, there was one bad habit he had got his tongue into, and I never could account for such a

wise man so forgetting his wisdom. If a soldier offended him, he would say at once: 'Take away his arms! strip off his sword and shield, and turn him out of the service!' "

This was the greatest dishonour he could inflict upon brave men, and he often did it hastily, and for nothing. At last, it cost him his life. He had a good soldier, who wanted to leave him, and whom he did not want to lose; so he put him off, at first, by soft words and promises; but at last, when the soldier demanded his pay and his discharge, he got up a law-suit against him, and threatened to put him in prison. The soldier remonstrated, and reiterated his demand. Sawun Mull got angry, and told his guards, as usual, to "seize the rascal, and take away his sword and shield!" The soldier called out to the guards to lay hands on him at their peril, but stand back, and he would give up his arms. He then pulled off his sword and shield, and surrendered them. The guards asked if they should take him off to prison? "No," said the Dewan, "let him sit at the door, that I may see him, and have a few last words, as I go out." They were his last, indeed! The soldier had retained under his scarf a loaded pistol; and burning with indignation at the shame that had been put on him, after years of faithful service, he resolved to revenge himself, if it cost his life; so he cocked the pistol, under cover of the scarf over his breast and shoulders, and awaited the Dewan's coming.

At last the Durbar broke up, and Sawun Mull, with a smile of gratified malice, stopped before the arrested soldier, and commenced taunting him with the folly of his resistance. In the midst of the abuse, the soldier pulled the

trigger, and the contents of his pistol were lodged in the Dewan's left breast, above the heart. The soldier was, I believe, cut to pieces by the guard. His victim bore up for about ten days, and was apparently recovering, when the wound broke out again, and caused instant death.

Such was the ignominious end of the great and wise Sawun Mull.*

The portion of his career, however, which has most bearing on future events, is his strengthening of the fortress of Mooltan, and the motives with which he accumulated munitions of war within it.

I am supported by the general belief of the people over whom he ruled so long, of many of his officers with whom I have conversed, and of the best-informed persons at the Sikh Court, when I state that there can be no reasonable doubt that Sawun Mull looked forward to the time when the province of Mooltan might be converted into a kingdom.

The stain of long premeditated independence, of years and years of silent and uncommunicated preparation for throwing off the yoke of his legitimate Sovereign, rests upon his memory; and Moolraj inherited the treacherous intent, together with the charge of the fortress, on whose fancied impregnability it was founded.†

*Lieutenant Maclagan is wrong in saying that he "was shot by a robber." Forgetting that he was a Governor, he was shot for himself trying to rob an unoffending man.

†This assertion has already been made by the author in a letter signed "Ultor," addressed to the editor of the "Friend of India," in March, 1849, with a view

Runjeet Sing in his later years felt that more than one of his servants had grown too strong for the interests of the throne; but he wisely forebore to show distrust when it was too late.

The Jummoo Rajahs, and Dewan Sawun Mull, are the most conspicuous instances; and Runjeet was once drawn aside from his general policy to try the dangerous game of making one destroy the other. Great enmity existed between the Governor of Mooltan and the Prime Minister of Lahore; and after many fruitless attempts Rajah Dhyan Sing induced his master to take the governorship away from Sawun Mull, and confer it on Rajah Goolab Sing.

Goolab set off with his own personal troops to take command; and I believe had actually reached the Mooltan frontier, and found the forts prepared for resistance, when the news of Sirdar Hurree Sing's death at Peshawur reached the Maharajuh, and sank all inferior matters in the paramount necessity of resisting the Afghans. Goolab Sing was hastily recalled to join the royal army with his men; and the hint given by Sawun Mull of the reception he had prepared, was prudently taken by Runjeet, who resisted every future proposal to remove a Governor against whom there was in reality no one ground of complaint.

But Sawun Mull's great advantage was gained after Runjeet's death. Kurruk Sing, the Idiot, sat on the

of vindicating the memory of Agnew and Anderson, and showing how little their murderer deserved compassion in his downfall.

throne, but Nao Nihal Sing his precocious son, was King of the Punjab.

Rajah Dhyan Sing returned to the charge against his ancient enemy, and insinuated to the Prince that he dared not call Sawun Mull to Lahore, as he knew that that Governor would not come. Nao Nihal's pride was nettled, and with the levity of a boy he made a heavy bet with his Prime Minister that he would both summon Sawun Mull, and Sawun Mull should come. Now, thought Dhyan Sing, I have set them by the ears! But Sawun Mull's good sense, and the Prince's impetuosity, extricated them even from this dilemma. The Prince wrote a friendly note to the Governor of Mooltan, and frankly told him the whole matter; adding. "Come along quickly, and I will give you anything you choose to ask afterwards!" Sawun Mull never more showed his wisdom than in trusting on this occasion. He went; the Prince won his bet; and the Minister lost all he played for. "And now," said Sawun Mull to the Prince, "you promised to grant me a favour! I have nothing to ask for myself; for by your kindness I have wealth and honour. But I am not blind, and I see that evil days are coming on the country of my lamented master. These Jummoo Rajahs are at heart faithless to their salt, and are aiming at the throne. If you are wise, you will prepare for the struggle. Cultivate a party faithful to your interests; and secure strongholds that shall be loyal to your cause. For instance, there is Mooltan; a place of great name and natural strength, but out of repair, and unable to resist a siege. Give me but the order, and I will so fortify it that if all the Punjab desert you, you will have a rallying-point with me!"

The Prince fell into the snare, and Sawun Mull returned to Mooltan with full authority to spend the revenues of his province in strengthening his fort. He set to work with energy, summoned every mason and carpenter in the province to assist, and in two years dug and faced with masonry an enormous ditch, threw up a glacis, threw out a *Fausse-Braye*, improved every point of the fortifications, and, in short, made the fort of Mooltan what General Whish's army found it in 1848.

Having done this, he felt that he was secure of independence; for there was no army in the Punjab that could turn him out, and he had only to wait patiently till the Lahore Government, which already showed signs of dissolution, should fall to pieces.

In case of a collision between the Sikhs and the British, Sawun Mull was prepared to secure Mooltan for himself, by assisting in the conquest of the Punjab; and I have heard, though I know not now on what authority, that both he and his son Moolraj, once at least in their respective administrations, proffered tributary allegiance to the lords of Hindoostan, on condition of a recognised independence.

It is highly essential to keep these designs of Sawun Mull's family in view, and to remember that Dewan Moolraj was thus reared up amid dreams of a future sovereignty.

On the death of Dewan Sawun Mull, his eldest son, Dewan Moolraj, was confirmed in the government of Mooltan on the same terms as his father, and divided

with his brothers the enormous sum of ninety lakhs of rupees (£900,000), amassed by the old Dewan during twenty-three years of unmolested government.

Well might Mr. John Lawrence exclaim, in considering this fact: "What a picture it portrays of native government!"*

The condition on which Moolraj had been confirmed in his father's place was the payment of a nuzzeranuh, or fee on succession, of thirty lakhs of rupees; and Mr. John Lawrence remarks† that this would have been paid had Pundit Julla and Rajah Heera Sing, the existing Ministers at Lahore, lived to carry on the Government; "but on their death everything fell into confusion."

"Early in 1846, it seemed that Rajah Lal Sing (the new Minister), designed to remove the Dewan from his charge. There had been a personal quarrel between them for some years, and now on the treaty of Lahore being executed, Rajah Lal Sing became Prime Minister of the Punjab, and a force was sent against Moolraj to secure the demand of fine on succession to Sawun Mull, as well as to realize a portion of the current revenue. An encounter took place near Jhung; Rajah Lal Sing's troops were defeated. The agent to the Governor-General at Lahore interfered to mediate between the two parties. After much delay and trouble, it was finally arranged that Moolraj should give up the district of Jhung, being nearly one-third of the province heretofore held by him; that he should

*See "Blue Book, 1847—9," p. 88.

†"Ibid."

pay twenty lakhs on account of fine on succession, and for arrears; and that the revenue of the districts still left under the charge of the Dewan, should be raised in amount by more than one-third. The new engagement was in fact a farm of the province for three years, commencing in 1904, Sumbat, corresponding with the autumn crop of 1847, A.D. Dewan Moolraj expressed himself to the British agent as extremely pleased at this arrangement, as, though the payment fixed was heavy, it secured to him, by the aid of the English, his life and office out of the hands of his merciless enemy."*

Thus we see the son of Sawun Mull in his very first year of government resisting the throne, and defeating the royal troops. What a singular reflection it is now, that had not the British at that juncture interfered, Moolraj might have effected his independence.

By the arrangement above concluded, Moolraj's payments for the two-thirds of his father's old province that were left with him were raised from one million five hundred and forty-seven thousand one hundred and eighty-three rupees to one million nine hundred and sixty-eight thousand;† and up to the time of his rebellion, we learn from Mr. John Lawrence, that he "faithfully fulfilled his pecuniary engagements, but rendered himself obnoxious for neglect, in not attending to the requisitions of the Resident when called on by him to redress the complaints of his people. In fact, Dewan Moolraj is a ruler of the old

*Grounds of the Court's judgment in convicting Dewan Moolraj of murder.

†See "Blue Book," p. 88.

school, and so long as he paid his revenue, he considered the province as his own to make the most of. He proved himself to be grasping and avaricious, with none of the statesmanlike views of his father, and few of his conciliatory qualities. The traders and agriculturists of the province had long been complaining of his exactions."*

This I now know to be a correct description of Moolraj's administration; but before the war took me into his country, where I could make inquiries, I heard the laws of the Mooltan province so universally spoken of with respect in other parts of the Punjab, that I fell into the natural error of fancying that Moolraj had inherited his father's virtues. The real fact was, that the general system established by Sawun Mull survived after a fashion under Moolraj; and the system, not the Governor, was praised. Moolraj, however, had already made such inroads into his father's institutions, that had peace continued, his true character as a ruler must have soon become matter of notoriety. To the people of Mooltan it was already sufficiently known before his father's death, as the following anecdote will show.

The old Dewan, to relieve himself of some of the cares of government, and accustom his sons to business, put the province of Jhung (then included in Mooltan) under charge of Moolraj; and Leia under his second son Kurrum Nurayun; he himself remaining in Mooltan.

Kurrum Nurayun was much liked in Leia, and Sawun Mull's popularity in Mooltan is proverbial; but

*See "Blue Book," p. 88.

Moolraj gave such general dissatisfaction, that the zumeendars of Jhung at last told the old Dewan that he had kept *Sawun* (or the rains) for his capital; bestowed his *Kurrum* (or kindness) on the men of Leia; and cursed Jhung with the *Moolla* (an insect which eats the roots of the corn.) The name stuck to him; and to this day he is as often called Moolla as Moolraj.

We come now to the reasons which induced Moolraj to resign the government of the province, which he had so long regarded as an embryo kingdom. For it is important to remember that there was no attempt to take it away from him; he was not even asked to resign it, but pressed unsuccessfully by two Residents to retain it; and Mr. Agnew at length went down at his urgent request to relieve him of the charge.

On June the 12th, being the tenth day of Dewan Moolraj's trial, Mr. John Lawrence was sworn, and examined. The following is part of his evidence:

"In November, 1847, on hearing that Colonel Lawrence was about to leave the Punjab, Moolraj wrote up, and asked for leave to come to Lahore to bid him good-bye, which was granted; but the Dewan arrived too late. I received him, and expressed my regret that he had not seen the Resident before his departure. He replied, that his business could be transacted very well with me. A day or two afterwards he paid me a visit, and explained *his desire to resign the charge of the Mooltan province, which I told him not to do in a hurry*, but consult the Durbar, and his friend Deena Nath. Some days afterwards, Deena Nath read out in Durbar Moolraj's resignation,

which I refused, as the conditions would have involved us in a long revenue account, and eventual loss. I explained that *I did not wish Moolraj to resign*, but that if he really desired it he might do so, provided that it was not in the middle of a harvest. To this the Durbar all agreed, and seemed to think that his proposal was not sincere. Some days afterwards Moolraj again came to me, and *again tendered his resignation*. He gave two reasons for doing so:—1st. That the new Custom arrangements in the Punjab (which however did not include Mooltan) had an injurious effect on his revenue; for his people did not like to pay any longer those dues which had been abolished everywhere else. To this I replied, 'Then introduce our system; you will be no loser!' But Moolraj did not like to try the experiment. 2ndly. *He seemed to think that his power of coercing the people was insufficient now-a-days, in consequence of their having now got an appeal at Lahore*. Of the two grievances this last was the greatest, for Moolraj distinctly said, that he would wave the former about the Customs, if I would promise not to listen to complaints from Mooltan. To this I would not consent; saying that I did not wish to interfere with his jurisdiction in petty matters; but that no authority could be permitted to exist in the Punjab independent of appeal, and unaccountable to the law. The fact is, that at that time, there were several complaints against him, the decisions in two of which happened to be against him, and he was much annoyed. One was a case in which he had imprisoned a number of bankers in Mooltan. It had been originally investigated by either Lieutenant Nicholson or Mr. Bowring, whose exact decision I do not remember, but the plaintiffs were not satisfied, and carried their complaint

to the Governor-General, who directed a fresh inquiry. The dispute involved the inspection and scrutiny of a mass of accounts and ledgers, and I therefore referred it for settlement to a punchayet of Lahore bankers, mutually agreed to by the parties. The committee carried on their investigation in my presence, and came to an unanimous decision against Moolraj. By this verdict, Moolraj lost some five lakhs of rupees, and was obliged to release the prisoners. The other case was one of some Muhommudan soldiers who claimed arrears of pay; and this also went against him. In short, Moolraj felt that he could no longer do as he pleased; and that when he punished he must be prepared to show cause for doing so. *The Dewan had never been really independent.* His strength or weakness, like that of all Nazims, was in an inverse ratio with that of the Crown. When the Government was strong, he was weak; when they were weak, he was strong. *Under Runjeet Sing, all Nazims were accountable for their acts.* To return: the result of the Dewan's discussion with me was, that *he seemed determined to resign. I tried much to dissuade him, but he was resolute.* He then required two promises from me, one of which I granted, the other refused. He wished me to guarantee him a jageer on resignation of Mooltan, which I could not do; but said I doubted not it would meet with favourable consideration, as all the servants of the Government, who had behaved well, had been rewarded. The fact was, that Colonel Lawrence, before going away, had remarked to me, that if ever Moolraj left Mooltan, he would be a good man to put into the Lahore Council, in which position he would of course get a jageer. But I did not tell him this, as it was a matter on which Government would have to be consulted, and

which might not after all be approved. Besides, it would depend altogether on the way in which Moolraj made over the country. However, Moolraj was well aware that I was personally well-disposed to him, and he went away quite satisfied."

Thus much as to Moolraj's resignation of Mooltan being voluntary and reiterated on his part, and quite contrary to the wishes of the British authorities. Now let us learn further from Mr. John Lawrence how Moolraj wished, and Mr. Lawrence agreed, that the Dewan should be relieved from his office.

"His other request was *that I would keep his resignation a profound secret, especially from the Durbar, which I consented to*, with the reservation that I should inform my own Government and the political officers under me. He asked me for a writing to the above effect, which I gave. The understanding was that he was to account for the revenue to the end of April, and the Durbar take charge from that time; *my proposal was that two or three months before his resignation, two British officers should go down to Mooltan, whom he should gradually initiate into the state of the country, and ultimately instal in charge. He was satisfied with this arrangement, and on my objecting, that perhaps it would discover his intention to resign, he replied that he thought not, as the Resident's assistants were in the habit of visiting all parts of the country to make settlements*; for instance, Mr. Cocks was at that moment settling Jhung close to Mooltan, and it would be thought by the public that a similar settlement was contemplated in Mooltan. *He explained that his reason for secrecy was his wish to prevent any disturbance amongst*

his own people, and quietly get away. All these circumstances were reported by me to Government, and I requested instructions; in reply to which I was told to take no further steps in the matter, but leave it to Sir Frederick Currie.

"*Q.* Can you state why the course of secrecy recommended by Moolraj was not followed?

"*A.* Sir Frederick Currie's arrival was delayed till the 6th of March, and in the interval Moolraj's proposed resignation got abroad. As soon as it was finally settled that Sir F. Currie was to come to Lahore, *I wrote to Moolraj that if he repented his resignation, he had now an opportunity of withdrawing it.* He replied, that *he had not changed his mind.* I wrote and told Sir F. Currie all that was going on at Lahore, and particularly about Moolraj's resignation, which seemed to me the most pressing matter. When Sir F. Currie arrived, he at once entered upon this affair, and proposed consulting the Durbar, to which I objected, on the score of the promise of secrecy; but Sir Frederick replied, that it was no longer a secret, as he had heard it at Agra. I urged Moolraj's particular request that the Durbar might not be told; and pointed out that there was a difference between the publicity of a rumour, and that of an authorized announcement. The Resident was, however, of opinion, that the Durbar ought to be consulted; and that doing so on a matter so generally bruited abroad could do no harm. *He was nevertheless averse to Moolraj's resignation and wrote down to Mooltan to give the Dewan the option of yet remaining.* He also sent for his vakeel, and asked him, what his master's wishes were? The latter replied, that he did not know. *Moolraj answered Sir F. Currie's letter by*

express, that he wished to resign, and his answer was read out before the members of Council and myself."

We see then that the particular mode of being relieved, on which Moolraj had laid such stress with Mr. John Lawrence, was set aside by Sir Frederick Currie, who however, in doing so, gave Moolraj the option of retracting. When, therefore, Moolraj again persisted in his resignation, notwithstanding the public manner in which Sir Frederick carried on the discussion, it must, in fairness to Sir F. Currie, be allowed that Moolraj entirely waved that condition, and made his resignation absolute under any circumstances. Nor does he seem to have had at this time any of his former apprehensions that the soldiery at Mooltan would oppose his leaving; or at least if he had, he was quite indifferent as to the result. He either thought the garrison would acquiesce, or cared not if they resisted and maintained him. It is not improbable that, like a weak swimmer, he threw himself on his back, and determined to let the stream of fate decide his course.

In the remaining portion of Mr. Lawrence's evidence we have the best opinion that can be obtained that Moolraj's wishes had not changed when Mr. Agnew arrived at Mooltan; and that though some of the arrangements and preliminaries for the transfer of the province may possibly have been displeasing to Moolraj, yet they afforded no just grounds for altering his plans.

"*Q.* Have you any reason for supposing that, previous to Mr. Agnew's arrival at Mooltan, the Dewan's feelings had undergone any change as to the resignation?

"*A. As far as I know, none*; but I do not know what happened while that gentleman was on the road. *I never heard of any circumstances which could have induced Moolraj to change his mind.* He was very wealthy. In one of our interviews, I remember his dwelling on the dissensions of his own family; and, baring his arm (which was very thin), he asked me if that was the arm wherewith to control a province?

"*Q.* Can you speak as to Moolraj's disposition being humane or otherwise?

"*A.* I do not think him a cruel man. He was a popular Governor, perhaps the most so in the Punjab, with the exception of Lena Sing Mejeeteea.

"*Q.* Can you give the Court any information on the subject of the demand for accounts made from Moolraj at the time of his resignation?

"*A.* Yes, I recollect telling him that to settle the revenue we should require the accounts of some previous years; and though I do not remember his precise answer, he certainly consented. This indeed was one of the conditions the fulfilment of which would entitle him to a jageer; and I purposely mentioned it to Moolraj, because I was aware that rendering accounts is a thing to which all natives have the greatest objection, while demanding them is both just and expedient.

"*Q.* Did you, in your conversation with Moolraj, intend to convey to him the impression that no pecuniary demand would be made on him by the Lahore Government on account of the Mooltan revenues for the time which he

farmed them, previous to the Hindoo year 1904, or during his father's time?

"*A*. Our conversation was only a general one, and I forget whether this point was particularly discussed; but I believe that Moolraj quite understood such to be the case, and that when he paid up the nuzzerana in 1846, it was considered to be in full of all claims.

"*Q*. In your opinion, could any remarks of Mr. Agnew's about giving up detailed accounts, have caused Moolraj to suppose that he could be made to refund any sum of money; or would the remarks affect him as disclosing what he wished to conceal, or otherwise cause annoyance?

"*A*. I do not think that any remarks of Mr. Agnew (who was a very straightforward and honest-minded man) were likely to lead Moolraj to suspect any other object than that which Mr. Agnew expressed; but, on the other hand, it is possible that the way in which the accounts were asked for may have annoyed Moolraj. It is possible also, that the people about either Mr. Agnew or Khan Sing may have alarmed Moolraj, or affronted him, with a view to extort money.

"*Q*. by Prosecutor. Was there any difference between the arrangements you proposed for relieving Moolraj, and those made by Sir Frederick Currie?

"*A*. Yes; an essential one. I selected Mr. Cocks and Mr. Agnew. Sir Frederick Currie required Mr. Cocks' serving at Lahore, and sent Mr. Agnew as principal, with Mr. Anderson as his assistant. Again, I would not have sent any Nazim. Whoever I sent should have been

subordinate to the British officers, the latter being the responsible rulers. Sir Frederick Currie thought that the Nazim should be the representative of the Durbar, and that he should have had full authority, though not independent of the British officers.

"*Q.* by Prosecutor. Did you inform Moolraj of the arrangements you proposed to make regarding the management of the country?

"*A.* Yes, generally; I mentioned two British officers, and I believe by name.

"*Q.* by Prosecutor. Was Moolraj informed that a Nazim would be sent to relieve him?

"*A.* I am not certain that the Durbar wrote this; but if they did not, Deena Nath would have done so, as would his own vakeel.

"*Q.* by Prosecutor. In your opinion, did the appointment of Sirdar Khan Sing as Nazim, in any way affect Moolraj's desire to resign his charge?

"*A.* I do not think it ought to have done so. It might have had that effect; but it did not strike me at the time, or I would have certainly pointed it out.

"*Q.* (by prisoner's counsel.) Can you mention in what part of the country is the mass of Moolraj's property?

"*A.* No, I cannot.

"*Q.* Do you know what number of troops accompanied Mr. Agnew to Mooltan?

"*A*. Yes, I do: there was the Goorkha regiment (upwards of six hundred), a troop of horse artillery, and five or six hundred cavalry, regular and irregular.

"*Q*. Was it intended that these troops should relieve Moolraj's?

"*A*. The chief object was their forming an escort, but ultimately they were to have supplied the place of a portion of the Mooltan troops, some of which were to come to Lahore, some to remain, some to be reduced.

"*Q*. Can you state to what extent reduction was to be made?

"*A*. Not positively. It depended on the report of the British officers after their arrival.

"*Q*. Can you mention the description of troops proposed to be reduced?

"*A*. New levies, garrisons of forts, &c., would have suffered most.

"*Q*. Do you know the number of troops in the province and city of Mooltan at the time of the outbreak?

"*A*. I could not make an estimate; Moolraj said he had twelve thousand men during the Sutlej campaign, which he reduced afterwards to six thousand. I know that after he left Lahore, in the end of 1847, he made still further reductions, for I heard complaints. A portion of his men must have been at Leia and other outposts. On the whole, therefore, I do not think he had more than

two thousand at Mooltan. Natives said less. Still we must bear in mind that large bodies of men can be collected in a short time."

I shall now briefly conclude this sad narrative in the way that I understand it myself, after all that I have heard or seen.

The British officers selected by Sir Frederick Currie to accompany the new Nazim to Mooltan were Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew, of the Civil Service, and Lieutenant W. A. Anderson, of the 1st Bombay European Fusiliers. The former is described by Sir Frederick as "the oldest political officer on this frontier, and a man of much ability, energy, and judgment, with considerable experience in administrative duties;" and the latter as "an excellent Oriental scholar, who was for some time deputy-collector in Sindh, under Sir Charles Napier, and has travelled through the whole of the Mooltan districts."*

They were both therefore men of experience; and Mr. Agnew, who was charged with the principal duties, had been many years not only in political, but civil employ, and was remarkable for carrying his kindness to natives almost to excess. They returned his attachment as natives generally do, and it would be difficult to say whether poor Agnew was morepop ular with them or with his own countrymen. I knew him well, and believe that he was capable of doing anything that was noble or generous, but quite incapable of a harsh or unkind act. Lieutenant Anderson I never saw, but have heard him described asan officer of

*See "Blue Book," p. 130.

unusual acquirements, and of peculiarly conciliating manners.

It must ever remain a subject of regret that two men so formed to "win golden opinions from all kinds of men," did not adopt the course best suited to attach their escort. Instead of accompanying the troops from Lahore to Mooltan, mixing with them on the march, and letting them share in their field sports, they were induced by the heat of the season to take the easiest route by water, while the escort went by land. Even Sirdar Khan Sing, the new Nazim, did not accompany the troops. This was a great error, but it is easier to look back than to look forward. The result was, that on the 18th of April the two parties, the troops, and their commanders met each other for the first time before Mooltan, and encamped in the Eedgah, a spacious Muhommudan building, within cannon-shot of the north face of the fort, and about a mile from Moolraj's own residence, a garden-house outside the fort, called the Am Khas.

The Sikh escort consisted of about fourteen hundred men: the Goorkha regiment of infantry (six hundred strong), seven hundred cavalry, and one hundred artillerymen, with six guns.

Moolraj paid two visits to the Eedgah, one of ceremony, and the other of business, in the course of the 18th; and at the latter it was arranged that the Dewan should make over the fort to the new Governor next morning.

It appears from the various accounts of this interview, that amongst other topics connected with the change of

government that of accounts was introduced; and it has been thought by some that the Dewan was alarmed by an unexpected demand for papers. But this is groundless; and was so deemed by the judges on Moolraj's trial. The papers Mr. Agnew asked for were the records of Moolraj's revenue receipts from the different parts of the province for some years past, so as to guide Mr. Agnew in assessing those districts for the future.

It was a matter of no consequence whether those papers showed that Moolraj and his father had made a very good thing of their lease; forthe lease was now thrown up. Had Moolraj been negotiating a renewal of the lease, and Mr. Agnew had demanded as a preliminary to know what the province really produced, Moolraj might have demurred but as it was, there was no reason for withholding the papers. Moolraj could not possibly suppose that all the bygone nett profits of his farm were to be demanded of him. Such a proceeding would have been unheard of either under British or Sikh rule. While, therefore, it must be admitted that, as a matter of taste and time, Mr. Agnew's asking for the papers was unseasonable, and might have better been deferred till the great matter in hand—the transfer of the fort—had been accomplished; yet I am decidedly of opinion that it had not the remotest connection with the events of the next day.

Into the clear hearts and open acts of the British officers you may look for ever, and find no cause for the rebellion. Whatever that cause was, it must be sought in the hearts and acts of Dewan Moolraj and his soldiers.

Let us then first trace the events themselves, and then endeavour to understand them.

Early on the morning of the 19th of April, the two British officers and Sirdar Khan Sing accompanied Moolraj into the fort of Mooltan; were shown all over it; received the keys; installed two companies of their own Goorkha infantry in possession; planted their own sentries;* mustered the Dewan's garrison, who seemed angry at the prospect of being thrown out of employment; allayed their fears with promises of service; and prepared to return home.

There seems to have been a surly fellow of a warden at the fort-gate, who would neither let the strangers go in or out, without the express orders of his own master; and who even told Mr. Agnew very plainly that he had better not turn him off. On this Mr. Vans Agnew laughingly said: "Don't fear; the Dewan's servants shall be as mine, and mine as his."† The bearing of the whole garrison during Mr. Agnew's inspection, was indeed much of the same kind; and if ever clouds foretold a thunderstorm, the fate of the British officers was assuredly foreshadowed in the dark looks and angry mutterings of Moolraj's soldiers. They needed but a word, a nod, from the master they were losing, to break out, and fall upon the intruders.

*As a military lesson, the Author ventures to suggest that Mr. Agnew, in prudence, should not have proceeded to occupy the fort until Moolraj's garrison, with the exception of sentries, had been withdrawn from it. He went to receive it, not take it, from Moolraj, and the whole onus of its peaceable delivery rested on the Dewan. Although discontented, Moolraj's troops did not mutiny till a collision had taken place, and they would probably have marched out of the fort at their master's bidding. When they had withdrawn, and been encamped at a suitable distance, it would then have been time enough for the new troops to take possession. It is very strange that this did not occur to either Agnew, Anderson, Khan Sing, or Moolraj, but especially to the latter, who knew exactly the critical temper of his men. But Moolraj himself *invited* the occupation! There are things in this rebellion hard to be understood.

†See "Blue Book," p. 134.

I am willing thus far as to believe that Moolraj never gave that signal; and that the whole train was fired by an accidental spark, though there are great difficulties in the belief.

The cavalcade passed forth, and entered upon the bridge over the ditch. Two soldiers of Moolraj's were standing on the bridge. One of them, named Umeer Chund, gazed for a moment at the two unarmed Englishmen, who presumed to ride in and out of a great fortress Sawun Mull had made so strong; and brooding, perchance, over his own long services and probable dismissal, impatiently struck the nearest with his spear, and knocked him off his horse. Agnew, who was ignorant of fear, jumped up, and struck his assailant with the riding-stick in his hand. The ruffian threw away his spear, and rushing in with his sword, inflicted two severer wounds. He would probably have killed Mr. Agnew on the spot, had he not been knocked into a ditch by a horseman of the escort.

The scuffle was now known; the crowd pressed round to see what was the matter; news was carried back into the fort that swords were out and going on the bridge; an uproar rose within, and in another moment the whole garrison would come pouring forth. Moolraj made no attempt to stem the tide, and rescue the Englishman who had come down, at his invitation, to Mooltan.* He

*It is only fair, however, to mention that one of Moolraj's chief officers, whose trial succeeded that of his master, assured me that the Dewan recognised Umeer Chund as a soldier under the command of Bhugwan Das, and hurriedly told the latter officer, who rode behind him, to bring Umeer Chund before him at the Am Khas. This, however, never appeared in the trial, when heaven and earth, and even Moolraj's features, were ransacked for evidences of his innocence.

either thought only of himself, or was not sorry for the outbreak; and forcing his horse through the crowd, rode off to his garden-house at the Am Khas. Nor was this all: his own personal sowars turned back half-way, and pursued Lieutenant Anderson, who had as yet escaped. Who can tell now who ordered them? Whether Moolraj had left the fort an innocent but timid man, but had already, in the short space between his fortress and his house, felt that the die was cast—that none would believe him guiltless—that heaven itself seemed to rebuke him for abandoning his dead father's dreams of independence, and there was nothing now for it but to go on, complete the treachery, slay the other Englishman, and plunge into rebellion?—or whether, as their coward master fled along the road to the Am Khas, the horsemen laughing hellishly at the mischief now a-foot, determined to commit Moolraj still further, and so of their own will rode back?

What moved them we can never know; but we know the fact that they sought out Anderson, attacked, and cut him down with swords; so that he fell for dead upon the ground, where he was found afterwards by some of his own Goorkha soldiers, who put him on a litter, and carried him to the Eedgah.*

Meanwhile Sirdar Khan Sing, protected by the presence and assistance of Moolraj's brother-in-law, Rung Ram, whose honest *deeds* are the only witnesses worth a straw of the Dewan's good *intentions*, had extricated Mr. Agnew from the mob, lifted him on to his own elephant,

*This point was not cleared up on Moolraj's trial, but was distinctly deposed on the trial of Goodhur Sing, Mr. Agnew's murderer.

and hurried away towards camp, rudely binding up Mr. Agnew's wounds as they rode along. Their road lay properly by one end of Moolraj's garden, the Am Khas; but as soon as they emerged from the suburbs, between the fort and garden, a discharge of matchlocks from the latter warned them to come no closer; guns too were being dragged out of the garden-gate; so they turned their elephant aside, and took another path; and as they went, a cannon-shot from the guns behind them hissed over their heads. *Moolraj, who had gallopped on before, was in the garden at the time*! If he did not order the soldiers who lived in the Am Khas to fire upon the English officers, how came they to do so?—for they had not been in the fort, and knew nothing of the affray until the Dewan came home.

Somehow or other, there seems to have been a general readiness for a row among Moolraj's soldiers wherever stationed, and active hostilities wherever Moolraj appeared; and yet Moolraj would have us think him innocent. Unhappy "victim of circumstances!" he goes about with the best intentions, and is followed by the most bloody and tragical results.

At last the two wounded Englishmen were brought back to the Eedgah. A sad meeting for them, who had gone forth in the morning full of life, and health, and zeal, to do their duty. The native doctor of the Goorkha regiment dressed their wounds. This done, Mr. Agnew proceeded to report these occurrences to the Resident at Lahore, and then addressed a letter to Dewan Moolraj, expressing a generous disbelief in the Dewan's participation, but calling on him to justify this opinion by seizing the guilty parties, and coming himself to the Eedgah. This

was at eleven A.M. At two P.M. Mr. Agnew wrote off to General Cortlandt and myself for assistance. At four P.M. one of the Dewan's chief officers, Raezaduh Toolsee Das, brought an answer from Moolraj, briefly stating "that he could neither give up the guilty nor come himself; that he and Rung Ram had already tried to do so, been stopped by the soldiers, and Rung Ram severely wounded for advising the visit; that all the garrison, Hindoo and Muhommudan, were in rebellion, and the British officers had better see to their own safety."

Mr. Agnew seems to have behaved with consummate calmness and heroism at this trying moment. He pointed out to Toolsee Das how grave a matter was in hand, and how absolutely indispensable it was for Dewan Moolraj to call on him, if he wished to be thought innocent. Toolsee Das returned with the admonition, but Moolraj never came. Why should he? The ambassador found the master, who had sent him on a message of peace, now presiding in a war council of his chiefs. The Puthans of the garrison were setting their seals to an oath of allegiance in the Koran; the Hindoos in the Shastras, the Sikhs in the Holy Grunth. The Sikhs were fastening a war-bracelet on the wrist of Moolraj himself!

Whatever may have been Moolraj's previous innocence; whatever his disinclination to rebel, after having voluntarily tendered his resignation; whatever doubts and misgivings may have assailed his mind after the first outbreak, as duty and ambition, fear and hope, alternately were put before him by his good and evil counsellors; these lingerings of conscience were now over. In the space between the going and coming of Toolsee Das,

Moolraj's mind had been made up; he would rebel. From this time forth we have no more weakness or hesitation; no going one step forward and two back. With the scarlet bracelet, Moolraj put on some valuable qualities, and set about rebellion with a determination which might have saved him from rebelling. Let us now see how he went through with it.

On the evening and night of the 19th of April, the whole of the carriage cattle of the officers and their escort, which were out at graze, were carried off; camels, bullocks, elephants, every beast of burden. Thus was flight cut off.

It was necessary for the little camp at the Eedgah to race the stern emergency, and prepare for open hostility on the morrow. That night, under Mr. Agnew's personal direction, the six guns which had come from Lahore were mounted in three batteries; and all the soldiers and camp-followers of that luckless expedition were called inside the walls.

Morning broke and Mr. Agnew made one last effort to avert the coming tragedy. Having failed with Moolraj, he now forwarded to Moolraj's officers and chiefs the purwannas of the Maharajuh, ordering them to make over the fort to Sirdar Khan Sing, and obey all Mr. Agnew's orders.

The messengers found Moolraj again in council with his chiefs, preparing proclamations to the people of the province to rise and join in the rebellion. They had just agreed, too, to remove their wives and families into the fort before opening the guns. The messengers

presented the Maharajuh's letters. The chiefs and officers replied that Moolraj was their master, and they would only obey him. The messengers returned, and extinguished hope. Mr. Agnew wrote off to Peer Ibraheem Khan, the British Native Agent at Bhawulpoor, to bring troops to his assistance, intending to hold out in the Eedgah till this reinforcement could arrive.

All disguise was now thrown aside. The guns of the fort opened on the Eedgah, as did also the guns at the Am Khas which were dragged on to a high mound hard by. One round alone was fired in return from the six guns in the Eedgah, after which the Lahore artillerymen refused to serve the guns. The fire of the rebels never slacked.

And now arrived an embassy from Moolraj in return for Mr. Agnew's. Moolraj invited the escort to desert the British officers, and promised to raise the pay of every soldier who came over. One Goolab Sing, Commandant of the Ghorchurruhs of the escort, led the way, and went over to Moolraj, who tricked the traitor out with gold necklaces and bracelets, and sent him back as a decoy. In vain Mr. Agnew bestowed money on the troops to hold out for three days only. It was honest money. The troops went over,—horse, foot, artillery—all had deserted by the evening, except Sirdar Khan Sing, some eight or ten faithful horsemen, the domestic servants of the British officers, and the moonshees of their office.

Beneath the lofty centre dome of that empty hall (so strong and formidable that a very few stout hearts could have defended it), stood this miserable group around the beds of the two wounded Englishmen. All hope of resistance

being at an end, Mr. Agnew had sent a party to Moolraj to sue for peace. A conference ensued, and, "in the end," say the Dewan's judges, "it was agreed that the officers were to quit the country, and that the attack upon them was to cease." Too late! The sun had gone down; twilight was closing in; and the rebel army had not tasted blood. An indistinct and distant murmur reached the ears of the few remaining inmates of the Eedgah, who were listening for their fate. Louder and louder it grew, until it became a cry—the cry of a multitude for blood! On they came, from city, suburbs, fort; soldiers with their arms, citizens, young and old, and of all trades and callings, with any weapon they could snatch.

A company of Moolraj's Muzubees, or outcasts turned Sikhs, led on the mob. It was an appalling sight; and Sirdar Khan Sing begged of Mr. Agnew to be allowed to wave a sheet, and sue for mercy. Weak in body from loss of blood, Agnew's heart failed him not. He replied: "The time for mercy is gone; let none be asked for. They can kill us two if they like; but we are not the last of the English; *thousands of Englishmen will come down here when we are gone, and annihilate Moolraj, and his soldiers, and his fort.*" The crowd now rushed in with horrible shouts, made Khan Sing prisoner, and pushing aside the servants with the butts of their muskets surrounded the two wounded officers. Lieutenant Anderson from the first had been too much wounded even to move; and now Mr. Agnew was sitting by his bedside, holding his hand, and talking in English. Doubtless they were bidding each other farewell for all time. Goodhur Sing, a Muzubee, so deformed and crippled with old wounds that he looked more like an imp than mortal man, stepped forth from the crowd with a drawn sword, and after insulting

Mr. Agnew with a few last indignities, struck him twice upon the neck, and with a third blow cut off his head. Some other wretch discharged a musket into the lifeless body. Then Anderson was hacked to death with swords; and afterwards the two bodies were dragged outside, and slashed and insulted by the crowd, then left all night under the sky.

Morning assembles the same crowd again, no longer furious but content. Where go they? To the Am Khas, "Moolraj's Palace," for he is now a king!

There sits the arch-rebel in High Durbar, taunting Sirdar Khan Sing, late his rival, now his prisoner. Goodhur Sing, the murderer, approaches, and presents a head—noble still in death. The crowd make way for him as for some good man, and call him the Second Prophet. Umeer Chund, who assaulted Agnew at the fort, is called the First. Moolraj rewards the Second Prophet with an elephant, some money, and the horse his victim rode; and long afterwards poor Agnew's servants, peeping from their hiding-places in the suburbs, could see their master's assassin capering through the streets on their master's well remembered horse.

The head is then thrown into the lap of Sirdar Khan Sing, who is told to "take the head of the youth he had brought down to govern at Mooltan." The Sirdar, thinking over many kindnesses and benefits he had received at the hands of Mr. Agnew, burst into tears. The head was immediately taken from him. It was not allowed to be wept over. Indignities followed, which it can serve no good purpose now to dwell on; for what I cannot myself write without indignation and horror, must needs be read by many with reviving pain. Suffice

it that as all things pall in this world, so at last Moolraj and the multitude outside grew weary of dishonouring the murdered Englishmen. Moolraj ordered them to be buried, and they were laid in a hasty grave among some tufts of grass by the Eedgah, where they were killed. But they could not rest even here. Twice they were torn up by the people of Mooltan to rob them of the clothes that wrapped them. A third time they were buried, and a sentry placed over the spot till they were forgotten.

Such, reader, was Dewan Moolraj's rebellion in its rise. Can any one pity such a rebel in his fall? Yes! I have been asked oftentimes in England, "What has become of *poor* Moolraj?" Seldom, very seldom, have I been asked "whether a monument had been erected over the graves of poor Agnew and Anderson?" Yet *they* fell doing England's work, and sustained England's honour in their deaths.

This is not well, dear countrymen. In healthy minds, the resistance offered by a malefactor to the officers of justice is neither the measure of his innocence nor his title to compassion. Mooltan defended against British armies is no oblation for the Eedgah polluted by British blood. Moolraj is not the less a murderer because he was one on a large scale; because he murdered with an army instead of a kitchen knife. Consider the tale again. Think better of it. Feel more justly. Discriminate between guilt and misfortune, vice and virtue, a just and an unjust cause. Then come with me, and let us grapple with this assassin of his invited guests; this traitor, who dethrones the dynasty under which his family rose from insignificance

to honour; this rebel, who, striking selfishly for his own independence, has rivetted the chains of his country.

to honour; this rebel, who, striking selfishly for his own independence, has riveted the chains of his country.

CHAPTER I

THE MESSENGER OF EVIL TIDINGS—MR. VANS AGNEW'S CALL FOR HELP—A PLAN FIXED AND AN ALLY CHOSEN—ACCOUNT OF FOUJDAR KHAN—LETTER TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE ANNOUNCING THESE EVENTS—REPLY TO MR. VANS AGNEW, PROMISING ASSISTANCE—THE AUTHOR JUSTIFIES HIS OWN INTERFERENCE—MARCH FROM DERA FUTTEH KHAN—PASSAGE OF THE INDUS—MELANCHOLY ACCIDENT—STORY OF THE MOOLTAN OUTBREAK—MARCH TO LEIA—IMPORTANCE OF THE CITY—NEWS OF THE DEATH OF THE BRITISH OFFICERS AT MOOLTAN—LETTER TO THE RESIDENT REPORTING THAT OCCURRENCE—ARRANGEMENTS FOR RECOVERING THE FRONTIER FROM THE REBELS—LETTER TO THE RESIDENT REPORTING PROGRESS OF BOTH SIDES—MOOLRAJ SENDS THE FIERY CROSS OVER THE INDUS, AND THE AUTHOR PREPARES FOR DEFENCE—TWO COMMUNICATIONS FROM MOOLTAN—LETTER TO THE RESIDENT CONCERNING THE REBEL MANIFESTO, AND THE FUTTEH PULTUN'S BOND OF FIDELITY—A SIKH SPY AND FRIENDLY WARNINGS OF SIKH TREACHERY—LETTER TO THE RESIDENT REPORTING THESE SUSPICIONS—TO THE SAME ON MOOLRAJ SENDING AN ARMY AGAINST THE AUTHOR—TO THE SAME REPORTING RETREAT OF THE AUTHOR BEFORE SUPERIOR FORCE—DIFFICULTY OF RECROSSING THE INDUS WITH UNFAITHFUL TROOPS—THE AUTHOR BOUGHT AND SOLD—SOME SIKH SOLDIERS PROPOSE TO MAKE A SIKH OF HIM—HOW THE PASSAGE WAS EFFECTED—SIGNAL GUNS FIRED AND ANSWERED BY BOTH FOES AND FRIENDS—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL CORTLANDT WITH REINFORCEMENTS.

CHAPTER I

It was towards evening of April 22nd, 1838, at Dera Futteh Khan, on the Indus, that I was sitting in a tent full of Beloochee zumeendars, who were either robbers, robbed, or witnesses to the robberies of their neighbours, taking evidence in the trial of Bhowanee Sing, recounted in the First Volume.

Loud footsteps, as of some one running, were heard without, came nearer as we all looked up and listened, and at last stopped before the door. There was a whispering, a scraping off of shoes, and brushing off of dust from the wearer's feet, and then the *purdah* (curtain) at the door was lifted, and a *kossid* (running messenger), stripped to the waist and streaming with heat, entered and presented a letter-bag, whose crimson hue proclaimed the urgency of its contents. "It was from the Sahib in Mooltan," he said, "to the Sahib in Bunnoo; but, as I was here, I might as well look at it."

I took it up, and read the Persian superscription on the bag: "To General Cortlandt, in Bunnoo, or wherever else he may be." It was apparently not for me, but it was for an officer under my orders, and the messenger said it was on important public service; I had, therefore, a right to open it if I thought it necessary. But there was

something in the kossid's manner which alike *compelled* me to open it, and forbade me either to question him before the crowd around me, or show any anxiety about it.

So I opened it as deliberately as I could, and found an English letter enclosed, directed to either General Cortlandt or myself. It was a copy taken by a native clerk of a public letter addressed to Sir Frederick Currie by Mr. P. Vans Agnew, one of his Assistants on duty at Mooltan, with a postscripts in pencil written by Mr. Agnew, and addressed to us.

The following is a copy, and appended is a faithful facsimile, which will be regarded with mournful interest, as the last tracings of a hand ever generous, ever brave, which held fast honour and public duty to the death:

"Mooltan, 19th April, 1848.

"My dear Sir Frederick,

"You will be sorry to hear that, as Anderson and I were coming out of the fort gate, after having received charge of the fort by Dewan Moolraj, we were attacked by a couple of soldiers, who, taking us unawares, succeeded in wounding us both pretty sharply.

"Anderson is worst off, poor fellow. He has a severe wound on the thigh, another on the shoulder,* one on the back of the neck, and one in the face.

*Written "shouldier" by the native, and corrected in pencil by Mr. Agnew.

FACSIMILE OF MR. VANS AGNEW'S APPEAL TO GENERAL CORTLANDT OR LIEUTENANT EDWARDES FOR ASSISTANCE

Mooltan 19 April 1848

My dear Sir Frederick

You will be sorry to hear that as Anderson and I were coming out of the Fort Gate after having received Charge of the Fort from Dewan Moolraj, we were attacked by a Couple of

all right

Yours in haste

19th

P. A. Vans Agnew

2. p. m

To Genl Cortlandt

or Lt Edwardes

Bunnoo.

N. B. FROM "MOOLTAN, 19TH APRIL 1848," DOWN TO "YOURS IN HASTE" IS A DUPLICATE OF MR. AGNEW'S OFFICIAL REPORT TO SIR FREDK CURRIE AT LAHORE; COPIED FOR THE INFORMATION OF GENL CORTLANDT, OR LIEUT EDWARDES. IT WAS WRITTEN EVIDENTLY BY AN IGNORANT NATIVE CLERK AND POOR AGNEW'S CORRECTIONS MAY STILL BE TRACED, WRITTEN WITH THE SAME PENCIL AS THE LETTER APPENDED BELOW.

H. W. E.

"I think it most necessary that a doctor should be sent down, though I hope not to need him myself.

"I have a smart gash in the left shoulder, and another in the same arm. The whole Mooltan* troops have mutinied,† but we hope to get them round. They have turned our two companies out of the fort.

"Yours, in haste,

(Signed) "P. A. VANS AGNEW."

POSTSCRIPT IN PENCIL

"My dear Sir,

"You have been ordered‡ to send one regiment here. Pray let it march instantly, or, if gone, hasten it to top-speed. If you can spare another, pray send it also. I am responsible for the measure. I am cut up a little, and on my back. Lieutenant Anderson is much worse. He has five sword wounds. I have two in my left arm from warding sabre cuts, and a poke in the ribs with a spear. I don't think Moolraj has anything to do with it.§ I was riding with him when we were attacked. He

*The word "Mooltan" is inserted in pencil by Mr. Agnew.

†Thus corrected in pencil by Mr. Agnew, the native having mistaken the original for "continued," and further on "round" for "bound".

‡By Sir F. Currie, before the mutiny; to form part of the garrison of Mooltan, after Dewan Moolraj's retirement.

§This generous sentence is a complete answer to those who have supposed that Mr. Agnew drove Moolraj into rebellion by the harshness of his behaviour. Had anything passed between them to cause irritation, or give reasonable offence, Mr. Agnew would surely be the first to have remembered it. Indeed, a reference to the

rode off, but is now said to be in the hands of the soldiery.

"Khan Singh and his people all right.

"Yours, in haste,

"P. A. VANS AGNEW.

"19th, two P.M.

"To General Cortlandt, or

"Lieutenant Edwardes,

"Bunnoo"

During the perusal of the above letter, I felt that all eyes were on me, for no one spoke, not a pen moved, and there was that kind of hush which comes over an assembly under some indefinite feeling of alarm. I never remember in my life being more moved, or feeling more painfully the necessity of betraying no emotion. After lingering over the last few sentences as long as I could, I looked up at the kossid, and said: "Very good! Sit down

trials which closed this causeless rebellion, will show that Mr. Agnew wrote to Moolraj himself, expressing a willingness to believe him innocent, if he would only prove it by coming to see him; otherwise he must consider him guilty. It is still further certain that Moolraj, by Rung Ram's advice, started to go to Mr. Agnew, which he would not have done had he had a quarrel with that lamented officer, and rebelled to avenge himself. In short, little doubt now remains that the first attack on Mr. Agnew was unauthorised, though done with the belief that it would be pleasing to Moolraj, and that Moolraj's guilt of Mr. Agnew's blood commenced subsequently to this letter of Mr. Agnew's, when stimulated by the warlike temper of his soldiers, he swore them to adhere to him if he rebelled, bound the bracelet of war upon his own arm, and ordered the fatal attack on the Eedgah. The Commissioners who tried Moolraj, took the very same view as Mr. Agnew, and acquitted the Dewan of the first assault upon the British officers, but found him guilty of their deaths.

in that corner of the tent, and I'll attend to you as soon as I have done this trial." Then turning to the gaping moonshees, I bade them "go on with the evidence," and the disappointed crowd once more bent their attention on the witnesses. But from that moment I heard no more. My eyes indeed were fixed mechanically upon the speakers, but my thoughts were at Mooltan, with my wounded countrymen, revolving how I ought to act to assist them.

In about an hour I had arranged the ways and means in my own mind, and that done, had no farther reason for concealment. I saw clearly what to do, and the sooner it was done the better.

So I broke up the court, and summoned an officer who was in charge of the ferry of the Indus between Dera Futteh Khan in my province, and Leia in Moolraj's; and filled up the interval till he came by cross-questioning the kossid as to what he had seen himself. His account of the events themselves amounted to much the same as Mr. Agnew had written; but being a native of Mooltan, and better acquainted with the temper of Moolraj, and his soldiery, he took a much less hopeful view of the position of the British officers, and believed that some guns, which he had heard since leaving Mooltan, announced the catastrophe which had in fact occurred.

Mooltan is about ninety miles (chiefly sand) from Dera Futteh Khan, and two broad rivers flow between them, yet the kossid had accomplished the distance in exactly three days, after making several circuits to avoid provincial officials of Moolraj.

By the time the kossid had told his story, the officer I had sent for was announced. His name was Faujdar Khan, Alizye; and as he took a distinguished part in the succeeding war, I claim the reader's attention to the singular chance which threw him in my way.

When Moolraj resigned the charge of the province of Mooltan, the collection of customs in his territory devolved upon Misr Sahib Dyal, who was the collector of the Lahore Government; and the Misr immediately wrote to his deputy at the Trans-Indus ferry of Kirree Kuheeree to send a detachment of horsemen, under a sharp officer, across the river to Leia, to relieve the retiring customs' officer of Dewan Moolraj.

The deputy at Kuheeree selected Foujdar Khan for the duty; and he had been some days at the town of Leia when I arrived first at Dera Futteh Khan. As I was the chief authority in the province to which he belonged, Foujdar came across to pay his respects, or "make his salam," as the natives say, and I detained him several days. During this period I had only two interviews with him; but in discussing the subject of customs on the Indus, he impressed me so much with his extensive local knowledge, practical common sense, and singular power of mental calculation, that I could not but mark him down in my memory as a man who might be wanted on an occasion.

The occasion had now come; and the first man I summoned to my side, on the receipt of Mr. Agnew's call for assistance, was Foujdar Khan. Simultaneous intelligence of the outbreak had reached Leia also; and it

is a singular coincidence that the letter which brought it to the Hakim or Governor of that town contained two orders: first, to seize all the boats at the Leia ferry, and prevent me from crossing the Indus; and secondly, to make Foujdar Khan (who was supposed to be still at Leia) a prisoner at all costs. Moolraj knew more of his ability at that time than I did; but both he and I became still better acquainted with it afterwards.

My first question to Foujdar was, how many boats he could obtain for me by midnight? He immediately told me off on his fingers every ferry-boat within twenty or thirty miles; and horsemen were dispatched in every direction to seize and bring them.

Meanwhile the whole camp was ordered to make instant preparations to cross the Indus; and I sent down to report my position to the Resident at Lahore in the following letter:

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Futteh Khan, Night,

"April 22nd, 1848.

"At three P.M. this day an express from Mooltan, directed to General Cortlandt, reached my camp. I opened it, providentially, to see if it was on public business which required attention, and found a letter, addressed to either General Cortlandt or myself, from Mr. Vans Agnew, communicating tidings of the dastardly assault made on that gentleman and Lieutenant Anderson at the gate of the

fort of Mooltan, on the 19th of April, particulars of which have ere this reached you.

"Mr. Agnew called on General Cortlandt for assistance; and my duty to render it was plain. I have accordingly resolved on making a forced march to Mooltan, which is about sixty koss from this, and hope by midnight sufficient boats will have been collected from the neighbouring ferries to allow the camp to cross the Indus.

"I have two guns, twenty zumbooruhs, twelve infantry companies, and about three hundred and fifty sowars; a small force, but quite strong enough to create a diversion in favour of our two countrymen, and whatever party the Maharajuh may still have in his city of Mooltan. I have written to Mr. Vans Agnew to fall back on me, if he is pressed, and rely on my speedy arrival. From the desert nature of the road, and the intense heat, I do not expect the men will be able to make Mooltan before the 27th of April; but every exertion shall be made.

"Looking to the possibility of the spirit displayed by Moolraj's soldiers being general in Mooltan, and consequent hostilities, I have written to Lieutenant Taylor, in Bunnoo, to put Soobhan Khan's Moossulman regiment (previously told off for Mooltan) and the four remaining guns of the Peshawur troop of horse artillery, to which the two guns I have with me belong, into boats at Esaukheyl, and thus pass them rapidly down the Indus to the Leia ferry, where the men and horses can disembark fresh, and push on to Mooltan.

"I feel sure that these measures will meet your approbation. I wound up the revenue settlement of this

district two days ago; and that of Dera Ishmael Khan is of very secondary importance to the duty of rescuing Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson from their perilous situation."*

To Mr. Vans Agnew I replied as follows:—

"Camp, Dera Futteh Khan,

"April 22nd, 1848.

"My dear Agnew,

"Your letter of 19th April, to General Cortlandt, reached my camp at three P.M. this day; and I fortunately opened it to see if it was on public business.

"I need scarcely say that I have made arrangements for marching to your assistance at once.

"I have one infantry regiment, and four extra companies; two horse artillery guns; twenty zumbooruhs; and between three and four hundred horse. This is a small force, but such as it is, you are welcome to it, and *me*.

"Your position is one of imminent peril; but God will bring an honest man out of worse straits; so trust in Him, and keep up your pluck.

"There are at this moment only three boats at the Ghat, and I have to collect others from the neighbouring ferries; but we shall manage, doubtless, to effect the passage

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847–49," p. 149.

in course of to-morrow, when the following route ought to bring us to Mooltan, on 27th:—

"23rd, left bank of Indus.

"24th, Leia.

"25th, Wells, half-way to Wander.

"26th, Wander.

"27th, Mooltan.

"Rely on it, it shall not be my fault if we are a day later; but the very sound of our approach will be a check to your rascally enemies, and to *you*, as refreshing as the breeze which heralds the rising sun at morning. If you are pressed, pray bring away Anderson, and join me. With all my heart I hope you are both safe at this moment!

"I have written on to Bunnoo for Soobhan Khan's regiment, and a troop of horse artillery.

"Write, write, write! and with the sincerest wishes believe me, in weal or woe.

"Yours, aye,

"HERBERT EDWARDES.

"For P. A. Vans Agnew, Esq., C. S.

"Mooltan."

Alas! this letter, written half jokingly to cheer up brave hearts in difficulty, was never destined to meet the eyes of either Agnew or Anderson. Those eyes were already closed; those hearts were still. The kossid who

took it, heard the tidings of their death upon the road, and brought it back. I keep it still among other sad memorials of those days.

To Lieutenant Taylor, who was with General Cortlandt in Bunnoo, I wrote the pith of the above two letters, and begged him to send a regiment of infantry and four guns, "sharp;" but on no account any other troops; for I felt certain, though I had never seen Mooltan, that if there was to be a war, and that fortress was to be reduced, the emergency must be met from Lahore. I went myself, not so much to fight Moolraj as to help my countrymen.

I am aware that it has been said (and strangely enough by many who desired nothing so much as a like opportunity of being useful; and who, had it fallen to their lot, would I gladly believe have used it honourably), that I interfered where I had no call of duty, levied soldiers to carry on a war for my own ambitious ends, and with all the rash presumption of a subaltern—

> "Rushed in where Generals feared to tread."

Perfectly satisfied with the approbation of my Sovereign country, the Indian and British Governments, and both Houses of Parliament, I could well afford to be silent; but having now printed, *in extenso*, poor Agnew's appeal for help, as an essential part of this narrative, I will just make two remarks upon it in passing;—that those I allude to may in charity be supposed to have been ignorant of its existence: but if not, I should have deserved even their contempt, had I been coward enough to disregard it.

As soon as ever the troops who were with me at Dera Futteh Khan were ready, the march was commenced

without delay. In describing the town of Dera Futteh Khan, I mentioned that it was situated on a branch of the Indus. We had, consequently, to cross this branch, or nullah, and an island three miles wide on the other side, before we could reach the main stream of the Indus.

On this nullah there was only one boat; and no others were brought round because we wanted them more on the Indus itself, where by midnight on the 22nd of April we had only collected three. It may easily be conceived, therefore, what a tedious operation it was to ferry over twelve hundred soldiers, with guns, camel-swivels, horses, carts, and camp-followers, in one punt which would only hold forty or fifty men at a time. All night, after the moon rose, the men were hard at it; and though the punt foundered and went down towards morning, and obliged the Sikh regiment to ford up to their chins, with their arms and accountrements in a bundle on their heads, the men behaved most cheerfully; and by noon of the 23rd, horse and foot had all reached the Indus.

There we found that no fresh boats had arrived from the neighbouring Ghats; and the horsemen who had been sent to the nearest, returned with the tidings that Moolraj's Kardars had secured all the boats on the left bank, and issued orders to the ferrymen to cross no troops.

So we were obliged to begin the passage of the Indus with three boats. It is a grand river at all seasons, but at this it was mighty and terrible. Each trip of the boats was a little voyage, and occupied between two and

three hours. But there was no help for it, and we sat down on the margin to watch the tedious process, and speculate on what was before us.

Ensconced in a palanquin I had borrowed at Kolachee (for the wound in my knee which I got in the Nassur skirmish, on the 16th of March, was still so bad that I could neither ride nor walk), I lay on the bank impatiently expecting the arrival of more boats. No tents were allowed to be pitched, not even my own, so as to be ready whenever boats arrived; and as everything was packed up, we got nothing to eat all day. At night a luxurious little gentleman named Hookum Chund, of the Lahore Secretariat, who could not possibly forego his curry, brought me half his dinner with the true compassion of an epicure; but I was more fit to be eaten myself after the broiling sun of a long April day.

At sunset a storm sprang up, and still farther embarrassed our slow passage; and I had given up all hopes of crossing the Indus that night, and had fallen asleep in the palkee, when loud shouts proclaimed the arrival of thirteen boats from Kuheeree, a ferry about twenty-five miles higher up the river, where Foujdar's horsemen had arrived just in time to prevent Moolraj's people from carrying them off.

The moon rose about the same moment, as if bidding us be diligent, and the storm lulled; so packing all the boats full of soldiers, I put myself like an Admiral in the van, and led the fleet across.

A melancholy accident occurred in the passage. One of the boats was very old and rickety, and before it could

make the left bank, filled with water and went down. It was first reported to me that out of eighty souls, only nine or ten had escaped; but it subsequently appeared that out of about fifty, only eight were lost. The stern of the boat found the bottom, and the prow remaining in the air enabled almost all to save themselves. Amongst them was a tall serjeant's wife who often boasted afterwards that she had shown more courage than the soldiers.

The following extract from my Diary gives the story of the Mooltan outbreak as it now first reached me; and I therefore give it entire:

April 24th, Camp, Sahoowalluh, on left bank of the Indus—Was awakened before dawn by Foujdar Khan, who had gathered the following particulars from a horseman of Hyat Oolluh Khan's, of Tak.

On the 19th, Moolraj accompanied the two Sahibs* to relieve the Mooltan guards over the fort, which was done. One gate, the last, was just being relieved, and the keys handed to the Sahib, when a Hindoostanee soldier attacked Agnew with a spear, and knocked him off his horse. Dewan Moolraj immediately fled, thinking that the Sahib had laid a trap for him; and the other Sahib fled in the opposite direction, thinking that the Dewan was acting treacherously! Rung Ram, Moolraj's greatest confidant,† picked up Agnew, wiped his face (he had received other wounds), and carried him off in his howdah.‡

*That is, Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson.

†And, as I afterwards learnt, brother-in-law.

‡That is, on his elephant. A howdah is the pulpit-kind of seat which originally gave rise to the sign of 'The Elephant and Castle.'

Moolraj had gone to his own garden (the Am Khas), and the other Sahib to another garden, where he was living. Rung Ram took the wounded Sahib,* and the soldier who attacked him, to Dewan Moolraj, and said: "Never mind; it's not your fault. Now, come along with me to the Sahib, and assure him that this is none of your doing. As for this rascal, we'll hang him!" On this another soldier stepped forward, and said: "You're a pretty *nimuk-huram* (faithless to salt), to hang our comrade for trying to keep our Dewan in Mooltan!" On this Rung Ram abused the soldier roundly, and the latter, drawing his sword, gave Rung Ram three wounds. The Mooltanee officers then came to Moolraj, and said: "You see what a mess you are in. If you want to be hanged, go off to Lahore. If you want to die like a man, declare at once your independence; throw yourself into the fort; and we will only yield with our last breath." The Dewan said he should like to consult his mother. He went, and his mother told him to act like a man, take counsel from his *Ameers* (nobles), and not come for advice to women.† The Dewan then made up his mind to rebel, and sent for all the officers and soldiers; the Puthans swore on the Koran, Hindoos by the water of the Ganges, and Sikhs by the Grunth,‡ to fight to the last, and die honourably.

*This is one of the few erroneous statements in the horseman's tale. It was Khan Sing who carried away Mr. Agnew on an elephant, and to their own camp at Eedgah, not Moolraj's garden.

†Throughout the rebellion, the widow of Sawun Mull raised her voice for war. None knew better than she why Moolraj's father had spent lakhs and lakhs of rupees in strengthening the fortress of Mooltan, and laying up military stores. It was simply because he never intended to give it up.

‡The "Grunth," or, as Sikhs respectfully style it, "Grunth Sahib!" is the sacred volume of their religion.

They then got all their women into the fort, and sent word to Khan Sing Man to march back to Lahore if he valued his life.* This was in the evening. Khan Sing said he would give an answer in the morning; and immediately set-to to throw up intrenchments, at which his men worked all night. In the morning the Dewan sent for Khan Sing's answer. Khan Sing said: "I am *tukra* (firm) in this spot, and won't move."

The Mooltanees thereupon moved out of the fort, and brought all their big guns, and opened a fire upon Khan Sing's camp, from whence it was returned. At last the weaker guns of Khan Sing were silenced, and the Mooltan guns continued to play until a flag of truce was hoisted in Khan Sing's camp, when Khan Sing sent word that, if they would let him march out with his men, he would give them the heads of the two Sahibs.† Moolraj replied that he did not want the Sahibs' heads; that the affair was altogether with *him* (Khan Sing), for refusing to go when told, &c. At last Khan Sing's whole force, amounting, it is said, to two thousand men, gave up their arms, and were made prisoners.

The horrible part of this affair is the uncertainty as to the fate of Agnew and Anderson. The horseman who told the above story says they are both dead! Meanwhile, the Kardar of Leia and his garrison have fled, after

*Khan Sing Man was the Sikh Sirdar sent by the Lahore Durbar to succeed Dewan Moolraj, and whom Mr. Agnew went to instal.

†In justice to Khan Sing's memory, I must state that I never heard this confirmed. His men probably sent the message, as they basely deserted to the enemy before the position of the British officers was attacked.

ineffectual efforts to prevent our crossing; and it is said that all the Mooltan officials have done the same, having received orders from Mooltan to throw themselves into Chowbaruh, a fort in the Desert, north-east of Leia. The zumeendars, Hindoos, &c., of Leia, are frightened to death, and have sent petitions to beg my protection.

(Here follows a clear definition of my own position, as it appeared to my judgment at the time, and which the judgment of my superiors immediately approved.)

In this crisis, I consider myself called upon to make arrangements for the peace of the whole country north of Mooltan, between the Indus and the Jheylum, and do what I can also on the other side of the Indus, from my own province to the Sutlej; for I must in sober earnestness and sadness face the supposition that poor Agnew is no more.

Accordingly, that very morning, before getting out of my bed, I dictated, signed, and dispatched twenty *purwannas*, (orders); eight to officers at important posts in General Cortlandt's province behind me, to warn them of what had occurred, and bid them be on the alert and steadfast, but not alarmed; eight others to Kardars and other district officers of Moolraj's Cis- and Trans-Indus in the country round me, transferring them to the Maharajuh's service, if they were loyally disposed, and bidding them tranquillise the minds of the people; two to detached officers to join me with their men; and two only to enlist new ones. For I had no intention of initiating hostilities against an enemy like Moolraj, in possession of a fortress like Mooltan; and I was not yet awakened to the necessity of either creating a faithful party in my own camp, or

enlisting the soldiers of the country, to prevent them from being enlisted by Moolraj. The latter I soon found to be imperative.

All our people being over the Indus on the night of the 24th, I marched to Leia on the morning of the 25th, and encamped south-east of the city, of which we took peaceful possession, Moolraj's Governor, Ruttun Chund, having retired with his men at our approach. The rest of the officials had remained, in compliance with my orders, and came out with the chief people of the city to receive us. They all brought very long faces, and very short presents.*

Leia is a very extensive city, built of burnt brick, with numerous wells around its suburbs. It is the chief town of the southern Sindh Sagur Doab, and, at the time I speak of, was a great commercial *depot* for the Cabul merchants. It was consequently an important place, and I at once put an officer in charge of it for the Maharajuh, and told him to collect the revenue as fast as he could.

Having done this, I wrote to Sir Frederick Currie, as follows:

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Leia, Cis-Indus,

"April 25th, 1848.

"I reached this place this morning, and have encamped south-east of the city, covering it from Mooltan

*In the East, an inferior never approaches a superior with an empty hand; and though European masters only touch the offered present as an acknowledgement of

"You have, I hope, already got my letters advising you of my determination to cross the Indus as soon as I heard of the attack on Agnew and Anderson, and move on Mooltan, in the hope of saving them. That hope is declared by general rumour to be hope no more. Agnew and Anderson are said to be both dead, killed by their own men; Khan Sing a prisoner, and Dewan Moolraj going all lengths in preparations to maintain himself in the fort.

"This I fully believe, as this Doab is full of his emissaries raising soldiers; and had I been a day later, I could not have crossed the Indus, instructions having been sent to the Kardar of Leia, to seize the boats, raise three thousand men, and hold the place.

"My crossing took him by surprise, and he fled. with the Leia Thannah, to Mooltan.

"Agnew and Anderson dead, and the Sirdar's force either traitors or prisoners in Mooltan, I have no object in advancing further. Neither could I cross the Chenab, if I wished. Neither would it be prudent to wish it, if I could.

"If Mooltan is to be reduced, it must be from Lahore, and by our own British troops; and I hope to God they are already on their way, or the whole of Dera Ghazee Khan will be in insurrection, with hill tribes summoned by Moolraj. I have written to the Mooltan officers in Ghazee Khan and Sungurh, transferring them

the compliment, yet officials keep up the ceremony, and neglecting it is a mark of disrespect. The amount offered increases with the rank and loyalty of the offerer.

to the Sirkar's service, in hopes of quieting their country; but do not anticipate success. Moolraj's service is better than the Sirkar's.

"My arrival here has been most timely, and, if I can only hold my own, it will reduce Moolraj to very narrow limits. The *rubbee* (spring) crop is just ripe. I have entertained all Moolraj's officials that had not run away, and set the collections a-going according to the old usages of the land. The shops are re-opened, and confidence is to a great extent restored.

"Leia is an important city, and the capital of this Doab. Its mere possession by the Sirkar's troops flies through the country and inflicts a blow on Moolraj's *prestige*, and prevents hundreds of mercenaries from joining his standard. Of this I have hourly proof. Still my position, I cannot but see, is one of great uncertainty and peril. If Moolraj has the spirit and skill to throw a force with guns over the Chenab at once, he might crush us, and return in a canter to Mooltan before our own troops can come from Lahore. Already, he is said to have done so. I believe the truth to be that he intends to do so. Perhaps, ere this his force has crossed.

"My mind is made up. I shall throw up intrenchments here, and stand. Great ends will be secured by my success; immense confusion follow a retreat.

"I am entertaining men, for the double purpose of securing them from joining Moolraj, and holding this Doab against the rebels. The Doab swarms with *shumsheerees*, (mercenary swordsmen), Beloochees, and Puthans

ever ripe for mischief. The regiment and four guns, which I have summoned from Bunnoo, cannot reach here till the 7th or 8th of May, and the interval will be one of immense anxiety.

"I calculate that you will have sent off our field brigade on the 24th of April, and that it will reach Mooltan in ten days, but trust that will only be the vanguard of a regular army, for the reduction of Mooltan will be no child's play. I know not if you have good information from Mooltan, therefore I may as well state my views of this affair.

"I think Moolraj has been involved in rebellion against his will, and, being a weak man, is now persuaded by his officers that there is no hope for him but in going all lengths; that the origin of the rebellion was the natural dislike of the Puthans, Beloochees, and Mooltanees (men of high family, courage, and false pride) to be turned adrift, after a life spent in military service well rewarded; and that these men will fight desperately, and die hard, unless a provision is held out to them just before the siege (before the last moment they would not accept it, and only then will they do so with dexterous *vikalut* (diplomacy), carried on by one of their own blood, who knows their points of honour).

"If I might, without offence, offer a military suggestion, when you have such able soldiers in Lahore, it would be that Bhawul Khan be called on to cross the Sutlej instanter, and co-operate with a British force from Lahore, and a brigade from Sindh.

"Bhawul Khan's country also is full of these noble Beloochees and Mooltanees, and already Moolraj has summoned them to join his standard, and they will come if not detained by Bhawul Khan.

"I have opened a correspondence with Moolraj, more with the object of getting a kossid unobstructed into Mooltan, than with any hope of persuading the Dewan to follow my advice, and throw himself on your mercy before things go any further.

"This letter goes by a kossid, *via* Jhung, by which route please send me instructions as soon as you can, and let me know, daily, what movements are made on Mooltan, that I may co-operate in any way in my power.

"There are two guns and four or five hundred men at Jhung, who would be very welcome here. At present, I am very much like a Scotch terrier barking at a tiger. If a week only passes over, I shall have got together enough men to hold on. If not, we are in God's hands, and could not be better placed."*

Determined now to seize as much of the rebel Dewan's country as I could, I wrote this day to Ali Khan, of Kolachee, to join me as rapidly as he could with one hundred horse, and two hundred foot of the tribe of Gundapoor; to Ubdoolla Khan, chief of the Ooshteraunees, who but a few days before was in rebellion himself, to send me one hundred of his best mountain marksmen; Hot Khan, of same tribe, to bring another hundred; Ubeezur Khan, of

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," pp. 151, 2.

Koondee, in Tak, to bring twenty horsemen from his native village; and lastly, to Foujdar Khan, Alizye, whom I daily found more useful, I gave the comprehensive order to enlist every soldier of the Sindh Sagur Doab, who was still out of employ, and preferred the royal standard to the rebel's.

Next day I wrote to the Resident as follows:

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Leia, April 26th, 1848.

"Common report still declares that Moolraj has thrown a force, with guns, across the Chenab, to oppose my advance; but my own spies have not yet had time to return, and the latest trustworthy intelligence contradicts the report above-mentioned, and says, that the greatest consternation reigns in Mooltan, where ghee is at a seer the rupee; and the garrison (officers and all) are engaged in cutting the ripe corn, and carrying it into the fort. They are very hard up also for grass. In this condition, it is not probable that the Dewan will detach men and guns, and weaken his own position. I am entertaining men in self-defence, and to check the tide of recruiting which was flowing to Mooltan. Moolraj is enlisting, right and left, and has unlimited command of money. My treasury is the present rubbee crop, and having reorganized the executive system of officials in the Doab (appointed new Kardars, where the old ones had fled, &c.), I have now got the resources pretty well under my thumb. I have put Hookum Chund (the Sirkar's Dufteree along with me, an able man, whose father and uncle held these districts, under

the Cabul Kings) at the head of all the Kardars, intending to leave him here at Leia, whenever I have to move forward.

"The Puthan gentry of the Doab are beginning to come in; among others, Nassur Khan, Badozye, the man who gave Lal Sing's detachment such a thrashing two years ago.

"I cannot convey to you any idea of the happy effect of our crossing the Indus, and occupying the great body of Moolraj's country; but I may say that it has arrested an extensive rebellion, and made the difference between a siege and a campaign.

"I have thought it best to tell Kishen Lal, the Jhung Adawlutee, to send me his two guns and four hundred men forthwith.

"A Puthan gave me a good account to-day of the Mooltan outbreak, and it seems that the Sikh troops behaved most shamefully, going over without any reason whatever. Agnew died like a hero, disdaining to fly, and refusing to yield. His head was cut off by Moolraj's soldiers.

"Unanimity is far from existing in the rebel garrison. Three of Moolraj's principal officers (Surbulund Khan, Badozye, and his son, Sadik Muhommud Khan, and Gholam Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee,) were so opposed to the whole proceeding, that they refused to set their seals to the Koran, leaving themselves open to conviction.

"I hope soon to hear of the advance of our British troops from Lahore, and may take this opportunity of

expressing my conviction, that to send any other troops to Mooltan, after what has occurred, would be to run the most imminent risk of a treacherous catastrophe."*

In the evening of the same day I ordered the Colonel of the Sikh regiment to look quietly about for a position to intrench, on the Mooltan side of Leia, for I expected before night to hear that Moolraj had thrown troops across the Chenab, in which event, relying on the fidelity of the Sikh troops that were with me, it was my intention to have made a stand at Leia.

On the 27th I received trustworthy intelligence that Moolraj's Kardar, at Dera Ghazee Khan, Longa Mull by name, had received "the fiery cross" from his master, and was going all lengths in stirring up the country Trans-Indus to rebellion. As this would carry the war into General Cortlandt's province of Dera Ishmael Khan, I instantly took measures for its defence by summoning the General, with another regiment, two more guns, and one hundred horse, from Bunnoo to Girang, there to co-operate with me as circumstances might require. The same train of thought made me consider well Lieutenant Taylor's position in Bunnoo, when his force should be thus weakened, and I advised his calling for another regiment from Peshawur, while I did what I could to secure the peace of the country round him, by desiring General Cortlandt to bring away with him (nominally as recruits, but in reality hostages), as many sons and brothers of the chiefs of Bunnoo and Murwut as he could enlist.

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," p. 152.

In the course of this day two very different communications reached me from Mooltan. One from a Nassur merchant, named Sadoolluh Khan, who related how the murdered British officers had been indebted to the Afghan merchants at Mooltan for burial; that they had covered the bodies with silk scarfs, and carried them to the grave in rude imitation of the British funerals they had seen. As the only return in my power, I immediately released two men of the Nassur tribe, who had been sentenced to six months' imprisonment for plundering; nor did I regret this acknowledgement, when subsequent inquiry proved that the Cabul merchants had only reproached Moolraj with not giving an honourable burial to men who were not even his enemies.

The other communication was as follows:—

"THE MOOLTAN SIKHS TO THE TROOPS UNDER
"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

"April 22nd, 1848.

"By the favour of the Holy Gooroo.

"Written by Esra Sing, Golab Sing, Gooldeep Sing, and the whole of the Khalsa troops under Khan Sing Man.

"Wah! Gooroo-jee-kee futeh, from all the Khalsa, Victory of the Gooroo.

"The facts connected with the Khalsa are as follow:—

We marched from Lahore with the Feringhees, and arrived at Mooltan on Tuesday, the 8th of *Bysakh* (18th of April). On the following day, Dewan Moolraj went to the fort, accompanied by the Feringhees and our troops, and, having made it over, placed two of our companies inside. One hundred men remained of those who had been stationed there previously. The Dewan then left the fort with the Feringhees.

"The following scene took place:—

"A sepoy out of service thrust a spear at one of the Feringhees, who fell from his horse. The sepoy then wounded the other Feringhee twice with his sword. We afterwards went off, taking with us to our camp the Feringees and Sirdar Khan Sing; while Moolraj returned to his abode. Rung Ram remarked to the Dewan, that they ought to go and see the Feringhees.

"Moolraj then returned, unattended by any of his own sepoys, when a strange occurrence took place by the Gooroo's will.

"The whole of the Mooltan Sikhs, together with the Moossulman soldiers, went in a body to the Dewan, and said: 'We won't let you go;' to which he replied, that he must go.

"A sepoy then drew his sword, and wounded Rung Ram three times.

"In the confusion which ensued, Dewan Moolraj's horse reared and threw him.

"The soldiers then carried him and Rung Ram off to their quarters, where they told him that it was the

Gooroo's order to expel the Feringhees by force. The Dewan would not consent that day. On the following morning, by God's will, the guns were fired, and the Gooroo ordered us to advance; for so it has been written in the Gooroo's writings. Upon this we obeyed his injunctions, and joining the Mooltanees, killed the Feringhees.

"Now we, in accordance with the Gooroo's command, have written to all of you, our Khalsa brethren. Those of you who are true and sincere Sikhs, will come to us here. You will receive plenty of pay, and the approbation of the Dewan.

"The Maharajuh Duleep Sing will, by the Gooroo's grace, be firmly established in his kingdom; there will be no more cow-killing, and our holy religion will prosper.

"All believing Sikhs, who trust in the Gooroo, will place confidence in our words, and, joining us, will honour his name.

"Forward copies of this manifesto to all our Sikh brethren, and delay not; for those who spread this intelligence will meet the approbation of the Gooroo.

"You know that all are mortal; whoever therefore, as becomes a sincerely believing Sikh, devotes his life to the service of the Gooroo, will obtain fame and reputation in *this world.*

"The Maharajuh and his mother are in sorrow and affliction. By engaging in their cause, you will obtain their favour and support. Gird up your loins under the

protection of the Gooroo, and Govind Sing will preserve his sanctity. Make much of a few words."*

The circumstances under which this plain-spoken document reached my hands, and the reflections it excited in my mind, were thus reported to the Resident.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Leia, April 27th, 1848.

"A most important document has fallen into my hands, being a solemn summons, in the name of all that is holy in the Khalsa religion, from the Sikh soldiers in the fort of Mooltan to the regiment of Sikhs along with me, to march immediately and join the rebels in Mooltan, that the Khalsa may once more unite, and relieve the Maharajuh and his mother from the thraldom of the Sahib log.

"It is signed and sealed by all the officers who went from Lahore with Agnew, from Khan Sing† down; and it was sent by Esra Sing, of the artillery, (Colonel) to his nephew, Dera Sing, a subedar in Futteh Sing's regiment, who took it to his Colonel, who consulted with Bhaee Ameera Buksh, and brought it to me the next morning, *i.e.* to-day, for it came last evening.

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," p. 150.

†It proved to be a mistake to suppose that Sirdar Khan Sing had signed, or joined in this manifesto. His seal was not found on it by the Resident on a closer examination.

"Along with it they have brought me a counter-bond of fidelity, signed by all the officers of the Futteh Pultun, professedly drawn up in ignorance of the Mooltan document, and suggested only by the crisis in which we are placed.

"I know not what to think of these circumstances. Bhaee Ameera Buksh's character you well know, and his relative connection with the Maharanee. But on the other hand, he may be "wise in his generation," and has certainly been very zealous on the march. Futteh Sing is a jolly good-natured fellow, who served with Lawrence in the Khyber. But what Sikh is not ever prepared to be a traitor?

"If this paper has not been seen by the whole regiment, how long will it be before another paper comes, and will that also fall into my hands? I feel bitterly indignant at this treachery, at the very moment when I am giving my life willingly to stem a rebellion, and wrest a whole Doab from a traitor to the Khalsa Government, at the very moment too of success; for, if they will only show a few days' fortitude, what doubt can there be of the result?

"But, after the base desertion of poor Agnew and Anderson, what else can any of us expect? You will, however, have to take a wider view of this matter than that which is merely personal to me; and it is for this reason I now write, and not to whine over a danger which duty requires that I should face. Depend upon it, the paper which I have got is a circular, and it is right to be prepared for the possible consequences of its favourable reception among the Sikh soldiers at all points.

"Doubtless, you have made up your mind, that a British force must go to Mooltan, and this will naturally bring in fresh reinforcements from the rear.

"I do not send the paper to you, as it is too valuable to be risked in the *dak* (Post-office) at this time.

"How strangely now do Lawrence's arguments return to my mind, for banishing that Jezabel from the Punjab; she is a leaven of evil, which some day will leaven a fearful lump of political trouble. You have not forgotten I dare say, her sending a slave-girl on a secret embassy to Mooltan, last June or July, and her impudent excuse, that she wanted a white ak tree for enchantments. The "tree" has now put forth its leaves, and their *rung* (colour, species) is much what might have been expected.

"With the above exception, all is going on well. Our presence has, at a stroke, secured quiet in this Doab, and those who are disaffected can only sneak off to Mooltan. I have most fortunately got with me an exceedingly clever Puthan, of good family, named Foujdar Khan, who is related to many of Moolraj's chief officers, and knows every mercenary on both sides of the Indus. This has enabled me to summon some twenty or thirty leaders, whose swords are in the market; and in a few days I shall have a levy or about three thousand Puthans and Beloochees equal to twice their number of Sikhs, for any work along the banks of the Attock. For the cost of this levy, I consider Moolraj responsible to the State, and look on this rubbee harvest here as my own lawful prize; for Misr Megraj would never have seen a rupee of it, had I not crossed the Indus.

"P.S. *Night, 27th of April*—I have just got your letter of the 21st, written on receipt of Agnew's first letter of the 19th, perhaps indeed the last also, poor fellow, that he ever wrote.

"You say that the Kaleewala, Deena Nath, and Tej Sing, are to start for Mooltan, with one Sikh regiment, and be joined by a troop of horse artillery from Ramnuggur.

"The next day's news will have shown you the necessity of an army; and I look anxiously for your next communication.

"Already you know, that several days ago I summoned one regiment and four guns from Bunnoo; and this very morning, the reports from Dera Ghazee Khan induced me to order Cortlandt forthwith from Bunnoo, with another regiment, two more guns, and one hundred Goorchurruhs, to proceed to Girang, and defend his own frontier, or co-operate with me, as circumstances may require.

"Moolraj has urged his lieutenant in Dera Ghazee Khan to disturbance, and as the said lieutenant is a thorough-going Moofsid (Longa Mull), I have little doubt but he will stir up all the tribes he can. However, I have cut him off, and blocked him out, by securing Cheytun Mull, the Mooltan Hakim of Sungurh, who has this day sent a most satisfactory answer to my purwanna, transferring him to the Sirkar's service. I need scarcely request that such promises as these, which, at this crisis, I am obliged to make for the peace of the country, may receive your confirmation.

"I am under considerable obligations to Hookum Chund, for his practical revenue knowledge, and zealous assistance in the Trans-Indus settlements, and I should be glad to see him rewarded.

"I have laid a dak to-day right across the Thull, to Jhung, where it will join the Lahore dak, and bring me into rapid communication with you.

"It will be prudent, nay necessary, to send another regiment down from Peshawur, without delay, to Bunnoo, *via* Kohat, to replace the 2nd, which has now been called away.

"Bunnoo is just settling down nicely, but must not be trusted too soon.

"Taylor is doing excellently, and has just tired out the obstinate Vizeerees, and got the better of them in the question of revenue.

"With reference to customs, I have not lost sight of them, even in these exciting hours, and have got them well in hand at this moment."*

I could have little doubt in my own mind that the paper addressed by the Mooltan Sikhs to the troops under me—which had been received by a Sikh officer in those troops from his own uncle, who was a rebel in Mooltan, and had been kept by him a whole night, and half the next day in camp, before bringing it to me—must have been seen and read by every Sikh soldier in my force. And if seen

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," pp. 153, 4.

and read, then assuredly had it gone straight to the heart of every reader, for it breathed the very essence of Sikh feeling, and faithfully interpreted the aspirations of the nation. The seeds therefore had been sown, and the harvest was for me to reap.

But I knew that it could neither spring, nor ripen, without the sunshine of opportunity, and the golden showers of Moolraj's gold. It was my duty to see that it got neither; and above all, to take care that no exhibition of distrust on my part precipitated the troops into disaffection.

In reply, therefore, to the bond of fidelity, which the Colonel and officers of the Sikh regiment had volunteered, I assured them that I should have great pleasure in forwarding it to their Sovereign at Lahore, who would doubtless be pleased with their attachment at a moment when a provincial Governor had displayed such ingratitude towards the nation, which had raised his family from insignificance. But I warned them, nevertheless, to watch over the honour of their regiment. I told them "that the rebels in Mooltan had conspired to involve my troops in the certain ruin which awaited themselves; that they would send traitors to corrupt the soldiers in this camp; and as all were not wise and experienced, it became the officers to be vigilant, to seize any such messengers, turn them out of their lines, and save their regiment from disgrace."

That very day a Sikh spy from Mooltan was found in camp, and brought to me, like the paper, after all the mischief had been done. Finding that he had been long

enough in camp to deliver as many letters and messages as he liked, I pretended to be quite satisfied with his account of himself, and showed no suspicion.

But my confidence in the Sikh soldiers of the camp was gone; and I felt assured that the march of a British army from Lahore was the only event which could secure even their neutrality.

This was not my opinion only. In the dusk of the evening, while I was eating my dinner, the Adjutant of the Artillery, a man of Hindoostan, begged to be allowed to speak to me, and when admitted, besought me on his knees, and in considerable agitation to move his guns to the right, with a company of Poorbeeuhs on each side, as he had every reason to believe that the Sikh regiment was conspiring mischief, and where the guns were then, they might be seized at any time. He added, "They have a prophecy, that in two years and a half from their defeat on the Sutlej, their independence shall be restored. That time has exactly come!"

Still later at night, when the old grey-headed Adjutant of the Poorbeeuh Infantry came to report that he had visited all the guards and sentries, he threw himself at my feet, and with tears in his eyes implored me to be on my guard, for he had served many, many years in the service of the Sikhs, and seen all their revolutions; and if the Futteh Pultun was not brewing mischief now, he (Sirdar Sing) knew nothing about their character.

"Nonsense!" I said, "what do you judge by?" He replied: "By their letting none but Sikhs come into their

lines these last two days, and going in and out of each other's tents in knots, and holding meetings, and an unusual kind of swaggering air with them, such as the Sikh soldiers used to have at Lahore before the Sutlej war, when they had the Government in their hands, and were buying and selling their own chiefs!"

The impressive and earnest manner of these two faithful men had a great effect upon me. Their experience set the seal to my own observations and suspicions, and I felt at once all the horror of being betrayed, and the revolting necessity of wearing the mask of confidence.

Before going to bed I wrote to my friend Taylor, and telling him my own position, warned him to be on his guard against the troops in Bunnoo.

Next day I wrote again to the Resident.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT "LAHORE

"Camp, Leia, April 29th, 1848.

"I have no longer any doubt of there being a mutinous correspondence going on between the Mooltan traitors (Khan Sing's troops) and the Sikhs in my camp; and it must be sufficiently evident, for the Adjutant of the two guns along with me came to me last night, and, on his knees, begged me to put the guns on the right, and away from the Sikhs, whom he said were root and branch nimuk hurams, and conspiring among themselves secretly in the lines. I cannot, of course, move the guns without declaring my suspicions; and see nothing for it but to be firm,

patient, and vigilant, hastening the recruiting of Puthans, and awaiting the arrival of Cortlandt with Soobhan Khan's regiment, which I believe is trustworthy.

"But he cannot reach till the 6th, so that I have a whole week of this anxiety to endure.

"Not the least difficult task is that of meeting, with cordiality and politeness, the Colonel of the Futteh Pultun and his officers, and Bhaee Ameera Buksh, knowing all the time that they have marked me for their prey.

"I have replied, however, to the bond of fidelity, which they volunteered to send me, in such terms as to appeal at once to their loyalty and cupidity; and I send you the originals herewith, thinking it would be a good thing if you were to make a great fuss in the Durbar, about the bright example thus set by the Futteh Pultun; send them an ell-long purwanna of approval, and, by assuming them to have virtue, induce them still to wear its mask.

"It is probable that the Sikhs, whatever their designs are, will not disclose them till the last moment, reserving themselves for a *grand coup* in front of Mooltan. I shall wait here, therefore, until joined by Cortlandt, by which time I hope to have got three thousand Puthans together, and thus be too strong for the Sikhs in my own camp. I propose then to move forwards, and throw myself into a small fort named Moondeh, twenty-five koss from this place, and about fifteen from Mooltan, pitching the Sikhs and majority of the camp outside, taking the guns inside. In that attitude I should be prepared for friend or foe, which seem just now synonymous terms.

"It is indeed mortifying to know that the only obstacles in my way are the royal troops. If I had not a Sikh soldier in the camp, my mind would be at ease.

"Accounts from Mooltan describe the garrison as constantly engaged in laying in stores, and preparing for resistance.

"There is a report that Moolraj has sent to seize two *Mem Sahibs* (ladies) on the Sutlej.

"Another, that Agnew wrote to Bhawul Khan for help, and that a detachment of his cavalry crossed the Sutlej for that purpose, but re-crossed on hearing of the catastrophe. There is a great dread of Bhawul Khan's army in these parts; and I hope, ere this, you have ordered him across the river. It is said that part of the Sikh soldiers who went over have been sent to watch the Ghat, opposite to Bhawulpoor.

"Perfect tranquillity, thanks to our presence, reigns in this Doab, and I have filled up almost all the vacant kardarships, and set the collections going.

"Several Puthan leaders, who had been summoned with their followers by Moolraj, have come over to me with his purwannas, and taken service against him. He is enlisting everybody, down to the scum of the city of Mooltan.

"P.S.—On the whole, I think it better to send you Khan Sing's manifesto,* and run the risk of its reaching, not knowing what may happen to myself."†

*The document addressed by the rebels to my troops.

†See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," pp. 156, 7.

On the 29th I redoubled my former efforts to enlist Puthans; and at the close of an anxious day received the startling intelligence contained in the annexed letter:

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Moorawallah, on the left bank of the Indus.

"opposite Dera Futteh Khan, May 1st, 1848.

* * * * *

(After recapitulating the contents of all the Author's letters from the 22nd to the 28th of April, so as to enable the Resident to judge whether they had come to hand, or been intercepted, he proceeds as follows:

"I have now to inform you that, late on the evening of the 29th, one of my own kossids returned from Mooltan, and brought the intelligence that Dewan Moolraj had at last made the move which, ever since my arrival in Leia, I had apprehended, and thrown eight heavy guns, and between four and five thousand men across the Chenab, to oppose me, which force would reach Leia without fail on the 1st of May.

" Four courses were open to me:

" 1. To intrench myself, either inside or outside of the town of Leia, and fight it out.

" 2. To move east on Munkhera, a royal fort of great strength, in the heart of the Sandy Desert, twenty-five koss from Leia, and encamp under its walls.

"3. To fall back on Bukkur, three marches to the north, and opposite to Dera Ishmael Khan, where there is a small fort, and await the arrival of General Cortlandt with reinforcements, expected at Dera on the 2nd of May.

"4. To re-cross the Indus, and await General Cortlandt, under the fort of Girang.

"Under any circumstances, the first plan would have been hazardous, for my whole force does not amount nearly to one thousand five hundred men, which are too few to hold the streets of a large town like Leia; and my two horse artillery guns in an intrenchment outside would soon be silenced by eight heavy guns. But doubting, as I did, the loyalty of two-thirds of my men; nay, believing that they had themselves invited the hostile movement, I determined at all costs to avoid the double danger of a collision.

"Plan No. 2, I rejected for similar reasons. The Thannadar of Munkhera is a Sikh, and had been very profuse in his offers of service; but he had also been corresponding very constantly with the Futteh Pultun, and Bhaee Ameera Buksh, that notorious intriguer; and I argued, that if, on arriving at Munkhera, that fort was to be closed by treachery against me, it would be quite impossible for me to conduct the loyal remnant of my men in good order and safety across the desert and the Chenab.

"If I retreated to Bukkur, it would be three long marches through a country which for many years has been under the Mooltan rule, and which looks unfavourably

on the present change; and there was no certainty of finding the Bukkur fort empty on our arrival.

"All these considerations led me to prefer making only one short march to the Indus, and awaiting General Cortlandt at Girang, on the other bank. The Killadar of Girang is also a Puthan of my own appointment.

"Accordingly, yesterday morning we marched from Leia to this place, on the left bank of the Indus, and collected boats for embarkation; but I strictly forbade any one to cross, resolving to wait one more day on this side of the Indus, and see if anything might turn up in our favour.

"This morning another kossid has arrived from Mooltan, and says that, out of the four thousand five hundred men ordered to Leia, only five hundred have crossed the Chenab, and are encamped on the right bank. The eight guns are halted still on the left bank, the Puthans of the Mooltan garrison having strongly remonstrated with the Dewan on the folly of weakening the Mooltan fort by such an expedition.

"I now hope, therefore, to be able to hold my ground on this side of the Indus, until General Cortlandt can come up, when, if he has reliance on the Moossulman regiments with him, and four guns, I shall lose no time in resuming my former position at Leia, so advantageous for the administration of the Doab, and co-operation in any plans you may have formed for the reduction of Mooltan. Already I have sent a party of cavalry to Leia, to secure intelligence, collect customs, encourage friends, and show foes that we are not yet gone.

"In my note of the 25th of April, I reported having opened a communication with Dewan Moolraj. He has not replied himself, 'fearing the soldiers;' but Moostapha Khan, his ablest officer, has written his sentiments in an urzee, which I forward. It is cleverly written, containing in a small space half a dozen meanings, and leaving the reader to choose among them. My own belief is, that Dewan Moolraj is under no restraint whatever from 'the soldiers,' by which expression is meant the Sikh traitors and regular regiments of the former Mooltan garrison, the Puthans of Moolraj's service having a supreme contempt for them, and being not at all likely to submit to their dictation. The kossid who brought Moostapha Khan's urzee certainly said there was considerable division between the Puthans and Sikhs of the garrison, but he added, that the Dewan had, in consequence, broken up the Sikh regiments into small parties, here and there; which mark of distrust had so offended them, that they refused to receive the wages of their treachery, unless they were re-united in battalions. That passage of the urzee which suggests the only certain way of allaying this rebellion, speaks the real wishes of the Puthan portion of the garrison; but I should say that the Dewan himself was in much more anxiety about his life than his government. He resigned the latter without a struggle, and only took refuge in rebellion when he thought the former was forfeited.

"In yesterday's ukhbar from Lahore, I perceive that the Durbar have ordered several distant regiments to concentrate on Mooltan; and being so close to the scene of agitation, I feel it a duty to express earnestly my conviction (founded on observation), that a more dangerous risk

could not be run at the present moment, than to give a Sikh army the opportunity of collecting before Mooltan.* The Sikh soldiers have neither forgotten, nor forgiven, their humiliation on the banks of the Sutlej; and incapable of gratitude to us, as they have ever been of fidelity to their own rulers, it is only a very small and reflecting portion of them on whom our extraordinary moderation has made any impression. The large majority would hail any feasible opportunity of rising as a God-send; and the unhappy coincidence of this rebellion in Mooltan, with the prophecy which was in every Sikh's mouth after the Sutlej campaign, (that in two years and a half the Raj should return to them again!) may well be regarded by the bigoted Khalsa as a special dispensation of their Gooroo to suspend that wise policy of the British Government, which dispersed them in small parties over the face of the Punjab.

"Even shutting our eyes to the probability of all the Sikh regiments following the example of those under Khan Sing Man, in the hour of trial, a very serious doubt arises, whether the Sikhs could reduce Mooltan if they wished. Nothing can be more strong than the belief, in this part of the world, that they could not; and it is certain that they accomplished it at last (after two previous failures) with the greatest difficulty and loss, when in the height of their pride and power, and under the eye of their great Maharajuh; and it is more as a mere reporter of public feeling in this direction, than as venturing any suggestion

*The result is matter of history. The Sikh force, under Rajah Sher Sing, went over to the enemy at the very moment when the town of Mooltan was within the grasp of General Whish, thus causing the raising of the first siege.

of my own, that I confidently report the Mooltan garrison prepared to submit to a British demonstration, but not to yield to a Sikh siege. The rumour to-day that Bhawul Khan (the faithful ally of the British) is already encamped at Shoojabad, in the Mooltan territory, makes it probable that this is only a part of a combined British movement, and that you have long ago anticipated the little information it is in my power to afford.

"P.S.—While meditating, on the night of the 29th, the best plan of retiring from Leia, I dispatched a small party of newly-raised Puthans, to see if a fort of Dewan Moolraj, named Mojgurh, twelve koss from Leia, north-east, were occupied or not, and if possible to obtain possession. A sowar of the party has just come in, with the intelligence that the small Thannah of Moolraj, which was in the fort, surrendered, and the fort is now in our possession. It is described as built of brick, sixty yards square, and capable of offering considerable resistance. I have directed the leader of the party to strengthen himself, by entertaining more men on the spot, and to put two hundred rupees' worth of corn into the fort without delay, as it will certainly come into use. The fort is one of four which the old Dera Nuwab built at equal distances of twelve koss, north, east, south, and west, from the great central fort of Munkhera in the Desert."*

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," pp. 157—9.

"URZEE FROM MOOSTAPHA KHAN, KHAGHWANEE, IN THE "FORT OF MOOLTAN, TO LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

SENT ON TO THE RESIDENT ENCLOSED IN ABOVE LETTER

"Your letter was duly received by Dewan Moolraj, but he dares not answer it, for fear of the soldiers, who would insult and ill-treat him, if it came to their knowledge. He has therefore commissioned me to write to you, and say, that if the smallest thought of rebellion had ever entered into his mind, it is not likely that he would have offered his resignation of Mooltan to the Maharajuh and the Sahib Log in Lahore, and requested them to appoint another Nazim, neither would he have made over to Mr. Agnew and Sirdar Khan Sing Man the fort, and guns, and magazine, nor have let the Lahore soldiers into the fort, and commenced relieving all his own guards from the gates and other posts therein. It was in fact quite by accident that this affair occurred, and the soldiers, becoming insubordinate, involved him against his will, caused the guns to be drawn out, and commenced hostilities. Orders are issued, and letters written, just as the soldiers please; and, by their desire, all the materials of war are now being prepared. In short, nothing can be done without their consent, and the Dewan is afraid to oppose them. If he did oppose them, it would cost him his head and his honour, so that the Dewan desires me to tell you that the only certain way of settling this matter is to return to the former arrangement, and let him remit the revenue regularly to Lahore, as previously, as the soldiers have now got the upper hand, and will not be satisfied with anything short of this. Thus much the Dewan sends for your information, and I may as well

mention that, news having been received of your occupation of Leia, a force has been dispatched in that direction."*

The narrative is continued two days after, from the right bank of the Indus.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Futteh Khan Ghat,

"May 3rd, 1848.

"It is with regret I inform you that I have been obliged to re-cross the Indus. On the 1st of May, I reported to you that I had retired from Leia to the left bank of the river, but I hoped to be able to maintain my ground in the Sindh Sagur Doab until General Cortlandt's arrival, as I had heard that the eight guns, and majority of the four thousand men, sent against us by Moolraj, had halted on the left bank of the Chenab.

"The halt appears to have been nothing more than the delay unavoidable in crossing troops and guns over a large river at this season of the year; and on the morning of the 2nd of May, their advanced guard suddenly appeared at Kofilah, only four koss from Leia.

"It was however still doubtful whether the guns had come on, or not; and I again advanced the whole of my cavalry to Leia, under Sirdar Muhommud Alum Khan, Barukzye, and Foujdar Khan, Alizye, to ascertain the force of the rebels; to surprise the Kofilah party, if it was

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," pp. 159, 60.

unsupported by guns in the rear; and to cover our retreat, if it proved to be only the advanced guard of the enemy's main body.

"They had scarcely left camp, when they were met by another kossid, with the information that Moolraj's guns and main body were indeed at Machehwallah, eight koss south of Leia; but they gallantly carried out their orders, reached Leia in the evening, threw out sowars to Kofilah, and having ascertained beyond all doubt the character of the hostile movement, fell back in good order at midnight.

"The intelligence brought by the kossid last mentioned, decided me to lose no time; and, striking the tents at mid-day, I crossed the whole baggage and cattle of the force to the right bank of the Indus, before nightfall, retaining only the guns and infantry. The men, fully accoutred, lay down in a half moon, with the river in the rear, and the empty boats drawn up ready for embarkation. In this order we awaited the return of the cavalry, and day; at dawn this morning, the cavalry and guns crossed the Indus in two detachments, and about eight o'clock I brought up the rear with the infantry, just about the time when the enemy must have been marching into Leia, twelve miles behind us.

"I assure you that I gave up the Doab with the greatest reluctance, but I have already, in my last letter, fully given my last reasons for avoiding so unequal a collision as must have taken place, between two guns and fifteen hundred men (of one thousand of whom the fidelity was very doubtful), and eight guns and four thousand men

united in a desperate cause, and encouraged by the knowledge of having friends in my camp. The mortification of the retreat, and possibly its condemnation by those who know not the difficulties of my position, can only be personal to myself, whereas a defeat of the Sirkar's troops, in any quarter at the present moment, could not fail to have a disheartening influence on the army now advancing from Lahore, and seriously increase the difficulty of quelling the rebellion in Mooltan.

"As it is, my withdrawal from the Sindh Sagur Doab can only be temporary. General Cortlandt, with another regiment (of Moossulmans), and I believe six guns, will join me to-morrow, when we shall be in a condition to re-cross, and engage the rebels."*

I shall not readily forget these events. To retreat at all, at any time, and under any circumstances, must be mortifying enough to a soldier. But the circumstances under which I had to retreat were these.

I was the only man in the whole camp who wanted to retreat!

The Sikh soldiers, who were the majority, had, there is every reason to believe, sold me. My very price had been agreed upon; twelve thousand rupees to the regiment for joining the rebels in the battle, and twelve thousand more if they brought over my head with them.† It is needless

*See "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," p. 160.

†This was afterwards communicated by the Sikhs of the Futteh Pultun to Heera Sing, an intelligent Sikh orderly of General Cortlandt's. But it had already become known to Government from Mooltan itself, as we find reported in the "Blue

therefore to add, that with twenty-four thousand rupees to lose on one side, and merely honour on the other, the Futteh Pultun to a man, was for standing fast at Leia. "What did I want to retreat for? Did I doubt their fidelity, or their courage? They would throw themselves into the town of Leia; erect barricades; and hold the place to all eternity. As for Moolraj's troops, though they were twenty to one, they should be eaten up! Only place implicit confidence in *them*, and I should never repent it!" (Which was probably true; for they would not have given me time.)

On the other hand the faithful few, the artillery, the Poorbeeuh Infantry, and the newly-raised Puthans of the last week, were indignant at the bare notion of retreating; for it is a maxim of war among high-minded Asiatics, and especially Puthans, that "having advanced your right foot, it is honourable to bring the left up to it; but to draw the right back to the left is a disgrace." But, I asked, suppose the enemy is obviously too strong for you? "Then stand and die!" was the rash, but chivalrous response.

Book," p. 155, in a letter from the British Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to Government, as follows:

"During last night, I received from Bhawulpoor intelligence from Mooltan up to the 1st, in which I regret to say it was positively stated that a messenger arrived at Mooltan on the 29th, from the Durbar troops, with Lieutenant Edwardes, giving in their full adherence to Moolraj and his interests, and promising, if the Dewan would send a force ostensibly to attack them, they would, men and officers, join him. The offer was of course instantly accepted by Dewan Moolraj, who sent off troops and guns, on the 30th ultimo, to Leia, with dresses of honour and presents for the Durbar officers and soldiers.

"My informant at Bhawulpoor, instantly on receiving the above intelligence, sent a kossid from that place to Lieutenant Edwardes, to warn him of his danger."

So there I stood alone among my soldiers; some traitors, some true men, but all urging me to prove a fool, all fearing I might prove a coward.

I esteem it not the least of my little victories, that I stuck that day to my own opinion. There was not a shadow of doubt in my mind as to the course which ought to be pursued; and I resolved accordingly to pursue it. For I again repeat a sentiment which I have before expressed in these volumes, that he who has to act upon his own responsibility, is a slave if he does not act also on his own judgment.

Turning therefore to all the officers, false and true I said: " It is my deliberate opinion that this force is incapable of resisting such an one as the rebels have sent against us, either in the open field, or in an intrenched position. To attempt it would be to sacrifice many lives in vain; and I consider it, therefore, my duty to retreat. As to military maxims, every country has its own; and among my countrymen (who are not considered very bad soldiers!) it is reckoned very bad generalship to fight unless there is a reasonable chance of victory. Let us therefore retreat, and reinforce ourselves. A long war is before us; and the day will soon come when I shall call on you all to prove the valour of which you now make such display. We shall then see who is brave and who is not."

Next day the retreat was made, but with reluctance; and the following colloquy between some Sikh soldiers of the rear-guard was overheard by my own servants.

"What shall we do with this Sahib of ours?"

" Oh! kill him of course—what else?"

" D'ye think so? Well I vote we *don't* kill him."

" What then? You wouldn't let him off?"

" No !" (with concentrated malignity,) " I'd *make a Sikh of him!*"

" What for?"

" Why when he was a regular Sikh, and had taken the pahul,* and read the Grunth, I'd then make him carry bricks and mortar in a wicker basket on his head, as he made us do at Bunnoo, building that fort of Duleepgurh. I should just like to see how he'd like it."

And that night of May 2nd, when we lay down on the bank of the Indus, in a half-moon, with our backs to the river, shall I ever forget it? There was a mutual distrust between the faithful and unfaithful parties of the soldiery. Not a word had been spoken, no duty refused, no symptom of open mutiny; and yet both sides knew each other, avoided each other, and were getting angry with each other. To make the best of it, I put the two guns in the centre, with the faithful Poorbeeuhs right and left, and lay down behind them. This secured the artillery, and divided the Sikh regiment into wings, right and left of the Poorbeeuhs. The new Puthan levies, and other horsemen, were thrown out as a picket to Leia.

*The "pahul" is the initiation into the pale of the Sikh religion, and consists chiefly, I believe, of pledging attachment to its ordinances in a draught of water, which has been mystically stirred up with a sword, or other weapon of steel or iron.

Wearily and sleeplessly passed the night; the picket having ascertained the proximity of the enemy, fell back from Leia; and when morning dawned, there must be no delay in re-crossing to our own side of the Indus.

Then arose the question, who was to go over first? I found myself at the school-boy puzzle of the Fox and the Geese and the Ferryman.

If the faithless went over first, they would keep the boats on the other side, and leave the faithful to be cut up by the enemy; if the faithful went over first, the faithless might join the enemy unopposed, and carry one thousand disciplined soldiers into the ranks of rebellion.

At last, I settled it in this way. The artillery and cavalry were sent over first in two voyages; and when the boats returned the third time, I appointed one to every company of infantry, faithful and unfaithful, at intervals along the bank; and told all to step in to their respective boats at the first sound of a bugle, and at the second to push off and proceed.

This was done, but not without considerable excitement, which was now becoming irrepressible, as the enemy was known to be within a few miles; and when at last a Poorbeeuh and Sikh soldier drew their swords on each other, and the rest of their comrades were beginning to run together to the point, I thought all our pains were about to be thrown away at the last moment: but on my seizing both the combatants by the collar, and thrusting them into my own boat, and then ordering the bugler to sound for embarkation, the crowd broke sulkily up again, and got on board. Again the bugle rang out over the Indus; to my

irrepressible joy every boat pushed off, and we crossed that broad river in almost as perfect a military formation as a regiment in open column of companies taking ground to its left at a review.

Once on the right bank, I felt a match for the traitors; and as soon as all had disembarked, I called up the grey-headed Adjutant of the Poorbeeuhs, and put the boats under the charge of him and his men. " Take them," I said, "out of the main stream two miles up the branch that leads to Dera Futteh Khan; anchor them at the back of the island, and defend them with your lives against any one who attempts to take them from you."

Moolraj's army marched into Leia at the same time that we landed on the opposite bank, and threw out a reconnoitring party to the Indus without delay, to ascertain our position, and if possible secure some boats; but neither were to be seen. In the course of the day, however, as I afterwards learnt, an ambassador from their camp managed to make his way over to mine, and deliver two or three pairs of gold bracelets, which Moolraj had sent to officers of the Futteh Pultun. This of course was unknown to me; but there was quite enough of disaffection apparent among the Sikh soldiers to make me very anxious for General Cortlandt's arrival with the reinforcements.

He could not now be far off; and my attempt to make out his exact distance produced one of the most striking incidents I ever witnessed.

It was a custom of Sikh armies, when they wished to proclaim their own position to an ally, or ascertain his, to

fire two guns as soon as all was still at nightfall, to which the ally immediately replied, if he was within hearing.

This was well known to me, and I determined to try it on the night of 3rd May. About nine P.M., therefore, our two horse artillery guns were fired, and I bent an attentive ear for the response.

Scarcely had the echo died away, when eight guns and countless camel-swivels and muskets, rent the air with their discharge; but not in the desired direction. It was the defiance of the enemy at Leia, who maintained it with successive rounds for an hour.

Such a roar of hostile artillery, in the dead of night, made a powerful impression on our little camp; and, were it ceased, dismay had fallen on many a faithful heart, when—hark!—due north there rolls down the Indus the deep boom of a distant gun;—a minute's pause, and then another boom is heard. It is the answer to our signal—heard and understood alike in those two hostile camps, divided by the Indus. *We* knew that our friends had come, and *they* that their opportunity was gone.

The long interval of an hour, which occurred between my signal and General Cortlandt's reply, and which the enemy so efficiently filled up, was after wards thus explained. Our two guns were heard by the General's fleet, while still floating down the river; and they had to pull to the nearest shore, and disem bark a gun, before they could fire in reply.

By seven o'clock next morning, the reinforcing fleet of twenty-six boats anchored along side our camp, bringing the General, with Soobhan Khan's infantry regiment of

Muhommudans, and six horse-artillery guns. General Cortlandt brought this detachment from Bunnoo in the extraordinary short period of eight days, having marched to Dera Ishmael Khan, and thence taken boat. None saw clearer than he to what end these events were tending; none knew better the value of every hour.

CHAPTER II

THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF THE WAR ANSWERED, WHY A BRITISH ARMY DID NOT TAKE THE FIELD AT ONCE—ON THE FIRST NEWS OF THE MOOLTAN OUTBREAK, SIR F. CURRIE SENDS A SIKH FORCE TO PUT IT DOWN—HEARING NEXT OF THE ATTACK ON THE EEDGAH, HE RESOLVES TO ADD A BRITISH BRIGADE, AND CALLS ON GENERAL WHISH TO DISPATCH ONE—NEWS ARRIVES OF THE DEATH OF AGNEW AND ANDERSON—THE RESIDENT COUNTERMANDS THE BRITISH FORCE, AND INFORMS THE SIKH GOVERNMENT THAT THEY MUST PUT DOWN MOOLRAJ THEMSELVES—THE SIKHS DECLARE THEIR INABILITY—THE RESIDENT REPRESENTS TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF THE POLITICAL NECESSITY OF A BRITISH ARMY REDUCING MOOLTAN WITHOUT DELAY, BUT REFERS IT AS A MILITARY QUESTION TO LORD GOUGH—LORD GOUGH DECIDES AGAINST IT—SIR CHARLES NAPIER COINCIDES IN THE OPINION OF HIS PREDECESSOR—LORD DALHOUSIE SUMS UP THE ARGUMENT, ADOPTS THE RESPONSIBILITY, AND MAINTAINS THE WISDOM OF THE DECISION—THE AUTHOR SHOWS THAT IT WAS PROVIDENTIAL, AND THAT A SECOND SIKH WAR WAS UNAVOIDABLE.

CHAPTER II

In the preceding chapter, I have faithfully set forth how I myself came accidentally to be involved in the Mooltan war of 1848; and explained, perhaps for the first time, to many an English reader how a young subaltern officer, away from his own regiment, and engaged in civil and political duties, came ultimately to be at the head of a large irregular force, sometimes fighting battles with the enemy alone, sometimes in alliance with a regular British army.

But though this history pretends only to be a personal narrative of one individual's share in a great campaign, it is necessary for the right understanding of his position, to show the reader why any part of that campaign fell to the lot of one so humble; why military operations were carried on by make-shifts and stop-gaps for so many months; why, in short, they were not undertaken at once by *real* Generals and *real* armies.

For *prima facie* it would be natural to suppose that when an enemy to British India was in the field, a British-Indian army would proceed at once to put him down.

The threshold question of the war, therefore, is this: "Why did it *not*?"

Fortunately the "Blue Book" is most explicit on the point; and as it may not be uncourteous to suppose that few English readers have waded through its six hundred and sixty-five folio pages, I will, before going any farther, bring into juxta-position a few scattered extracts that will put the answer into a nut-shell.

The intelligence of the Mooltan outbreak, and the first assault on the British officers reached Sir Frederick Currie, Resident at Lahore, on April the 21st, 1848. On the 22nd, he informs the Governor-General he has taken steps to put it down:

"The affair does not appear to have been a premeditated one, as far as I can make out; and Moolraj's active concern in it is doubtful; his conduct, however, according to our present accounts, is very suspicious; at any rate, there was much excitement among the troops, and prompt measures to put down the disturbance are necessary. I have put in motion upon Mooltan, from different points, seven battalions of infantry, two of regular cavalry, three troops and batteries of artillery, and twelve hundred irregular horse. These will proceed on their way, or be stopped, according to the accounts I receive in the next twenty-four hours. A separate account of all expenses will be kept, and be charged to Moolraj, who has seventy lakhs of rupees, the plunder of the province, as his share in the division of the property of the late Dewan.

"The fort of Mooltan is very strong, and full of heavy cannon of large calibre. This cannot be taken possession of by force. Except the Mooltan garrison, Moolraj has not many troops, and only five or six field-

guns. He is very unpopular both with the army and the people; and it is generally thought, by the natives that he has been urged to what he has done by the machinations of unfriends, who desire to make him compromise himself with us, to effect his ruin."*

It will be observed that the death of the British officers was not then known; only the first assault on them, which seemed to have been unauthorized by Moolraj, and the work solely of his rebellious troops, whom the Sikh army and Sirdars, now despatched from Lahore, might prove sufficient to put down. On the 23rd, the news of the attack on the Eedgah, and the utter revolt of Moolraj, reached Sir Frederick, who seeing that the affair was more desperate than was before supposed, resolved to back up the Sikh army with a brigade of British troops. He writes accordingly on the 24th to the Governor-General, as follows:

"The immediate punishment of this outrage is imperative; but the consequences to be apprehended throughout the whole Punjab from this outbreak, and rebellion of Moolraj, unless instantly put down, are most serious.

"Measures the most prompt and decisive must be taken.

"I told your Lordship, in my last, that I had ordered all the disposable troops in any way available, of the Sikh army, to move upon Mooltan. I have ordered down all

*"Blue Book, 1847—49," p. 133.

the chiefs of the greatest note, and who have the deepest stake in the preservation of the present order of things, to the spot, with the few troops that were at Lahore, to be met at a rendezvous on this side of Mooltan by the force from Bunnoo, Attock, &c.

"But the case is very serious. The Sikh Sirdars whom I have sent may be implicitly relied on, and the influence they have with the soldiery they will make the best use of. But the soldiery themselves are not equally trustworthy; they are dispirited; not satisfied with their Sirdars; and have, as may be supposed, no very kindly feeling for us, or sympathy with the parties so treacherously massacred (if they are so) on this occasion.

"The movement in Mooltan appears to be the result of Puthan counsel and machination. The whole Puthan population, from Mooltan to Peshawur, Trans-Indus, are ripe for mischief."

(This was a mistake. It was the Puthan population, from Mooltan to the Salt Range at least, and every tribe of the Trans-Indus south of the same mountain barrier, which assisted me to shut Moolraj up in his citadel.)

"There are many thousand dissatisfied and discontented spirits throughout the Punjab—quiet, while all around them is quiet, but watching an opportunity for revolt and disturbance. A successful rebellion in Mooltan which this affair, if not immediately put down will become, would kindle a flame through the land which it would be very difficult to extinguish.

"I have weighed all circumstances well, and am keenly alive to the many great objections to the measure;

but I consider the necessity paramount, and have determined on moving the British movable column from Lahore upon Mooltan, if the intelligence I may receive by sunset today is not more favourable than my fears anticipate.

"I came to this determination yesterday afternoon, and immediately communicated it, privately and presonally to the Major-General commanding the division.

"The place of the troops which move from Lahore will be supplied, temporarily, from Ferozepoor.

"The knowledge that the British army is in motion from Lahore and Ferozepoor, will, in all probability, settle the affair at once, and the demonstration only will be necessary. Confidence will be given to the Lahore troops and to the country; an immediate check will, it is to be hoped, be put to the hopes and movements of the disaffected; and the British troops will not, I trust, have many marches to make this weather.

"Had the case been less urgent than I consider it, I should never have consented to move the British troops at this season of the year, and on such a distant expedition; but I feel that the peace of the frontier, and perhaps of much more than the frontier, or the Punjab, depends on the measure.

"The season is an exceedingly mild one, and as yet the weather is not oppressive; but, in another month, it will be so; and Mooltan is a very hot place. The General and the Brigadier, however, are not apprehensive of the health of the troops, if they get back before the rains.

"As I said before, I trust demonstration will be sufficient."*

The Resident's official call on General Whish for troops is as follows:

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO MAJOR-GENERAL
"W. S. WHISH, C.B., COMMANDING THE PUNJAB
"DIVISION

"Lahore, April 24th, 1848.

"It is with much regret that I inform you, that circumstances have arisen which make it necessary that a British force should march immediately towards Mooltan.

"The late Nazim of Mooltan, Dewan Moolraj, having requested to be relieved of his government, and urged the Durbar and the British Resident to send another officer as Governor, and make arrangements for the administration of the province, has, on their arrival at Mooltan, treacherously attacked the British officers, Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew of the Civil Service, and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European Regiment, and the Sikh Governor, with their escort; and, as it is feared, destroyed them all.

"Dewan Moolraj is now, with his troops, in open rebellion to the British Government; and it is necessary that he, and those remaining his adherents, be captured, and the rebellion quelled.

*"Punjab Blue Book," p. 137.

"A Sikh force, with some of the chiefs of the highest rank of the Lahore Durbar, has been sent to Mooltan to coerce the Dewan; but to insure success—to assure the people of the country, and to check the spread of rebellion and disaffection—a demonstration by a British force, and, if necessary, active operations for the capture of Dewan Moolraj, and the dispersion of his troops and followers, are absolutely necessary.

"The Sikh force has marched. It is desirable that the British column should move, with as little delay as possible."*

Scarcely had the move of British troops been resolved upon, than news arrives from Bhawulpoor giving the melancholy but expected result of the attack by Moolraj's troops on the position of the British officers at Mooltan.

This, in the Resident's opinion, "quite alters the aspect of affairs;" and he again addresses the Governor-General of India.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

"Lahore, April 25th, 1848.

"In my letter of yesterday, I told your Lordship that, if I heard nothing before sunset of the fate of the British officers, Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, and the new Governor of Mooltan, with the Sikh escort, I should address to the General commanding the Lahore

*"Punjab Blue Book," p. 138.

division an official application for a British force to move towards Mooltan.

"I received no intelligence, and in the evening therefore I sent to Major-General Whish the letter, of which the enclosure is a copy. (Alluding to letter last quoted).

"Finding that the General did not propose sending any heavy guns with the column, I intended to-day to explain to him that I considered the demonstration incomplete without them, and that for active operations it would be ineffective.

"This morning, I received information, *via* Bhawulpoor, of the sad proceedings at Mooltan, which quite alters the aspect of affairs.

"I enclose, for your Lordship's information, the statement of the distressing and disgraceful transactions, sent to me by Peer Ibraheem Khan, the British Agent at Bhawulpoor."*

It will be more convenient for the reader if I insert the statement here.

"STATEMENT OF PEER IBRAHEEM KHAN, BRITISH AGENT "AT BHAWULPOOR.

"Bhawulpoor, April 24th, 1848.

"A letter has reached me from Mooltan to the following effect. On the 20th instant, the guns began to

"*Blue Book," p. 139.

play on the mosque where the British officers were, and at nightfall the officers of the Sikh artillery went over, with their men, to the enemy. Sirdar Khan Sing Man, by the permission of Mr. Vans Agnew, begged for quarter, upon which he was seized, and the two gentlemen killed.

"Dewan Moolraj bestowed great praises on the soldiers who brought in their heads; and presented a pair of golden bracelets to Hurdas Sing, a jemadar of the insurgent troops. He gave also one hundred rupees to some of the soldiers, and said, 'All the rest will receive similar rewards.' He then sent out people, with messages to Dera Ghazee Khan, Sungurh, and other districts in Mooltan, instructing his officials to collect soldiers, and stating that all those who made their appearance quickly would be taken into his service.

"The Government news-writer in Mooltan was forbidden to send intelligence under pain of punishment. Abdool Ghufoor Khan, jemadar of the Zumboorkhana, seized a Lahore messenger, and brought him before Moolraj, who took from him all his papers, and gave orders for cutting off entirely all communication between Mooltan and Lahore.

"The officers in command of the cavalry were directed to send out patrols on the Lahore, Bhawulpoor, and Dera Ghazee Khan roads, with orders to intercept all messengers.

"The Dewan then wrote to his brother, Sham Sing, Governor of the district of Shoojabad, directing him to take at once into his service all the soldiers he could collect, and to send them to Mooltan.

"From the day of the disturbance, the Dewan has been busily employed in getting together, and inspecting his troops, in laying in stores, and in collecting money.

"The Kardars of Mooltan have been instructed to levy at once the first instalment of the spring crop. The zumeendars seem disposed to try to evade paying the revenue."*

The base desertion of the British officers by their Sikh escort, related in the above statement, destroys the Resident's confidence in the other Sikh force sent against Mooltan; and determines him not to send the British brigade to assist them.

"Your Lordship will, with me, feel the deepest indignation and regret at the cowardly and treacherous destruction of these most promising and valuable young officers.

"But, as I said before, the whole nature of the case is altered by this narrative.

"I had determined at all hazards, under the emergency of the case, to support the Durbar troops and Sirdars in coercing an officer in rebellion against the Sikh Government and the British authorities, and offering armed opposition to those troops.

"Your Lordship will observe, that the Durbar troops to a man, went over to the rebellious force; the

*"Punjab Blue Book," pp. 138, 9.

Sirdar made terms for himself; and the British officers were left to be cruelly butchered, being the only individuals of the whole party who were injured.

"We may expect that the other troops of the Durbar, marching on Mooltan, may act a similar part, and that the British reserve, sent to support and succour, would find itself opposed to supposed friends and foes, united together against it.

"I could not consent, under any circumstances, to send a British force on such an expedition, whatever may be the result and consequences of the state of things which will follow, to the continuance of the Sikh Government.

"I have intimated to the General that the British column will not be moved now, on the service mentioned in my letter of yesterday.

"That condign punishment must be visited on those who committed this perfidious outrage and insult to the British Government,' is indispensable; but at this season of the year, operations of the magnitude which will now be required, and at such a distance as Mooltan from our reserves and magazines, cannot, I fear, be thought of."*

The British reserve thus withdrawn, the Sikh commanders of the advanced force are recalled to be informed that they must put down their rebellious Governor themselves. Their avowal of inability to do so, and the Resident's consequent opinion that the British army, unassisted by the Sikhs, should undertake to reduce Moolraj at once, are next reported to the Governor-General.

*"Blue Book," p. 139.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

"Lahore, April 27th, 1848.

" In my letter to your Lordship of the day before yesterday, I mentioned that I had recalled three of the chiefs who had started for Mooltan, for the purpose of explaining to them that, under the circumstances which had transpired, I would send no British force in aid of the Durbar troops, in putting down the rebellion in Mooltan.

"The chiefs returned yesterday morning, and having heard what I had to say regarding the necessity of their putting down the rebellion, and bringing the offenders to justice, by their own means, as the only hope of saving their Government, they retired to consult and concert measures. In the evening they came to me again, and sat in consultation till very late. I could not, therefore, write to your Lordship yesterday.

" After much discussion, they declared themselves unable without British aid to coerce Dewan Moolraj in Mooltan, and bring the perpetrators of the outrage which has been described to your Lordship to justice. They admitted that their troops were not to be depended on to act against Moolraj, especially the regular army of the State; and they recommended that these corps should be kept in their former positions, to maintain the peace of their respective provinces, and to prevent, as far as possible, the spread of the rebellion.*

*It is not extraordinary that the Sikh Durbar should have known their own troops so well; but it is very remarkable that they should have given such good advice. A Sikh army was ultimately permitted to approach Mooltan, under Rajah Sher Sing, and its desertion *en masse* converted the Mooltan rebellion into a Sikh war.

"This service they thought the Sikh troops might be depended on to perform, under the arrangements they proposed for the chiefs, with their personal followers, going out themselves into the provinces; more especially, if speedy measures were taken by the British Government for the occupation of Mooltan.

"After what has happened, I feel that, if the question were one merely affecting the maintenance of the Sikh Government, and the preserving the tranquillity of their provinces, we should scarcely be justified in expending more British blood and British treasure in such service.

"But the question is one which very deeply concerns the British interests, apart from all considerations connected with our treaty with the Maharajuh's Government, at Bhyrowal.

"If this outrage and insult to the British Government be not punished, and that speedily—if Dewan Moolraj is allowed to extend his machinations for rebellion and revolt—we may expect that the Afghans will take advantage of the state of things, and of Moolraj's invitation and encouragement, to establish themselves upon the Indus.

"If general tumult and disturbance spread through the Punjab, moreover, there is reason to fear that the Cis-Sutlej territory, under Major Mackeson's Commissionership, will not remain quiet: there are thousands of the late Sikh soldiery in the Manjha, who will aid Moolraj by every means in their power; they are giving out, generally, that Moolraj is the person indicated in the prophecies of their priesthood, who is to restore the Khalsa supremacy.

"I have addressed the Commander-in-Chief, stating the political urgency of the case, and consulting him as to the possibility of undertaking military operations, on the scale required, at this season of the year.

"I send, for your Lordship's information, and any orders the Supreme Government may desire to give, a copy of my letter, just written to the Commander-in-Chief.

"I must beg your Lordship to consider these letters as addressed to you in Council. They contain all the information I have to furnish, and if I am to write an official narrative of the occurrences of the past week, it would only be a recapitulation of what I have reported to your Lordship daily.

"I have not time to prepare such a document: I am overwhelmed with references, night and day; every chief has to receive his separate instructions from myself, over and over again; if my health were to fail under the work, there is not a person here to give a single direction of any kind. I intend, therefore, should the necessity arise, to apply for the co-operation of Mr. John Lawrence; a step of which I hope your Lordship will approve.

"P.S.—I have just discovered in the office a memorandum of the fort of Mooltan, with a sketch made by Lieutenant Anderson, in September last, the officer who was killed there, on the 20th instant, with Mr. Vans Agnew; a copy of the memorandum and sketch was sent to Government, with Mr. Lawrence's letter of the 22nd of September."*

*"Blue Book," pp. 140, 1.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-"CHIEF.

"COPY ENCLOSED IN THE ABOVE.

"Lahore, April 27th, 1848.

"I had the honour to write to your Lordship by express the day before yesterday, sending you an extract from my letter of that date to Lord Dalhousie, stating the circumstances under which I had determined to forego my intention of marching the movable column from Lahore, to aid the Durbar troops in putting down disturbances in Mooltan.

"In the other part of my letter to the Governor-General, I reported that I had recalled to Lahore the chiefs who had marched that morning, to communicate to them the intelligence which had reached me after they had left, and to explain to them that, in the altered state of the case, I could not consent to send a British force in support of troops who had proved themselves so treacherous.

"The chiefs returned to Lahore yesterday; and I had them with me till late last night.

'They distinctly declare themselves, without the aid of a British force, unable to take measures to reduce the fort of Mooltan, into which Moolraj has thrown himself, and without the reduction of which the rebellion cannot be put down.

"As a question of British policy, unconnected with that of the Punjab administration, and the interests of the Sikh Government, it is a matter of the last importance that

the rebellion on that frontier should be put down with as little delay as possible. The consequences of revolt and rebellion spreading on this frontier, from Mooltan to Peshawur, may be of vital importance to the interests of British India. They could not, moreover, it is to be feared, be confined to that part of the country.

"In a political point of view, I am satisfied that it is of the utmost importance to the interests of British India, that *a force should move upon Mooltan, capable of reducing the fort and occupying the city, irrespective of the aid of the Durbar troops, and, indeed, in the face of any opposition which those in that quarter might present in aid of the enemy.*

"It is for your Lordship to determine, in a military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the year.

"The military resources of Mooltan are very inconsiderable; a large unorganized rabble may join Moolraj's standard, but even if aided by a portion of the Durbar troops in their present condition (which he certainly would not be, if a large British force were put in motion), Moolraj could make no effectual resistance outside his fort. The fort is the difficulty, and its strength and position are said to be such that, if ably defended, it would require operations on an extended scale to reduce it.

"The season of the year is much advanced; the heat in the province of Mooltan in the months of May and June is very great; when the river rises at the end of June, the fort is said to be insulated by the inundation, which extends for one or two miles on all sides. In the head-quarters' offices, however, there will be more information

regarding the strength of the place than I can at this moment furnish.

"The question, as a military one, must be determined by your Lordship.

"The political urgency is very great.

"Eventually, these operations must be undertaken if they could be so at once, they would not be required on so large a scale as, I fear, may be necessary if they are deferred till after the rains.

"I believe the siege-train is at Ferozepoor, whence there is a water-carriage for large boats to the ghauts opposite Bhawulpoor, about forty miles from Mooltan. The Nuwab of Bhawulpoor is a friendly ally. Supplies would be abundant.

"Ferozepoor is sixteen marches from Mooltan. Shikarpoor is about the same distance.

"It would not be expedient at the present moment to take from the force at Lahore any troops, without supplying their places from other quarters, except perhaps one of the royal regiments; the 53rd is so strong that a wing would be sufficient for the Anarkullee cantonment, while the other wing might occupy the quarters in the city.

"I have informed the Major-General commanding the division of the general purport of this letter to you personally, that he may be prepared for my orders he may receive from your Lordship.

"I send this letter by express this morning, that your Lordship may be able to determine the question with

as little delay as possible, though I cannot but fear that your Lordship may consider the military difficulties, owing to the season of the year, as insurmountable."*

The passage which I have italicized in the above letter, expresses strongly that the Resident, after entertaining other expedients for a few days, was at last deliberately of opinion, that the siege of Mooltan should be undertaken at once by the British troops, notwithstanding the advanced season of the year. The Resident had authority, on his own responsibility, to act on this conviction of political necessity, and call on the Commander-in-Chief to furnish troops; but as a civilian, he seems to have felt the difficulty of taking such a step on his own judgment, and referred it in the shape of a military question to the Commander-in-Chief, who, looking at it, as he was bound to do, in a military light alone, decided against it in the following letter.

"THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA TO THE RESIDENT "AT LAHORE

"Simla, April 30th, 1848.

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, which reached me, by express, at nine o'clock P.M. yesterday, stating your opinion of the expediency of putting down the rebellion at Mooltan with the least practicable delay, by a British force, irrespective of aid from the Durbar troops; setting forth the difficulties attending it; and calling upon me to determine, in a

*See "Blue Book," p. 142.

military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the year. I shall ever be ready to take upon myself responsibility, when unforeseen circumstances imperatively call for prompt and decisive measures, and I should not have shrunk from recommending a movement could I have conceived that by so doing the lives of the two officers who have been sacrificed could have been saved, or a body of troops rescued. Neither of those objects is now, unfortunately, to be attained; but from what you state in your letter, corroborated by Burnes and Elphinstone, there can be no doubt that operations against Mooltan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain, if not altogether impracticable; whilst a delay in attaining the object, would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apprehend, be undertaken.

"It is, therefore, unnecessary to enter upon the many difficulties and delays consequent upon assembling a force at this side of the Sutlej, to undertake the reduction of Mooltan at this season; and I entirely concur in the inexpediency of weakening Lahore, under the very uncertain disposition of the Sikh army which you describe."*

As the opinion of every great soldier on a point like this has an enduring value, I trust I may add to the above, without any breach of confidence, the assurance given to me by Lord Gough's successor, that his decision would have been the same. "I would not have taken the field at that time," said His Excellency Sir Charles Napier;

*"Blue Book," pp. 142, 3.

"I would have prepared at once for the war, and have sent you money and arms to do Moolraj as much mischief as you could in the meantime."

Lastly, the "Blue Book" gives us, in one of the ablest State Papers that Indian affairs have ever elicited, the following summary of the whole question:

"THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE

"Camp, Sidham, April 7th, 1849.

* * * * *

(After recapitulating the facts of the outbreak, and the Resident's application to the Commander-in-Chief; he proceeds as follows:)

"The Commander-in-Chief replied that operations at that time against Mooltan would be 'uncertain, if not altogether impracticable, while a delay in attaining the object would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged,' and he gave his decided opinion against the movement which was proposed. The Resident concurred in His Excellency's view, and the Governor-General in Council after full deliberation, confirmed the decision.

"As the wisdom and propriety of this resolution have subsequently been questioned, I trust that you will permit me to repeat the declaration, which was made to you at the time, that, in referring to the opinions of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident, I do not desire to throw upon others any portion of the responsibility which attaches to that resolution.

"The decision was the decision of the Governor-General in Council, and on him the responsibility must rest.

"The question which the Governor-General in Council was called upon to consider was a difficult and perplexing one.

"On the one hand, it was impossible to doubt that, if there existed in the minds of the people of the Punjab any inclination to rise against the British power, a delay in visiting the outrage committed at Mooltan, and the apparent impunity of the offender would give strong encouragement to an outbreak, which might spread over the whole Punjab. On the other hand, it was equally clear that there would be serious danger to the health, and to the very existence of European troops, in commencing extended military operations at such a season of the year.

"The risks which are incurred by the exposure of troops in carrying on military operations in the hot and rainy months are too well known to require description or corroboration.

"Whatever the danger of the season in Hindoostan, the Government of India had every reason to believe, both from the information that had been received, and from experience of the effects of climate in neighbouring provinces, that the ordinary danger would have been greatly aggravated to troops engaged in operations at Mooltan.

"The fierceness of the heat of Mooltan is reputed to exceed that of any other district, and is such as to have passed into a proverb even, in India.

"The Government were in possession of plans of the fortress, which, though rude, were sufficient to show that it was formidable in its character, and would require time and ample means for its reduction.

"We were already in the month of May.

"The distance which the troops would have had to traverse was considerable. As the garrison at Lahore could not be materially weakened with safety, some time must have elapsed before troops could have been assembled, and could have reached Mooltan.

"Thus, the toil of siege operations must have been commenced and carried on against a fortress of formidable strength, during the very worst season of the year, and in the worst district in India.

"The Government conceived that there was good ground for His Excellency's belief that a fearful loss of life among the British troops would have been the consequence of this movement.

"Moreover, the sickness and loss of life would not have been the only danger; for this involved in itself the further danger of a necessary discontinuance of operations against the fort. A failure of those operations would have afforded even greater encouragement to risings in the Punjab than a postponement of them would have given; while we should have been thereby compelled to enter on the subsequent struggle with a force greatly reduced, both in strength and confidence.

"These were grave considerations upon which the Government of India was called upon to determine.

"It was a choice of difficulties—an alternative of evils; and the Government of India selected that which appeared the lesser evil of the two. I venture still to maintain that the decision was not an error. It is, at all events, satisfactory to one to know that the course which I adopted was in accordance with the opinions of the highest military authorities in this country, and in accordance also with the opinions of those in England, who must be regarded by all as the highest authorities there on matters connected with warfare in India.

"It is, above all, satisfactory to me to know that the determination was approved by those whom I have the honour to serve, and that you not only cordially concurred in 'the resolution to abstain from all movements of British troops upon Mooltan until the season should admit of field operations,' but that you entirely agreed with me in preferring the risk which might arise from delay in putting down insurrection, 'to the certain difficulties of an immediate advance upon the revolted province.'

"Whether the immediate commencement at that time of the siege of Mooltan would, or would not, have averted the war that has occurred, can never now be determined. But this, at least, is certain, that if the short delay which took place in punishing the murder of two British officers at Mooltan, could produce an universal rising against us throughout all the Punjab, the very fact itself betokens the existence of a deep and wide-spread feeling of hostility against us, which could not long have been repressed.

"The worst that can be alleged, therefore, against the delay is, that it precipitated the crisis; and opened

somewhat earlier to the Sikhs that opportunity for renewal of war, which, sooner or later, so bitter a spirit of hostility must have soon created for itself."*

The above argument of the question leaves it on its permanent historical basis. The opinions of all authorities are given without concealment; the circumstances are enumerated and weighed, and the responsibility of the decision is frankly accepted with a generous wish to relieve others if it were unwise, but a sustained conviction that it was wise.

Time, that great conciliator, who hates all salient angles, and never leaves square stones till they have consented to roll on in amicable roundness through the world, has long ago smoothed off the asperities of the war of 1848-9; and I have collected together the above opinions not to re-open old discussions, but to close them in a form that may be profitable to the student who searches history for either military or political lessons.

In the words of Lord Dalhousie, it "can now never be determined, whether the immediate commencement at that time of the siege of Mooltan, would, or would not, have averted the war." The reader of this narrative will discover, from many passages, that it was my own belief at that time, that had the Mooltan rebellion been put down at once, the Sikh insurrection would never have grown out of it; it was a belief shared, moreover, (as well as I remember) by every political officer in the Punjab, and I for one still

*See continuation of "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—9," pp. 656, 7.

think so now: but so far from regarding this as matter for regret, I see in it only the strongest example that ever came within my own experience, of human judgment overruled by Providence for good.

Had Mooltan fallen to the British arms in June or July, 1848, before the father-in-law and brother-in-law of Maharajuh Duleep Sing, or any other Sikh chiefs shared in the rebellion of the Viceroy at Mooltan, it may reasonably be doubted whether the whole Punjab would have been annexed to British India in March, 1849;* and supposing, for the sake of argument, that the most favourable circumstances had then succeeded, and that "on the 4th of September of the year 1854,"† it had been the office of the Governor-General of India, in fulfilment of treaties permitted to remain in force, to withdraw all British troops and officers from the Punjab, and hand that country over to its youthful Sovereign, with a revenue improved by peace, an exchequer replenished by honesty and economy, and an army improved by discipline—is there any one still,

*Lord Dalhousie, in considering the possibility of such a termination to the war, thus justly, yet moderately, expressed his resolution:

"You will, however, not fail to make it clearly understood that the Government which you represent is neither indifferent nor inactive; but that, fully prepared for every event, and deeply resenting all that has occurred, they will assuredly inflict severe punishment, and exact a heavy reparation. You may inform the Durbar that the extent of that reparation will greatly depend on the manner in which the State of Lahore shall be found to have observed its engagements, and fulfilled its obligations towards that Government which has hitherto shown itself so full of moderation and friendship towards the Government of Lahore."—*Secretary to Government of India to Resident at Lahore, May 19th*, 1848. "*Blue Book*," p. 176.

†Article 11. Articles of agreement between the British Government and Lahore Durbar, concluded 16th December, 1846.

whom the experience of the last five years has informed so little in the character of the Sikh nation, as to believe that a sincere friendship would have grown up meanwhile between the Christian and Hindoo States, that the peace of the frontier would have lasted for a year, and the "second Sikh war" have been avoided?

I scarcely think it. The "existence of a deep and wide-spread feeling of hostility against us, which could not long have been repressed," was, indeed, unquestionably revealed in the rising of 1848. What its cause was is now of little moment; though, to obviate a sneer, I may as well declare my own belief that it was the wounded vanity of an idolatrous and hitherto conquering nation, which, believing itself invincible, and destined to expel Christianity from Asia, invaded British India in defiance of treaties in 1845; was, to the astonishment of itself and Hindoo India, met with firmness, defeated with disgrace, driven back to its capitals and fortresses with confusion, and then—unkindest cut of all—forgiven with magnanimity.

Justly then might it be concluded in the words of the Governor-General, that "the worst that can be alleged against the delay is, that it precipitated the crisis, and opened somewhat earlier to the Sikhs that opportunity for renewal of war which, sooner or later, so bitter a spirit of hostility must have created for itself."

But the argument may be carried one step farther, by a consideration legitimate in retrospect, though it would have been dishonourable as a motive for action.

It is this: that the Sikhs, interpreting delay into weakness, "precipitated the crisis" before it was ripe for

their purpose. Instead of waiting till 1854 saw their strong posts abandoned by British soldiers, and occupied by their own countrymen; instead of waiting till the Sutlej again flowed between them and the avenger; they impatiently took up arms when their capital and Sovereign were in the hands of their enemies, when a British garrison was in Govindgurh, and when a bridge of boats was riding on the Sutlej. The campaign of 1848 opened at the point where that of 1846 left off—with the British army in possession of the Punjab.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL CORTLANDT ASCERTAINS THE DISLOYALTY OF THE SIKHS IN CAMP—THE SPIES' REPORT OF THE REBEL FORCE—CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM IT—CHANGE OF GROUND—ENLISTMENT GOES ON IN BOTH CAMPS—MOOLRAJ RECALLS HIS ARMY FROM LEIA TO MOOLTAN—THE AUTHOR RE-OCCUPIES LEIA WITH A PICKET—AN AMBASSADOR FROM MOOLRAJ—HIS DOUBLE MISSION—HE DEMANDS A FAIR TRIAL FOR MOOLRAJ, AND DECLARES THE INTENTION OF THE MOOLTANEE PUTHANS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE REBELLION—HIS ACCOUNT OF THE REBELLION—HE IS DISMISSED WITH TWO GUARANTEES—MOTIVES AND CHARACTER OF DEWAN MOOLRAJ.

CHAPTER III

One of the first duties which I intrusted to General Cortlandt, after joining me at Dera Futteh Khan, was that of thoroughly ascertaining the condition of the suspected Futteh Pultun. This his long familiarity with Sikh soldiers would enable him to do much better than I could: he had Sikh orderlies attached to him, who would worm any secret out their countrymen; and he had above all an honourable partiality for the Sikh army, in which he had served so many years, which would make him glad to exculpate the regiment if he could, and correct my own prejudices against them.

The General was fully alive to the importance of an inquiry on which the safety of the whole camp might any day depend; and spared no pains to ascertain the truth.

In particular, his Sikh orderlies had leave to spend the day with their friends in the Sikh regiment; and under the genial influence of a full stomach, the brightly dawning prospects of the Khalsa nation, the strange and unexpected fulfilment of Sikh prophecies by Moolraj, who was no Sikh but a mere Kuthree, the patriotic behaviour of poor Agnews escort in going over, the ability displayed by the Sikh garrison of Mooltan in making Moolraj's ambition a tool to

embroil the British in another war, the bold manifesto they had sent to the Futteh Pultun at Leia, how the Futteh Pultun hailed it, and sent off deputies to Mooltan to sell their services, the rewards Moolraj had held out in reply, the heavy gold bangles he had clinked and jingled in their ears, the dispatch of a rebel force against us to bring things to a crisis, my untimely suspicions and retreat, their difficulty in acting without knowing how the great Sirdars were inclined, and what the chief Sikh cantonments meant to do, the dispatch of emissaries to Bunnoo and Peshawur, and meanwhile the resolve of the Futteh Pultun at all events not to fight against Moolraj;—all these topics were unreservedly canvassed, and such a thoroughly treacherous and disaffected spirit displayed, such a greedy looking forward to the coming revolution with its plunder and rewards, that the spies summed up their report to the General in the evening with the emphatic figure, "that the mouths of the Futteh Pultun were as wide open as they could go, and would swallow anything."

This being the alarming state of the Sikhs in our own camp, we next sent over spies to that of the enemy at Leia.

They returned in the evening of May 5th, and reported the rebel force to consist of four infantry regiments (among them the Ghoorkhas who deserted Agnew and Anderson), two thousand Puthan, and one thousand Sikh and Punjabee cavalry, eight horse-artillery guns, two heavy ditto, sixty camel-swivels, and two more heavy guns coming up from the rear;—in fact almost the whole of Moolraj's disposable force at that time, and under the command of his brother Sham Sing.

Having myself no letters as yet from the Resident, I was obliged to draw conclusions from the movements of the enemy.

It was clear that he had neither news of an army coming against him from Lahore, nor expectation of one being sent, else he dared not have thrown all his strength across the Chenab, to oppose a single British officer with a mere detachment. I could only conjecture, therefore, that the season was declared too far advanced for a British army to take the field; that the Resident thought a Sikh army would be worse than none; and that consequently no operations would be undertaken against Mooltan during that hot season.

Should that course be adopted, Moolraj would be at liberty, for some months, to turn his arms in whatever direction he chose; and the force he had already dispatched to Leia showed his decided predilection for destroying *me*.

In the direction of Lahore he had little to hope for; the capital was held by a strong British garrison.

The Peshawur and Huzaruh forces doubtless contained as many partizans as soldiers; but they were too remote to be tempted by demonstrations at this early stage of the rebellion.

There remained only the province of Dera Ishmael Khan, adjoining Moolraj's own frontier. In this tempting quarter, Moolraj beheld a large Sikh force engaged in a most unpopular duty—the reduction of Bunnoo—under an officer who had dared to advance into his territory to the rescue of his victims; and nothing seemed more probable than that

Moolraj would amuse himself for the summer with the annexation of the Upper Derajat.

Looking round me for the means of meeting such a campaign, I saw clearly that, exert myself as I might in the enlistment of the border tribes, I never could keep them together in sufficient numbers to perform the double office of overawing doubtful friends and fighting open enemies, without a large exchequer.

Old soldiers, and loyal soldiers, don't like fighting long without pay; but mercenaries will not fight at all.

Where was I to get money from? The revenues of General Cortlandt's province were insufficient to pay the Sikh troops already in it; and the treasury at Lahore was emptied by the ordinary expenses of the State as fast as revenues came in. There was not room for another drummer-boy's fist in the Sikh military-chest.

One way alone was open to me to get money, and that was to take it from Moolraj; to defend my own provinces by taking *his* and feed my own soldiers out of the revenues of the country they could wrest from *him*.

I thought this feasible, if I could get an ally to help me, if only by distracting the enemy's attention; and, on the 5th of May, I wrote to ask the Resident for the assistance of Bhawul Khan, the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, a Muhommudan Prince, whose territory was only divided from that of Mooltan by the Sutlej, and whose character for fidelity to the British Government stood high.

If not, I begged him to send me no more Sikhs!

On the 6th of May, the rapid rising of the Indus threatened soon to overwhelm us, unless we moved away from the margin of its banks; and I reconnoitered the country for a better spot to encamp in. The country people showed me one in the direction of the fort of Girang but I feared the moral effect of a retrograde movement, however small, and determined to move to the front, if it were only a mile.

Enlisting was now going actively on in the camps on both sides the Indus; and on this day, while stout old Ali Khan, of Kolachee (the owner of the Pushtoo Bible), and his son, Kaloo Khan (both carried in litters, the one from sickness, and the other from wounds in the Nassur fight), were entering our camp with one hundred and fifty Gundapoor juzailchees, their rude banners flying, and bag-pipes screaming martially, the rebels on the other bank were burning the house and village of Ghamun Khan, Ronguh, a zumeendar of Moolraj's, who had joined our standard. Ghamun Khan escaped with his women and his sword, the two sources of honour and disgrace; but his farmer's heart was hard to be comforted for the crops he had lost.

Nor was this example calculated to get me any more recruits from the Sindh Sagur. Had I been able to make a stand at a Leia, the majority of the mercenaries of that country would, I believe, have sided against Moolraj; but my retirement from Trans-Indus, and the advance of Sham Sing's army on Leia recovered the Dewan's *prestige*, and sent hundreds daily across the Chenab to be enlisted in the ranks of rebellion.

The tribes of Dera Ghazee Khan, and the mountains beyond it, argued in the same way. They loved not

Moolraj; but they were poor, and desired military service. If they joined the rebels, success on that side would ensure permanent employment; but on the side of the Maharajuh and the British, it could only be the signal for their discharge.

While, therefore, my own levies were coming in better than I could have hoped, I still heard of numerous parties of fifty or one hundred, making their way to the southern ferries of the Indus; and in every village found a purwanna from Moolraj in the small and beautiful handwriting of his low-bred Counsellor and Secretary, Futteh Khan, the oilman, inviting some chief or other in flattering terms to give "his vote and interest"—and sword.

On the 7th of May, there was another shifting of the scenes. The rebel army broke up from Leia and retreated with such precipitation that all discipline was lost. Moolraj's orders to his brother were "to make Mooltan in two marches, a feat just possible, the distance being forty-five koss, with a broad river to cross."*

Many reasons were given out by the rebels for this move; but believing that it could only be to defend Mooltan from some of our approaching armies, I once more crossed a picket of one hundred horsemen over the Indus to Leia, to gain intelligence for our future guidance. Ruttun Chund, Moolraj's Governor, once more abandoned his government, and fled with his guards, leaving some artillery horses and other impediments behind him, and the picket took peaceful possession of the city.

*See "Punjab Blue Book," p. 161.

On the 8th of May, I received a letter from the Resident, dated April 29th! It informed me that he approved of all I had done, and had written to me constant letters (none of which I had received), containing full instructions (of which I was consequently ignorant).

Later in the day a second letter-bag came in (the communication being no longer intercepted by the enemy). It contained only a short note; but this conveyed the Resident's explicit instructions to keep to the right bank of the river, protect my own province, and do all in my power to secure the fidelity of the regular troops with me. This last I had already done, by enlisting Puthans to overawe them; and with reference to the two former points, so long as our main body was Trans-Indus, no danger and many advantages could arise from keeping a picket at Leia.

A still more urgent communication next came in. It was from Moolraj's right-hand man, Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, who had come in one day all the way from Mooltan to Sooltan Kee Kote, twelve miles from Leia, to deliver a message from his master, and requested my right-hand man, Foujdar Khan, to meet him and receive it. Foujdar was of opinion that the Ambassador was too honourable a man to leave Moolraj without his consent, and too useful to be sent on any but the most important business. So I sent Foujdar Khan off in a boat, full of trusty followers, to float down the Indus to the ferry nearest Sooltan Kee Kote, and ordered him on no account to land in the enemy's country; but send word to Moostapha Khan that he might come down to the river if he had anything to say.

My impression was that Moolraj had thoughts of surrender; so I not only complied with his Ambassador's request, but wrote a few lines of invitation to Moostapha Khan to come to my own camp, if he had anything of importance to communicate to me.

He accepted the invitation and returned next day with Foujdar Khan.

His commission was a fair specimen of Oriental diplomacy. It consisted of two parts; one public, the other private.

The private instructions were to buy over Foujdar Khan, whose utility to me made him obnoxious to the rebels.

The public orders were to inquire if I had authority to treat with Moolraj; and if so, what assurances I could give him if he surrendered?

To the latter, I replied, that neither I, nor the Resident at Lahore, nor any one else, had authority to stand between the murderer of the two British officers, and the retributive justice which their countrymen would demand.

Moostapha Khan met this by warmly defending his master from the guilt of that cowardly deed, and said that all Moolraj demanded was "justice and a fair trial." This he repeated so often and earnestly, that I really believed Moolraj's heart misgave him, and that he was seriously entertaining the design of coming in, and throwing all the blame upon his soldiers. I did not believe, that in a Court

of Justice he could ever establish his innocence to the satisfaction of any one of common sense: but if he wished for the opportunity, I conceived it to be my duty to assure him that a fair trial in a British Court of Justice would be granted him at any time, and both life and honour be safe, if he were pronounced not guilty.

Public business being thus transacted, the envoy turned to his private memoranda.

He had ascertained, on the road, that Foujdar Khan was not "for sale" at present, having already found a purchaser, with whose chances of ultimate success he was well content. Moreover, Foujdar managed to convince him that it would be a much better stroke of business to sell himself, and the rest of their mutual countrymen, the Puthan officers of Moolraj's garrison.

To do Moostapha Khan and his Puthan friends justice, they had little heart in their master's rebellion; some of them (among whom was Moostapha) had even refused to set their seals to the oath of allegiance in such a cause; and all would have gladly seen the affair brought to a termination.

What they most ardently desired was, if possible, to induce the Dewan to surrender; in which case they would have surrendered with him, and their honour and fidelity as soldiers remained free from stain. But if this could not be brought about, then they were generally resolved to separate themselves from Moolraj, but not to act on the side of the Maharajuh and the British.

Moostapha Khan, therefore, now acted on what he knew to be the secret plans of his countrymen in Mooltan.

He had secured a written promise of a fair trial for Moolraj, and would use it on his return to the Dewan as a new argument for surrender. But he had in his own mind little expectation of success, and turned with greater earnestness to the alternative.

Before entering into any negotiation with the Puthan portion of the Mooltan garrison, I thought it only right to ascertain distinctly what share they had taken in the murder of my own countrymen. For as yet I only knew, by common report, that the Puthans were the anti-war, and the Sikhs and Poorbeeuhs the war party.

Moostapha Khan declared that the rebellion from beginning to end was the work of Hindoos; that of the two miscreants who first attacked Agnew and Anderson, one was a Dogruh, and the other a Sikh;* that on the second day it was by the advice of the Sikhs and Poorbeeuhs, and in opposition to that of the Puthans, that the guns were ordered out against the Eedgah; that the Puthans certainly attended Moolraj on the field during his attack, but took no part in the attack itself; that the only troops of Moolraj's who entered the Eedgah were Sikhs of Deedar Sing's regiment; and that the crowning crime of assassination was either perpetrated by them, or the treacherous Sikh escort.

He added, that of all the troops who accompanied the British officers from Lahore, but one man showed fidelity

*I asked Moostapha Khan during this conversation, what injury the British officers had inflicted on the soldier who first so brutally attacked them? He replied, that the man himself could only account for it by "the miraculous appearance of Gooroo Gooind, who stood before him in black garments, and bade him kill the enemies of his religion!" This is thoroughly Sikh, and suggests what is probably the simple fact, that the base design flashed unpremeditatedly across a discontented mind, and was carried out upon the spot.

to his salt, viz., the officer of the artillery,* a tall man, whose name he could not remember, who replied alike to bribes and threats, that they might blow him away from a gun, but should never induce him to take service with the enemy.†

These events, and the readiness with which the Lahore escort sided with the Mooltan soldiery, were viewed, Moostapha Khan said, with regret by the majority at least of the Puthan officers in Moolraj's service. Mr. Agnew had spoken kindly to them all, and assured them of employment.

*This was a mistake, I believe. The Commandant of Mr. Agnew's artillery, Eesar Sing by name, entered Moolraj's service; and his Adjutant, Hurree Sing, who was a very large man, did the same, and died in General Whish's camp of the wounds he received in the battle of Soorujkoond, on the 7th of November, 1848. The tall officer who remained faithful was Gooldeep Sing, Colonel of the Goorkha regiment, who was put in irons by Moolraj, and, in despair at the shame which had been brought on Mr. Agnew's escort, threw himself into a well, as he was passing it under a guard, and was drowned.

†When Moostapha Khan declared that this individual alone, of all the escort, maintained his fidelity, I naturally inquired about Sirdar Khan Sing. Moostapha Khan's reply was, that he had readily agreed to make Moolraj the centre of a Sikh national movement; but, for appearance sake, had requested to be put in irons, in order that his jageers might not be confiscated by the Resident. Whether this be true or not, is one of the questions concerning Moolraj's rebellion which remain unsolved. That he was the last man who should have dealt treacherously with the Englishmen who went to Mooltan simply to instal him as Governor, is true, but unfortunately no argument. If he was faithful, I cannot understand why Moolraj's soldiers did not kill him, even before they killed the British officers; for, in that case, he was by far Moolraj's worst enemy, and the man who came to supersede their master, and probably discharge them. Yet, certain it is that he remained in confinement in Mooltan throughout the siege, until the ruins of the exploded magazine at once killed and buried him. After the fall of the fort, his body was dug out, and was found so heavily ironed, that it must have been impossible for him to walk. His little boy had been apparently sleeping beside him on the bed; and the attitudes of calm repose in which both remained, even in decay, showed that they had never awakened, but passed with awful suddenness from sleep to death. Under these circumstances, I thought it right to adopt the most charitable construction of the Sirdar's conduct, caused him to be buried with all honour, and sent the gold bangles which were on the arms of his son to the surviving members of the family.

under the Crown; so that they were certain of an honourable maintenance, and had nothing to gain by retaining the Dewan in power; while, on the other hand, they had lately been estranged from him by his ceasing to intrust them with the chief management of his affairs, and choosing for his favourites and counsellors men of vulgar birth, whose airs and slights had become insufferable.

In short, he said, whether they receive encouragement or not from you, the Puthan officers are prepared to quit Moolraj if he persists in the rebellion; they have already removed their wives and children out of Mooltan to a fort of our own, named Kummur Kote, twenty koss south-east of Mooltan; and our only object in now informing you beforehand, is to record the motives on which we act, and establish our future claim to employment.

I received the above account at the time with more suspicion than I now know it deserved, for I felt strongly that nothing could justify even the passive adherence of the Puthan officers to their rebellious master; but on the whole it convinced me that the guilt of our countrymen's blood was upon the Sikh and Hindoo portion of the garrison, and that the Puthans had contributed no more towards the rebellion than they could now counterbalance by their defection.

Accordingly, I closed with the envoy's offer, and guaranteed an honourable maintenance to all the Puthans who should desert Moolraj, and withdraw to Kummur Kote, on this condition—that they were innocent of the blood of Agnew and Anderson.

Moostapha Khan, therefore, returned to Mooltan with two guarantees in his pocket.

A guarantee to Moolraj of a fair trial before a British Court of Justice, if he felt innocent enough to surrender.

And a guarantee of employment under the Crown to all the Puthan officers who, having hands unstained with British blood, chose to go no farther with Dewan Moolraj.

How ultimately the breach between the Dewan and his Puthan officers so widened, that they not only left him, but fought on my side against him, will be related in due course; but I may as well close the other point here.

The ambassador himself had no expectation of the Dewan's surrender; for with true Afghan sarcasm he had said to me at parting, "Moolraj has asked for a fair trial, but he will hardly accept it. After all, what is he? A Hindoo! And did you ever know a Hindoo who had the magnanimity to throw himself on the honour of an enemy? His very fears have made him desperate; and he will scarcely give himself up alive."

The speech was justified to every letter, except the last. Moolraj had more confidence in his military resources than in his innocence; and chose the plain and the fortress before the prison and the dock.* Timid by

*In the opinion of the judges who tried him, he not only made this choice after the death of the British officers, but made it after they were first accidentally attacked at the fort, and caused them to be murdered in consequence of this decision.

"From the evidence of the above witnesses, and from the general probabilities of the case, the attack at the fort seems to have been regarded by Moolraj as hopelessly compromising him with the British authorities. Taking his position as it stood at noon on the 19th of April, he seems, on a deliberate calculation of chances, to have come to the conclusion that, in the then state of affairs, he had more to hope from the fears of the English than from their mercy. He headed an armed movement as his best policy, and the death of the officers was completed in due pursuance of his hostile proceedings.

nature,* and untrained to arms, his circumstances of mingled danger and temptation created in him every kind of courage, except the personal—in every degree except the last and rarest. He found, if he possessed it not before, the courage to dare the British power; the courage to murder its magistrates; the courage to hope to be a king; the courage to direct military operations; and the courage to endure and protract a siege; but he neither had, nor found, the courage to run the risk of a wound in saving the lives of two innocent men; he had not the courage to fly and throw himself on the mercy of the power he had unwillingly outraged; he had not the courage to lead his own army in the battles to which, with taunts, he urged them on;† and he had not the courage at last to die like Mozuffur Khan‡ in the breach of his battered

He yields to the circumstances of his case, and draws new vigour and determination from his isolated position."—*See the Judges' remarks on their own sentence upon Dewan Moolraj.*

*Moolraj was accounted "timid by nature" in general opinion before the war, though known to be haughty and ambitious, and consequently the war itself remained a constant source of astonishment to natives who knew him. The clue to his conduct is that given by the judges, and by Moostapha Khan; that he was desperate through fear. The judges delineate his character as follows:

"Moolraj would seem by nature and habit to possess more of a mercantile than a martial character. On succeeding, in 1844, to his father's office, it was with no great promise of success. His intercourse with the British Resident in 1846—7, had not left any very favourable impressions of fitness to represent his father in his bold and vigorous career as Governor of Mooltan. There seems to have been more of calm endurance than of active daring in his temperament."—*See the Trial of Moolraj.*

†Once only throughout the Mooltan war did Moolraj show himself in the field—at Suddoosam, on the 1st of July, 1848,—when his own precipitate flight long preceded the general rout of his army.

‡The last Nuwab of Mooltan, from whom the Sikhs took the fortress in 1818. He died sword in hand in the breach.

fortress, and throw the pall of glory over his buried crimes.

He *did* "give himself up alive,". He was brought to trial; found guilty; sentenced to death; mercifully reprieved, and transported. In short, he lived to ascertain what would have been, at worst, his fate had he surrendered, under my guarantee, before the war. I forbear from conjecturing whether his cell is darkened by the reflection that his not doing so cost many thousands of brave men their lives, and his own Sovereign a throne; but on our side it must ever remain a subject of satisfaction that he was not denied the "justice in open court" which he first sought, and then refused. On Moolraj alone rests the awful responsibility of the war which followed.*

*The reader of the "Punjab Blue Book, 1847—49," will be aware that the Governor-General disapproved of my having "offered any terms whatever" to Moolraj. But it should not be understood that the Governor-General would not have accorded a fair trial to the murderer, whenever taken. On the contrary, Lord Dalhousie caused him to be tried at last, after the war had been added to his crimes, and when no guarantee of a trial had been given him. But the Governor-General conceived that British justice was well known enough for Moolraj to rely on it if he wished, and to offer it him was consequently superfluous, and bore the undignified appearance of an overture. "To such an offender as this," said his Lordhsip, "the Governor-General in Council conceives that no terms should have been offered; and that no overtures should have been entertained which did not convey the Dewan's unconditional surrender of himself to the British Power, and his unconditional submission to that justice which it never fails strictly to observe. The Governor-General in Council accordingly requests that, in the event of Lieutenant Edwardes's present proposal not having been accepted, no proposal but one of unconditional surrender shall hereafter be admitted from the Dewan Moolraj."—*See Blue Book*, p. 180.

fortress, and threw the pall of glory over his buried cowardice.

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CHAPTER IV

ORDERS ARRIVE FROM THE RESIDENT TO REMAIN TRANS-INDUS—THE RESIDENT'S PLAN FOR BLOCKADING MOOLTAN BY FIVE CONVERGING COLUMNS, OF WHICH THE FIFTH UNDER COMMAND OF THE AUTHOR—THE FORT OF MUNGROTA OBTAINED WITHOUT A STRUGGLE—THE AUTHOR AGAIN PLANS THE RECOVERY OF THE SINDH SAGUR DOAB, AND SUGGESTS THE PROPRIETY OF THREATENING MOOLTAN WITH THE ARMY OF BHAWULPOOR—MOOLRAJ'S ARMY AGAIN ADVANCES UP THE SINDH SAGUR DOAB—GENERAL CORTLANDT IS REINFORCED BY A FAITHFUL REGIMENT OF REGULAR INFANTRY, BUT IS STARTLED WITH INTELLIGENCE THAT THE REBELS HAVE CROSSED IN FORCE BETWEEN HIM AND DERA GHAZEE KHAN—THE REBEL VAN ATTACKS THE ROYAL PICKET IN LEIA, AND IS GALLANTLY DEFEATED WITH THE LOSS OF ITS ARTILLERY—THE AUTHOR TAKES ON HIMSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CALLING ON THE NUWAB OF BHAWULPOOR TO CROSS THE SUTLEJ—MEASURES CONCERTED WITH GENERAL CORTLANDT FOR RESISTING THE REBELS WHO WERE SAID TO HAVE CROSSED TRANS-INDUS; BUT HEARING MORE CERTAINLY THAT THE CROSSING WAS NOT YET EFFECTED, THE AUTHOR, BY A FORCED MARCH OF FIFTY MILES, OCCUPIES THE INTENDED FERRY, AND CHALLENGES THE ENEMY WITH A SALUTE—THE AUTHOR NOW VOLUNTEERS TO BLOCKADE MOOLRAJ IN MOOLTAN IF THE NUWAB OF BHAWULPOOR IS GIVEN HIM FOR AN ALLY—MUTINOUS CONDUCT OF SIKH TROOPS AT DERA ISHMAEL KHAN—

MOOLRAJ'S GOVERNOR AT GHAZEE KHAN INTRENCHES HIMSELF WITH FIVE HUNDRED MEN TO RESIST THE ROYAL TROOPS—THE KHOSUHS, A LOYAL TRIBE OF BELOOCHEES, RISE, ATTACK, AND DEFEAT HIM AFTER A DESPERATE FIGHT, AND OBTAIN POSSESSION OF THE CITY, FORT, AND REBEL FLEET—THE KHOSUHS ARE REWARDED BY BOTH THE SIKH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS.

CHAPTER IV

On the 9th of May distinct orders reached me, from the Resident, for the guidance of myself and General Cortlandt during the summer.

We were, if possible, not only to defend our own province of Dera Ishmael Khan, but get and keep possession of the whole Trans-Indus.

Royal purwannas came also from the Maharajuh, directing the zumeendars of Sungurh and Dera Ghazee Khan (that is, all the Lower Derajat) to pay their revenue in future to General Cortlandt.

This was a part of the general plan which Sir Frederick Currie finally adopted to fill up as advantageously as possible the interval of inaction which must ensue between May and October.

The Resident was well aware that few, if any, of the Sikh troops could be trusted to act against Moolraj in any military operations to reduce Mooltan; but he determined to employ the most trustworthy of them, and the most influential chiefs, in taking possession of the districts heretofore attached to the Mooltan Government, leaving the occupation of the city and fort of Mooltan Proper to

be accomplished by British troops, whenever the season might permit them to take the field.

Five separate and converging columns were to carry out this plan.

Firstly. Five thousand men, under the command of three members of the Lahore Council (Rajah Sher Sing, Sirdar Shumsher Sing, Sindhanwalluh, and Sirdar Uttur Sing, Kaleewala), were to advance from Lahore and occupy the Mooltan dependencies on the left bank of the Ravee River, as far westward as Tolumba.

This column contained only one regiment of regular infantry, and was composed chiefly of cavalry, the flower of the Sikh yeomanry, whose jageers were held pledges of their fidelity. Ten horse artillery guns and two mortars were attached to this column.

Secondly. Three thousand men under Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt were to advance from the north, and occupy the heart of the Sindh Sagur Doab, locally described as the district of Munkhera, after the fortress which stands in the midst of it.

Of these, a regular regiment of infantry, and the Churunjeet regiment of Sikh regular cavalry, must have numbered one thousand, and the other two thousand were to be levied by Jowahir Mull in the provinces through which he marched. A troop of horse artillery was attached to this column.

Thirdly. Two thousand men under Sheikh Emamoodeen were to advance from Lahore along the right

bank of the Sutlej, and occupy the dependencies of Mooltan as far as Loodhen, or the border of the district of Mylsee.

The Sheikh, moreover, was to have revenue charge of all the Mooltan dependencies as far as Tolumba on the Ravee, although occupied by the troops of Rajah Sher Sing.

The Sheikh's two thousand men were to be all new levies of his own.

A detachment of two horse artillery guns accompanied this column.

Fourthly. The army of the Bhawulpoor Nuwab was to cross the Sutlej due south of Mooltan, and occupy the provinces from Mylsee on the east to the Indus on the west, and as far north as they were able.

Bhawul Khan, the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, is an independent Muhommudan Prince, and firm ally of the British Government, who volunteered the services of his whole military establishment and levies, at the very commencement of the rebellion. His soldiers were exclusively Muhommudans, and great ill-will pre-existed between the Nuwab and Dewan Moolraj.

Fifthly. As has been already related.

General Cortlandt's jurisdiction and occupation was to be extended by his and my joint efforts from the southern frontier of his own province of Dera Ishmael Khan, to the extreme limit of the Derajat, or the frontier of Sindh, at Roojhan.

If the reader has read these details, map in hand, he will see clearly that if these five columns carried out the Resident's orders, and answered his expectations, the effect would be to confine Dewan Moolraj and his army, if willing to be confined, within a circle of from forty to fifty miles in diameter, thereby preventing the rebellion from spreading, and diverting the revenue of the occupied countries from Moolraj's pocket to that of the Maharajuh.

This is a highly important point, and I call prominent attention to it for these reasons.

Firstly. Because although all the details of this plan may be gathered from scattered passages in the Blue Book, they are nowhere, that I remember, brought collectively together as a whole—as a plan—except in an admirable paper on the siege of Mooltan, by the late Major Siddons, of the Bengal Engineers—an officer, whose untimely death in the prime of his utility, is as much to be lamented by the noble service he adorned, as by those who best knew his private worth.*

Secondly. Because, without a previous comprehension of this plan, as a whole, it is quite impossible to get a distinct idea of the irregular campaign during the hot season of 1848—a campaign necessitated by the failure of four out of five of its details.†

*See Paper XLI. Third number of the "Corps Papers of the Royal and East India Company's Engineers." (John Weale: High Holborn, London.)

†The non-appearance of the three columns under Rajah Sher Sing, Sheikh Emamoodeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, made the fourth (Bhawul Khan's) refuse to advance, and brought the whole scheme of blockade to a standstill. The fifth column

Thirdly. Because, without it no English reader can possibly understand how Rajah Sher Sing and his army came to be in a position to join the enemy on the 14th of September, 1848, and thereby oblige General Whish to raise the siege of Mooltan.

Having thus given the general scope of the Resident's plan for occupying the whole Mooltan country, except Mooltan Proper, by five converging columns; I now return to my own, or the fifth column, and proceed to show how it effected its object.

The Lower Derajat, or country we were ordered to seize, has already been said to consist of two districts, Sungurh on the north, and Dera Ghazee Khan on the south.

Of course Sungurh, being nearest, was to be seized first.

The key of the district of Sungurh is the fort of Mungrota, which, with the exception of Hurrund, was the only fort of any consequence in the Mooltan Trans-Indus.

It was occupied at the opening of the war by a garrison of Moolraj's, under Cheytun Mull, the Surpurust, or Governor, of the four districts which constituted the department of Sungurh.

alone, under General Cortlandt and myself, effected its purpose by occupying Dera Ghazee Khan. Then first was made the proposition that I should undertake the blockade, with the assistance of the fourth column.

I had endeavoured to win this man over, by retaining him in the Maharajuh's service, but subsequently heard that he was recruiting secretly for Moolraj, while openly professing obedience to me.

He now lay directly across our path, and it was necessary to bring his loyalty or rebellion to an issue. While, therefore, General Cortlandt was making his preparations for entering Moolraj's Trans-Indus territory. I summoned Cheytun Mull to my camp, and told him to bring with him the first instalment of his spring revenue.

I had no expectation that he would comply, and I knew that he was unpopular with the Kusranee tribes around him, so I sent a party of horsemen to Mitha Khan, their chief, and called on him to assist my detachment in expelling Cheytun Mull from the fort of Mungrota, should he venture to resist.

Mitha Khan was reckoned a wise man in his generation, and justified his good report. Called upon to do what no Asiatic leader likes to do—declare openly for one side or other before the war had taken any turn—he calculated the odds correctly in the face of Moolraj's great *prestige*, and declared against him.

He sent his drum round the villages, raised the country, and dispatched a short message to Cheytun Mull, that, if he did not want to be besieged, the sooner he evacuated Mungrota the better.

The Governor took the hint, and fled in haste with his garrison, leaving the fort to my detachment, who

marched in triumphantly at the head of their Kusranee allies.

It was scarcely light on the morning of the 11th of May, when I was awakened by something cold against my hand. It was the keys of the fort of Mungrota, which had been laid upon my bed. The rude horseman that brought them could no longer be restained, but burst in, embraced my unstockinged feet, and related at the top of his voice, how "the Hindoo" had run away, and left a fort which he might have held for a year!

To do Cheytun Mull justice, he did not run out of fear; but wisely abandoned Sungurh, that he might join his nephew, Longa Mull, the Governor of Dera Ghazee Khan, and their combined forces have a better chance of resistance.

It was in a small way similar to the well-known resolutions adopted by Lord Hardinge, at the opening of the first Sikh war, by which (much to the sorrow of house proprietors) he withdrew Brigadier Wheeler's force from Loodiana, leaving that cantonment unprotected, it is true, but adding five thousand men and ten guns to Lord Gough's army before the hard-won battle of Moodkee; and again summoned Sir John Littler from Ferozepoor, leaving, it is true, that place exposed to all Tej Sing's army, but giving Lord Gough five thousand five hundred more men and twenty-one guns wherewith to fight the battle of Feroze-shuhr,—a battle so equal, desperate, and bloody, that it is now notorious that nothing but the obstinate resolution of the two illustrious veterans at its head, "to stand and fight again at daylight," saved the British army from a retreat

through one hundred and sixty miles of Sikh country, and perhaps (for who can say where they would have halted?) the loss of India.

Therefore, though Moolraj was very worth with Cheytun Mull for abandoning Mungrota without a blow, I was always of opinion, even before he proved it with his life blood at Dera Ghazee Khan, that he served his master as well as any of the numerous lieutenants who adhered to the Dewan in his rebellion, with a devotion seldom exceeded.

It was, nevertheless, a great piece of good fortune for us to obtain Mungrota so easily; for it threw open the whole country between Futteh Khan and Ghazee Khan, without the delay of a siege.

On the 12th of May, therefore, General Cortlandt marched in that direction with six guns, six zumbooruhs, two regiments of infantry (one Sikh and one Muhommudan), and about two hundred horse.

I did not accompany him; for though the Resident at Lahore had only called on me to arrange for the Trans-Indus territories, I felt sure that he expected me to do as much more as I could; and there being no signs of anybody else coming to the Sindh Sagur Doab, I resolved once more to cross the Indus with six companies of Moossulman regular infantry, two guns, fourteen zumbooruhs, and all the Puthans I had newly levied (as yet numbering only a thousand), and make another attempt to save the revenue from falling into the hands of the rebels.

It will be remembered that I had kept a picket of one hundred horsemen in the town of Leia, Cis-Indus,

ever since the rebel army, under Sham Sing, had been recalled to Mooltan; and my present intention was to recross the Indus, and join this picket on the 12th of May; but late on the night of the 11th, certain intelligence came in from the Chenab, that Sham Sing's army had been halted on the right bank of that river instead of going on to Mooltan, was consequently in the Sindh Sagur Doab, and might at any time return to Leia.

In reporting this to the Resident, I made the following remarks, and once more urged him to bring another piece on to the chess-board, by ordering Bhawul Khan into the field.

"The explanation of this is obvious. Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, told me, that a steamer arriving from Sindh, and the report of Bhawul Khan crossing the Sutlej, was what alarmed Moolraj, and made him recall the Leia force. No sooner, therefore, did he find that no operations were in reality on foot against him, than he again took courage, and told his army not to recross the Chenab. If I am right, we shall again see the rebels in Leia in a few days, and many lakhs of revenue will be lost, if no worse mischief ensues.

"My views of the evil consequences of leaving Mooltan uninvested, are thus early borne out. So secure is Moolraj of not being molested, that he has not kept five hundred men in Mooltan. The rest of his army are across the Chenab, considering, no doubt, in which direction the most profitable circuit may be made.

"The Puthans of the garrison may, or may not retire to Kummur Kote; if they do, a diversion will certainly

be effected, and Moolraj obliged to call his men from the Sindh Sagur Doab. But the same reaction of courage and apparent immunity may alter the plans of the Puthans altogether, though I still am of opinion that they will separate from Moolraj.

"Under any circumstances, however, there is but one move on our part which is required to secure peace throughout the hot weather, until our troops can take the field, confine Moolraj and his army to the Mooltan fort, prevent him from enlisting another man, and secure all the dependencies of Mooltan, without a shot being fired. That move is, to order Bhawul Khan to cross his army over the Sutlej, and encamp it, for the hot weather and rains, in any district near Mooltan that he pleases. I should be very happy to go and encamp with it, and keep an eye on the proceedings of Moolraj, who would probably some morning escape from the fort, and come in. The whole force could be hutted in with grass-chopper, in a fortnight, and be as comfortable as anywhere else. If this is done, the effect of delay will not be bad, Moolraj being a prisoner in his own fort; otherwise, the whole hot weather and rains must pass in the same insecurity that has been felt on this frontier ever since the outbreak.

"P.S.—*Morning of the* 13*th of May*—News already that the rebels are again in full march to Leia; and I have halted General Cortlandt in order that, if the intelligence is confirmed, we may meet and concert measures."*

*See "Blue Book," p. 166.

General Cortlandt halted his force at Littree, four koss from Futteh Khan, on the 13th; moved two koss farther next day to Tibbee, to get better water for the troops; and on 15th, three koss farther to Ratera, in the district of Sungurh.

At Tibbee he was joined by a deputation from the loyal zumeendars of Dera Ghazee Khan, headed by Gholam Hyder Khan, son of Kowrah Khan, chief of the powerful tribe of Khosuhs. They brought word that Moolraj's officers were alarmed at the news of our approach, and having no orders from Moolraj, were meditating retreat to Mooltan.

At Ratera very different news came in from Ghazee Khan. Orders from Mooltan had reached Longa Mull, the Governor, to defend his post to the last; and he was in consequence enlisting soldiers for his life, and seizing every boat on the river to enable Moolraj's army to march to his assistance, and carry the war across the Indus. The rebel army was already at Talee Noor Shah, on the left bank of that river, about twenty-five koss from General Cortlandt; their guns were heard in his camp both on the 14th and 15th of May; and spies had been sent over by the General to learn their numbers and intentions.

On the 15th, General Cortlandt was reinforced by another excellent and faithful regiment, the Sooruj Mookhee, from Bunnoo.

On the 16th, he advanced to Downee, about six koss, and there received the startling intelligence that the enemy, after being still further reinforced from Mooltan, had crossed the Indus about thirty miles below him, at the

ferry of Peeronwalluh; that Kowrah Khan, chief of the Khosuhs, who had been on his way from Ghazee Khan, with a body of horse, to join General Cortlandt, had turned back on receipt of this news, and gone to protect his home and tribe; and lastly, that the head of every tribe in the district of Sungurh and Ghazee Khan had been summoned by Moolraj to join the approaching rebel army, and recapture the fort of Mungrota.

I had remained all this time stationary at Dera Futteh Khan, waiting to ascertain the designs of Moolraj's force, for I could not move in any direction until I knew what they were about.

If their object was the same as mine, to obtain the spring revenue of the Sindh Sagur Doab, it was of no use for me to cross and contend with them, for they were too strong for me. And if, on the other hand, as was very generally reported, and as General Cortlandt believed, it was their intention, while he was absent from his post annexing Ghazee Khan, to checkmate him by a rapid march through Leia to Bukkur, cross the Indus at Dera Ishmael Khan in our rear, between us and our supports, and so induce the Sikh troops in Bunnoo to break out and join the rebellion;—it was indeed of vital importance that I also should be within a forced march of Ishmael Khan, and at least have the opportunity of disputing the passage.

The necessity of thus distributing our vigilance along the frontier, by marching in two divisions, and not concentrating till we knew for certain the point where we were wanted, became now apparent.

On the 15th of May, while General Cortlandt, at Ratera, heard the enemy meant to cross and retake Mungrota; I, at Futteh Khan, received certain news that a rebel detachment of five hundred horse, two guns, and some zumbooruhs, had marched through Oodoo Kee Kote, and by a rapid movement reached Sooltan Kee Kote, which was only fifteen miles from my picket of one hundred men at Leia. One more march and there must be a collision.

To provide against such contingencies (rendered probable at any moment by the well-known activity of Sikh troops when bent on striking a blow), I had given the Leia picket orders to consider their post merely one of observation, which it was by no means necessary to defend; and they were to retire before a superior force, without waiting for any farther communication from me.

But these are orders which brave men ever reluctantly obey; and when the picket sent me word that five hundred men, with artillery, were within a march of them, they said nothing about retiring across the Indus. It was now night, and with the morning's dawn, the enemy would be upon them. The only thing now was to reinforce them, that they might either retire with safety, or fight with equality. They chose the latter, and with their own good swords, like seekers of auguries in ancient days, wrested from the oracles a most happy omen for the long campaign before them.

The story is told in the following letter:—

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Ghat, Dera Futteh Khan,

"May 16th, 1848.

"On the 12th, I had the honour to report, that the rebel army of Dewan Moolraj had not quitted the Sindh Sagur Doab, but halted on the right bank of the Chenab, when they discovered that they had retreated on a false alarm of hostilities against Mooltan.

"Aware of your intention not to take the field till the cold weather, I have been anxiously watching this army on the Chenab, to see in what direction their next expedition would be made; but they have intercepted and imprisoned so many kossids, that it is extremely difficult to get correct intelligence in time to be useful.

"Last evening, however, the picket which I had stationed in Leia, on the other side of the Indus, obtained information that the advanced party of the rebels had reached Oodoo Kee Kote, with five hundred sowars, two guns and some zumbooruhs; and, later still, that they had arrived at Sooltan Kee Kote, only ten koss from Leia.

"The picket had standing orders to retire before a superior force; but, afraid of their being pressed, I crossed two hundred men during the night, and strengthened them. Before the arrival of this reinforcement, the picket prudently fell back across a nullah, about half a koss to the western, or Indus, side of Leia; the enemy heard of their retreat, and as soon as it was light this morning hurried on to Leia, with between three and four hundred horse, and ten zumbooruhs, thinking that all was clear. In Leia, they were

told that the Sahib's picket had only fallen back to the nullah, and being under one hundred men, would fall an easy prey. The rebels pushed on, therefore, to the nullah, and great must have been their surprise, to find nearly an equal force drawn up ready to receive them; for the picket had been joined by the night reinforcement, and agreed among themselves, that, in spite of their zumbooruhs, they would not retreat. The rebels immediately opened their zumbooruhs across the nullah, and our men, finding this annoying, plunged into the nullah, forded it in the face of the fire; and attacked the enemy on the further side. A short struggle ensued, which ended in the total defeat of the rebels, who were pursued for a koss or two beyond Leia, losing all their zumbooruhs and twelve men killed, besides several prisoners who took refuge in the city streets, and afterwards gave up their arms. On our side, two men were slightly wounded.

"The report of the zumbooruhs sounded so loud across the Indus, that the artillerymen in our camp declared they were guns. I therefore ordered my horse, and desired the whole force to cross along with me to assist in bringing off the picket, with the exception of the two guns, which I determined to leave in camp, with two infantry companies, in order that we might not be embarrassed with them on our return. The passage was not completed, when two sowars came in from Leia, with the news of the enemy being beaten back.

"The affair was one of considerable gallantry, and did great honour to the picket, which was composed entirely of Puthans, raised during the last fortnight. The excitement it caused in camp among the other Puthans was so

great, that every voice was for an instant advance on Leia; and I had great difficulty in showing the wisdom of waiting, at least, for farther information, as to the strength of the enemy in the rear.

"Only an hour before, I had received a note from you desiring me to confine my attention to the Trans-Indus; and very sufficient reasons could alone justify my again entering the Sindh Sagur Doab; so I halted the force on the left bank, in the village of Noorawalla; remaining myself on the right bank; sent praise to the picket; and ordered them to scour the country round for information of the enemy's main body.

"Most fortunate was it that we were not led away by our morning's triumph; for in the evening, from several quarters, information reached us, that between six and seven thousand horse and foot were marching on Leia, with fifteen guns (nine heavy, and six horse), and had already got within a short march of the city. They were delayed by some of their guns being in the rear; and the interval was not to be thrown away.

"Immediate orders were issued for the re-crossing of the whole force, including the brave picket at Leia; and as I write this the operation is going on by moonlight. It will be close work, but it will be done in time, and our men certainly retire with honour after the feat of this morning.

"Anxiety, however, now commences in earnest, and my main object in the present letter is to claim your most serious and prompt attention to this frontier, which

I should be deceiving you if I pretended to think otherwise than in imminent danger.

"From the first I have lost no opportunity of stating the extreme probability of Dewan Moolraj assuming the initiative, if the British Government did not at once put him on the defensive, by investing Mooltan, and declared the inability of General Cortlandt and myself to offer any effectual resistance, should Moolraj carry the campaign across the Indus. The time has now arrived when these anticipations seem likely to be realized.

"Not content with having marched four thousand men and ten guns across the Chenab, Moolraj has now strengthened them to upwards of six thousand men and fifteen guns; and, while marching on Leia, this force is accumulating a fleet of boats, with the avowed intention of crossing to this side, and destroying either my force, or General Cortlandt's, or both.

"General Cortlandt has with him six guns, six zumbooruhs, and two regiments, one of which is required to keep the other from open mutiny and desertion to the enemy.

"My force consists of two guns (two more will join me the day after to-morrow), fourteen zumbooruhs (besides those captured to-day), six companies of regular infantry, two hundred Barukzye sowars, and about twelve hundred Puthans, horse and foot, newly raised. Total, under two thousand men.

"If, therefore, General Cortlandt and I were to unite, our strength would be little more than half that of the

enemy's on the other bank, which the enemy may cross to-morrow by a skilful choice of a ferry.

"The consequences of a defeat on this frontier would be so extensive and disastrous, that, plainly as they stare me in the face, I have deemed the responsibility of not acting on my own judgment greater than that of acting without authority. Supposing that no British force is likely to take the field till after the rains, the only move which can save this frontier, is, in my opinion, the advance of Bhawul Khan's army across the Sutlej, so as to threaten Mooltan, and oblige Moolraj to recall his frontier expeditions. I have, therefore, this evening, addressed a letter to that Prince, stating my position, and recommending him to cross at once; and I have now to request that you will be so good as to let me know, by return of dak, whether this move meets your sanction, and if not, whether I have your authority to give up Dera Ghazee Khan and Sungurh to the rebels, and fall back altogether on Ukalgurh, where alone it will soon be practicable to make a stand; to this alternative we are reduced.

"It will be much to be regretted if any circumstances render the former plan impracticable, for it offers exactly those advantages to the Sirkar which the latter will relinquish to Moolraj; if Bhawul Khan threatens Mooltan, he will confine Moolraj therein, prevent his undertaking expeditions to the provinces, and collecting their revenue, and cut him off from getting more recruits. If General Cortlandt and I are driven into Ukalgurh, it will release the provinces from our control, stop the revenue, and send every recruit to Moolraj. I see, by the public papers, that an absurd idea had got abroad, that Moolraj has sixty thousand

soldiers; at present he has not more than ten thousand; but, if Mooltan is not invested, however slightly, and a few months elapse before any steps are taken to check his present career of impunity, those who best know the military resources of this frontier are quite of opinion that he may gather fifty thousand: from what I see, I quite agree with them.

"P.S. *Morning*, *May* 17*th*—Information from General Cortlandt has just come in, that the enemy has crossed a strong force, with twelve guns, at the ferry of Peeronwalluh, about thirty koss to the south of this place. The great zumeendars of Dera Ghazee Khan, on hearing this, and receiving summonses from the rebels, stopped on their way to the General's camp, and returned to their homes in alarm, to look after their families. This is the best we could expect from them, under the circumstances. Moolraj has called on all the zumeendars of Ghazee Khan and Sungurh to join his army, and wrest Mungrota back again from us. It is an anxious crisis, rendered still worse by the state of the Futteh Pultun; and if some move is not made from Lahore or Bhawulpoor at once, the consequence can be nothing but disastrous. It is disheartening to perceive that we alone are conscious of our own danger.

"I have been reluctantly obliged to order Cortlandt to fall back, in order that we may unitedly throw up embankments round the fort of Girang, and make a stand on our own ground. The result is with God; but I trust

you will no longer delay to take the field, or you will have to fight all this frontier as well as Mooltan."*

Had the rebel army at this time really effected a crossing at Peeronwalluh, and obliged General Cortlandt to fall back on me, our position would have been one of imminent peril; and reviewing all the circumstances now, I am of opinion that the Sikh regiment with us (the Futteh Pultun) would have fraternized and left us; we should have retired to the fort of Ukalgurh, at Dera Ishmael Khan, and been besieged; the Sikh troops in Bunnoo would have risen, murdered Lieutenant Taylor, abandoned Duleepgurh and the valley it coerced, and marched to join the rebels before Ukalgurh.

In such a crisis, there was no assistance to be hoped for. Sikh troops could not be sent, for fear of fraternizing; and British troops could not be moved till the cold weather. The scene at the Eedgah at Multan, on the 20th of April, must have been repeated at Ukalgurh in May; the Trans-Indus frontier would have been lost, and the Sikh insurrection, instead of being delayed by the battles of Kineyree and Suddoosam till September, would have burst upon the Punjab in June, and forced the British into the field.

It will be seen, however, by the following letter, that the enemy had *not* been able to get across the Indus at Peeronwalluh, and that I at once joined General Cortlandt to prevent their doing so.

*See "Blue Book," pp. 170—2.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, at Dera Futteh Khan,

"May 18th, 1848.

"On the 16th and 17th, I had the honour to inform you of a skirmish between our picket at Leia and the advanced party of the rebels, in which the former were completely victorious, and the latter lost their zumbooruhs, and twelve men killed; of my withdrawing all my men from the Sindh Sagur Doab, under the idea that the rebel army was making for Leia in force; and of the sudden intelligence from General Cortlandt that they had altered their plans, and crossed the Indus at the Peeronwalluh ferry, below the General's position.

"General Cortlandt reported only twelve guns; but kossids, on whom I could rely, had seen fifteen on the left bank, previous to the passage, and estimated the force of the rebels as not under six thousand, a reinforcement having arrived from Mooltan.

"The inference was, that the rebels had never intended advancing their main body to Leia, but had given out that intention to cover their crossing the Indus, and that the party of four hundred horsemen who really did come to Leia on the 16th, had done so under the idea that we had evacuated it, and that the revenue was at their mercy.

"It became necessary to decide at once how this new and imminent danger was to be met, and, as neither General Cortlandt nor I could, single-handed, venture to oppose such a force, the necessity of an immediate junction was evident. The only question that remained was, whether

General Cortlandt should fall back on me, or I advance to him? His account of the instantaneous defection of those zumeendars, who had joined him from Dera Ghazee Khan when they thought his side the strongest, was too significant a hint to be neglected. It proved that the yoke of Sawun Mull was still strong on that dependency of Mooltan, and that Moolraj's army would have the assistance of the Moolkeiah.* The faithlessness of the Futteh Pultun, too, hung like a millstone round my neck whenever I thought of venturing a collision; and, finally, I wrote to General Cortlandt that, if the enemy had actually effected the passage in force, my opinion was that we must confine ourselves to our own elaqua, throw up intrenchments round the fort of Girang, and make the best stand we could in that position.

"Scarcely had this been decided on, than a new difficulty arose. Of the two wells at Girang, one is salt, and causes sickness to those who drink it—a sufficient obstacle to awaiting a siege at that point. Whither to go next? Ukalgurh, at Dera Ishmael Khan, ought only to be retired upon in the very last extremity. To betake ourselves at once to it would be pusillanimous. In this emergency, I counted up the number of our new levies. Many horse and foot had, fortunately, joined us during the day, and they amounted to one thousand seven hundred and forty-one in the whole. Besides these, I had six companies of regular infantry, two guns, fourteen zumbooruhs of our own, and nine taken from the enemy, and two more guns from Bunnoo were only a march behind us. General

*Moolkeiah means strictly the country people, but idiomatically is confined to the armed population, and is equivalent to our word insurgents.

Cortlandt's force might be sixteen or seventeen hundred men, of whom eight hundred (the Futteh Pultun) were known to be disaffected. The General had six guns, and six zumbooruhs. It appeared, therefore, that if we could in any way get rid of the Futteh Pultun, we could muster about three thousand men (on whom we could rely to fight honestly), ten guns and twenty-nine zumbooruhs; a force which, if intrenched, however slightly, might beat back, if it could not conquer, six or seven thousand men, though the latter had fifteen guns, of which nine were heavy artillery.

"I wrote, therefore, again to General Cortlandt, that, if he was still convinced that the enemy had got over the river, he was to detach the Futteh Pultun to the fort of Mungrota, of which we recently obtained possession, and put that post in the exclusive charge of the suspected corps, making the Colonel responsible for holding it; after which, he was himself to retire, with his remaining men, to Tibbee, a point midway between him and me, where I understood there was good water and an open plain. Here I proposed to join him, and intrench. Tibbee is in the extreme south border of our own elaqua; and could not, therefore, be considered a dishonourable position wherein to await the enemy; while, at the same time, its maintenance would secure the whole of our country from plunder.

"The move of the Futteh Pultun may be regarded as a bold, nay, almost desperate, resource; but I would urge that to such resources are we reduced, by no move being made on Mooltan, and Dewan Moolraj being at liberty to turn all his strength in the only quarter where he is threatened with hearty opposition. I was not by any means

hopeless either, that the conspicuous and unavoidable responsibility, thus forced on the Sikh regiment, would oblige them to be loyal by leaving them no cover for their treachery. If they held the fort, the service they would render to the State would restore their reputation; and if they gave it up to the enemy, we should have made a good exchange of a secret foe in our camp, for an open one outside. Moreover (and this alone is a sufficient reason), the only other means I had of holding Mungrota, during the retreat of General Cortlandt, was to make it over to Mitha Khan, Kusranee, the chief Toomundar of Sungurh, who would have kept possession certainly, but for both sides, prepared to claim the reward of service from whomsoever was victorious.

"This being settled, I marched this morning from the Ghat to the town of Dera Futteh Khan. Here I received later letters from General Cortlandt, contradicting the passage of the enemy, but confirming their intention to do so as soon as they had collected sufficient boats. The General urged me to join him in order that unitedly we might now try to oppose their crossing; and as this is one more point in our favour, I immediately agreed.

"This evening, I shall put the guns and infantry into boats, and accompany them myself down the river to the ferry opposite Dera Deen Punnah, on the right bank of which General Cortlandt is encamped, and on the left the rebels. The cavalry I send by land, and they will, as well as the infantry, reach General Cortlandt to-morrow afternoon.

"If the enemy are discouraged by the defeat their

party sustained at Leia on the 16th, they will perhaps consider well before they cross; but it is obvious that they will be again reinforced from Mooltan, and that we have no succour to hope for. I have candidly laid the whole state of the case before you, and again repeat my conviction, that if a British force does not threaten Mooltan, or Bhawul Khan cross the Sutlej, General Cortlandt's force and mine must, sooner or later, be destroyed. If neither of these moves seem advisable, I can only assure you of my protracting what resistance is in my power as long as possible. Circumstances, however, are much altered for the worse since it was determined to defer hostilities till the cold season. Dewan Moolraj was then merely holding a strong fort against the Sirkar. He is now in the field, hunting the royal armies."*

Although unknown to me for a long time afterwards, it is both proper and convenient to show the reader here, that Sir Frederick Currie had anticipated my call on the Bhawulpoor Nuwab, and directed him to cross the Sutlej; though still with the view of his co-operating with three Sikh converging columns in a distant blockade of Mooltan, my operations being still confined to the Trans-Indus.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

"Lahore, May 23rd, 1848.

"I received late last evening your letter, dated the 16th and 17th instant, with its enclosure, a letter addressed

*See "Blue Book," pp. 173, 4.

by you to Nuwab Bhawul Khan, calling on him to cross the Sutlej and threaten Mooltan.

"My letters already addressed to you, and more particularly those more recently written, will have informed you of my having, from the first breaking out of Moolraj's rebellion, called upon Bhawul Khan to co-operate with us, whenever the moment for making that co-operation most effective should arrive, and that Bhawul Khan declared he had his troops in hand, ready to cross the Sutlej when desired.

"I sent him instructions, through his vakeel here, ten days ago, to put his force across at once, and occupy the country and forts between Bhawulpoor and Mooltan. This injunction, through the vakeel, I followed up by a khurreeta from myself, on the 20th instant, and urged him, if the troops recalled from Leia had been again sent away, to lose not a moment in pushing on as near Mooltan as he could.

"I repeated these injunctions by another khurreeta yesterday, in reply to one from the Nuwab, asking if he might occupy the lower part of the Sindh Sagur Doab, as well as the tract on the Ravee already indicated.

"I sincerely trust that Bhawul Khan's army is now across the Sutlej, and threatening Mooltan. The instant Bhawul Khan's troops are across, Moolraj must recall the force he has sent against you, for it comprises his whole army and movable artillery.

"I need not, after what I have now and before written, say that I approve of your having put yourself in

communication with Nuwab Bhawul Khan, and called on him for co-operation.

"Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, with his newly-raised levies, was at Jeura, near Saheewal, on the 16th instant, and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, with his force, was at Ahmedabad on the same day, pushing down to the southward. The approach of these may tend to make the force sent against Leia hesitate to cross the Indus, even if Bhawul Khan's troops are not across the Sutlej. At any rate, Moolraj's army will never follow you to any distance up the right bank of the Indus, if you should have fallen back towards Dera Ishmael Khan.

"It seems to me that General Cortlandt's information, received by you on the 17th, of the force being actually across the Indus, cannot have been correct, considering where they were on the 16th, according to the account given by your people.

"You have acted with the utmost energy and gallantry on this, as on all other occasions, but my object has all along been to prevent your bringing your weak force, composed of such uncertain materials, in collision with the rebel army. Therefore, I have always urged upon you to confine your operations to the right bank of the Indus, being sure that, as soon as the newly-raised troops should, with Bhawul Khan's co-operation, threaten Mooltan on all sides, Moolraj never could move across the Indus to annoy you.

"I am, I assure you, fully aware of the vast importance of preserving the peace of your frontier, and of the extensive and disastrous consequences that will, in all

probability, result from the rebellion extending in that direction, and the Trans-Indus districts joining the insurrection, and in all my arrangements, I have kept in view the necessity of preserving tranquillity, if possible, in your districts.

"Your newly-raised levies have behaved most gallantly, and you may assure them of my admiration of their conduct and that it will meet with its just reward.

"My position is one of great difficulty; the siege of Mooltan is declared by the military authorities, by whom it must be undertaken, impracticable at this season. To march British troops, without the means of effecting their object by reducing the fort, would be a mockery.

"I look with the most anxious expectation for the next accounts from you. The position in which you were placed when your letters were closed, was a very intricate one; but I have such confidence in your judgment, energy, and resource, that I am not without hope that you may have succeeded in extricating your force from the peril in which it was placed."*

How we extricated ourselves, and how our bold advance encouraged the loyal party at Dera Ghazee Khan to rise and conquer that important post, by engaging and defeating the rebel Governor, even before we could arrive, will be seen in the next letter.

*See "Blue Book," pp. 177, 8.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Peeronwalluh, twenty-five koss, directly
"north from Dera Ghazee Khan,
"May 20th, 1848.

"I dispatched the whole of my cavalry, magazine, spare store-carts, heavy baggage, and as many infantry as I had no boats for, by the land route, from Futteh Khan to join General Cortlandt, opposite Dera Deen Punnah on the evening of the 18th; and, as soon as the moon rose, embarked the four guns and the majority of the infantry in twenty-seven boats, and floated down the branch of the Indus, which passes under Dera Futteh Khan. The river is now very high, rising daily, and its navigation dangerous: so that the Mullahs refused to proceed any further, when we emerged into the main stream, and we were obliged to anchor till morning, when we pushed off again; and by nine A.M. on the 19th were abreast of General Cortlandt's camp, at a place called Jhung, which however we were unable to approach, owing to an island lying between us, and the inland stream being too shallow for navigation: merely exchanging shots, by way of recognition, therefore, we determined to occupy at once the ferry of Peeronwalluh, seven koss further south, at which the enemy had for the last three days been threatening to cross, and we reached it safely, though with much trouble from a baffling wind at mid-day yesterday.

"The whole of the cavalry reached General Cortlandt's camp, a distance of twenty-five koss, by noon; and many of them came in the evening to the Peeronwalluh

Ghat, having made a march of thirty-two koss in twenty-four hours, which in this weather is a great feat."*

"In the evening, at my request, General Cortlandt rode over to my camp, to consult about the state of affairs; and from him and other parties during the day we learnt that the rebel force in the Sindh Sagur Doab was really designed to recover the Sungurh country and Mungrota Fort, and prevent General Cortlandt from getting possession of Dera Ghazee Khan. The nominal chief is Hur Bugwan Doss, nephew of Moolraj's factotum, Dewan Rung Ram, but the active spirits are Ussud Khan, Nootkanee, and Julal Khan, Lugharee, to the former of whom Moolraj has (with the generosity of an Alexander) made a present of Sungurh, and to the latter, Dera Ghazee Khan, of which districts they are respectively natives, and men of note. It is only just to Ussud Khan, to remind you that he gave me the first refusal of his sword, on the terms that I would give him the farm of Sungurh. The overture was verbal, and I replied verbally, that he would find it his interest to come in. The Dewan bid higher and for the time at least secured him. Ussud Khan, however, finds that it is not so easy to take possession of Sungurh; and, as I write this, he has again sent overtures through Mitha Khan, Kusranee, demanding the 'farm of Sungurh, ten thousand rupees cash, and the country of Wuhoa in jageer as the price or desertion!' I laughed, and told Mitha Khan I regarded Ussud Khan as a dead man already, about whom it was useless to dispute; that he was welcome to all of Sungurh he can take; that it is not the custom of the Sahib

*Thirty-two koss are about fifty miles.

log to buy and sell small rebels; and that, if he is determined to be bought, he had better bring away some guns, or do something else to raise his price. Mitha Khan dropped his tone at once, and said, Ussud Khan would send a vakeel over to me, to see if the affair could be arranged.

"The fact is that, at the present moment, our 'ikbal' is once more in the ascendant. The shameful repulse of the rebel detachment at Leia, on the 16th, proved that we are not to be touched with impunity. The leader, one Jas Mull, who was coming to take possession of Leia, of which Moolraj had (on paper) appointed him Hakim, saved himself from that rout only by hiding in a tobacco-field, and has become the jest of the country in consequence; and the runaways, to account for the loss of their zumbooruhs, declared that they had been enticed by the deceitful Feringhee into an ambush of three thousand men, which has raised me much in public estimation without deserving it. This, followed by our sudden withdrawal from Leia, and appearance next day at Peeronwalluh, in a formidable fleet, thirty-two koss from where we were last heard of, and just opposite the rebel camp, has so completely confounded the enemy that, last night when all was still, I turned my four guns to the Indus, and saluted them with twenty-one rounds as a challenge; they were too prudent even to reply, lest I should make out their position. Yet there is no doubt they have a very superior force to ours, both in men and guns.

"If they had not heart to cross, when General Cortlandt was alone, they are little likely to do so now; and, for the time, I consider our position as most materially improved since last I wrote. The general opinion indeed

is that the rebel camp opposite us will give up the idea of crossing, break up, and hurry back to Mooltan. It is natural to suppose that they will either be recalled by Moolraj, under the influence of fright, or that they will be reinforced by him to such an extent as will enable them to force the passage, and retrieve the defeat at Leia. The latter seems to me by far the most probable, because there exists no earthly reason why a rebel, with a large army and fifty guns, should allow himself to be bullied by a small army and ten guns. I still adhere, therefore, to my view of the untenableness of this frontier by us, if left unassisted to cope with the whole resources of Moolraj; while at the same time, *I am prepared to undertake the blockade of that rebel in Mooltan for the rest of the hot season and rains, if you should honour me with that commission, and order Bhawul Khan to assist me.* Bhawul Khan would cross the Sutlej, and General Cortlandt and I cross the Indus from Dera Ghazee Khan; Moolraj would be obliged to call in all his men, and for the rest of the season he would be a prisoner, unless he had the spirit to give up the advantage of the fort, and hazard an engagement on the plain; in which case, please God! we could decide the campaign without any necessity for a siege.

"At present my movements are dependent on those of the rebels, for so long as the would-be lord of Sungurh sits on the opposite bank, eyeing wistfully his promised land, it is impossible for me to pass on to Ghazee Khan, and give him an opportunity of crossing behind me.

"Yet Ghazee Khan must be seized. Longa Mull the rebel Hakim, is said to be standing, with one foot on shore and one in the boat, prepared to fly as soon

as we advance, or to return, and collect the revenue, if we retire or halt. He has about five hundred men, and one gun.

"General Cortlandt agrees with me in thinking the best plan will be to send a detachment with two guns ourselves, with the main body of our force remaining here, to watch the enemy's main body. Probably the detachment will start to-morrow.

"The state of the Futteh Pultun is so bad as to render treachery a certainty, should we engage the rebels in its company; and, on the same principle that I proposed to put them in charge of Mungrota, we now think of sending them to Mithunkote, where troops will be required; Mooltan is distant, and Bhawul Khan near, to correct them, if necessary.

"While on this subject, it is necessary that I should acquaint you with an incident that occurred at Dera Ishmael Khan a few days ago. Lieutenant Taylor had sent eight companies of infantry to assist me; I believe three companies of Dogruhs from Zorakhun Sing's regiment, three ditto from Bishen Sing's Moossulman regiment, and two from Mihur Sing's regiment of Sikhs. Bunnoo became, in the meanwhile, so disturbed that I was obliged to write, and order these eight companies to hurry back. The order reached them at Dera, and the Sikhs and Moossulmans refused, I understand, to obey, declaring that 'they would go on and see what arrangements were being made by the other punts (or punches) in our camp.' Sirdar Chundar Sing (the Deputy-Governor of Dera) got alarmed, and communicated his fears to Mrs. Cortlandt, whose

nerves, having been fortified by some years' residence in the Punjab, enabled her to enlist the artillerymen of two guns of the same detachment in her favour, and persuade the companies to return to Bunnoo. The Dogruhs expressed a determination throughout to be faithful to their salt, and obey orders. The conduct of the Sikhs is nothing more than everybody would expect who knows anything of their character and history; but that of the Moossulmans is more surprising, and adds considerably to the secret danger which is smouldering at this moment throughout the Sikh army. It is observable, however, that the men of Bishen Sing's regiment are Moossulmans of the Manjha,* and districts neighbouring thereto. The longer the Mooltan rebellion remains triumphant, the more weak men will it lead astray.

"P.S. *Eleven o'clock at night, May 21st*—News has just arrived of a most complete victory to our party, and defeat of the rebels, at Dera Ghazee Khan this morning. In this letter I have mentioned Julal Khan, Lugharee as a native of Ghazee Khan, to whom Moolraj had given that country. His bitter enemy is one Kowrah Khan, Khosuh, a powerful Toomundar, whose vakeel came to me at Futteh Khan to offer me his submission fully a fortnight ago. I then told him to send his son to me, with a contingent, which he did. The son, Gholam Hyder Khan, received a khillut from me, and was made over to General Cortlandt, when that officer started for Dera Ghazee Khan. Yesterday, this young fellow volunteered to go on ahead to Ghazee

*The "Manjha" means the Central Sikh Country; viz., that containing Lahore and Umritsir, the civil and religious capitals of the Sikhs.

Khan, raise his father's clan, and drive Longa Mull out of the country across the Indus. General Cortlandt gave him permission, but thought so little about it that he never mentioned it to me. It now appears that Gholam Hyder Khan, when he left General Cortlandt's camp, made up his mind 'to do or die,' and made but one request to a Puthan friend, that, if he fell in the fight, he would 'ask the Sahib to avenge his death!' Having joined his father, Kowrah Khan, at Dera Ghazee Khan, the two raised their clan for a grand struggle against their enemies, the Lugharees, who mustered five hundred strong around Longa Mull. Cheytun Mull, uncle of Longa Mull, and the runaway Hakim of Sungurh and Mungrota, had joined his nephew, and the two moved boldly out in front of Dera Ghazee Khan, and encamped themselves on the road to oppose General Cortlandt's anticipated advance. They had one gun and five zumbooruhs. In the last watch of the night, the Khosuhs drew near, and surrounded the two Kardars who fired away at random till it was light, when the Khosuhs attacked them sword in hand. The Lugharees fought desperately, and the fight lasted three hours, when the rebels were overpowered: Cheytun Mull and one nephew killed on the field; Longa Mull taken prisoner, and the gun and five zumbooruhs captured. The Khosuhs were still pursuing the vanquished when the two kossids who brought this news left Dera Ghazee Khan. This is most important news, and cannot but have a great effect upon the enemy."*

A portion of the defeated rebels threw themselves into the fort of Ghazee Khan, but surrendered, and were

*"Blue Book," pp. 183—5.

allowed to go across the river. Amongst these latter were the survivors of a company of regular Sikh infantry, sent to Longa Mull's help by Moolraj a few days before.

In this very gallant affair, the rebels left forty dead upon the field, and the Khosuhs lost fifteen killed, and upwards of forty wounded. Amongst the slain was Kowrah Khan's own nephew, Muhommud Khan. Indeed, the conduct of the whole of the Khosuh tribe in this fight was such as I have never seen equalled by mere insurgent zumeendars—for such I must call them, though they rose in defence of order and loyalty.

In the night attack, the Khosuhs were repulsed more than once, and at last drew off till morning dawned, when Kowrah Khan thus addressed his son, Gholam Hyder: "Son, you were a fool to pledge the honour of your tribe in this matter, but, as you have done so, the pledge must be redeemed." Then, dismounting from his own horse, and drawing his sword, he called upon every true Khosuh to follow him on foot, and leave their horses for the enemy to fly on! The clan obeyed, and their now united assault proved irresistible.

Thus was this noble Belooch, Kowrah Khan, left master of the fort of Dera Ghazee Khan, and of forty large, masted boats, collected by Longa Mull, at Moolraj's orders, to enable the rebel army to cross the Indus.

For this timely service, very handsome dresses of honour were given to all the Khosuh chiefs; letters were sent by both the Maharajuh and the Resident, thanking Kowrah Khan and his son; and the dearly-loved title of

CHIEF OFFICERS



KOWRUH KHAN
(Khosuh)
A Belooch Chief of the Lower Derajat

KALOO KHAN
(Gundapoor)
A Puthan Chief of the Upper Derajat

"Ali Ja," or "Of high degree!" was conferred upon them.

Proud of both what they had done and what they had won, they followed me afterwards "to the wars" with four hundred Belooch horsemen of their own tribe, and shared with me many months of exposure and hard fighting without any other recompense than their food!

These, indeed, were not Kowrah Khan's first fields. He had in earlier years striven army to army with the great Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, and when defeated, had given his daughter to the conqueror in marriage, as a proud acknowledgement of submission.

I recall these anecdotes of Kowrah Khan, because my memory dwells with admiration on his character: so brave, so humble, so hot in fight, so cool in council, so sober and dignified in triumph, so smooth browed and firm amid disaster; a man at all times to be relied on.

Nor is it the least pleasing recollection of him, that, when danger and difficulty had passed away, peace returned, and the State had no more need of volunteers, Lord Dalhousie, with a just and unforgetting gratitude, which rulers do not always imitate, not only confirmed Kowrah Khan in possession of a jageer of one thousand rupees a-year, but extended it also to the lifetime of his gallant son; added a money pension of twelve hundred rupees a-year to Kowrah Khan, and gave a garden at their native place to the family for ever.

CHAPTER V

THE CAPTURE OF GHAZEE KHAN, AND ESPECIALLY THE MODE OF IT, GRATIFYING TO GOVERNMENT—RELUCTANCE OF FOUR OF THE CONVERGING COLUMNS TO CONVERGE—THE RESIDENT STILL RELIES ON THEM, AND DISPENSES WITH THE AUTHOR—DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNICATION THE TRUE CAUSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY—FAILURE OF THE FOUR COLUMNS AGAIN PREDICTED—THE ENEMY DISAPPEARS FROM OODOO KEE KOTE, AND CORTLANDT OCCUPIES GHAZEE KHAN—CURIOUS SCHEME OF DEWAN MOOLRAJ'S FOR A TRANS-INDUS SOVEREIGNTY—THE AUTHOR SUPPRESSES AN INJUDICIOUS ORDER OF THE DURBAR TO REMIT REVENUE IN MOOLRAJ'S COUNTRY—REBEL ARMY RE-APPEARS AT KOREYSHEE, AND THE AUTHOR JOINS GENERAL CORTLANDT AT GHAZEE KHAN—BEAUTY AND FERTILITY OF THAT PLACE—A KARDAR OF MOOLRAJ'S HOLDS OUT IN THE FORT OF HURRUND, AND IS SUMMONED TO SURRENDER—MUHOMMUDAN EXCESSES AFTER CAPTURE OF GHAZEE KHAN—ROYALISTS INCREASE, REBELS DESERT—MUHOMMUDAN POPULATION RISE ON A REBEL KARDAR—THE DISAFFECTED FUTTEH PULTUN SENT ON SERVICE—BHAWUL KHAN INQUIRES FOR HIS ALLIES, AND THE AUTHOR AGAIN VOLUNTEERS—THE AUTHOR'S PLAN OF BLOCKADE EXPLAINED—THE BHAWULPOOR ARMY CROSSES THE SUTLEJ, AND CALLS ON AUTHOR TO CO-OPERATE—THE AUTHOR SOLICITS A "CARTE BLANCHE"—THE REBEL KARDAR IN HURRUND REFUSES IN VERSE TO SURRENDER—BRITISH STORES

SEIZED ON THE SUTLEJ—COLLISION BETWEEN REBEL AND ROYAL DETACHMENTS AT ALIPOOR—THE AUTHOR MOVES HIS FORCE DOWN TO THE INDUS—DAOODPOTRAS MOVE ON SHOOJABAD—THE RESIDENT ALLOWS THE AUTHOR TO CROSS THE INDUS, BUT NOT THE CHENAB—MOOSTAPHA KHAN AT LAST REPORTS THE RESULT OF HIS EMBASSY—MARTIAL ARDOUR OF THE AUTHOR'S LEVIES—LIEUTENANT TAYLOR'S GENEROUS REINFORCEMENT—THE QUIET OF BUNNOO ATTRIBUTED TO HIM—MOOLRAJ'S ARMY ASK LEAVE TO RETIRE FROM THE INDUS—THE DAOODPOTRA GENERAL HESITATES TO ADVANCE—THE RESIDENT AT LAST GIVES UP THE DURBAR AND THEIR ARMIES, ADOPTS THE BLOCKADE PROPOSED BY THE AUTHOR, AND APPOINTS LIEUTENANT LAKE TO DIRECT THE DAOODPOTRA ARMY—TRIBUTE TO THAT OFFICER'S PUBLIC SPIRIT.

CHAPTER V

THE achievement of the Khosuhs, narrated in the last chapter, was viewed with satisfaction by the British-Indian Government.

On the 10th of June, 1848, the Governor-General in Council thus wrote to the Secret Committee:

"The occupation of Dera Ghazee Khan is not only gratifying in itself, but especially for the mode in which that post was gained. By the encouragement held out to a native chief of influence, and by the conquest he has effected on behalf of Lieutenant Edwardes, the sympathies of the rude Muhommudan tribes of the Derajat have been enlisted on the side of that gallant officer, securing for him a greater chance of being able to offer successful resistance to the Sikh troops in his own camp, whom he suspects of disaffection, and even of more treasonable designs, if they had the means to carry them into effect.

"These two actions, at Leia and Ghazee Khan, will, by their complete success, operate most favourably upon the minds of those who maintain but a doubtful allegiance; and as the river has already begun to rise, and

will now daily increase in depth and rapidity, we have great reason to hope that Lieutenant Edwardes will be able to maintain his position till the British troops advance to Mooltan."*

Up to this period there was indeed no probability that I should be able to do more than "maintain my position" on the other side of the Indus.

The Resident's combination of four other columns to converge upon and blockade Mooltan, was yet in progress; and though the lack of zeal or courage which held them all back from giving it a fair trial, was too prophetic of failure, yet it had not failed.

Rajah Sher Sing, still undoubtedly honest in intention, though probably far too sanguine in his reports of the feeling of his men, continued to throw a mistaken veil over their disaffection, and turn a deaf ear to their mutterings. He would have done far better for his own honour and the public service, had he candidly disclosed his difficulties to the Resident, avowed his inability to control the conspiracies in his camp, and marched back his column to Lahore. But let us do justice even to an enemy. Had he adopted that manly course, would it not have furnished to the British a fresh and just accusation against his faithless countrymen? He was, I sincerely believe, anxious to thwart their treachery—for, unlike his father, he was well content with the existing state of things—but he had not the moral courage to expose it. So he still cried, "All's well," and

*"Blue Book," p. 181.

kept his face towards Mooltan. If it had not been for something or other quite unforeseen, which always *would* occur or some provoking "circumstance over which he had no control," there was no day of the week (except Sunday, when he could not think of doing anything, out of respect to British feelings,) on which it was not his intention to have made a forced march of extraordinary dimensions. But, never mind; he would certainly move "to-morrow!"

Then Sheikh Emamoodeen, the Commander of Column No. 2—he was a very clever fellow; for he knew as well as possible what would be the end of the war, and had quite made up his mind, ever since his own expulsion from Cachmere, to be always on the British side in future. However bad things might look now—however wide the gulf of rebellion which yawned between Moolraj and punishment, and whatever number of loyal human lives might therein be swallowed up before it filled, there was never a doubt about its filling to the brim at last, in the mind of Sheikh Emamoodeen.

All that the Sheikh objected to was, contributing his own right loyal life to fill it, unless absolutely necessary. He knew the disaffected state of Column No. 1, as well as Sher Sing himself; he heard nothing of Jowahir Dutt's Column No. 3, in his front; and saw nothing of Bhawul Khan's Column No. 4, on his left; and he naturally felt a little unsupported. So he pursued his way to Mooltan leisurely, along the meandering bank of the Sutlej, and was very particular indeed in the recruits he was told to entertain. Rather than not get the right sort, he would never fill up his number.

Jowahir Mull Dutt, with Column No. 3, was equally opposed to any indecent haste, though from different motives. He was a good kind of man, and was willing, God knows, to be on the winning side; for he had suffered a good deal in former revolutions from getting on the wrong. But how to know which was which? It was a knotty point, and required deliberation. If you could once get him to make up his mind that he was all right, that he had made no mistake, and was certain of his jageers, he became a perfect hero. His mind at rest, his body would go anywhere. I had him under me for months, and never saw a braver man. But that was after Kineyree and Suddoosam. At present the rebels were in the ascendant, and Jowahir Mull perplexed. So he came on like a crab.

And as for Column No. 4, the army of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor; the Nuwab very justly remarked that he was ordered to co-operate, not act alone; and it would be time enough to cross the Sutlej when there were some allies to meet him on the other side.

To direct and concentrate on a given point the manœuvres of four such columns, advancing from four different points of the compass, would have demanded Napoleon in a balloon with a staff of A.D.C.'s in parachutes; and the Resident at Lahore might well have despaired of effecting by such means the blockade of Moolraj in his capital.

But as yet he had not given up the invidious task; and in reply to my offer of May 20th, "to undertake the blockade of the rebel in Mooltan, for the rest of the hot season and rains, if he should honour me with that commission,

and order Bhawul Khan to assist me,"* Sir Frederick wrote as follows:

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT "EDWARDES

"Lahore, May 29th, 1848.

"I congratulate you heartily, on your energetic operations, and on the success of your Afghan ally, Gholam Hyder Khan, and beg that you will convey to him and his father the expression of my approbation and admiration of their conduct, and that you will tell them, if you think it right, that a purwanna and khillut shall be sent to them from the Maharajuh.

"I cannot, however, approve of your proposal to cross the Indus at the present moment. You will do the State excellent service by maintaining the peace of your frontier and jurisdiction, and by holding and collecting the revenues of the Trans-Indus provinces.

"You would put yourself in a false position, if you were to forego your present advantage, and place the Indus in your rear, should Moolraj's force be in the Doab. Should they have retired thence, your presence will not be required; *the officers and troops I had sent to those districts, will be able to do all that is necessary.*

"Your own frontier and districts should be your special care for the present."†

*See "Blue Book," p. 184.

†"Ibid," pp. 185, 6.

This letter, however, did not reach me for a long time, and I remained in that most embarrassing situation for a subordinate public officer, convinced by circumstances of which I alone was cognisant, that a certain line of conduct was necessary to effect the policy of my superior, and yet cut off from ascertaining his wishes. Such indeed was the difficulty of sending private messengers across the Punjab, even at this early period of the war, and such the studious neglect of the regular post, conducted by the Sikh Ministry, that, as will be seen in my next letter to the Resident, the latest letter I had received from him on May 23rd, was dated May 8th. It was quite impossible during this rebellion for the Resident's correspondence with his assistants in the provinces, to keep pace with the events and movements of the war. Those events and movements were as diligently and fully reported to him as if the season had been one of profound peace. No impartial person can peruse the "Blue Book of 1847—9," and not be struck with the laborious reports which the detached political officers in the Punjab continued day after day to furnish to their Government; while, singly and unassisted, they were struggling to keep the peace of disturbed frontiers, maintaining the discipline of the mutinous Sikh armies, walking with their lives in their hands among conspiracies, or wresting countries from open rebels.

And it should be recorded likewise, to the honour of Sir Frederick Currie, that every note of every assistant received from him a prompt reply. The delay was not with him, but with the messengers, whose path was beset by rebels in the highway, robbers in the jungle, and

(worse than either) Sikh officials in the towns.*

But, except for the information of Government, these reports were of little use. They discerned a coming crisis, communicated it to the Resident, and asked for his instructions. As well might a frigate in a squall have made signals to the Admiral for permission to shorten sail. The crisis came when it liked, without waiting for the post, and then woe to the seeker for advice if he could not act for himself!

Fortunately, the political officers upon the frontiers at this time, were such as George Lawrence, James Abbott, John Nicholson, Harry Lumsden, and Reynell Taylor, each certain to meet any emergency with firmness, employ it with advantage, and emerge from it with honour.

Yet many occasions must have occurred to them (certainly they did to myself) when they would have given anything to know the wishes of Government upon a particular point; and our countrymen at home should generously remember this, when, reading the story of the war, they think sometimes there should have been a little more of old men's advice, and a little less of young men's "responsibility."

Let us now return to the narrative; for the bank of the Indus is a very hot place to stand talking in.

*It would have been well if these gentlemen had been equally active in impeding the progress of the rebels; but though recruits from the Manjha and Cis-Sutlej streamed down to Mooltan for many months, I never once heard of any being arrested by Dewan Deena Nath's Kardars.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Peeronwalluh, on the right bank of the Indus,
"Twenty-five koss north of Dera Ghazee Khan,
"May 23rd, 1848.

"The details of the victory at Dera Ghazee Khan proved to be as first reported, with the exception that there were no zumbooruhs in the field, only a gun, and that the loss of men on both sides was greater than originally was known.

* * * *

"On the morning of the 22nd, I thought it best to send General Cortlandt's division on to Dera Ghazee Khan, to take possession, and watch the result at Mooltan. He will make it in three marches; his cavalry pushed on the whole distance in one day to show that a force was on the road, and quiet alarm in the large city of Ghazee Khan. I remained here to watch the rebel army on the opposite side of the Indus, which yesterday was at Dera Deen Punnah, and to-day is at Oodoo Kee Kote. The latter place is rather to the south of me, and I move to-morrow morning to Ulliyanah, which is directly opposite them, and six koss from this place, on the bank of the Indus.

"It is impossible to say what plan will now be followed by Moolraj; defeats are more discouraging to natives than to Europeans; and the Leia and Ghazee Khan affairs are not likely to infuse more vigour into the rebel counsels. Yet Moolraj's army at Mooltan is daily on the increase; my occupation of the Trans-Indus has cut off most of the Beloochees and Puthans from joining him; but I have good

information that the Sikhs are coming in to him in large numbers from the Manjha; and the delay which has occurred has enabled him to dig up and mount all the guns which were buried for concealment in the fort of Mooltan, amounting they say to not less than sixty.

"My anticipation is, that Moolraj will immediately concentrate all his disposable force of men and guns at Koreyshee opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, and that Ussud Khan and Hur Bugwan Doss's army that is now opposite me, will be moved down to the left bank for that purpose. I shall move parallel, and join General Cortlandt. The two forces will then encamp face to face, and the result depends on Moolraj's enterprise, and your estimate of the danger in which General Cortlandt and I will then be placed.

"I once more lay it before you, that we have now done our best, in execution of your instructions, and have come very nearly to the length of our tether. It is probable that, in another month, we may gain two or three thousand more Puthans, but, in the same time, Moolraj will gain twice as many Sikhs; you cannot fail to have observed the utter indifference with which Moolraj treats the approach of Rajah Sher Sing's division, as if it put him to no inconvenience, and by no means required him to draw his forces home; and I venture to prophesy that, when the Rajah, with his trusty Jageerdars, reaches Chichawutnee, between which and Mooltan there cannot be fifty koss, and no river interposes, Moolraj's main army will be still found encamped on the left bank of the Indus, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, with the Chenab between them and Mooltan. Why? Because he knows I am his enemy, and

because he knows that Rajah Sher Sing's force is not. I imply no suspicion against the Rajah, because he has much to lose, and nothing to gain; but his men will show forbearance if they merely remain inactive. The same with the force ordered to Munkhera. This distant investment of Mooltan, if it produces any effect at all, will probably be more sinister than beneficial; and I trust you do not calculate on its affording the slightest protection to the position of General Cortlandt and myself at Ghazee Khan.

"As yet, I have not heard from you in reply to several letters, in which I have stated my opinion, that this frontier is untenable by me, unless Bhawul Khan effects a diversion by crossing the Sutlej. The latest letter I have received from you bears date the 8th of May. I know not, therefore, whether you consider my fears well or ill-founded, and approve or disapprove of my request that Bhawul Khan be moved across the Indus; objection there seems to be none, and the advantages are obvious, and may be expressed in a few words—security for the whole hot weather and rains. There can be no delicacy in exposing the Nuwab's troops to the hot season, seeing that the troops with me are certain to be out all the year.

"I had written this much, when news arrived of the sudden disappearance of the enemy from Oodoo Kee Kote—whither, it is not known. I believe they had not boats enough to cross to this side, and they must either have been suddenly recalled to Mooltan, or have been ordered to move downwards to Ghazee Khan. In a few hours, correct information will be received, but, meanwhile, I have written to General Cortlandt, to march at once into Ghazee Khan, however distant, and, if necessary, summon me. This is

the harassing state of uncertainty in which we must expect to pass the next five months, unless a large body of troops that can be relied on, such as those of Bhawul Khan, are permitted to assist me in shutting Moolraj up in his fort, and putting an end to field operations for this season.

"Up to this time, I have not heard again from Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, though he was to have sent me the answer of the Mooltanee Puthans by the 18th. His plans, however, must have been quite disconcerted by the detention of the rebel army on the Chenab, and with it of many of the Puthan officers, with whom he was to have arranged to leave Moolraj. To correspond with them on such a subject was too dangerous to attempt; and if Bugwan Doss's army has now been recalled to Mooltan, I shall read that incident as the result of Moostapha Khan's counsel to Moolraj, with the secret object of getting all the Puthan officers together.

"A curious piece of information has been communicated to Foujdar Khan in my camp, from a relative in Mooltan; that the scheme to which latterly Moolraj had made up his mind, was to leave a force in the fort of Mooltan, and himself cross the Indus, where he proposed to master the whole Derajat, and then adjourn himself, with his own family, and those of his officers, to the hills, and pass the remainder of his life in trying to establish an independent sovereignty, Trans-Indus. The scheme (to a man possessed of treasure to commence with) is by no means so wild as it looks; and though ultimately, of course, such an usurpation must have yielded to the systematic opposition of the British power, yet its temporary success was merely a question of time. Had Moolraj crossed

the Indus, and anticipated the arrival of General Cortlandt and myself, he would have been joined at once by all the mountain tribes, and chiefs of the plains, who have now been obliged to come in to us; and so circumstanced, he would have given much more trouble than the siege of Mooltan can possibly do: such a contingency has, however, been happily obviated by our rapid appropriation of the Trans-Indus elâquas.

"It is right that I should report having suppressed a purwanna, sent by the Durbar to General Cortlandt, directing him to remit a third of the revenue to the zumeendars of Moolraj's territory, on condition of their paying the remainder to the Sirkar. Such a sign of weakness would be most pernicious in these parts. The Puthans and Juts would argue, 'What service have we done to make the Sirkar so kind to us? Or is this a bribe to coax revenue out of us, which the Sirkar is unable to exact? If so, we are the masters, and there is no occasion to pay any revenue at all.' On this side of the Indus, if the enemy do not cross, the whole revenue will be collected, without even an attempt at resistance. If the enemy crosses, not a halfpenny will be paid. And, on the other side of the Indus, in the same way, the revenue will be unhesitatingly paid to whomsoever is undeniably the strongest party; and so long as the point of superiority remains undecided, so long will the revenue remain unpaid. I collected a few thousand rupees in the Sindh Sagur Doab; so has the enemy; and, though the zumeendars have been told, by the Sirkar, that no allowance will be made to them for any revenue which they pay Moolraj, yet it would be impossible to enforce so harsh a decree—the zumeendars paying only under compulsion, which it is the fault of the Sirkar that they are exposed to. It

will be better, therefore, to wait till the Mooltan affair is settled, when accounts will be equitably adjusted, the zumeendar paying all that he has kept back, with interest, and receiving credit for all that Moolraj forced him to pay."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Ulliyanah, sixteen koss north of

"Dera Ghazee Khan.

"Night, May 25th, 1848.

"On the 23rd, I reported the sudden disappearance of the enemy from Oodoo Kee Kote, on the left bank of the Indus, and my uncertainty as to their whereabouts; but that I had taken the precaution of ordering General Cortlandt to push on to Ghazee Khan, and secure the ferry.

"On the 24th, I marched from Peeronwalluh to this place, feeling certain that, wherever the enemy was, he was to the south, and not to the north, and have employed these two days in gaining information from the other bank.

"It now appears that, when the rebel camp broke up from Oodoo Kee Kote, the whole of the cavalry made but a single march, from that place to Koreyshee, a village on the left bank of the Indus, directly opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, with the object of seizing the fleet of boats which had been collected there, by Dewan Moolraj's Lieutenant, Longa Mull, of whose defeat they had heard.

*See "Blue Book," pp. 188—90.

"The move was good, but had been completely anticipated by a party under Nassur Khan, Populzye, whom I sent off from Peeronwalluh, precisely twenty-four hours previously, to strengthen the victorious zumeendar Kowrah Khan, Khosuh, and to secure the fleet of boats, which I was afraid Kowrah Khan would forget in the excitement of his success. When, therefore, the rebel cavalry reached Koreyshee, they found that the boats were no longer in the Indus, but safely harboured in an inland nullah out of their reach.

"The rebel infantry and guns remained behind, making short marches after the cavalry, and masking what they fondly deemed that masterly manœuvre. Last night, they were at Goraie, and probably this morning reached Koreyshee.

"General Cortlandt has sent word, that Moolraj has dispatched a reinforcement, of some two thousand men and five guns, to Longa Mull, to enable him to hold his own in Ghazee Khan, but that detachment also is much too late. It will, however, swell the already very superior force on the opposite bank; and, fearful of any opportunity being given to the Futteh Pultun to fraternize, I have put my artillery into the boats once more, and with them and the infantry shall, to-morrow morning, hasten to reinforce General Cortlandt at Ghazee Khan. My cavalry goes by land, and will not reach (unless urgently summoned) till the second day.

"At Ghazee Khan, I shall have arrived at the most southerly point to which it will be prudent, or necessary, for our main body to go; and, if more active operations

are not determined on, General Cortlandt's troops and mine will probably pass the next five months on the ferry bank of that place, face to face with Moolraj's army at Koreyshee.

"But I trust a more stirring lot is in store for us. I have just received your letter of May the 18th, and am sincerely rejoiced to see that that faithful ally Bhawul Khan has gallantly *taken on himself the occupation of all the country between the Sutlej and the gates of Mooltan.* Under such circumstances, it would be ungenerous of me not to assist him, and, with your permission, as soon as I can get into communication with him, I propose to cross the Indus, and unitedly drive these foraging armies of Moolraj's back into Mooltan. We can then close the campaign for the hot weather in an attitude of dignity, which will make it impossible for the most disaffected to misrepresent the delay which will ensue before the siege. It would be a grave error, I think, to rest so long as one detachment of the rebels is at large. The fact should be distinctly brought out that it is for a siege alone that we are unprepared.

"When I get to Ghazee Khan, I mean to detach the Futteh Pultun to Mithunkote, where, if it does not do good service, it can do no harm. They want two guns, but it is bad enough that they have got muskets.

"Jus Mull, Moolraj's Kardar of Leia, has once more gone thither with one hundred horse, to collect revenue. He is a great coward, and thinks himself safe now our backs are turned; but Sirdar Jhunda Sing ought to be now reaching Munkhera; and I have written to him

to drive out the whole batch, and, if possible, put Jus Mull in prison."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"May 27th, 1848.

"I have the honour to report the junction of my own and General Cortlandt's force at this place, yesterday evening.

"With the artillery and infantry, I embarked in thirty-three boats at Ulliyanah yesterday at daybreak, and should have reached our destination by nine A.M., but for a baffling south wind, which prevails in the Lower Indus at this season, and which kept us beating about till late in the afternoon, when we reached the mouth of a beautiful canal, called the Kustooree Wahn, which runs inland, and under the city of Dera Ghazee Khan, which is two koss from the Indus. Here we found, securely moored, thirty-nine magnificent boats which the rebel Longa Mull had collected, for the passage of Moolraj's troops, and which fell into our hands after the victory of the 20th. We have thus a fleet of seventy-two boats, and could throw six thousand men across the Indus at one passage. The enemy, to the best of my knowledge, has not a boat, and, so far as I can make out, are very glad of the excuse thus afforded them for not carrying out their instructions to cross and engage us.

*See "Blue Book," pp. 190, 91.

"So lovely and rich a country as that around Dera Ghazee Khan I have seen nowhere in the Punjab, and compared with the Northern Trans-Indus territories, it may called a garden. Date groves stud the fields and shade the canals; and my new Puthan levies (eight hundred and seventy-nine horse and one thousand three hundred foot), for whom I have not yet been able to provide tents, are delighted to get out of the fiery May sun into this friendly shelter.

"The enemy is encamped near Koreyshee, as I anticipated, exactly opposite us; but there are two or three nullahs besides the river between them and us, and had they the will they have not the means of crossing over to oppose us.

"The only enemy left on this side of the Indus of one Mohkum Chund, Kardar of Hurrund, who with about two hundred men, is holding a strong fort there, three koss from the hills, and nearly fifty from Ghazee Khan. The brother of one of the officers in the fort is in my service, and I have this day sent him with an open purwanna to the Kardar, to come in with all his officers; and secret purwannas to his Puthan officers to overpower him and the Sikhs, if they refuse to come in and consider themselves as my servants for the future. As the fort is strong, and has two heavy guns in it, I am rather anxious about the success of this manœuvre; but Kowrah Khan, Khosuh, has gained such honour in these parts, by his victory over Longa Mull, that I am tolerably confident that the Puthans will be glad of the opportunity of similarly distinguishing themselves against the Hindoo rebels.

"This reminds me to report, that after the defeat of Longa Mull by the Khosuhs, sundry excesses were committed, which are never heard of in our regular armies, but which almost invariably wind up the vengeance of a native leader in the hour of victory. Several Hindoos, who had no share in Longa Mull's resistance, were plundered by the excited Moossulmans; and some other Muhommudans in the city, who had not been concerned in the fight, took the opportunity of settling a religious feud which had smouldered since the days of Runjeet Sing, and murdered a Hindoo fakeer, for whose accommodation Dewan Sawun Mull and Sirdar Lehna Sing had destroyed a musjeed, and erected a dhurmsalah* on its ruins. The Khosuhs who defeated Longa Mull, are in no way responsible for this, which seems to have been a spontaneous outbreak of long-repressed and insulted religious feeling; and though of course the case will be taken up, and legally dealt with, one cannot be astonished at such results of persecution. The Hindoos themselves feel the 'wild justice' of the retribution, horrible as it was, and have attempted to turn the blame of persecution back on the Puthans, by declaring that in the days of the older Kings of Cabul, a dhurmsalah was destroyed, to make way for the musjeed levelled by Sawun Mull. Kowrah Khan, Khosuh, was much incensed with the authors of this murder, and reproached them with destroying all the merit of his victory; and he is now inducing those Puthans who plundered Hindoos after the fight to restore their booty quietly, before the law looks after it. I mention these things because it is as wrong for one side

*A "musjeed" is a Muhommudan church, and a "dhurmsalah" a Hindoo almshouse.

to conceal, as for the other to exaggerate them; and every impartial mind will feel more sorrow than surprise if so monstrous an evil as war is not at all times to be restained within its licensed channels of destruction.

"The position of General Cortlandt and myself is no longer an object of anxiety to ourselves, and need not be to you. The vacillation and lack of enterprise of a very superior enemy has enabled us, in self-defence as it were, to wrest from him sixty koss of country in less than a fortnight, and to give him two discouraging defeats at two points so far removed as Leia and Dera Ghazee Khan, within four days of each other; and now as much more country lies before us, which we have only to stretch out our hand and take. Kardars are now departing to the several districts; we have been joined as we advanced by the chief toomuns and their followers, and have steadily continued to enlist men, so that we cannot now be less than six thousand strong, with ten guns, two more on the road from Bunnoo, and thirty zumbooruhs. With such a force (after detaching the Futteh Pultun) we are quite prepared, if necessary, to give the enemy the general action which so recently our weakness obliged us to avoid; and now that you have ordered Bhawul Khan to occupy the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, I trust you will permit me to assist him in turning that move to the greatest advantage, and driving all the rebels into their fort, for the rest of the summer. I have already written to the Nuwab to offer to do so, and to ascertain his plans.

"Three or four days ago, I received a purwanna from the Sirkar, for Ussud Khan, Nootkanee, in the enemy's camp opposite. He has made himself very

conspicuous in the rebellion, and ill-deserves the promise of keeping his jageer, which that purwanna holds out to him; so I told him that if he intended to avail himself of its terms, he must do so at once, or else consider them cancelled, as the Sirkar could not be aware of the lengths to which he had gone. This morning I received an answer from him, declaring that he is unable to comply, on account of his women being in Mooltan, which is a falsehood, as I have good information that he removed them some time ago to the khangah of Mukhtoom Rusheed; Koreyshee, whence he is at perfect liberty to send them whithersoever he likes. I consider, therefore, that he has forfeited all claim to anything but his life, should he surrender at some future stage of the campaign.

"Julal Khan, Lugharee, with sixty men, has deserted from the enemy, and I expect him in to-morrow or next day. There are no boats, and he must cross on a mussuck,* which will do him good.

"Mussoo Khan, who fought at Leia, and has again returned thither, is also expected in; his brother having undertaken to bring him in in seven days.

"This is not to be mistaken for loyalty. The homes of these traitors are on this side of the river, and confiscation is, as it were, on their threshold.

"There is a fellow named Jowahir Mull, of Imnabad, in the enemy's camp, whose name is much in people's

*A mussuck is a water-bag, made of the skin of a sheep, which, being inflated, is used by the people on the banks of the Indus to buoy them up while swimming across the river.

mouths. It would be well to confiscate his estates, if he has any.

"A Sirdar, named Ujeet Sing, of Pukka Sirdarwalla, on the Sutlej, who enjoys a considerable jageer from the Sirkar, fought on the side of the rebels here in Ghazee Khan, on the 20th, and took refuge at the end of the action in the fort, whence he was allowed mercifully to emerge on giving up his arms to the Khosuhs. I hope this man's jageer will be immediately taken from him. He is again with the enemy on the other bank."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"May 30th, 1848.

"Things remain much in the same state as when last I wrote. We are encamped here, threatening to cross; and the enemy opposite us, at Koreyshee, looking out to prevent us.

"Julal Khan, Lugharee, a zumeendar of this district of considerable note, came over to us the day before yesterday from the rebel camp with about eighty men. He is more trouble to me here than there, on account of his belonging to the party which is at war with the Khosuhs, who have been doing us much good service; and receiving both in the same Durbar is much like associating a tiger and a lion. But desertion is so disheartening that I encourage as many as possible to leave the enemy. Last night Moostapha

*See "Blue Book," pp. 191—3.

Khan, Suddozye, came over, leaving his tents and horses all standing. He is a Jageerdar, and of course looks to the end. I expect two or three others in a day or two.

"An affray has taken place in the south of the Sindh Sagur Doab, near the Sutlej, at a place called Juttoan. The zumeendars rose spontaneously, to pay off some old scores against Moolraj's Kardar, one Purubdyal (brother to Sudda Nund, the Mooltan vakeel), and finally made him prisoner, and sent him over the water to Bhawul Khan. Moolraj's Kardars are certainly unlucky. Jowahir Mull, of Imnabad, with two hundred horse, has left the camp at Koreyshee for Juttoan, to take vengeance on the zumeendars, who, I hope, will rise in numbers and repulse him.

"This morning, the Futteh Pultun started for the south. It is under the orders of Nassur Khan, Populzye, who has with him two hundred and fifty sowars and five zumbooruhs, and they all proceed *via* Jampore and Hurrund, to Mithunkote. Hurrund is a strong fort, in which I have already reported that the Kardar, Mohkum Chund, is holding out; but I expect he will evacuate before the force arrives. Should he still refuse to surrender, the detachment now sent will be strengthened, and the place regularly besieged. It has two heavy guns, and is reckoned strong.

"Moostapha Khan, Suddozye, describes the Puthan allies of Moolraj to be all out of heart, discontented, and prepared to desert, should an 'honourable' opportunity offer itself! But the Sikhs, he says, are mustering strong, and determined to fight. What is strange, he declares

that the troops which deserted our officers are dissatisfied with Moolraj, who has not rewarded them as they expected.

"I send a letter from Nuwab Bhawul Khan, relative to his movements, from which it would appear that *the occupation of the country between Mooltan and the Sutlej, for which he has undertaken to be responsible, is dependent on the simultaneous advance of Sheikh Emamoodeen, and Raja Sher Sing from other quarters, and as yet 'he hears nothing of either!'* Neither can anybody else say where those chiefs are, though there has been time enough for them to march two or three times to Mooltan, since the ukhbar first reported their departure for Lahore. *Would it not be better, therefore, to let Bhawul Khan co-operate with those who will exert themselves at this crisis*? *General Cortlandt and I are quite prepared to force the passage of the Indus, whenever you give the word*; *and to unite with the troops of Bhawul Khan, in a plan for driving back the Koreyshee camp to Mooltan.* Should Bhawul Khan's army cross at Julalpore, it is reasonable to believe that Moolraj would instantly summon Hur Bugwan Doss's army home, and thus allow us to cross and follow them unopposed; but should Moolraj feel secure in his fort without their aid (which is scarcely credible), we are now quite strong enough to attack Hur Bugwan Doss, under the certainty that Bhawul Khan would prevent any further reinforcements from coming to their assistance from Mooltan. In a few words, my request is, *that the task of driving in the rebels be confided to this force, and Bhawul Khan's*; *leaving us at liberty to adopt our plan of operations.* Undoubtedly, there can be no feeling of security for the empire, during the next four months, if the enemy is not confined to the fort of

Mooltan; and *I am willing to be responsible for reducing him to that condition, if Bhawul Khan's assistance is put at my disposal.*

"Revenue arrangements are proceeding very satisfactorily on this side of the Indus, and money beginning to come in from the districts in our rear; but all will be disturbed, if Jowahir Mull Dutt is allowed to remit, at one stroke of his pen, a third of the whole revenue of the Sindh Sagur Doab. This remission can only have been devised by the Durbar, under the idea that the zumeendars are in rebellion. Of course, there is a considerable class of the population (Beloochees and Puthans) who, at all times, prefer military service to agriculture; and these men have now either joined my camp or Moolraj's. The cream of the country has, therefore, been skimmed off; and the residue is very thin milk indeed. If half as much revenue again were to be imposed by the Sirkar, as fine for supposed disloyalty, it would be paid as soon as ever Jowahir Mull arrived at Leia; and if half the revenue, instead of a third, was to be remitted, the other half would not be paid a day before that city was occupied, and permanent arrangements were to be made by the Sirkar. The zumeendars do not pay at once, because they are afraid that to-morrow the opposite party will be uppermost, and they will be called on to pay over again. They make no resistance to paying their full revenue. They only want assurance that they are paying to the strongest side. And it is evidently unjust, as well as unnecessary, to make this remission, for it becomes a fine on loyalty, a temptation to the surrounding peaceful districts to revolt, for the sake of being dealt with as enemies. I am in daily expectation of the zumeendars, Trans-Indus, asking to be treated as their brethren over the water; and the

answer I shall give them will be more arbitrary than logical, namely, that Jowahir Mull is master on that side, and I on this. I trust that a consideration of these circumstances will induce you to rescind the remission of one-third in all the districts of Jowahir Mull, Sher Sing, and Emamoodeen; the example being most pernicious, and leading to the belief that the Government of the Maharajuh is much weaker than it is."*

I ask the reader's particular attention to those passages in the above letter which are printed in italics; because the combination therein proposed always seems to me the most interesting operation of this irregular campaign.

The plan of blockading Moolraj in his fortress by means of four converging columns, independent of mine, had now failed. Three of the columns not being apparent, Bhawul Khan refused to advance the fourth across the Sutlej.

Consequently Dewan Moolraj remained unthreatened; and he had a large army encamped at Koreyshee, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, which threatened to carry the war beyond the Indus.

The problem before us was, "How to drive in this army, and shut up Moolraj?" and the solution suggested was simply this:

Take Columns 1, 2, 3, off the board, and consider the forces under Sher Sing, Sheikh Emamoodeen, and

*See "Blue Book," pp. 193—5.

Jowahir Mull Dutt, as non-existing; then advance Column No. 4, from Bhawulpoor, on the left bank of the Sutlej, to Shoojabad, between the right bank and Mooltan. The adversary's castle and king being thus threatened, Moolraj must withdraw his army from the Indus, to the left bank of the Chenab to cover them. This leaving the way open for us, we cross the Indus and the Chenab, unite with the Bhawulpoor army, and fight the enemy under great advantage.

If the effect of advancing the Bhawulpoor army to Shoojabad be not to make Moolraj withdraw his army from the Indus, then will that army lie between two enemies, and be cracked like a nut.

Either of the events would be a heavy blow to the rebellion; so that there must be a result, and that result beneficial.

There were, however, great difficulties in both. In the former, General Cortlandt and I would have to cross two broad rivers, the Indus and Chenab, in the same time that the rebel army at Koreyshee crossed the Chenab alone; else that army would engage and probably destroy Bhawul Khan's before we arrived to their assistance. In other words, I had to give the enemy the Indus for a start; and the Indus at this time was about fifteen miles wide, and rushing and roaring like a sea.

Undoubtedly this was a great venture; but I relied on the Koreyshee army having no General, and referring continually to Moolraj in Mooltan for orders; a delay which would bring us even. The result is known; I joined Bhawul Khan's army at the opening of the battle of

Kineyree, on the 18th June, after a stern chase of one week.

Had the other plan been necessary, I must have crossed the Indus in the face of the enemy at Koreyshee; and I am very glad to be now sitting in my chair and recording that it happened otherwise. But though most hazardous, it was feasible. Bhawul Khan's army would have crossed the Chenab the day before, and making one long march have met us at the ferry of the Indus where we designed to land.

Having thus explained the design of the combination, let us see what came of it; remembering that as yet it was only a voluntary offer of mine, which neither the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, nor the Resident at Lahore, had accepted.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT "LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"June 2nd, 1848.

"This morning I received a reply from Nuwab Bhawul Khan, dated the 30th of May, in which he informs me that he is crossing the whole of his force, expects to complete the passage as it were to-day, and shall then move on Shoojabad, which is twenty koss from Mooltan.

"I offered to co-operate with the Nuwab should he desire it, and marked out two plans as those which lay open to him, one without, and one with, my co-operation, requesting of him to tell me which he meant to follow. The

first was, for him to advance alone towards Mooltan, and to force Moolraj to recall the army of Hur Bugwan Doss at Koreyshee in my front. But to do this, I said, 'You must be strong and self-sufficient.' The other plan was, in case of his not being strong enough to adopt the former, that he should act in conjunction with me, crossing below the *debouche* of the Chenab (at Ooch, or somewhere thereabouts), into the lower part of the Sindh Sagur Doab, and advancing up the right bank of the Chenab to Khangurh, where I proposed to join him, by forcing the Indus at the ferry of Kinjur. This offer I made because Bhawul Khan's friendship for our Government is undoubted, and I thought that if, out of good-will, he had undertaken more than he could well accomplish, in becoming responsible for the occupation of the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, it would be but right to give him every assistance in my power. His answer, this morning received, adopts the former plan, and implies that he is sufficiently strong to go alone, but hints that I might join him at Shoojabad, which is impossible without boats on the Chenab.

"I am not sorry that the Nuwab has taken his own line, since it is the one which obviously offers the greatest military advantages, and which, if followed with any vigour and show of strength, must oblige Moolraj to summon all his troops across the Chenab. At least, I do not give him credit for sufficient courage to withdraw Hur Bugwan Doss, only as far as Raj Ghat, two koss from Mooltan, on the right bank of the Chenab, though that would be quite as safe as if the rebel force were under the walls of Mooltan, supposing that I did not follow them up.

"We may daily expect therefore to hear of the retreat of the enemy from Koreyshee, and it becomes necessary

for me to make up mind how to act under such circumstances.

"Your instructions are distinct, 'to remain Trans-Indus, to secure the peace of this important frontier, which is of more consequence than the revenues of the Sindh Sagur Doab.' But it is very questionable whether inactivity on my part is consistent with the preservation of lasting peace in this quarter.

"For, let us suppose the Daoodpotra* army to have reached Shoojabad. By the Nuwab naming that place as suitable for my joining him, I take it he does not mean to go any further north this hot weather; in which case the rebel forces will not be under the necessity which we contemplate, of shutting themselves up in the fort. At the utmost, they will encamp on the left bank of the Raj Ghat. In this position they will correspond with Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force at Leia, the same as they did with mine at the same place; and, from Captain Abbot's account, the officers distrusted their men even before they left Huzaruh. To expose such rotten troops to four months' tampering would be most unwise; and at no time could we be astonished to hear of their going over to Moolraj. Again, the Leia force is linked on to Bunnoo, by the sowars at Dera Ishmael Khan. That place is empty of regular troops, and none but Sikh Ghorchurruhs from Bunnoo were available for its protection. I hear that these men talk treason

*Daoodpotra means descendants of David, and is the family name of the Bhawulpoor chief and his tribe. The Nuwab maintains a small standing army, but considers his chief power to lie in his brethren, the Daoodpotra zumeendars, who hold their lands on feudal tenure, and render military service whenever called on.

very freely, and speculate openly on the events which the next few months are to produce. Of course these opinions find their way to Bunnoo, and thence to Peshawur and Huzaruh, with improvements at every stage; and both Lieutenant Taylor, Major George Lawrence, and Major Abbott feel that their garrisons, however quiet, are watching affairs narrowly. This being the case, the smallest spark may, any day during the next four months, set the cantonments of Bunnoo, Peshawur, and Huzaruh in a blaze of mutiny. Such, for instance, as the arrival of Bhaee Maharaj at Mooltan, in the character of a persecuted Gooroo.* This is the great danger which now seems to me to threaten this frontier, unless some vigorous move on my part, in backing up that of Bhawul Khan, drives the rebels into their stronghold, and reduces them for the rest of the summer to a discouraging and humiliating position in the public eye.

"Other apprehensions I have none. From the nature of this frontier, perfect peace is a thing unknown. Some one tribe or other must necessarily be in a ferment, or some hereditary and unintelligible feud must needs be brought, for the hundredth time, to the sharp appeal of the sword; but one gets accustomed to this, and ceases to regard it as an interruption to the general good understanding

*Bhaee Maharaj was a Sikh fanatic, who went about the Punjab prophesying the downfall of the Christians, and raising recruits for the rebel standard. He was on his way with about five thousand armed followers to Mooltan, when a party sent after him by the Resident came up with, and engaged him. About eight hundred of the rebels were driven into the Chenab river, of whom five hundred were drowned, and three hundred taken prisoners on an island. The Bhaee swam out safely, and reached Mooltan.

existing between a prudent ruler and races fonder of the sword than of the plough.

"It would require the residence of one officer for some years, to make up all enmities and redress all grievances, so as to establish in the Derajat what is called peace in other districts. What I think we can calculate on, now that all the chief Puthans and Beloochees have joined us, is general subordination and assistance, which is all we want until this rebellion is settled.

"On the one hand, therefore, our presence here with a large force, is no longer necessary to secure peace with the Puthan population; and if we moved we should carry with us, enlisted in our ranks, the best hostages for quiet in our absence; while, on the other hand, to render innocuous the delay of four months, which must occur before the British army takes the field, it seems almost indispensable to get between the enemy and all the north-west stations of Sikh troops, so as to cut off both intrigue, desertion, and coalition.

"Raj Ghat, on the right bank of the Chenab, two koss from Mooltan, is the point which, after mature consideration, I should like to reach, as promising more public tranquillity and moral effect than any other. Half an hour's consideration of the map will, I am sure, incline you to agree in this opinion.

"What I would ask therefore is, to be left at liberty on this head, to act on my own discretion according to circumstances. For the present we are fully employed here, and could not leave under any temptation until the

fort of Hurrund has surrendered. Some days ago I reported the dispatch of a regiment to back General Cortlandt's summons to the Kardar and officers of that garrison.

"This morning the Kardar (Mohkum Chund) sent in his answer, which is sufficient to hang him, should he be taken alive. It commences with a Persian verse, which, literally translated, means, 'Only see how great is the power of the immaculate God, which can enable one man to slay a hundred thousand.' It then proceeds to state that Dewan Moolraj made him Kardar, and either Dewan Moolraj or Maharajuh Duleep Sing must order him to give up the fort. The saving clause about the Maharajuh is a shallow pretext to gain time, which he certainly shall not have, but I told General Cortlandt to send him one of the numerous proclamations, wherein all persons in this district are called on to obey that officer, and separate from Dewan Moolraj, in order that he may not plead the excuse again, when put on his trial. I rather expect though, that if this is his humour, he will be killed in resisting the Puthan officers of his garrison, whom I have called on to bring him in, and one cannot help admiring the folly of Moolraj in letting such thorough-going partisans as Mohkum Chund, Cheytun Mull, and Longa Mull, be killed, and taken prisoners, in holes and corners, instead of gathering them round his person for the grand struggle at Mooltan.

"There is no news of any importance from the enemy's camp at Koreyshee. They are very much afraid of our crossing, and often beat to arms on false alarms of our fleet being under weigh. The Sikh regulars are described as the only men who are prepared to offer any resistance. Ussud Khan, Nootkanee, has, it appears, not gone to

Mooltan, but has fallen under suspicion, and been virtually put in arrest by Hur Bugwan Doss in a building apart from the camp. This Ussud Khan's name is much used, on account of his old family and rank; but, personally, he is a mere time-server, unstable and unfaithful taking up a cause for no attachment, and deserting it as soon as good luck sets him the example. He has not twenty followers. Jowahir Mull, of Imnabad, is making overtures to desert to us with two hundred men. I tell him to come, and not talk. Our kossids have great difficulty in penetrating their camp; one got his nose cut off the other day.

"A circumstance came to my knowledge to-day, of which no previous mention has been made that I am aware of. About the time when this rebellion broke out, several boats, laden with military stores, are said to have been on their way up the Indus, from Kurrachee to Ferozepoor, for the British Government, and were intercepted and seized by the Kardar of Mithunkote. One boat, heavily laden with stores, selected from the above (muskets, &c.), has just been sent by the said Kardar to the enemy's camp at Koreyshee; but a Puthan zumeendar and robber heard of the affair, and made a foray on the sepoys in charge, about twenty koss to the south of this place, and possessed himself of the prize. The boatmen, however, talked him over, told him that the stores belonged to the Sahib log, and that he would make a better thing by giving them up to me, than by keeping them. He approved the argument, and sent word of what had happened, and General Cortlandt has sent out twenty horsemen to accompany the boat hither.

Have you any report of these boats being intercepted from the Sindh Government?*

"The Kardar of Mithunkote will not give us any trouble, I trust, after the fort of Hurrund, to the north of him, has been taken. The Futteh Pultun and Nassur Khan, Populzye's, party will then proceed to Mithunkote. In fact, as far as the country and people, Trans-Indus, are concerned, I have no anxieties whatever; any danger that threatens us is from the Sikh troops."†

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"June 5th, 1848.

"The enemy has received another defeat, at Alipore, in the lowest part of the Sindh Sagur Doab. Jowahir Mull, of Imnabad, with one hundred horse, and one hundred foot, had a forced march of nearly thirty koss, from the camp at Koreyshee, to seize a few thousand rupees of revenue which had been collected by Sahib Purubdyal, Kardar of Juttoe, and which had again fallen into the hands of the zumeendars, when they rose, and made Purubdyal a prisoner, as before reported. Jowahir Mull was not aware that, in the interim, Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, an officer of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, had crossed the Sutlej below Ooch, into the Seetpore district, with one

*On inquiry it appeared that these stores were intercepted by Moolraj's people during the first Sikh war.

†See "Blue Book," pp. 195—7.

thousand five hundred men, and the consequence was, that he came plump into the middle of them near Alipore; and I hear that out of his two hundred men he left one hundred and nine dead upon the field, and himself with difficulty escaped with the remainder to Khangurh, on the banks of the Chenab, opposite Shoojabad, whence he has probably continued his flight to Mooltan. You will have got the particulars, probably, from Peer Ibraheem Khan before this reaches you.

"When this information reached me yesterday, it immediately occurred to me that the rebel army at Koreyshee would either retreat upon Mooltan to escape from the toils closing around them, or else march against the weak party of Moozooddeen Khan, and revenge the defeat of Jowahir Mull. In the former case, it would be desirable to hasten their movements, and secure a footing on the other bank; and, in the latter, to assist the troops of Bhawul Khan would be imperative. This morning, therefore, I marched all our regular troops down to the river, and proposed to follow with the new levies to-morrow. The strong fleet of eighty boats of which we are master, has likewise been towed out of the nullah in which it was moored, and brought into the open river in front of the camp. Every demonstration, in fact, has been made of an intention to cross to the left bank at once, though, as I said in my last letter, I am not prepared to leave this side, without special reason, until some satisfactory settlement has been made at Hurrund, where the fort still holds out. Our detachment has, however, not yet reached it.

"Full details of the movements of the Bhawulpoor troops have, at length, reached me from the Nuwab and

Peer Ibraheem Khan; from which I gather that the latter, with the main body, will be to-day within a long march, or two short ones, of Shoojabad, at which place he presses me to unite my forces with the Nuwab's. No doubt the Nuwab has told him to do this, and feels apprehensive of Moolraj turning all his troops against the Daoodpotra division. But this was easily foreseen from the first; and I wrote to the Nuwab, a fortnight ago, to tell him not to advance on Shoojabad, unless strong enough to fight single-handed; otherwise, to advance up the Seetpore road, between the Chenab and the Indus, when I would cross and join him at Khangurh, and unitedly, we might then proceed whichever way we chose to Mooltan.

"He was too proud to accept of this assistance, and thought he could gain all the credit of advancing alone on Shoojabad, and still have the advantage of my reinforcement, by making Peer Ibraheem Khan apply for it. This is very native, but I must not follow his example; and having nothing at heart but the successful termination of the campaign, I shall certainly go to his assistance, even at Shoojabad, if I see any chance of his being opposed in strength. I have therefore written, in reply to Peer Ibraheem Khan, that my own plan was to make my way to the Raj Ghat, whenever I crossed the Indus, and so press the Dewan on the north, while the Nuwab's troops pressed him on the south; but that I will now take the Khangurh route, as Khangurh is only five koss from Shoojabad, with the Chenab between them; and from that place I can either cross the Chenab, if there are any boats along with the Daoodpotras, or continue my way to Raj Ghat, whichever the times require. But I repeat, that special reasons only

can induce me to cross the Indus, before the reduction of the fort of Hurrund. After that, you are well aware that my opinion is, that the sooner our force can get to the Chenab the better; and though, judging of the matter from Lahore, you urge me to keep on my own side of the Indus, you would not, I am sure, wish me to withhold my assistance from Bhawul Khan, if required.

"The aspect of affairs, indeed, has never been so good as at this moment. Moolraj is playing his game very ill, and would appear to have no able, or no sincere, military adviser; else he would not fritter away his strength, discourage his troops in these detached expeditions, which none of his officers has the skill to bring to a successful issue. Whenever they have been met, they have been signally beaten and they will now be driven back to Mooltan which they should never have left, unless for the purpose of forcing me to a disadvantageous action, and so putting me *hors de combat* for the rest of the season.

"The chief zumeendars of Mithunkote have written to offer to rise, and expel Moolraj's Kardar from that district, where he has assembled some three hundred or four hundred men, and is collecting revenue. In reply, I have directed General Cortlandt to tell them to rise by all means, but not to let the rebel Kardar escape on any terms. It is a new thing these men of the pen buckling on the sword. Moolraj's rebellion has made all the Kuthrees mad.

"The Nuwab of Bhawulpoor informs me, that you made over to him 'the Trans-Indus territories, up to the hills;' an obscure description; but I take it that, when

you thought I should not be able to reach Dera Ghazee Khan, you requested the Nuwab to undertake its appropriation. That however is no longer necessary, and I have told him so."*

It will be remembered that on May 29th, the Resident declined my offer of co-operation with the army of Nuwab Bhawul Khan; under the impression that that, and the other three converging columns, "would be able to do all that was necessary."†

On the following day, however, the Resident received a letter from the Nuwab himself, soliciting my co-operation with a division of the Bhawulpoor army which was about to cross the Sutlej between the Chenab and the Indus, to recover from the rebels the southern district of the Sindh Sagur Doab; and Sir Frederick Currie promptly complied with the request. Accordingly, on May 31st, the Resident so far modified his former instructions as to leave me at discretion either to detach General Cortlandt, or go myself with troops across the Indus, to co-operate with those of the Nuwab, eastward of the Chenab.

Again, however, he pressed on me the paramount importance of maintaining the peace of the Trans-Indus frontier.

This modified permission, reached me on June 6th, and I replied as follows:

*See "Blue Book," pp. 199, 200.

†"Ibid," pp. 185, 6.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"June 6th, 1848.

"I am happy to have received your sanction to my detaching General Cortlandt across the Indus, or going myself, if necessary, for the support of the troops of Bhawul Khan; and judging from the aspect of things, in this quarter, I should expect that many days will not pass over without rendering such co-operation indispensable. We are treading close upon that stage of the rebellion which is to decide whether Dewan Moolraj is to await the British troops, as an already condemned prisoner, in the fort of Mooltan, or, at the head of an insurrectionary army, in the field: within a fortnight he will either be shut up in his stronghold, or at large for the hot weather.

"My latest news of Bhawul Khan's main body, left it at Julalpore Khakran, which is only eight or nine koss from Shoojabad. At Shoojabad, there is a stout fort, I understand, capable of making considerable resistance. It is intrusted to one Jummeeut Raee, who is said to have one thousand five hundred men with him. Had Moolraj moved his fleet of boats down from the Raj Ghat, to Shoojabad, so as to enable the force now at Koreyshee to cross at Khangurh, and collected all his movable forces and artillery around the fort of Shoojabad, Bhawul Khan's division could not have passed that place without a general action. At present it is difficult to tell on what point the Koreyshee force will retreat, but I think it probable they will not be in heart for so spirited a move as that I have mentioned, and will make for Raj Ghat and Mooltan

to-night. The night before last, they fired six guns, either to persuade me that they had won the fight at Alipore, or else to show that their guns were still at Koreyshee, preparatory to sending them away by forced marches to the Chenab, themselves remaining to cover the manœuvre. In the latter case, they will follow the artillery to-night, and make Raj Ghat in two days. That something of this sort is brewing is clear from the increased vigilance with which they have watched the river, to prevent any spy from coming over from my camp; and this is now the second day that none of my messengers have returned.

"This morning, I received the long-expected letter from Gholam Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, in Mooltan. His silence, as I imagined, was caused by the absence from Mooltan, with the army sent against me, of all the Mooltanee Puthan Chiefs whose defection he had undertaken to accomplish, and his reluctance to write until there was some prospect of success. He now writes that, on his return from my camp to Mooltan, he strongly urged Moolraj to surrender himself to me, but the Dewan rejected his advice, got angry when he pressed it, and renewed his preparations for war. In this mood he is encouraged only by two of the Puthan officers, Ahmud Khan and Kalikdad Khan, who have brought their wives into the fort of Mooltan: all the other Puthans have already removed their families, not only from the fort, but also from the neighbourhood, and chiefly to Kummur Kote, whither, you will remember, Moostapha Khan proposed that they themselves should retire. In his present letter, he offers to leave Mooltan for Kummur Kote, as soon as Bhawul Khan's force crosses the river, but I have told him by no

means to do so, but wait the return of all the Puthan officers to Mooltan, with the army now before us, and take them with him as originally proposed. Moostapha Khan's letter is ten days old, yet it contains the significant sentence, 'The crisis is at hand!'

"At the rebellious fort of Hurrund, one hundred of the Puthan sowars of the garrison have engaged to come over, but are unwilling to turn upon the rest of the garrison. Probably their desertion will force the others to follow their example. The country round Hurrund belongs to the Goorcanee tribe of Beloochees, whose equals, for all kinds of violence and lawlessness, are not to be found in this border, and were they on the same side as the rebels in the fort, its reduction would be a very serious affair; fortunately, they were all with us, burning to distinguish themselves as Kowrah Khan and the Khosuh clan have done.

Indeed, the whole of my newly-raised Puthan levies are in just the temper that could be wished. War is their trade and also their pastime. They like it. They have met with one or two successes at the outset, and are persuaded that the 'ikbal' is on their side; and my task is to restrain their impatience, which is a good omen when hard blows are to the fore. Their pay is good (six rupees a footman, and fifteen rupees a sowar), and they are all satisfied. They muster now nearly three thousand men; General Cortlandt has levied nearly two thousand more; so that a strong division can still be left Trans-Indus, to preserve the peace of the frontier, whenever it may be necessary to send reinforcements to Bhawul Khan.

"By a private note from Lieutenant Taylor, I learn that he has dispatched to us another regiment from Bunnoo, viz., General Cortlandt's Kuthar Mookhee Pultan, a strong body of Poorbeeuhs. This is quite contrary to my wishes, and once before, I sent back eight companies of infantry, which Lieutenant Taylor sent to our relief. The disinterested generosity of the action claims my warmest acknowledgements, for I know it to be one of the only two regiments on which that officer could really rely to stand by him in case of a military revolt, and I shall not refuse the reinforcement, now that more active operations lie before me on the other bank; for the argument which Lieutenant Taylor uses to press it upon me is such as might be expected from his judgment, viz., that his safety depends on my success, not on the strength of his own position. It would be an injustice, however, to him were I not to state, what none but myself can be fully aware of, that the extraordinary security of Bunnoo at this moment, when older possessions are in rebellion,—the peaceable conduct of the Bunnoochees, who are paying in their guns and swords in part of revenue, and escorting artillery to me, one hundred and fifty koss from their own valley,—the happy issue to which the threatening *emeute* of the Thull Vizeerees has now been brought,—and the inability of the neighbouring hill tribes to find allies enough in Bunnoo to get up an insurrection, are results solely to be attributed to the rare union of forbearance and firmness, gentleness and determination, which Lieutenant Taylor has brought to bear on the subjugation of two races, one the most independent, and the other the most vicious, that I ever saw.

"P.S.—Eight P.M. One of my spies has arrived from the enemy's camp. They have as yet not sent away a single gun, and are waiting for orders from Mooltan. The greatest alarm reigns among them, at our preparations for crossing; and Jus Mull, one of their principal officers, has gone off to Mooltan, to show Moolraj a letter from Julal Khan, Lugharee (who came over to us), descriptive of our immense numbers, and blood-thirsty intentions; which letter I myself dictated to Julal Khan, three days ago, having intercepted a letter from the enemy to him, asking for news of our camp! The cry among the men is, 'If the Dewan intends us to be killed, let it be at Mooltan!'

"A different version is given of the fight at Alipore, in which it is said that Moozooddeen Khan was not engaged, but only his advanced party of one hundred men under Deen Muhommud Shah, which was very roughly handled by Jowahir Mull's cavalry, now estimated at three hundred. Part of the Syud's men fled to the rear, to bring up Moozooddeen Khan, but the rest stood their ground, and Jowahir Mull at last withdrew, in dread of Moozooddeen Khan's arrival, and retreated on Khangurh, but carried all his wounded off the field. This would make it not quite so good, therefore, as a drawn battle; and it is reported that Bhawul Khan is pouring reinforcements across, with orders to take revenge on the Koreyshee army. But I give him credit for more temper and sense.

"P.S. *Morning, June 7th*, 1848, *Camp on the ferry-bank of Dera Ghazee Khan, on the Indus*—This morning I have left the town of Ghazee Khan, and joined the camp

on the river bank, to hurry the movements of the enemy at Koreyshee.

"On re-perusing the letter of Peer Ibraheem Khan, it appears that the 'Julalpore' at which Bhawul Khan's army has arrived, was 'Julalpore Peeronwaluh,' and not 'Julalpore Khakran,' as mentioned in this letter. This makes a considerable difference, as the former place is about forty koss from Mooltan, and the latter only eight or nine; and the apathy of the rebels at Koreyshee is thus fully accounted for. When Bhawul Khan reaches Julalpore Khakran, Moolraj must look about him for all the means of resistance he can muster."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan,

"June 8th, 1848.

"In a postscript to my last letter, I informed you of my having once more gone into camp, on the banks of the river, below Dera Ghazee Khan, for the purpose of restraining the enemy at Koreyshee from marching against Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee's, small Daoodpotra force, in the Seetpore district, and hurrying their retirement to Mooltan.

"A sepoy of General Cortlandt's, who was sent into the Koreyshee camp to gather news, returned this morning, and reported that the rebels had changed their ground, and taken up a position more to the south, at the

*See "Blue Book," pp. 200—2.

precise point where our fleet would land, if we made the usual passage of the river.

"I do not believe the report of the sepoy, who could scarcely have ventured into the rebel camp, so strictly watched as it is, and so ruthlessly as all spies are maltreated. One of their own officers, who fought against my picket at Leia, is working out his pardon in secret intelligence, and I have received no notice from him of this move. A salute of five guns was fired this evening by the rebels (I suspect for the arrival of Misr Kool Jus from Mooltan), and the sound was certainly from the direction of Koreyshee, not Khangurh. It is extremely probable, however, that there has been a picket sent to Seyrah, to watch for the coming of our fleet, which is the bugbear of their camp. It is worthy of notice that the soldiers all wish to retire upon Mooltan at once, while they can, but that move is not to be undertaken without Dewan Moolraj's orders, to obtain which, Misr Kool Jus has been deputed by them to Mooltan. *This quite disposes of the Dewan's plea that he has no command over his men.*

"The Dewan's officers are conducting themselves with great violence towards the zumeendars on the left bank, and have now confined all the Punches of villages, to make them advance the revenue at once.

"This morning I received letters, both from Peer Ibraheem Khan and the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, of a very unsatisfactory nature. The former writes that the main body of Daoodpotras under Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, is still idling at Julalpore Peeronwalluh, and that the Commander replies to all his remonstrances by inquiring: 'Why

Edwardes, Sahib, does not come on and join him?' This is a good joke, that I am to force the Indus in June, in the teeth of an equal foe; cut them into little pieces; and then march across the Sindh Sagur Doab, and swim the Chenab (guns and all) for want of boats, to enable Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, a timid veteran of eighty, to march an army of seven or eight thousand men, twenty koss along the Mooltan road, with nothing in front of him but the fort of Shoojabad, in which there are three hundred and thirty-two footmen, thirteen sowars, and two rattle-trap guns! What is worse, the Nuwab does not see, or pretends not to see, the absurd pusillanimity of this proceeding, or rather this standing still. He actually backs the request of Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, and reproaches me, as broadly as good breeding will allow, with not keeping my promise to join him. I have politely, yet firmly, defended myself from this accusation, by requesting the Nuwab to re-peruse my letter, wherein I distinctly set before him two lines of action; first, to cross the Sutlej at Julalpore, and advance on Mooltan, without my co-operation, if he was strong enough to do so, and so compel Moolraj to recall the Koreyshee army; and secondly, if he was not strong enough to go alone, then to co-operate with me, by crossing the Sutlej at Dummar, below Seetpore, and advancing on Khangurh, where I would join him; (even this last would seem a rash promise, but I relied on the enemy's common sense to retire from between two parallel armies). The Nuwab, in reply, dispensed with my co-operation, as I reported to you at the time, and advanced by Julalpore, yet he now sticks irresolute in the middle of his purpose, and calls on me to do mad things, without the least occasion. He thinks he clenches his appeal by sending me a copy

of your *moorasila* (letter), consenting to his crossing by the Seetpore route, and authorizing me, in that case, to join him between the Sind* and the Chenab. At this very moment I have not got your sanction to cross the Chenab under any circumstances, though, of course, I should do so, if events, of which you were ignorant, demanded such a step.

"It is most unfortunate, this hesitation of Bhawul Khan, for the mere marching on two or three more marches would, as we have all along calculated, force Moolraj to withdraw the Koreyshee force; I should then cross, and follow them up to the Chenab, when all the rebels, wedged in between Bhawul Khan and me, would take refuge in the fort of Mooltan. As it is, the crossing of Bhawul Khan has effected nothing, and only exhibited to Moolraj a fourth converging column, which has not the courage to converge. (I allude to those of Rajah Sher Sing, Sheikh Emamoodeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, all of which are as good as nowhere).

"I have tried to stir up the Khan by assuring him that if he will only tell me plainly that his army cannot go on any further, without my coming to its assistance, I will immediately force the Indus at all hazards, as there will then be no other alternative, except leaving the rebels in possession of the field for the hot weather. Of the result of a general action between my own force and that of Koreyshee, I have no doubt whatever; my only argument is, that such an expenditure of human lives is quite superfluous if

*The Indus river is called Sind by the natives.

Bhawul Khan will only make the demonstration, which he has got so much credit from you and all of us for undertaking to make, and which moreover would not cost him a man.

"The truth is that Bhawul Khan, with all his undoubted and sincere attachment to our Government, and readiness to prove it, mingles, like most mortals, a leaven of selfishness in his virtue. He has, I rather think, an eye to those districts south of Mooltan, and about Seetpore, &c., which formerly belonged to Bhawulpoor; and perhaps, calculating on a further dismemberment of the refractory Sikh empire, has already laid down in his own mind the boundary pillars of the share which is to reward his present co-operation. Hence the anxiety for which you could not account, to occupy Seetpore, and the consequent splitting of his force into a strong and a weak division. The latter, under Moozooddeen Khan, is avowedly bent only on revenue arrangements, appointing Kardars, &c., which might better have been left for another fortnight, till by an active and united advance of the whole Daoodpotra force in one line, Moolraj's forces had been driven into quarters. The Nuwab is not thinking of Mooltan, he is thinking of its southern districts. Doubtless he will come around, and all will be well. I am merely speculating on this sudden shifting of his task on to my shoulders, where there was quite enough before."*

The British Resident, who seems to have entered upon his new duties at Lahore with as kindly feelings

*See "Blue Book," pp. 203, 4.

towards the Durbar as his predecessor, Sir Henry Lawrence; to have reposed even greater confidence (from shorter acquaintance) in their public zeal and honesty; and consequently have been inclined to interfere still less with the details of their administration;* had gradually, during the past month, ascertained the precise value of the "vexation and trouble at this affair" expressed by "the Members of the Council within an hour of the news being received," and their vehement "desire to do anything he might direct, collectively and individually to meet the emergency."†

He had hoped, when every one of his assistants had ceased hoping, that the chosen officers and Sirdars of the converging Sikh columns would have influence enough to carry their men with them in that unpopular expedition, and though unable to reduce the rebellion, would at least confine it within a narrow circle of about fifty miles diameter, until the British troops could take the field.

So late even as the 29th of May, Sir Frederick Currie was willing to believe that "the officers and troops he had sent to those districts would be able to do all that was necessary;"‡ and not until the 5th of June does he seem to have felt the utter rottenness of the reed on which every real well-wisher of the Khalsa had been leaning.

*See "Blue Book," p. 127. Resident's letter to the Secretary to Government of India, April 6th, 1848.

†See "Blue Book," p. 133.

‡ "Ibid," p. 186.

Then indeed he abandoned the expectation. He had watched the columns on whose behaviour now depended the existence of the Sikh nation any longer among independent powers; and composed though they were of "the most trustworthy of the Sikh troops," he had seen them begin their march with reluctance, continue it with murmurs, and amid a storm of "wild and whirling words,"* threaten to end it with treachery whenever they should come into collision with the rebels they were sent to quell.

It was impossible any longer to conceal that neither would the Sikh armies blockade Mooltan, nor the Sikh Durbar incur the odium of openly resisting a rebellion in which those dreaded armies sympathized.

Yet if there was to be any peace during the hot weather, Moolraj must be shut up in his fort; Moolraj who was still at large, and gaining strength, the "Imperator" of rebillious legions.

The British troops had been ordered into quarters till the rains; but how were they to stay there if Moolraj retained the field?

The Resident had pledged himself to "do everything in his power, with the means at his command, to prevent the spread of rebellion, and defeat the machinations of Dewan Moolraj and his emissaries to create a general insurrection in the country, and cause inroads on our frontier, till the season when operations will be possible may arrive;"† but those means were well nigh exhausted

*See "Blue Book," p. 179.

†"Ibid," p. 161.

when it was found impossible to blockade Sikh rebels with Sikh troops; and he might well exclaim in despair: "I find it difficult to carry out my plans with any prospect of success, with instruments so bad, and so little to be depended upon, as those at my disposal."

Never, perhaps, was any public officer placed in a position of greater difficulty with more disproportionate means to surmount it than Sir Frederick Currie; and it is but justice to allow that never did any one more perseveringly bring up decreased resources to oppose increasing opposition, or more untiringly struggle on in the face of constant disappointment.

No sooner is he convinced that a Sikh combination against Mooltan is hopeless, than we find him looking round upon the fragments of that broken project.

He sees that Bhawul Khan alone stands forward to serve the British Government, if he can get any one to assist him; he knows from my repeated letters that I long to do so; and marking with approval the temper and achievements of the troops under my command, he already revolves a new plan of operation.

To me he writes only as follows:

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

"Lahore, June 5th, 1848

"The account you give of the state of your force is highly satisfactory, and reflects the greatest credit on your zeal and perseverance, which have raised the greater part of it, and made it what it is in the short space of one month.

"You are quite right to record exactly, without extenuation or exaggeration, all that takes place in connection with the operations in which your troops, or allies, are concerned. The excesses committed by persons unconnected with troops at Dera Ghazee Khan are to be regretted, but, in the state of society which exists in the Derajat, are not to be wondered at.

"You will, of course, mark your displeasure at the occurrence.

"If the Durbar officials and Sirdars would do for themselves one-tenth part of what you are doing for them, the rebellion might be put down at once."*

But the same day he tells the Governor-General that I am "now ready to act on the offensive;" that Moolraj has been preparing to take the initiative against the State, and must be prevented; that Bhawul Khan has at last been ordered to advance, and has advanced over the Sutlej; that Moolraj's army must retire from before me to meet him; and that I shall then cross the Indus, co-operate with Bhawul Khan, and probably drive the rebel into his fort.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE SECRETARY TO THE "GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

"Lahore, June 5th, 1848.

"I forward a letter from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated Dera Ghazee Khan, the 27th ultimo.

*See "Blue Book," p. 199.

"His Lordship in Council will perceive that that enterprising and energetic officer has entirely succeeded in performing the duty assigned to him, of getting possession of, and holding, the whole of the Mooltan districts, Trans-Indus.

"Lieutenant Edwardes has succeeded in raising according to the instructions sent him by me, such a force of new troops (Moossulman) as to render him quite independent of the fidelity, or otherwise, of the Sikh regiment, with which he alone commenced operations, just a month before the date of his last letter.

"He is also now in a position to render it impossible for Moolraj's troops to force the passage of the Indus, for the sake of regaining the districts wrested from them on its right bank; *and indeed, if need be, to act on the offensive.*

"If the chiefs of the Durbar, or any one individual among them, had shown one-tenth part of the zeal, energy, and judgment exhibited by Lieutenant Edwardes, for the preservation of their Government, the Mooltan rebellion might have been put down ere this.

"But the chiefs are, collectively and individually, utterly without resource or energy: in a crisis like the present, they are quite useless, and, to all appearance, Durbar and all, as far as their actions go, quite indifferent as to what may be the result of the present state of things.

"I have warned them, distinctly, openly in Durbar, and each member individually and personally, that, upon their conduct now, and the result of their exertions, depends the only chance that remains for the preservation of the Khalsa state.

"In the meantime, Dewan Moolraj is by no means inactive; he is employing all his resources to raise a large army, and to equip it, to prepare his fort for a siege, and to gain over to his interests the Khalsa troops and the Sikh people.

"I am constantly at work, the Durbar merely acquiescing, to defeat the machinations of the Dewan, to confine the rebellion within the smallest limits, and to keep the Dewan and his troops to the neighbourhood of the city and fort of Mooltan, till after the rains, when the business will be easily settled, and when it matters little, as far as the British Government is concerned, whether the Khalsa army were to join Moolraj or not.

"I find it difficult to carry out my plans with any prospect of success, with instruments so bad, and so little to be depended upon, as those at my disposal.

"It is extraordinary to what an extent the treacherous and cowardly Dewan has the sympathies of the army, and of the Khalsa portion of the population. Up to this time, he has only their sympathies (with the exception of the numbers of the discharged soldiery and Sikhs from the Manjha, who have taken service with him); but any success on his part, or any lack of vigilance on ours, would be very probable to give him the service of the army.

"No stronger proof of the strength of the feeling in favour of those connected with the present rebellion can be adduced than the conduct of all parties—officials and non-officials—in the case of the self-styled Sikh Gooroo, Bhaee Maharaj Sing, for whose capture, and dispersion of his followers, we have now a force in the interior, and regarding

whose conduct I shall report separately, as soon as the final result of the present measures for the seizure of the delinquent is known.

"*It is of the last importance that Moolraj should not be enabled to send his troops into the Lahore districts, as he has been preparing lately to do*: the effect would be not only the spread of disaffection, the withholding by the zumeendars of the State revenues, and the prevalence of disturbances and crime throughout the provinces, but the army would certainly in such case not remain quiet, and the frontier provinces would immediately revolt, and the rebellion would become very formidable.

"The Dewan has now about six thousand men, horse and foot, with twelve guns, on the left bank of the Indus, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan. He has about two thousand, or two thousand five hundred men, with three guns, on the banks of the Chenab, opposite Jhung, threatening the Lahore districts, and he has a force of about the same strength, or rather less, with two guns, at Toolumba, to oppose the approach of Rajah Sher Sing and the Jageerdar troops.

"He has about one thousand men, of all arms, at Mooltan itself, where he is daily collecting new levies.

"The above constitutes the whole of his force up to this time. The generality of these troops are newly-raised, ill-armed, and totally undisciplined; they have taken service for the pay that has been promised, but they will not face a formidable opponent.

"It is very desirable that employment should be found for this army in the neighbourhood of Mooltan, where it can do little harm; whereas, in the provinces, it would certainly cause much mischief.

"*I have therefore urged Bhawul Khan to put his troops across the Sutlej now, and threaten Mooltan from both sides of the Chenab.* The Nuwab has a very fine little force of from ten thousand to twelve thousand men, well equipped and disciplined, and composed almost entirely of fighting Puthans.

The Bhawulpoor troops crossed on the 30th and 31st of last month. The zumeendars of the neighbouring districts immediately tendered their allegiance to him on behalf of the British Government, *and Moolraj must now recall his detached troops to defend the city and the immediate neighbourhood of Mooltan.*

"*When he does this, Lieutenant Edwardes will cross the Indus again*, and in a very different condition from that in which he crossed it a month ago near Leia. *He will co-operate with Bhawul Khan, and will, I think, very probably drive Moolraj into his fort, there to remain, if not murdered by his own troops, till the British army can take the field.*

"The Nuwab of Bhawulpoor is desirous that a British officer should be with his force, to aid in directing its movements, and, as he says, to bear witness to the conduct of his officers and soldiers in the service of the British Government.

"It is very expedient that an energetic and intelligent officer should accompany the force; for though Peer

Ibraheem Khan, our agent at the Bhawulpoor Court, is an excellent and zealous officer, and is with the troops in the field, yet he does not carry with him the weight of a British officer, even with the force itself, or in the eyes of the people.

"Lieutenant Becher, the Bhawulpoor Boundary Commissioner, would have done admirably for this duty, but he is, I understand (though I have had no communication from him on the subject), gone, since the setting in of the hot weather, to Mount Aboo, whence to get him to the frontier would take a long time.

"I therefore purpose, if he is willing to undertake the duty, of which I have scarcely a doubt, to depute Lieutenant Lake, of the Engineers, Acting Deputy-Commissioner at Jullunder, to Bhawulpoor.

"Lieutenant Lake is a very intelligent, active officer, with great knowledge of the natives, and peculiar tact in managing them, and gaining their regard. He will co-operate admirably with Lieutenant Edwardes. I trust, therefore, that if Lieutenant Lake is willing to proceed to Bhawulpoor, the Governor-General in Council will sanction the arrangement on my reporting its final adoption, which I will do separately, if it takes place.

"It is very desirable, now that the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor's troops are across the Sutlej, that a steamer or two should come up to Ferozepoor; this will have a very good effect in protecting the traffic of the Sutlej, now very much interrupted, as well as being useful in communicating between the Bhawulpoor camp and Ferozepoor,

and in aiding the passage of troops across the river, at Ferozepoor during the rains."*

Four days later this intention is carried out.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT E. LAKE,
"OFFICIATING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, JULLUNDER

"Lahore, June 9th, 1848.

"I have nominated you, pending the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, as a temporary measure, Political Agent with Nuwab Bhawul Khan of Bhawulpoor.

"The Nuwab has, at my request, sent a portion of his troops across the Sutlej, to act against the rebel Dewan of Mooltan; the object being to occupy and collect the revenues of the Mooltan district on the Bhawulpoor frontier, and to confine Dewan Moolraj to his fort, and prevent his sending troops into the Lahore districts, in order to create disturbances therein, and promote the spread of rebellion through the other Punjab provinces.

"There is, as you are I dare say aware, a native agent, Peer Ibraheem Khan, a very excellent officer, at Bhawulpoor; he will co-operate with you, and be, while you are on this duty, under your orders.

"Your duty will be to join the headquarters of the Bhawulpoor troops, and to give your advice, which will

*See "Blue Book," pp. 197, 8.

be implicitly followed, in directing the movement of the troops, and the operations which are to be undertaken, for carrying out the objects of Government.

"You will put yourself in communication with Lieutenant Edwardes, now at Dera Ghazee Khan, and co-operate with him, according to your own judgment and discretion, for the attainment of the end in view.

"It is not probable that any opportunity will be given you of getting possession of the fort of Mooltan, but such a circumstance is not impossible. Bhawul Khan has great influence with the Puthans in the service of Dewan Moolraj; there is believed to be a strong feeling of jealousy and dislike between the Puthan and Sikh portions of his army, and the former may rise on the latter at any moment, when their first victim would probably be the Dewan himself; in which case the city would most likely be plundered, the force break up, and the occupation of the fort by the nearest force might then be accomplished.

"This is a possible, but by no means a probable, contingency. Should the fort by this, or any other means, come into the occupation of the Nuwab's troops, it must be held by them till you receive orders for your future guidance from me.

"You must distinctly understand that you have no authority to make any overtures of any kind to the rebel Dewan, and that you have no authority to entertain any overtures from him, except unconditional surrender to the British power.

"You should make the best of your way to Bhawulpoor.

"You may entertain a personal guard of a Jemadar and a few soldiers, on whom you can place reliance, at a cost not exceeding one hundred rupees per mensem. I have directed Jalaloodeen Khan, the brother of the Chief of Mumdote, and thirty picked horsemen of his own, to accompany you from Ferozepoor."

Thus was Lieutenant Lake, in fact, constituted the Commander-in-Chief of the Daoodpotra army. How well he justified that unusual trust, to the mutual honour of his own Government and that of the troops he led, will appear abundantly in these pages; but this is the place for me to bear witness that he *did* "co-operate admirably with me" throughout the war. He did more.

By his instructions from the Resident, he was not put under my command. At this time the Resident did not intend, perhaps, that I should ever cross the Chenab, and did not contemplate that Lieutenant Lake's force and mine would be united in one body. It seemed enough, therefore, to tell him "to co-operate according to his own judgment and discretion."

But events brought us irresistibly together. Before Lieutenant Lake could reach his army, I had crossed the Chenab, and saved the Daoodpotras from a disastrous defeat at Kineyree; and finding me in the successful execution of my own plans, Lieutenant Lake at once put himself under my command, and without one selfish thought devoted his rare abilities and energy to second the operations of another. I felt the generosity of the action then; but I do more full justice to it now, when I look back calmly on those stormy times, and remember how impossible it was

that two young heads should always think alike, however true their hearts kept time; yet never was there anything but unity of action in the field. Seldom indeed did we differ, even in the council tent; but if we had two plans, Lake manfully exposed the weaknesses of mine; and if I was not to be convinced (as I own I very seldom was), gave up his own better judgment, and made mine perfect by the heartiness of his assistance in giving it effect.

My peaceful readers, whose experience of "heroes" has happily been confined within the limits of the "Biographical Dictionary," or the smooth historian's page, may think so well of soldier-nature as to deem Lake's magnanimity and lack of jealousy a thing of course; but others, who have lived in camps, will know both its rarity and its value, and esteem it the most unfading of the laurels won by Edward Lake under the walls of Mooltan. "Better is he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city."*

*Proverbs, c. xvi., v. 32.

[illegible]

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CHAPTER VI

THE RESIDENT SENDS A "CARTE BLANCHE" TO THE AUTHOR TO ACT ON HIS OWN DISCRETION—MOOLRAJ WITHDRAWS HIS ARMY FROM THE INDUS, AND THE SAME DAY THE AUTHOR CROSSES THAT RIVER—ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND—MOOLRAJ CONCENTRATES HIS STRENGTH ON SHOOJABAD—THE AUTHOR DIRECTS THE DAOODPOTRAS TO CONCENTRATE—THE DAOODPOTRA GENERAL REFUSES TO ADVANCE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR—THE RESIDENT RECOMMENDED TO SEND ANOTHER ASSISTANT TO THAT CAMP—THE AUTHOR JUSTIFIES HIS HASTY PASSAGE OF THE INDUS—MOOLRAJ'S PUTHAN OFFICERS AGAIN URGE HIS SURRENDER—LOVE OF LIFE KEEPS HIM IN REBELLION—THE CHURUNJEET REGIMENT OF SIKH CAVALRY JOINS THE REBELS—THE AUTHOR RECALLS LIEUTENANT TAYLOR FROM BUNNOO, AND APPOINTS A NATIVE GOVERNOR IN HIS PLACE—THE RESIDENT DESCRIBES THE STATE OF THE SIKH ARMY—THE AUTHOR MARCHES FROM THE INDUS TO THE CHENAB—MOOLRAJ ORDERS HIS ARMY TO FIGHT THE DAOODPOTRAS BEFORE THE AUTHOR JOINS—THE AUTHOR HASTENS TO PREVENT IT, AND RECEIVES ON THE BANK OF THE CHENAB THE RESIDENT'S PERMISSION TO CROSS IT—RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE FORCES OF THE AUTHOR, HIS ALLIES, AND THE ENEMY ON THE 17TH OF JUNE—MOVEMENTS OF ALL THREE UPON KINEYREE—THE AUTHOR CROSSES THE CHENAB ON THE 18TH OF JUNE, AS THE BATTLE OF KINEYREE OPENS—THE BATTLE.

CHAPTER VI

LIEUTENANT LAKE was appointed on June 9th to command the army which the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor had sent into the field against Dewan Moolraj, and we have seen that he was instructed by the Resident to "co-operate with me."

But as yet, under the Resident's instructions of the 31st of May, I had only permission either to send General Cortlandt, or go myself, with a division of our force, to co-operate with such detachments of the Daood-potras as might be acting between the Chenab and the Indus. I had received no authority to cross the former river and act against Mooltan, yet without it my co-operation would be a nullity, and the army of Bhawul Khan had better have stayed at home. The Resident resolved to give it, and wrote next day as follows:

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

"Lahore, June 10th, 1848.

"So long a period must intervene, under the best dak arrangements that we can make, ere you can receive any specific orders from me, that I *must leave much to your discretion, to act as you think best, as circumstances may*

arise; I can do no more than tell you generally my views and purposes, and the part in the general scheme of operations which I look to you to perform.

"The great object is, to confine the Mooltan rebellion within the smallest compass, till we can put a final extinguisher on it, by capturing the fort.

"To do this, the best plan undoubtedly is to shut Moolraj up in his fort till the British force arrives there.

"But we must at the same time secure, if possible, the tranquillity of our important frontier.

"The latter depends very much, perhaps entirely, on the former. If the Mooltan rebellion were to spread much, the Khalsa troops would undoubtedly join Moolraj.

"At present you are in a very secure position: for defence, you are quite safe; but *your's and Bhawul Khan's are the only forces that can be relied on for offensive operations.*

"*If you have an opportunity of co-operating with Bhawul Khan, you should do so*; but you must bear in mind the fatal consequences that would result from Moolraj's army getting an advantage over you, and you must risk as little as possible.

"With these general instructions, *I must leave you unfettered, to act according as circumstances render it most expedient that you should*, with a view to attaining the great object in view.

"I have every confidence in your zeal and judgment, and do not doubt your discretion."*

Thus at last were matters brought to the point I had so long and ardently desired. The wavering columns of Rajah Sher Sing, Jowahir Mull Dutt, and Sheikh Emamoodeen, were left to stagger about the jungles as they chose, and the blockade of the Mooltan rebel was intrusted to "the only forces that could be relied on for offensive operations."

Nor was there, indeed, any other course to be pursued. On the very day that the Resident at Lahore was penning his sanction to my "unfettered" prosecution of the plan I had myself proposed, that plan had begun to work; the advance, however slow, of the Bhawulpoor army towards Mooltan, during the first week of June, had alarmed Moolraj for his capital, and laying aside for a moment his favourite project of destroying me, he recalled his army from Koreyshee on the Indus to Shoojabad on the Chenab. Hur Bugwan Doss, their General, marched away before daylight of the 10th of June, and before nightfall I had occupied his place with the van of my own army, after crossing a river thirteen miles wide. The chase continued till the 18th of June, when all three armies met for the first time in the shock of battle; and I only received Sir Frederick Currie's permission to cross the Chenab the morning I arrived upon its banks!

*"Blue Book," pp. 204, 5.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Ferry of Dera Ghazee Khan,

"June 10th, 1848.

"Yesterday morning I heard of a ferry, nine koss to the southward, called Danuhwalluh, and proposed to embark my artillery, and as many of the troops of all branches as could be stowed away in a fleet of eighty boats, and turn the enemy's position, described in my last letter, by landing on the left bank of the Indus, a few koss below Khangurh; accordingly, I sent out men to explore the land route to the ferry, which the heavy baggage would have to pursue; and the report was so unfavourable as to the state of the intervening canals, that I reluctantly gave up the idea. The news, however, was carried speedily across the river to the enemy, and Hur Bugwan Doss, the Commander, held a council of his officers, at which it was agreed that they could not meet me in the plain, and that the best plan would be to retreat to Shahgurh, a ruined fort between Koreyshee and Khangurh, and there throw up intrenchments. This had scarcely been determined on, than a message from Mooltan brought orders from Moolraj for the retreat of the Koreyshee force it is supposed on Mooltan, but it was given out on Shoojabad; and, after the first watch of the night, their guns marched, and were followed by the infantry and cavalry before dawn this morning. Accounts vary as to the route pursued from Koreyshee, some saying the Mozuffernuggur road, which leads to Raj Ghat and Mooltan, others the road to Khangurh, which is opposite Shoojabad.

"Either route is probable, and it would be waste of

time to speculate on which is most so. Both alike call on me to act, and as speedily as possible comply with the request of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor to support his column advancing on Shoojabad; not that that column wants support, but they think they do, which is much the same thing. Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, also, with another weak division of the Daoodpotra force, is between the Indus and the Chenab, and I know not how near to or distant from Khangurh, having received no reply from him since I wrote to know what his plans were. It is right that I should put myself in a position to relieve him, should Hur Bughwan Doss come across his path.

"Under these circumstances, I have resolved on not delaying a day. "Ten guns, and about two thousand five hundred Puthans are now getting into the boats, and I shall accompany them in person over the river. We make for the Seyrah ferry, described in my last letter. General Cortlandt, with the rest of the troops, will follow to-morrow. The river is nine koss wide, and the boats will not reach this place again before morning.

"Two more guns joined us this morning from Bunnoo, guarded by sons of Bunnoo chiefs, and their sowars,* but two guns (the lightest) will have to be left at Ghazee Khan, so that our number will still be only ten.

"With respect to Dera Ghazee Khan, my arrangements are these:—For the present, two guns, one hundred

*The reader will remember that when the war broke out, I desired Lieutenant Taylor to send me sons and brothers of the chiefs of Bunnoo, nominally as volunteers, but really hostages, for the peace of that valley. It is not the least surprising incident of this campaign, that these Bunnoochees whom I had subdued only a few months before, now brought guns upwards of two hundred miles to my assistance.

horse, and one hundred foot will remain with Ubdool Ruhman Khan, the Kardar in the fort; and, in the course of a week, they will be joined by the Kuthar Mookhee regiment from Bunnoo, which, for that purpose, I have directed to come in boats from Dera Ishmael Khan. When you consider that the chief zumeendars, with their contingents, accompany us across the Indus, you will, I am sure, agree with me that we have sufficient security against any insurrection, even if the people were that way inclined, which they are not; the presence of a strong force of Moolraj's, Trans-Indus, could alone induce them to waver. The fort of Hurrund still holds out, though all the garrison but one hundred Sikhs have come over to us. I should have been very glad to have seen their fort reduced before leaving the right bank of the Indus, but it is naturally strong, and would take a long while to breach with such guns as we have; and, meanwhile, I should be leaving Bhawul Khan to bear the whole weight of the fast approaching crisis, to which he has already declared himself unequal without my assistance. In war, evils must be balanced when they conflict, and, at this moment, the fort of Hurrund sinks into insignificance before the operations now on foot at Mooltan. The Kardar of Hurrund, with three hundred men, will take up his position in the neighbourhood, and uniting with the Goorcanee tribe of Belooch zumeendars, who live in that district and adjoining hills, and who are sworn enemies of the Sikhs in the fort, will maintain an annoying blockade, which, combined with the news of the retreat of the Koreyshee army, will perhaps induce the garrison to forego their expressed intention of yielding only when Mooltan falls.

"General Cortlandt will return to Dera Ghazee Khan from the Chenab whenever I either join Bhawul Khan before Shoojabad, or take up my stand at Raj Ghat for the rest of the season. I take him with me so far, in case we should have to engage the enemy between the Indus and the Chenab, when his sound military knowledge, courage, and acquaintance with his men would be invaluable. Indeed, all is so peaceful in our rear (Trans-Indus), that he feels a natural dislike to be left behind. His civil arrangements in this district are completed, and Nassur Khan, Populzye, with the Futteh Pultun, will now leave Hurrund, and proceed to settle Mithunkote. Still, I beg you to understand that General Cortlandt will not be absent a fortnight from his immediate duties.

"I will write again from the left bank, but have no time now to give more than an outline of affairs.

"A report has reached camp that Bhaee Maharaj Sing, with three hundred followers, has arrived at Mooltan.

"Jowahir Mull Dutt and Sirdar Jhunda Sing have already written to inform me of three Sikhs having deserted from the Churunjeet regiment of cavalry, and two from Dhara Sing's infantry. They have begun early."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Seyrah Dewanwalluh, on the left bank of
"the Indus, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan,
"June 11th, 1848.

"Yesterday, I reported to you my intention to

*"Blue Book," pp. 206, 7.

cross the Indus. I have now to inform you, that, with about two thousand five hundred of my newly raised Puthans, and ten guns, I effected the passage before nightfall, without accident; and, sending back the fleet of boats to General Cortlandt under a favouring south wind, encamped in a half moon, on the river's edge at this place. Traces of the enemy were fresh upon the ground—bridges having been thrown by them over all the nullahs, to enable them to bring their great guns against us at this spot, and coolies coming back every moment from the rebel camp at Khangurh, whither they had been pressed to carry baggage. Khangurh is only nine koss from this, and four or five from Shoojabad, on the other side of the Chenab, which was evidently the point they were making for, and not Mooltan as was generally supposed yesterday.

"A glance at the map will show you what an excellent move this is—so excellent, indeed, that it is difficult to say which is most culpable, Dewan Moolraj for not making it before, or Nuwab Bhawul Khan for not preventing him from making it at all. Had Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree,* not halted, like an old woman, at Julalpore Peeronwalluh, but pushed on to Shoojabad, as was all along proposed and understood that he should do, that fort would at this moment be unsupported, and might have been passed without any fear of its small garrison creating mischief in the rear. The Nuwab's troops would then have got between it and Mooltan; and the Dewan in front, and the Shoojabad garrison in the rear, would have been greatly out-manœuvred. As it is, not only has the Koreyshee

*The General of the Daoodpotras.

force gone off to reinforce that garrison but, by a letter dated 8th of June received this morning from Peer Ibraheem Khan (still at Peeronwalluh Julalpore!), I learn that two thousand men and four guns have been sent by Moolraj thither from Mooltan, and from other quarters. I hear that Hakim Raee and Sadik Muhommud Khan,* who were at Maharajgurh with two guns and two thousand men, have also been ordered down to Shoojabad. The long and short of it is, that Moolraj has ordered his whole force to concentrate on Shoojabad; and the Daoodpotra force will not be able to get within twenty koss of Mooltan, without fighting a general action.

"When we arrived here last night, I dispatched intelligence to Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, who, with two thousand men and a few guns, has, as you are aware, been sent by the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor to make revenue arrangements in the Seetpore district; and I advised him to advance at once to my neighbourhood, that we might concert plans for the future.

"When, however, the better intelligence of this morning developed this scheme for strengthening Shoojabad, I wrote again to Moozooddeen Khan, and urgently pressed him to cross the Chenab at once, and reinforce Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, whose force Peer Ibraheem reports to be only nine guns, twenty zumbooruhs, two infantry regiments (probably five hundred strong each), three thousand Daoodpotra Jageerdars and zumeendars,

*Officers of Moolraj's. Sadik Muhommud was opposed to the rebellion, refused to put his seal to the oath, and was known to be watching for an opportunity to fly. He was therefore associated with Hakim Raee, a bitter malignant.

and three hundred Khood Uspeh* cavalry. If he does this at once, there is nothing to fear. If he does not, but waits for orders from Bhawul Khan, he may be too late to save Futteh Muhommud from defeat; for the latter's force could not possibly stand before such a combination as I have described, unless reinforced.

"The Bhawulpoor Nuwab has mismanaged the part assigned him, by attempting too much at once. He should never have divided his troops, by sending one division Cis-Chenab, and one Trans-Chenab; neither equal to doing anything alone. He should have chosen one Doab, or the other, as the scene of his operations, and advanced up it in strength. The revenue is quite a secondary matter; or, if considered primary, can only be satisfactorily secured by first driving the enemy out of the field.

"You will, I doubt not, be as much astonished as I was, to read that Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, has positively declared his inability to advance beyond Julalpore Peeronwalluh, until 'Captain Edwardes, Sahib,' comes to help him. At the same time, I receive a pressing request from Jowahir Mull Dutt, at Bukkur, to 'send him four hundred or five hundred Moossulman sowars without delay;' though he has authority to raise two thousand; and again, the Durbar send General Cortlandt orders to detach as many again of the sowars with him to Dewan Dowlut Raie, who is sent to help us! These are the strangest allies I ever met with; who either rob us of our men, or else call on us to do everything for them. The Durbar must surely be aware that General Cortlandt is engaged in

*Khood Uspeh cavalry are men who own the horses on which they ride.

military operations, and that neither he, nor I, nor Lieutenant Taylor, know which way to turn for want of men. It is a pity, also, that the Durbar have selected Dowlut Raie for military command. He will either do nothing, or get into difficulties from which other people must come and help him out. The Tank Jageerdars, who are along with him, are of a fighting breed, and might have been better sent to join their relations Kasim Khan, Foujdar Khan, &c., who are doing good service along with me. Maharajgurh, to which Dowlut Raie has been sent, is in the Sindh Sagur Doab, and Jowahir Mull Dutt should be quite able to look after it himself, unless indeed Moolraj has already bought his army.

"The fleet of boats has only made one voyage today from the Ghazee Khan ferry to this place, the river being nine koss wide; and I am afraid two more days will be occupied in crossing the whole of our camp. General Cortlandt will bring up the rear. When all are once more united, my intention is to lose no time in marching on Khangurh, and probably it will be necessary to comply with the Nuwab's repeated requests that I should join his force. Even, in that case, I would beg to recommend that another assistant be specially deputed to the Daoodpotra camp, first visiting the Nuwab. European energy is the material requisite just now, to make the most of the advantages we have within our grasp. Two heads also are better than one; and one man cannot be in two places at once.* My health (I thank God for it) has, as yet, not suffered from the exposure and fatigue incidental to these

*These wise remarks seem borrowed, without acknowledgement, from the "Sayings of Poor Richard."

operations; but it would, I think, be prudent to guard against the confusion into which this brave, but heterogeneous army, composed of every race that peoples the Soolimanee Range and the Derajat, would inevitably fall, should any accident happen to me."*

This hasty passage of the Indus may, in the eyes of military critics, seem to need some justification; but may very easily be justified.

It is quite true, as I have been told, that the information I received of the enemy's retirement from Koreyshee on the 10th of June, might not have been correct, coming to me as it did across a river thirteen miles wide; that if correct, it might only have been a *ruse* to draw me into an ambush when I crossed; and if that had been the case, I was cut off from my supports, and the van of my army must have been destroyed, and all its guns captured by the rebels; all this is very true, but I deny the inference that, therefore, I should not have crossed till the next day; that I was rash, &c.

If there were certainties in war there would be no victories. A good strong probability is a sufficient base of operations for any soldier. And this I had.

A combination had been formed expressly to *make* the rebel army retire. I knew, from the camp of the Daoodpotras, that they had approached Mooltan so near that the rebel army *ought* to retire. Consequently, when a tolerably good spy reported that the rebel army *had* retired,

*See "Blue Book," pp. 207, 8.

it was surely more probable than that they had not! For my own part, I was as much convinced of it as that the sun was in the heaven, and most abominably hot.

But farther, I had pledged my word more than once to join Bhawul Khan's army before Moolraj's could come up and engage it. The combination to draw away the rebels from Koreyshee would have been perfectly perfidious if it was to end in my leaving the Daoodpotras to contend with them alone on the Chenab. The very pith of it was to induce the rebels to rush at Bhawul Khan's solitary force, and then let them find that force united with mine, which they had left behind at Ghazee Khan. This must be effected, or all was lost; and to effect it, I knew every hour, every moment, was of value. And I maintain that this knowledge justified the risk.

As it was, what was the result? I joined Bhawul Khan's troops at Kineyree just half an hour after Moolraj's guns had opened on them; and, under God's help, was the means of saving every man from destruction, every gun from capture, and our own name from the disgrace which the defeat of our ally must have occasioned. For the Nuwab's troops were beaten by two o'clock, after a cannonade of six hours; and the close of the action, when it came hand to hand, was borne and won by about five thousand of my men.

Therefore, if I had not hazarded the risk of crossing the Indus on the same day that the enemy retired from it, *I should have been too late by a day, and Moolraj would have won the battle of Kineyree.*

So I think I was right; and would do the same again.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Seyrah Dewanwalluh, on the left bank of
"the Indus, opposite Ferry of Ghazee Khan,
"Night, June 12th, 1848.

"The relative positions of the four forces remain much the same as yesterday. The last kossid from the camp of Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, left him still at Julalpore Peeronwalluh; but a distant salute, just now heard, leads me to hope that, hearing of our crossing the Indus, he has advanced to Kot Abid Shah, where his vanguard, under command of a reputed good soldier, Ubdool Khalik Khan, was previously posted. Moozood-deen Khan, Khaghwanee, moved a few koss to-day, from Ghullooan to Julharee, and writes that he will reach Sooltan Shuhr to-morrow. Hur Bhugwan Doss, with the fugitive rebel force, is pitched to the east of the town of Khangurh, half a koss from the river, awaiting, as he says, the orders of Moolraj, either to cross the Chenab to Shoojabad, or to stand and fight when I come up. A villager has brought in news of his crossing his artillery, but as yet it wants confirmation. Our own troops are as yet not near over the Indus. The boats are going and coming continually, but at this season it is quite a voyage across. I don't think we shall be all collected on this bank before the day after to-morrow. No delay will then occur in our advance.

"An intelligent kossid in my employ has brought interesting intelligence from Mooltan, whither I sent him some days ago with a verbal message to Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, asking for an explanation of his silence. In reply, Moostapha Khan sends word: 'That the absence of all the Puthan officers with the Koreyshee force has prevented him from carrying out the plan agreed upon; that he thought I would scarcely thank him for deserting Moolraj alone, without bringing all his friends with him; and that he is not without hopes of inducing Moolraj himself to surrender. Moolraj wished Moostapha Khan to take command of the reinforcements he was sending to Shoojabad, but the Khan declined the appointment, and once more urged the folly of continuing this hopeless struggle. The Dewan got angry, and the Khan requested to have twenty-four hours' leave of absence, to go and see to the defences of Kummur Kote, where his family has been placed for safety. Moolraj declared he could not spare him, as he wanted him to go as his vakeel to the Lord Sahib at Delhi.* Moostapha asked what business he had with such distant officials? If he intended to surrender, he had better do so to me at once. Ultimately, the Dewan gave him leave to go to Kummur Kote for twenty-four hours, and promised to send him to me on his return. From Kummur Kote, Moostapha Khan wrote to Peer Ibraheem Khan at Julalpore, that he should certainly go back and make a last effort to bring in the Dewan. On his return to Mooltan, Moolraj so far listened to Moostapha Khan's advice as to consent to withdraw the Koreyshee force, but said that he thought the return of that

*Natives call our English noblemen the "Lord Sahib." Here it means probably the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

force to Mooltan would render his surrender impossible, and that it would, perhaps, be better to leave them to be destroyed by me! Moostapha Khan very sensibly observed, that if a general action was fought between Hur Bugwan Doss and me, it would close the door of mercy on him for ever. If he (the Dewan) was sincere in wishing to surrender, let him recall the Koreyshee force over the Chenab and halt them on the left bank, and then, summoning the Puthan officers from among them, get them and their adherents into the fort, close the gates, and write for me. The Dewan half seemed persuaded; and if the Koreyshee force really retired, I was to consider it a symptom of Moolraj being inclined to give in, but at any rate, if, when all the Puthan officers were assembled, they failed to induce the Dewan to go over with them in a body to me, I might rely on the whole of them retiring from Mooltan to Kummur Kote, and remaining there throughout the rebellion.

"You are inclined, I think, to distrust Moostapha Khan's sincerity, of which I am as much convinced, and the result alone can decide the question. Meanwhile, you will not have overlooked the testimony borne to his trustworthiness by both the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor and Peer Ibraheem Khan. In reply, I have sent a verbal message to Moostapha Khan, to exhibit the same patience he has done hitherto, and do nothing decided till he can do it well.

"To retract the guarantee of a formal trial, which on my own responsibility I gave to Dewan Moolraj, would be only to drive him to despair, and urge him to leave no stone unturned to plunge the country into insurrection during the four months of inactivity to which we are condemned. On the other hand, I cannot renew it in defiance

of the commands of Government. I have escaped from the dilemma by leaving matters just where they are, and verbally sending word to Moostapha Khan to do his best.

"Meanwhile, if asked to give an opinion as to the probability of Moolraj acting or not acting on the guarantee in question, I should say that it is much more probable that he will surrender now than it has ever been yet. Bhawul Khan's forces and mine are his stanch enemies, and if the Sikh troops under Rajah Sher Sing and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, only remain neuter, he will in a few days be reduced by our approach to very narrow limits, and be exposed to continual apprehension, both from us and his own troops, for months. The feeble mind of Moolraj is unequal to the contemplation of so hopeless a vista, and it would not be surprising if his rebellion were to die of the same unmanly fright which gave it birth."*

In the last sentence of the above letter I did not so much underrate Moolraj's mind as his desperation. Personal fear, acting on a feeble mind, drove him to murder two British officers whom his soldiers only wounded; and I ought not, therefore, to have expected that the same fear would lead him to surrender until surrendering would prolong his life. When the British storming parties had assembled below two practicable breaches in his fortress, and another hour would bring a bayonet to his breast, Moolraj emerged from his stronghold, and appealed to law. Rebellion to him was neither honour, nor independence, nor patriotism: it was time and life.

*See "Blue Book," pp. 209, 10.

There was no period of the rebellion at which Moolraj would not have surrendered had he only been guaranteed his life—had he only been able to anticipate the merciful recommendation of his judges. But it was impossible for him to make sure of it; and it would have been dishonourable and unjust in the British Government to make him so before the extent of his guilt had been investigated.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Seyrah Dewanwalluh,

"June 13th, 1848.

"The event anticipated by Captain James Abbott, and latterly apprehended by myself, has unhappily occurred. Letters from Sirdar Jhunda Sing and Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, dated the 8th of June, communicate the intelligence that the Churunjeet regiment of Sikh regular cavalry has deserted bodily to Dewan Moolraj, with the exception of the officers and a few orderlies. While I was actually engaged in the perusal of this news, the guns of Mooltan were faintly, yet distinctly, heard firing a salute; and I conclude it is either in honour of the arrival of the Churunjeet regiment, or of Bhaee Maharaj Sing, at the headquarters of rebellion.

"This event is most unfortunate, and commences a new crisis altogether. It tears the veil from the whole Sikh army, and leaves them all to view as traitors, waiting only for the opportunity which the Churunjeet regiment has found. It is painful to think what the consequences may be to Lieutenant Taylor in Bunnoo, Major Lawrence

and Lieutenant Nicholson in Peshawur, and Captain Abbott in Huzaruh. You are, of course, the best judge of the propriety of keeping those officers longer at their posts; but in the territory of which I have charge, I conceive it to be my immediate duty to extricate my junior and Assistant Lieutenant Taylor from the meshes of the army in Bunnoo. The absence of General Cortlandt from the Trans-Indus gives me the opportunity of doing this without any exhibition of distrust, and I shall write a vernacular proceeding to Lieutenant Taylor (in order that its contents may be made known), informing him of General Cortlandt's unavoidable absence, and requesting him, if Bunnoo is quiet, and the fort completed, to remove his court to Dera Ishmael Khan, which is a more central position, and take up all the judicial and revenue superintendence as far as Girang, until such time as General Cortlandt may return, or express his ability to resume charge.

"In the place of Lieutenant Taylor, I propose to depute Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh, with charge of Bunnoo, Murwut, Esaukheyl, and probably Kuchee as far as Khooshab and the boundary of the old Mooltan Elaqua. His name alone will be a sufficient guarantee for the peace of those districts; and he has, more particularly, great influence with that independent and impracticable tribe, the Vizeerees. The arrangement is not agreeable to the Mullick, who had made up his mind to show his gratitude for release by exertion in the Mooltan affair; but the fact is, that he will do more harm than good by introducing dissension into my united force. Most of the Puthan and Mooltanee officers along with me are his bitter enemies, and some have blood feuds to settle with him. In one day

that he has been with me, I see the impossibility of my keeping both.*

"I shall feel quite at rest about Bunnoo when the energetic Mullick reaches it; and the fact of Lieutenant Taylor being stationed at Dera Ishmael Khan will not only stop the tongues of the Sikh sowars there, and break the chain of communication between Mooltan and Bunnoo, but it will throw an additional difficulty in the way of desertion from the latter place.

"The Sikh troops in Bunnoo happen to be particularly dangerous. The Khas' and Mihr Sing's infantry regiments are of the old Boorcha mutineer breed. Bishen Sing's Moossulman regiment has betrayed perfect sympathy with the Khalsa cause. The cavalry regiment was disaffected, even when it came first from Peshawur with Lieutenant Taylor. The Dogruh regiment is angry at not getting leave for two years; and the Irregular Cavalry, under Sirdar Ram Sing Chapah, are mostly greybeard Ghorchurruhs from the Manjha, and showed their teeth a good deal when their numbers were reduced in February by invaliding, and discharge.

"A kossid of mine, who was seized by the enemy in the Koreyshee camp some days ago, and whose beard they shaved off as a punishment, escaped yesterday from

*This Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh, is the same whose early struggles with Dewan Dowlut Raie for the Governorship of Dera Ishmael Khan have already been related to the reader in Vol. I, Chap. IX of this book. His present appointment effected the object of withdrawing Lieutenant Taylor from a post of treachery and danger, which no British officer was called upon to hold for the sake of the Sikh Government; but it proved fatal to the Mullick, whose noble, though vain, defence of Duleepgurh against its own garrison will be related in the sequel.

their hands, and came back this morning. He relates that a Sooniyassee Fakeer, in his presence, related to the soldiers in Hur Bugwan's camp how he had taken the document to Bunnoo, and how the Sikhs there had regretted that Edwardes, Sahib, had sent them back to Bunnoo when they were on their way to reinforce him, thus depriving them of the opportunity of joining Moolraj.

"Peer Ibraheem Khan writes, that the force under Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, has at last marched three koss towards Mooltan.

"Hur Bugwan Doss's army crossed the Chenab yesterday; and this morning part of it, under Hur Bugwan and Jowahir Mull, re-crossed to the right bank, and again took possession of Khangurh, with what object is not yet apparent; but the move is so bold, and apparently desperate, that I am almost afraid it has been made in the expectation of the rest of the force with Jowahir Mull Dutt, and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, including the artillery, joining the rebels at Khangurh. The sooner I can strike a blow at them therefore the better; and as General Cortlandt has now joined me, and reports that all the force will be over to-morrow, I intend to advance the day after on Khangurh, halt within a koss or so of it, and engage the rebels the next morning.

"P.S.—*Noon, June* 14*th*—I have detained the dak in hopes of being able to give you more certain information of the enemy's intentions at Khangurh. The chief zumeendar of that place has just come in with the news that another change of plans took place yesterday at noon. Hur Bugwan Doss

and his army abandoned Khangurh as hastily as they returned, and crossed the Chenab to Shoojabad, in the comprehensive language of the Mullick, 'not leaving a dog behind.'

"The reason of their return at all to Khangurh, is described to have been of the kind anticipated in this letter, 'the Dewan having written to say that he expected an important reinforcement through the means of some Gooroo who had joined him,' but a subsequent express from Mooltan informed Bhugwan Doss that Bhawul Khan's force at Julalpore had been also reinforced to so great an extent as to render it necessary for Moolraj to muster all his strength to oppose him. This is as it should be. The combination is now working, and let the Dewan do what he likes, I trust firmly that he has not many more days to keep the field."*

The comments of the Resident at Lahore on the above letter of the 13th of June give a more full and correct account of the condition in which the column commanded by Jowahir Mull Dutt arrived at Leia, the point where it was originally intended to have commenced its operations against Moolraj.

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE SECRETARY TO THE "GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

"Lahore, June 20th, 1848.

"The extent of the desertion of the Churunjeet regiment, mentioned by Lieutenant Edwardes, is not

*See "Blue Book," pp. 214, 15.

so great hitherto as Lieutenant Edwardes thought.

"Two hundred and fifty-three sowars, with their troop officers, went off, and used their best endeavours to induce the infantry and artillery to go off with them. They have as yet gone no farther than Leia, where they have joined a Kardar of Dewan Moolraj's, who was about to run off to Mooltan, when they arrived, and persuaded him to remain, stating that the rest of the Churunjeet regiment, with the infantry and cavalry, would join them, on the arrival of the force at Leia.

"What Lieutenant Edwardes says of the whole Sikh army is true, I believe; they are all of them traitors in heart and purpose, and want only a favourable and safe opportunity to rise against the Government.

"The Churunjeet regiment thought they had found this opportunity; they believed that Bhaee Maharaj Sing was marching in triumph to Mooltan, and they credited the reports, industriously spread by Moolraj's adherents, of his extensive and increasing influence and power.

"On arriving at Leia, they discovered that Bhaee Maharaj Sing and his numerous host were destroyed; and they heard that, if they proceeded to Mooltan, instead of finding Dewan Moolraj in the plenitude of power that they expected, they would find him deserted by a great part of his followers, and hemmed in by nearly twenty thousand Muhommudan troops.

"Sirdar Jhunda Sing and Jowahir Mull Dutt have halted for the present; they are afraid to advance to Leia, lest the infantry and cavalry should join the rebel Kardar,

as the Churunjeet sowars have done, and yet Jowahir Mull has, by his last report, fourteen hundred Muhommudan troops.

"If we meet with no serious reverse at this juncture, I do not expect that the example of the Churunjeet regiment will be generally followed; there may be more desertions from Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force, but I hope to prevent them. And as the Peshawur, Huzaruh, and Bunnoo forces have not risen hitherto, when the field was so much more open to them, and the success of the Dewan's rebellion so much more likely, I do not expect that they will do so now.

"Lieutenant Edwardes is, perhaps, right in the arrangements he has made under the circumstances, of bringing Lieutenant Taylor to Dera Ishmael Khan; and Futteh Khan, Towannuh, will keep the peace in Bunnoo, if it is to be kept.

"But I could not attempt to withdraw the British officers from Peshawur and Huzaruh, without at once causing the revolt which we so earnestly desire to prevent; nor would there be, in that case, much probability of their reaching Lahore in safety. They are safer where they are, in the midst of a Muhommudan population, than they could be anywhere else, except in a British cantonment.

"The answer reported to Lieutenant Edwardes, as having been made by the Bunnoo force to the Fakeer sent by Dewan Moolraj, rather imports, I think, that they consider the time for joining Moolraj as past.

"There is every probability that Lieutenant Edwardes's force joined the Bhawulpoor army, on the 16th or 17th; if it did so, I think Moolraj's troops would refuse an action, and would run to the fort, where they will be shut up for the rest of the season, if they do not murder Moolraj, and abandon the place."*

And now let us continue our chase of the rebel army, or they will fight the Daoodpotras before we can come up.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Khangurh, on the right
"bank of the Chenab,

"June 15th, 1848.

"The whole of our troops having completed the passage of the Indus yesterday afternoon, I marched with three thousand Puthan Irregulars, horse and foot, and twenty zumbooruhs, from that river to this this morning. The distance across the Doab here is not more than twenty miles, but there being a good deal of sand in the middle of it, the regular troops, guns, ammunition, carts, &c., were unable to make so long a march, and will not be up till to-morrow.

"Khangurh has an extensive fort, but the enemy had abandoned it entirely, as I believe they have also the two smaller forts of Mozuffernuggur and Ghuzunfurgurh in the neighbourhood. The only soldiers of Dewan

*See "*Blue Book*," pp. 217, 18.

Moolraj that I am aware of, on this side of the Chenab, are a party under Sadik Muhommud Khan at Muharajghur in the Jhung direction, and that officer is about to desert to us.

"This evening, my kossid returned from taking a message to Moostapha Khan in Mooltan, and brought the important news that Dewan Moolraj had sent the whole of his disposable force of men and guns against Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree's division, which is moving on Shoojabad. The force is put under the command of Rung Ram, the man who was wounded by a soldier on the outbreak of the rebellion, for advising Moolraj to fly to the 'Sahib log.' *Moolraj's orders are positive to fight Bhawul Khan's army before I come up*, and the day fixed for the battle is the day after to-morrow. Rung Ram has not yet recovered from his wounds, but Moolraj forced the command upon him, with an elephant and a handsome khillut.

"No sooner did I hear this than I wrote off to Moozooddeen Khan to cross the Chenab instantly, and join Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree; and to the latter I sent word, through Peer Ibraheem Khan, on no account to seek a fight till I came up, but throw up intrenchments wherever he may be, and defend himself merely till I can come to his assistance. If he does this, all will be well; for to-morrow bridges will be completed over the canals between me and the ferry of Bindwalluh, opposite Futteh Muhommud Khan's camp, and to-morrow night I shall march down to that ferry, and commence the passage at once, in the boats collected by Moozooddeen Khan; so that, let the enemy be as punctual to their time as they like, I hope to

be able to throw ten guns into Futteh Muhommud Khan's camp, even if the cavalry and infantry are unable to cross in time. But I much doubt the enemy having courage enough to advance so promptly on a tolerably equal foe, and it is probable we shall be in plenty of time to see the whole affair. Nothing could be more desirable than catching the whole of Moolraj's army thus in the open plain, for it may enable us to finish the rebellion at one blow.

"I have written to Moostapha Khan, in Mooltan, that now is the time for him and his Puthan friends to desert Moolraj, and go over to Peer Ibraheem Khan, or to Kummur Kote, previous to the fight.

"To Rung Ram also, the Commander of the rebel force, I have written to say that I presume he accepted the command to give him an opportunity of coming over to us with his nephew, Hur Bugwan Doss, as it is no secret that his loyalty got him the wounds from which he is still suffering. Should he come over, I have assured him of every kindness. Either one or the other of these desertions would damp the ardour of the rebels considerably.

"Jowahir Mull Dutt informs me that the Churunjeet regiment of cavalry only got as far as Leia, on its way to Mooltan, when it halted; probably hearing of the retreat of the Koreyshee force, and our crossing in pursuit. Were there nothing more important to do at this moment, it would be a good thing to go and annihilate this corps at once, as an example to the whole Sikh army; but the situation of Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, is critical, and on him depends my own success. It was very unwise

of Bhawul Khan to scatter his troops in the way he did, but I hope we shall get over the blunder safely."

Here followed an alarm which fortunately proved false.

"*Morning*, 16*th of June*, 1848—I wrote the above last night, and kept it open to give you the latest news this morning. At daylight this morning, guns were heard in full play, in the direction of the enemy and Bhawul Khan's troops, and the firing lasted for an hour or two. A collision has evidently taken place a day sooner than was expected, and it is most unfortunate that we could not have got up sooner, but we have nothing to reproach ourselves with in this respect. The very day the enemy left Koreyshee I crossed the Indus, and a favourable south wind enabled us to complete in four days a passage that would have taken ten had the wind lulled. As soon as my troops were all over, I marched without a day's delay hither; and my men are now making the bridges for our advance this evening to the ferry opposite Bhawul Khan's force. A kossid from Peer Ibraheem Khan tells me that Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, began intrenching the day before yesterday, in which case there is nothing to fear. His force was six thousand strong, and nine guns; and was joined before the fight by Moozooddeen Khan, with two thousand men and two guns, and Khoda Buksh from Mylsee, with near one thousand men, so that Futteh Muhommud will have had nine thousand men and eleven guns wherewith to meet the enemy this morning. Moolraj

can scarcely have brought up more men, though a few more guns he probably has."*

Next morning, at the end of a moonlight march, I received the Resident's letter of the 10th of June, removing the restriction I was under not to cross the Chenab, and leaving me at liberty to make any movements that might be necessary to drive the rebels out of the plain, and shut them up in Mooltan for the hot weather.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT

"Camp, Gaggianwalluh Ferry, on the right bank of the "Chenab, nine koss south of Khangurh and Shoojabad,

"June 17th, 1848.

"I have to thank you for the confidence you repose in me, in leaving me 'unfettered, to act according as circumstances render it most expedient that I should, for the purpose of obtaining the great object in view; without this, indeed, my position would be still more difficult than it is, and the army I have enlisted be reduced to inutility. The operation now going on is a good illustration—Dewan Moolraj has concentrated his whole force, for one decisive effort against the Daoodpotra army, east of the Chenab, with the avowed intention of destroying that army and mine, successively and separately, and so ridding himself of the only enemies he sees in the field. It is quite possible that the Daoodpotra army (which, by my advice, has, in the course of the last two days, strengthened itself, by calling

*See "Blue Book," pp. 215, 16.

in its detachments west of the Chenab and south-east of Mooltan) would be equal to encountering the Moolraj troops, but they evidently were not of that opinion themselves, and repeatedly called on me to come to their assistance. The impolicy also of leaving them to run the risk was sufficiently obvious, when the event could be made certain by junction, yet I had no authority from you to cross the Chenab, and only a reluctant permission to cross the Indus under pressing emergency.

"*In resolving to follow the Koreyshee army across the Chenab, and unite with Bhawul Khan's troops, I have been obliged to incur the, at all times, dangerous responsibility to a political officer, of acting contrary to orders; and it is a relief to me, on the very bank of the forbidden river, to receive your kind and considerate carte blanche.*

"I am happy to inform you that the heavy firing heard by us at Khangurh yesterday morning, in the direction of the Daoodpotra camp, turned out not to be an engagement with the enemy, but a prolonged *feu-de-joie* of artillery, on hearing of our rapid approach to their assistance.

"Dewan Moolraj's force, under Lalla Rung Ram, is still encamped within two koss to the south of Shoojabad, taking up a strong position, it is supposed to await our united arrival, instead of hurrying on a collision this morning, as positively ordered, with the Daoodpotras before I could come up. This is a fatal error, as, please God, they will find. The rebel movements show occasional flashes of military skill and enterprise in their design, but they invariably fade away when it comes to execution, and end in a weak retreat.

"The Daoodpotras are still at Goweyn, twelve koss from Shoojabad, where they have wisely intrenched themselves till our arrival.

"General Cortlandt, with the guns and regular troops, joined me yesterday, at Khangurh; and as soon as the moon rose, the march was again resumed to this place, between nine and ten koss; even this distance is a great effort in this severe heat. The Daoodpotras are sending us up forty-seven boats, in which Moozooddeen Khan crossed his detachment yesterday. They will be here in a few hours, when the passage of the Chenab will immediately commence. Our numbers have swelled to nearly nine thousand men, and I am afraid we shall not be all over under three days; I have left it to Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, to fix the point of junction.

"When our two forces unite, we shall not be under eighteen thousand men, twenty-one guns, and about fifty zumbooruhs; and I cannot conceive the enemy awaiting such a force at Shoojabad. Even in intrenchments, natives look to numbers, and the rebels have got neither the consciousness of honesty, nor the *prestige* of success, to support them.

"Were the Sikh troops on the frontier to be relied on for a moment, I would at this juncture make a rush at Mooltan, and, leaving Rung Ram in his intrenchment, get between him and his master, who is left, with a few personal guards only, in the fort.

"But the struggle now going on is of such a mixed nature, that the step would probably be unsuccessful;

Moolraj is chief of the rebellion, merely by the accident of holding the *moshuksah* (lease, or contract, of the revenues) of Mooltan. The Sikhs have not espoused his cause out of attachment to him, but because it holds out an opportunity of renewing the old Khalsa struggle. It would therefore annoy them but little, to separate Moolraj from the rebel army; they would probably abandon him to his fate, cross the Chenab, join Jhunda Sing's force at Leia, and call on those at Bunnoo and Peshawur to rise at once, in the name of the Khalsa. We should quell a rebellion, and get an insurrection in its stead. I shall bend all my efforts, therefore, to driving the rebels into Mooltan, if we cannot bring them to an engagement in the plain.

"The force beyond Leia is a source of considerable anxiety to me; the majority of the Churunjeet regiment has joined Juss Mull, Dewan Moolraj's Kardar at that place; and it is but too apparent, that the guns of Umeer Chund and Dhara Sing's infantry regiment are inclined to join them. Your orders are, to send Jhunda Sing's force to Jhung—most probably to avoid this very catastrophe; and I have forwarded the order to Jhunda Sing; but I have also told him not to act upon it, if he thinks it would only make the men declare themselves, and go openly over to Moolraj. The Churunjeet regiment were led to decide for Moolraj, by Jowahir Mull trying to get rid of them, by sending them on a frivolous excuse to Pind Dadun Khan. Seeing that they were suspected, they threw away the mask, and instead of marching on Pind Dadun Khan, bent their steps to Leia. It is a serious addition to our difficulties, thus to find our allies turning enemies, but there is no help for it; all we can do, is to increase our efforts to shut

Moolraj up in Mooltan, and thus discourage all his friends.

"Your appointment of Lieutenant Lake to the political charge of the Bhawulpoor force is both timely and happy.

"That officer's personal courage, and professional talent, will find a field prepared for them."*

As my next letter to the Resident was written "on the field of battle," after fighting for nine hours under an Indian sun in June, with the wrecks of a bloody struggle lying round me as I sat on the ground, and as yet the details of that struggle only imperfectly known to myself; I shall here depart for a moment from the general rule I have adopted of letting the "Blue Book" tell the tale with the addition of occasional new comments and explanations; and shall endeavour to give the reader a more full and just idea of the battle of Kineyree.

On the day of the 17th June, the relative strength and positions of the three armies were as follows:—The rebel army of from eight thousand to ten thousand horse and foot, and ten guns, commanded by Moolraj's brother-in-law, Rung Ram, and the Daoodpotra army of about eight thousand five hundred horse and foot, eleven guns and thirty zumbooruhs, commanded by Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, were on the left bank of the Chenab; and my force, consisting of two divisions (one of faithful regulars, foot and artillery, of the Sikh service, about one thousand five hundred men, and ten guns, under General Cortlandt,

*See "Blue Book," pp. 221, 2.

and another of about five thousand irregulars, horse and foot, and thirty zumbooruhs, under my own personal command), was upon the right bank.

Rung Ram's camp was pitched across the high road to Mooltan, three miles south of Shoojabad; Futteh Muhommud's at Goweyn, fifteen miles farther south; and mine at Gaggianwalluh Ferry, about twelve miles south of Khangurh.

The three formed a triangle; in which the Daood-potras were nearer to me than to the enemy, but nearer to the enemy than I was; while a river about three miles wide divided the allies.

It is obvious that in such a position of affairs, had Rung Ram marched upon the Daoodpotras on the morning of the 17th, his numbers being equal if not superior, and his *materiel* far better (Moolraj's soldiers being chiefly experienced regulars, and Bhawul Khan's chiefly irregulars who had never seen a round shot fired), he must have defeated my allies before I could get across the river, and perhaps have prevented me from crossing at all.

That he did not do this, I attribute partly to the divided councils of a native camp, but chiefly to Rung Ram's uncertainty as to my intentions. He was afraid I should cross the Chenab above him at Khangurh; and he had no wish to be placed between two fires.

About noon on the 17th, he obtained correct information that I had moved south to Gaggianwalluh, and was endeavouring to effect a junction with the Daoodpotras. But it was too late to march fifteen miles to Goweyn, and

fight a battle with Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, before night. So Rung Ram waited till the evening, and then moved eight miles lower down the Chenab, to the village of Bukree, which brought him within an easy march of Kineyree, where he knew I must cross from Gaggianwalluh; and he calculated on occupying Kineyree early the next morning, and so keeping me on the right bank while he thrashed the Daoodpotras on the left.

The merit of defeating this plan is due to Peer Ibraheem Khan, Buhadoor, the Native Political Agent of the British Government at the Court of Bhawulpoor.

This able and faithful officer had accompanied the Daoodpotra army from Bhawulpoor to Goweyn, and counteracted in no small degree the imbecility of its General, Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree.

No sooner did Rung Ram issue orders for a move to the south on the evening of the 17th, than the Peer's spies brought him the intelligence; and the Peer immediately sent it on to me, adding his own belief that the place where the rebels meant to halt for the night was Bukree. "Under these circumstances," said the Peer, "I would advise our moving down to Kineyree, to secure the ferry, and cover your disembarkation."

The Peer was one of those men who are found only on frontiers, as the chamois is found only amid snows. On one side of his girdle was a pen, and on the other a sword; and he had a head, a hand, and a heart, ready to wield either with vigour.

The advice which he now gave was admirable; and I not only adopted it, but gave him a positive order

to carry it out upon the spot. "Tell Futteh Muhommud," I sent him word, "to strike his tents, and march down to this ferry at whatever hour of the night this letter reaches you; and if he refuses, supersede him. *It must be done*, and there is no time for correspondence." At the same time I promised, if possible, to have three thousand men and ten guns across the river to meet the Daoodpotras on their arrival.

While this order was on its way to the Daoodpotras, I held a consultation with General Cortlandt and Foujdar Khan (who by this time had become "Adjutant-General!" of the Puthan levies), as to the order of our passage over the Chenab.

We had as yet but a few boats, which had been collected for us by Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, an officer of Nuwab Bhawul Khan's, and if we attempted to pass the regular troops over first, very few could be got over before morning; and as to the guns, it was deemed unsafe to cross them during the night at all. Finally, therefore, it was resolved that the boats should be filled choke full of picked Irregular Infantry and dismounted cavalry, whose chief officers should be allowed to take their horses, but no other horse were to go till morning.

In this way a strong division of three thousand Puthan Irregulars, with about fifty mounted chiefs, effected the passage, and their commander, Foujdar Khan, boldly led them forward in the direction whence the Daoodpotra column might be expected, and met it about a mile from the river, a little before sunrise.

I slept that night on the right bank, intending to take over a second division as soon as the fleet returned from its first voyage. But at six o'clock on the 18th there was no fleet to be seen. Two little ferry-boats had, however, come up from another ferry, and, getting into these with a few horsemen and servants, and leaving General Cortlandt to pass the rest of the force over as rapidly as he could, I pushed off for Kineyree.

About a hundred yards from the left bank, I was roused from a "brown study," not unnatural amid plans so doubtful in their issue, so heavy in their responsibility, by a burst of artillery within a mile or two of the shore. A second cannonade replied, was answered, and replied again, and two tall opposite columns of white smoke rose out of the jungle, higher and higher at every discharge, as if each strove to get above its adversary, then broke and pursued each other in thick clouds over the fair and peaceful sky.

Gazing at this unmistakable symbol of the fight below, I could scarcely forbear smiling at the different speculations of my companions in the boat. The servants, men of peace, declared and hoped it was only "a salute," fired by the Daoodpotras in honour of the allies who had joined them; but the horsemen knit their brows, and devoutly cried "Al-lah! Al-lah!" at every shot, with an emphasis like pain on the last syllable. They quite *felt* there was a fight going on.

For my own part, I felt so too; and as I stepped on shore, and buckled the strap of my cap under my chin, I remember thinking that no Englishman could be beaten on the 18th of June.

Nor am I ashamed to remember that I bethought me of a still happier omen, and a far more powerful aid—the goodness of my cause, and the God who defends the right. A young Lieutenant who had seen but one campaign—alone, and without any of the means and appliances of such war as I had been apprenticed to—I was about to take command, in the midst of a battle, not only of one force whose courage I had never tried, but of another which I had never seen; and to engage a third, of which the numbers were uncertain, with the knowledge that defeat would immeasurably extend the rebellion which I had undertaken to suppress, and embarrass the Government which I had volunteered to serve. Yet, in that great extreme, I doubted only for a moment—one of those long moments to which some angel seems to hold a microscope and show millions of things within it. It came and went between the stirrup and the saddle. It brought with it difficulties, dangers, responsibilities, and possible consequences terrible to face; but it left none behind. I knew that I was fighting for the right. I asked God to help me do my duty, and I rode on certain that He would do it.

On the shore, not a creature was to be seen, so we had to take the smoke and roar of the guns for our guides to the field of battle. But how to find out our own side was the difficulty, and not to fall into the hands of the enemy. On one side, the firing was regular, and apparently from guns of equal calibre; on the other side, irregular and unequal, as if from guns of different sizes.

Obliged to choose between them, I paid the enemy the compliment of supposing their guns would be the best,

and those of Bhawul Khan the worst, and rode straight through the jungle to the latter.

At the village of Kineyree, I got a wretched peasant to put us in the road, though he would not go a yard along with us; and soon we met a horseman who had been despatched by Foujdar Khan to tell me what had happened, and conduct me to the field.

This was Peer Muhommud Khan, Foujdar's uncle; and from him I learnt that Rung Ram had marched before dawn from Bukree to seize the ferry at Kineyree, but finding it occupied by my men and the Daoodpotras, had taken up a strong position on the salt hills of the village of Noonar, and then opened on the allies. Hot-tempered, brave, but ignorant of fields, and consequently rash, the Daoodpotra levies lifted up their voices in one vast shout of their master's name,* then rushed impetuously forward, without either waiting for an order or asking for a plan. Their very baggage was mixed up with them; the artillery was entangled; and the fire which poured down from the heights of Noonar was so different from the matchlock volleys of their own border warfare, that they staggered, stopped, and finally fell back in a mass of confusion upon a village in their rear. Here Peer Ibraheem Khan, assisted by the oldest soldiers in the Nuwab's army, endeavoured to restore order, and persuade their General to issue the necessary commands for taking up a position, occupying the village, knocking

*Nothing can exceed the reverence with which the Daoodpotra tribe regard their master, the Nuwab, or, as they call him, the Khan. They have a most impressive custom of calling on his name every evening, just as the sun sets below the horizon, the whole camp joining their voices as one man. The same takes place when they enter battle.

embrasures out of the mud walls for the artillery, extricating the baggage and sending it to the rear, and, in short, putting themselves into something like an attitude of defence, since it was clear they were unable to attack.

It was at this moment that, led by Peer Muhommud, I arrived upon the field, a plain covered with jungle, amongst which loaded camels were passing to the rear, out of range of the enemy's guns, and detachments of wild-looking warriors, with red hair and beards,* were taking up a line of posts. Suddenly, a European stepped out of the crowd, and advanced to me in a hurried manner, wiping his forehead, and exclaiming: "Oh, Sir, our army is dis-organised!" —a pleasing salutation on arriving at a field of battle! He then told me his name was Macpherson, and that he commanded one of the Nuwab's two regular regiments. I asked him where his General was? He laughed, and pointed to a large peepul-tree, round which a crowd was gathered. I gallopped up, and looking over the shoulders of the people, saw a little old man, in dirty clothes, and with nothing but a skull-cap on his head, sitting under the tree, with a rosary in his hands, the beads of which he was rapidly telling, and muttering, in a peevish, helpless manner, "*Ulhumdoolillah*! *Ulhumdoolillah*!" (God be praised! God be praised!) apparently quite abstracted from the scene around him, and utterly unconscious that six-pounder balls were going through the branches, that officers were imploring him for orders, and that eight or nine thousand rebels were waiting to destroy an army of which *he* was the General.

*The Daoodpotras are as fond of staining their hair red with henna, as other nations are of staining it black.

He had to be shaken by his people before he could comprehend that I had arrived; and as he rose and tottered forward, looking vacantly in my face, I saw that excitement* had completed the imbecility of his years, and that I might as well talk to a post. Turning, therefore, to the many brave and experienced officers of his staff, and to Peer Ibraheem Khan, who now came up, I learnt the general nature of their position, and then struck out a plan for the day. "Nothing," I said, "can be done with an army so disorganized as this, or with guns such as Peer Ibraheem describes yours to be. The enemy has taken up a strong position, and will probably prefer being attacked. It is not likely that he will attack us until he thinks we don't mean to attack him. We have therefore got the day before us. I will write to General Cortlandt on the other side of the river to send us over some guns that are better than the enemy's, and not a move must be made till they come. In the meanwhile, occupy yourselves with recovering the order of your force; make the whole lie down in line in the jungle; keep them as much under cover as possible, and let your artillery play away as hard as they can on the enemy's guns. Above all, stand fast, and be patient."

The Nuwab's officers readily comprehended what was to be done, and cheerfully promised obedience.

I then betook myself to the left, where I heard that my own three thousand men were posted; and as I rode down the Daoodpotra line, and received the loud greetings of the soldiers, I saw how timely had been my arrival. I

*I say excitement, and not fear, because I have been assured that in former years he possessed the one good quality of courage.

had not joined them in a moment of triumph, but of trial. They found their ally for the first time when (in Asia at least) allies are most seldom found—in the hour of difficulty; and seeing even a single British officer come among them to share dangers which they were encountering for the British Government, they felt its justice, and took heart again.

On reaching the left of the Daoodpotras, I found their straggling front prolonged by my own three thousand men, who had stuck their standards upright in the turf, and were lying down in a beautiful line between them. This was the work of Foujdar Khan, but I loudly praised all the other officers as they flocked about me.

I now dismounted from my horse, and asked (without much hope) if any one had got pen and paper?

"Sahib!" replied a well-known voice behind me and turning, I beheld Sudda Sookh, the moonshee of my office, pulling out a Cachmere pen-box and paper from his girdle, just as quietly as if he had been in cutcherry. He had no sword, or other implements of war, but merely the writing materials, with which it was his duty to be furnished; and though he looked serious and grave, he was perfectly calm amid the roar of hostile cannon, and men's heads occasionally going off before his eyes.

"What are you doing here, Sudda Sookh?" I asked in astonishment. He put up his hands respectfully, and answered: "My place is with my master! I live by his service; and when he dies, I die!" A more striking instance of the quiet endurance of the Hindoo character I never saw.

Seating myself under a bush (in humble imitation of the Daoodpotra General), I wrote two short notes to General Cortlandt, informing him of our critical position, and my belief that I could hold it until three p.m. by which time he must send me guns, or the battle would be lost.

These two notes I sent by two different horsemen, with an interval of half an hour between them, and the second reached the General first.

They were written at eight A.M., and what I had engaged to do was to stave off Rung Ram's army for *seven hours*. Those seven hours I should never forget if I lived seven centuries.

The firing on both sides continued for six hours without slackening; and though the Daoodpotra artillery drew the heaviest of the enemy's fire on to the right of our line, yet my Puthans on the left got so much more than they had ever been used to in the petty raids of their own frontier, that they were continually springing up and demanding to be led on against the enemy. "Look here," they cried, "and there, and there" (pointing to men as they were hit), "are we to be all killed without a blow? What sort of war do you call this, where there is iron on one side, and only flesh and blood on the other? Lead us on, and let us strike a blow for our lives! If we are to die, let us die; but let us kill somebody first!"

Then the officers crowded round, and every one thought he was a General; and "if I would only listen to *him*" (pulling me by the sleeve to interrupt my rebuke to some one else), "the battle would be mine." But of all the advisers,

I must do them the justice to say, that none counselled a retreat. Every voice was for attack. Foujdar Khan, and one or two others, alone supported my opinion, that we must wait for General Cortlandt's guns. Happily I had no doubt or misgiving in my own mind. I never had a clearer conviction in my life than I had that day that I was right, and they were wrong; and with a patience, which in the ordinary affairs of life I never had possessed, I strove hour after hour to calm that rash and excited throng, and assure them that when the proper moment should arrive, I myself would lead them on.

And so I sat out those seven hours, under a June sun, with no shade but that of a bush, and neither a drop of water nor a breath of air to lessen the intolerable heat.

A little after two P.M. the Daoodpotras began to slacken the fire of their artillery; and, as I afterwards learnt, Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, without giving me any information, and without any sort of necessity, gradually withdrew his own line, beginning with the right, and commenced falling back upon the river.

The ground we held all day was covered with jungle, which both screened and protected us so long as we lay down. No sooner, however, did the Daoodpotras retire, than the enemy from their high post at Noonar detected the movement, and determined to follow up their advantage.

Slowly their infantry and artillery were disengaged from the village of Noonar, and their cavalry employed the interval in reconnoitring our position.

Foujdar Khan had brought across the Chenab the ten zumbooruhs which we had captured from the rebels at Leia. As yet I had not allowed these to be fired, for fear of betraying our position; but they were now opened with effect on the reconnoitring parties of horse, who hastily fell back on the main body with the intelligence they had gained. This was about three o'clock. A short pause followed, and then the whole fire of the rebels was turned from the retiring Daoodpotras on to the newly-discovered enemy still occupying the left.

If the wild Puthan levies had been difficult to restrain before, they were now perfectly mad, as the shot tore through their ranks and ploughed up the ground on which they lay; and when presently the fire ceased, and bodies of horse were again seen stealing up towards our front in numbers that set our ten miserable zumbooruhs at defiance, I saw that none but the most desperate expedient could stave off the battle any longer.

Imploring the infantry to lie still yet a little longer, I ordered Foujdar Khan, and all the chiefs and officers who had horses, to mount; and forming themselves into a compact body, charge down on the rebel cavalry, and endeavour to drive them back upon the foot. "Put off the fight," I whispered to Foujdar, "or not a man of us will leave this field."

Gladly did those brave men get the word to do a deed so desperate; but with set teeth I watched them mount, and wondered how many of my choicest officers would come back.

Spreading their hands to heaven, the noble band solemnly repeated the creed of their religion, as though it were their last act on earth, then passed their hands over their beards with the haughtiness of martyrs, and drawing their swords, dashed out of the jungle into the ranks of the enemy's horse, who, taken wholly by surprise, turned round and fled, pursued by Foujdar and his companions to within a few hundred yards of the rebel line, which halted to receive its panic-stricken friends.

In executing this brilliant service, Foujdar Khan received two severe wounds, and few who returned came back untouched. Many fell.

The purpose, however, was completely answered; for though the enemy quickly rallied, and advanced again in wrath, and I had just made up my mind that there was nothing now left but a charge of our whole line, unsupported by a single gun, of which there could have been but one result—our total annihilation—at that moment of moments might be heard the bugle-note of artillery in the rear. "Hush!" cried every voice, while each ear was strained to catch that friendly sound once more. Again it sounds—again—and there is no mistake. The guns have come at last—thank God!

"Quick, quick, orderlies, and bring them up. There's not a moment to be lost! Now, officers, to your posts, every one to his own standard, and his own men. Let the infantry stand up, and get into as good a line as the jungle will allow; let none advance until I give the word; but when the word is given, the duty of every chief is this, to keep the standard of his own retainers in a line with the standards

right and left of him. Break the line and you will be beaten; keep it, and you are sure of victory."*

Away they scattered, and up sprang their shouting brotherhoods. Standards were plucked up, and shaken in the wind; ranks closed; swords grasped; and matches blown; and the long line waved backwards and forwards with agitation, as it stood between the coming friend, and coming foe. Louder and louder grew the murmur of the advancing rebel host; more distinct and clear the bugles of the friendly guns. And now the rattling of the wheels is heard, the crack of whips, and clank of chains, as they labour to come up; the crowd falls back, a road is cleared, we see the foremost gun, and amid shouts of welcome it gallops to the front.

Oh, the thankfulness of that moment! the relief, the weight removed, the elastic bound of the heart's main-spring into its place after being pressed down for seven protracted hours of waiting for a reinforcement that might never come! Now all is clear before us. Our chance is nearly as good as theirs, and who asks more?

One, two, three, four, five, *six*† guns had come; and panting after them, with clattering cartridge-boxes, might be seen two regiments of regular infantry—Soobhan Khan's corps of Moossulmans, and General Cortlandt's Sooruj Mookhee. It was well thought of by the General, for I

*This is the only manoeuvre I ever attempted to instil into that impatient mass.

†In my despatch after the battle, I reported my own guns as ten, and those captured from the enemy as six; but we had only six of our own, and took eight—errors on the right side.

had only asked for guns; but he judged well that two regiments would be worth their weight in gold at such a pinch.

There was scant time for taking breath, for the enemy was close at hand; so bidding the guns come with me, the two new regiments to follow on the guns, and the whole irregular line advance steadily in rear under command of Foujdar Khan, I led the artillery through the trees on to the cultivated plain beyond. There we first saw the enemy's line.

Directly in my front, Moolraj's regular troops were pushing their way in some confusion over fields of sugar; and through an interval of space caused by a few wells and houses, some horse artillery guns were emerging on the plain.

Round went our guns; and round went theirs; and in an instant both were discharged into each other. It was a complete surprise, for the rebels believed truly that all the guns we had in the morning had left the field with the Daood-potras; and of the arrival of the others they were ignorant. Down sank their whole line among the long stalks of the sugar; and as we afterwards learnt from a Goorkha prisoner, the fatal word was passed that the "Sahib had got across the river with all his army from Dera Ghazee Khan, and led them into an ambush." To and fro rode their astonished and vacillating Colonels; and while the guns maintained the battle, the intelligence was sent by swift horsemen to the rebel General, Rung Ram, who, seated on an elephant, looked safely down upon the fight from the hills around the village of Noonar.

Meanwhile the Sooruj Mookhee and Soobhan Khan's regiments had come up, followed closely by the line; and I made the two former lie down on the left and right of the artillery, and the latter halt under cover of the trees.

The gunners were getting warm. "Grape! grape!" at length shouted the Commandant; "it's close enough for grape;" and the enemy thought so too, for the next round rushed over our heads like a flight of eagles. And there for the first time, and the last in my short experience of war, did I see hostile artillery *firing grape into each other*. It was well for us that the enemy was taken by surprise, for they aimed high, and did little mischief. General Cortlandt's artillery were well trained and steady, and their aim was true. Two guns were quickly silenced, and the rest seemed slackening and firing wild. A happy charge might carry all. I gave the order to Soobhan Khan's regiment to attack, and away they went; Soobhan Khan himself, a stout heavy soldier, leading them on, and leaping over bushes like a boy. Before this regiment could reach the battery an incident characteristic of irregular troops occurred. A cluster of half a dozen horsemen dashed out from the trees behind me, and passing the regiment threw themselves on the enemy's guns. Their leader received a ball full in his face, and fell over the "cannon's mouth." It was Shah Niwaz Khan of Esaukheyl, whose family I had recalled from exile to rule over their own country.* The regiment followed, and carried at the point of the bayonet the only gun which awaited their assault. Another gun lay dismounted on the ground.

*See their history in Chapter VIII, Vol. I.

While this was doing, our guns poured grape into the cover where the rebel infantry were lying, and these hearing their own artillery retire before Soobhan Khan's charge, retreated hastily through the high crops with which the fields were covered, but suffered heavily from the fire behind them, and formed again in great confusion when they reached their guns.

Our whole force now advanced over the contested ground, the men shouting as they passed the captured guns. The enemy then rallied, and the artillery on both sides re-opened.

It was at this point of the battle that a small body of cavalry approached our battery from the left. I asked an orderly if he knew who they were? He thought they were Foujdar Khan and the mounted chiefs of the Puthans, and I had just turned my horse to ride towards them with an order, when a single horseman advanced, and, taking a deliberate aim, discharged a matchlock at me, within fifty or sixty yards. The ball passed first through the sleeve of the brown holland blouse which I had on, then through my shirt, and out again on the other side through both, and must have been within an hair's breadth of my elbow. But the party paid dearly for their daring, for two guns were instantly laid on them, and horses and riders were soon rolling in the dust.

And now I gave the word for the whole line of wild Puthans to be let loose upon the enemy. One volley from our battery, and they plungea into the smoke-enveloped space between the armies with a yell that had been gathering malice through hours of impatient suffering. The smoke

cleared off, and the artillerymen of two more rebel guns were dying desperately at their posts, their line was in full retreat upon Noonar, and the plain was a mass of scattered skirmishes.

Once more our artillery gallopped to the front, and harassed the disordered enemy. In vain the rebels tried to rally and reply. Our infantry was on them, and another and another gun was abandoned in the flight. Rung Ram, their General, had long since fled; Moolraj's Puthan cavalry, who had stood aloof throughout the battle, were supposed to have gone over; the regular regiments, and especially the Goorkhas (who had deserted Agnew and Anderson at Mooltan, and now fought with halters round their necks), had borne the brunt of the day, and suffered heavily. More than half the artillery had been already lost. The pursuit was hot, and fresh and overwhelming numbers seemed to be pouring in upon both flanks; for at this juncture the Daoodpotras had come up again, and were burning to retrieve their place.

Thus, without a General, without order, and without hope, the rebels were driven back upon Noonar; and having placed its sheltering heights between them and their pursuers for a moment, they threw aside shame and arms, and fled, without once halting, to Mooltan.

Few indeed would have reached that place, had I had any cavalry to carry on the pursuit; and as it was, the cavalry of Nuwab Bhawul Khan maintained it for some miles, and brought in two more guns at nightfall.* Out of

*At least the Puthan cavalry of the Nuwab laid claim to them; but they were also claimed by the Nuwab's two regular regiments, as having been taken on our right

ten that the rebels brought into the field of Kineyree, but two returned to Mooltan.

Their camp at Noonar, and all their ammunition, fell into our hands; and the former furnished many of our irregular levies with tents for the first time.

On our side, upwards of three hundred men were killed or wounded in my own and the Nuwab's forces, and the enemy left five hundred dead upon the field.

And so ended the battle of Kineyree, which began a little after seven A.M., and was not decided till half-past four P.M.

At five P.M., after nine hours' constant exertion of mind and body, under a fiery sun, I leave the reader to imagine the feelings of thankfulness with which I sat down at Noonar, on the very ground occupied by Moolraj's army in the morning, and penned a hurried despatch to the Resident, announcing our victory.*

during the battle. I can only say that I neither saw any troops of any kind of the Nuwab's during that part of the battle when the two armies closed, nor was I aware of any contest going on beyond the right of my own line. Where I first saw the Nuwab's regular regiments was at Noonar, where *they came up after I had stopped the pursuit*, and formed upon my *left*.

* The original despatch is given in an Appendix.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"On the field of battle, near the village of Noonar,
"four koss from the River Chenab,
"five o'clock P.M., June 18th, 1848.

"I have the honour and satisfaction to report to you the complete defeat of the whole united army of Dewan Moolraj, this day, by the troops of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, strengthened by about five thousand of my men, ten of our guns, and twenty-five zumbooruhs, after a pitched battle, which lasted for nine hours, commencing a little after seven o'clock A.M., and not being decided till half-past four P.M.

"Yesterday evening, Peer Ibraheem Khan wrote to inform me that the enemy had certainly advanced from Shoojabad, and it was not known where they had encamped, but it was his opinion that they were making for a village named Bukree, only four koss from the ferry of Kineyree, at which I intended to cross the Chenab: and he requested to know if I wished the troops of the Nuwab to move down, and cover our disembarkation. It was evidently necessary, and I ordered the Daoodpotras to march in the middle of the night, and come down to Kineyree, where I would endeavour to have three thousand men and ten guns to meet and reinforce them.

"They obeyed my instructions to the letter, marched to Kineyree, and were joined there by three thousand of my Puthan levies, all on foot, even

the cavalry being obliged to leave their horses behind, for want of boats. The guns could not be crossed during the night at all.

"I slept on the right bank, intending to cross when the fleet that took over the first three thousand men should come back for another detachment; but at six o'clock the boats had not returned, and getting anxious, I crossed my own tent and guard in two small boats that had come up from the south in the interim at about seven A.M. this morning. I had not reached the left bank ere I heard heavy firing commenced on the north-east of Kineyree; and when we landed, not a soldier was to be seen, the whole of my own three thousand men having joined the troops of Bhawul Khan, two koss from the river. Accompanied by three or four horsemen and half a dozen guides of Lieutenant Lumsden's corps, I set out for the scene of action, and guided by the smoke and roar of the guns, soon joined our friends; not however without some apprehension of getting into the lines of the enemy.

"The Daoodpotras were drawn up in a line in a jungly plain, with my Puthans on the left; and I rode down the whole line, spoke a few words to the Nuwab's officers, counselled patience, and begged them not to make a rash attack until the evening, when more men and guns would come across from General Cortlandt's camp on the right bank. They promised not to advance till I gave the word, and I proceeded to my own division on the left.

"From this time till three o'clock P.M., the firing on both sides scarcely slackened, and as the guns were all on the right with the Daoodpotras, the Nuwab's troops had to bear the chief brunt of the long bowls throughout the day. However, we got our turn. By three o'clock, the enemy had approached so close as to be able to reconnoitre our position; and having little or no cavalry, we could not drive back their numerous parties of horse, dispatched to discover our weak point. This they effectually did; and at three P.M. left the Daoodpotras alone, and turned their whole fire on the left. The galling volleys poured into the new levies at this time were enough to shake older troops; and their impatience to be led on to strike a blow in their own defence was most difficult to restrain. It was indeed an anxious moment, for I had not a gun to return a shot; and I felt certain that General Cortlandt would not fail me, but send the guns for which I had written by three o'clock.

"At half-past three, the enemy, despising our zumbooruhs, had pushed up to within a few hundred yards of us; and I was just contemplating the sad necessity of making an unsupported charge, when in the very nick of time the guns came up, and with them the two regular regiments—one, General Cortlandt's well-disciplined Sooruj Mookhee, and the other, Soobhan Khan's regiment of Moossulmans. Calling them to the front, and taking command of them myself, in the absence of General Cortlandt (who had remained on the right bank, by my orders, to cross the force), I gave the long-wished-for word to emerge from the jungle, and fall upon the rebels.

"I feel unable to do justice to the gallantry with which this order was obeyed. Men, whom I had only enlisted a month ago, shook their swords with a will, and rushed upon the rebel cavalry with the most desperate and irresistible valour. The fight was hand-to-hand in five minutes, and the opposing guns were pouring grape into each other almost within speaking distance. For half an hour fighting could not have been harder, and we were left entirely to ourselves, the Daoodpotras being either engaged on their own account, or thinking they had done enough.

"At a little before four, Commandant Soobhan Khan, at the head of his Moossulman regiment, made the bravest sally I ever saw upon a single gun of the enemy, and carried it at the point of the bayonet. Confusion fell among their artillery; ours advanced, and cruelly harassed them with grape; the infantry followed up, a momentary struggle ensued for the mastery, and the next minute the rebels were in full flight. Bravely, I must allow, did they labour to carry off their guns; but, one by one, they all fell to either the sword or the bayonet. In the morning, they commenced the action with ten guns, and in the afternoon, advanced with six, across a nullah which was between them and us; leaving four guns behind. All six are now in our possession; but they managed to carry off the more distant four, though we followed them up for two koss after they broke.

"God be praised for a most signal victory, gained under the most discouraging circumstances; but to be followed, I hope by most encouraging results! All have behaved well, many nobly. Our loss is not yet known, nor that of the enemy.

"Scouts are already after the latter, and I will let you know to-morrow where they halt; but most probably it will not be before they reach Mooltan, after the defeat they have got to-day at Kineyree."

* "Blue Book," pp. 218, 19.

CHAPTER VII

PICKING UP THE PIECES AFTER A FIGHT—CONTRAST BETWEEN A CAMP WITH DOCTORS AND A CAMP WITHOUT—THE PRIDE OF WOUNDED MEN—SHOOJABAD SURRENDERED—PRAISE OF PEER IBRAHEEM KHAN—CENSURE OF HIS COLLEAGUE, THE DAOODPOTRA GENERAL—ANECDOTE OF HIS HISTORY—THE ARMY ADVANCES TO SHOOJABAD—ITS STRENGTH—PUTHANS DESERT MOOLRAJ—THE AUTHOR OFFERS TO UNDERTAKE THE SIEGE OF MOOLTAN IF HEAVY GUNS ARE SUPPLIED HIM—MR. QUIN JOINS THE ARMY—NEWS OF LIEUTENANT LAKE'S ARRIVAL AT BHAWULPOOR—SYMPATHY OF THE LARGE TOWNS WITH MOOLRAJ'S CAUSE—A STEAMER ORDERED TO CO-OPERATE ON THE CHENAB—BHAEE MAHARAJ SING REAPPEARS AT MOOLTAN, THOUGH BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DROWNED IN THE CHENAB—EVIL REPORTS OF RAJAH SHER SING'S FORCE—MOOLRAJ AGAIN OFFERS TO SURRENDER IF HIS LIFE IS GUARANTEED—THE FORT OF SECUNDERABAD SURRENDERS—SHEIKH EMAMOODEEN AND JOWAHIR MULL DUTT OFFER TO JOIN THE AUTHOR—ILL NEWS FROM EVERY SIDE—ADVANCE TO ADEE WALLUH BAGH—DISTRUST OF ALL SIKHS AT THIS CRISIS—LIEUTENANT LAKE'S TIMELY ARRIVAL—ADVANCE TO SOORUJ KOOND—MORE DISCLOSURES FROM SHER SING'S FORCE—CONSULTATION AS TO BEST POSITION BEFORE MOOLTAN—SHEIKH EMAMOODEEN JOINS THE ARMY WITH HIS DIVISION—THE AUGURS FIX AN AUSPICIOUS DAY FOR MOOLRAJ TO FIGHT—HE FIGHTS AND IS DEFEATED—THE BATTLE OF SUDDOOSAM—THE DAOODPOTRA GENERAL CONGRATULATES LAKE, AND HIS

MEN DEMAND A RECEIPT IN FULL—CONTRAST BETWEEN KINEYREE AND SUDDOOSAM—EQUESTRIAN VICISSITUDES—SADIK MUHOMMUD KHAN IS TRUSTED, AND PROVES TRUE—HOW TO KEEP YOUR HEAD COOL IN A FIGHT—THE REBELS DECLINE TO FIGHT AGAIN, AND GET BEHIND THEIR WALLS—A FALSE ALARM LOSES A RIGHT HAND—AN APOTHECARY SEWS IT UP WITH A PACKING NEEDLE, AND A FRIEND SITS ON IT—BARBAROUS SURGERY OF THE CAMP—GHOLAM SURWUR KHAN—DOCTOR COLE GETS MANY PATIENTS AND AS MANY FRIENDS.

CHAPTER VII

THREE days of inaction followed the battle of Kineyree, to enable us to "pick up the pieces," and cross the main body of our army, which had been left on the 18th of June at Gaggianwalluh.

The interval was divided between the hospital and the grave. Our own killed were no sooner buried, than we had to attend to those of the enemy. Natives feel very creditably upon this point, unless some peculiar circumstances have exasperated hostilities; and after a battle, I always found that the Muhommudans and Hindoos of my force took upon themselves the duty of burying or burning the slain of their respective faiths, with little distinction of friend or foe. But with all our efforts, the air around us became perfectly pestilential in the short space of forty-eight hours, from the action of intense heat on the dead bodies of men, horses, camels, and gun-bullocks, in the thickets round about; and had we remained much longer, sickness must have broken out among us. For my own part, food became loathsome to me; for I had not only to breathe the dead, but attend to the wounds of the living. It had never been contemplated that we should have to bear the burden of the blockade, and no medical officer had been ordered to join our camp. Consequently, after the battle

of Kineyree, there was no European doctor to alleviate the horrors of war, by taking up lacerated vessels, amputating shivered limbs, extracting balls, and dressing painful wounds. Campaigners who have walked through a field hospital the day after a general action, and seen the wounded on their clean and comfortable cots, ranged in military order along the tents, with humane and skilful surgeons going from cot to cot, followed by their staff of ministering angels, the apothecaries and dressers, with all their paraphernalia of relief, their lint, their plasters, and their ointments, sponges, basins, water carefully lukewarm, and endless rolls of snow-white bandages, will best be able to appreciate the distress of eighty-nine wounded men, huddled together in the deserted tents of the village of Noonar, bleeding and suffering *without a doctor.* Nobly, however, did they bear it; not merely uncomplainingly,* but with honourable pride at these evidences of their valour. Few of them had ever seen towards a round shot fired before; and though inured to arms from their childhood, the raids of their mountain border could have given them but a faint conception of a general action between two armies. They had now seen, shared in, and won one; and each man felt inspired with double confidence in himself and his leader. Round

*Had they been used to such luxuries as doctors, they would doubtless have felt more acutely the hardship of being without them. After the battle of Moodkee, in 1845, the wounded were sent into the fort of Moodkee, while the army went on to Ferozeshuhr. A ball through my thigh assigned me to the party in the fort. Doctors were very scarce, from the sudden nature of the war, and the bad cases had to wait while the *worse* cases were looked to. At the door of my tent lay a sepoy with a smashed leg. It had only been dressed once since the fight. His cries I shall never forget. Sometimes he would exclaim: "God! God! where are you?" but more frequently he called out to the passers-by: "Where is *my* doctor, Sahib? Why does not *my* doctor come?" He evidently thought the service of the East India Company was in a bad way when any sepoy could not have an assistant-surgeon to himself.

the mattress of every wounded Puthan gathered all day the men of his own brotherhood, each recalling some incident of the fight, and all uniting in praising and brushing off the flies from the gratified hero who was stretched upon the floor. Their pride reached its climax when I looked in to see how they were all going on; and my arrival was followed by a general removal of bandages, which, for all our sakes, might better have been kept on. While writing my despatch to the Resident on the field of the 18th, I remember being interrupted by a litter stopping in front of me. Looking up, I received a "Salaam, Sahib!" and a hearty laugh from Kaloo Khan, Gundapoor, who, though still unable to lift his right arm, from the dreadful wounds he got in the skirmish with the Nassurs, under "Solomon's Throne," had taken his sword in his left hand, plunged into the fight, and got severely wounded again. Another officer of the same brave tribe, Nourung Khan, Gundapoor, would allow nobody to dress his wounds till I came, when he requested, as a particular favour, that I would "put my finger into the hole in his head!" On inspection, however, I thought his brain had been laid open enough, and coaxed him to go to sleep.

On the 19th General Cortlandt brought over a native doctor from his regular regiments, who had had some English instruction; one or two Hukeems, skilled in the medicine of the country, came into camp from the neighbouring districts; and these were all the means we had of patching up our hospital for the onward march.

Let us now return to the "Blue Book:"

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT

"Noonar, June 21st, 1848.

"I have been unable to advance hitherto, owing to the entire lull of the south wind, and the consequent labour and delay occasioned to our troops in crossing the Chenab. Our camels and rear-guard have not yet come up, but will be all in camp by evening; and to-morrow morning it is my intention to march to Shoojabad. The interval has been employed in burying the killed, and attending to the wounded, of both sides.

"The loss in our camp proves, I am happy to say, to have been most trifling, only fifty-eight killed, and eighty-nine wounded. In the Nuwab's force, Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, estimated his loss at one hundred men, but I believe he had no regular muster. This would make a total of two hundred and forty-seven killed and wounded on our side, whereas there are between five hundred and six hundred of the enemy's dead alone left upon the field; and those who have come from Shoojabad, say the road is marked with dead bodies. A deserter from Mooltan says four hundred soldiers of Moolraj's Khas Pultun were killed; and that of the two companies of Goorkhas (who deserted Mr. Agnew) only seven men escaped alive.

"The enemy's total loss, therefore, cannot have been under one thousand; and the great discrepancy between theirs and ours is easily accounted for. Their guns played from a great distance on our men (who were posted in jungle) for eight hours; but when our guns came up, the enemy had (in the belief that there were none) approached

so close to us, that when we emerged from the thicket to meet their charge every discharge of grape took terrible effect.

"I under-rated the captured guns in my account of the action. We took eight, not six, out of ten guns; only two returned to Mooltan.

"The routed rebels never halted, I find, till they reached Mooltan, a distance of twenty-three koss; which was a good run for them, after a nine hours' fight under a June sun; not three thousand, out of seven thousand supposed to have been in the fight, mustered at Mooltan next day; and, doubtless, many went off to their homes. Others who took circuitous routes to avoid pursuit will, however, have joined again ere this; and it is the greatest pity in the world that we had no cavalry to follow them up with, in which case, few would have lived to give more trouble.

"The Nuwab's troops should have marched the day after the battle to Shoojabad, but I was unable to get them off till yesterday morning, when they only went three koss.

"Early yesterday morning, the Killadar of Shoojabad sent in his submission to me; and the chowdries, bankers, and chief Kuthrees (rebels to the back-bone, all of them) presented themselves, and begged for kind treatment. This I readily promised, though it is more than they deserve, for they have been supplying Moolraj largely with money, stores, and encouragement from the Shastres. The rebellion indeed is a Bunyah rebellion, with a Sikh insurrection grafted on to it. One Shroff alone of Shoojabad, a mean-looking

little fellow, undertook to furnish Dewan Moolraj with two months' pay for his army, if he would only send them against the Nuwab's troops, a circumstance which I shall not forget whenever we are pressed for cash. Such moneyed men are invaluable in these times.

"At first, I thought of sending some of my own Puthans to occupy the fort of Shoojabad, but reflecting that I am an intruder in this Doab, and that the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor undertook to conquer up to Mooltan, I thought it would be but right to put his troops forward, and let him have as much credit as possible. So I sent Peer Ibraheem Khan, along with Sirfiraz Khan, Lukkozye, of the Nuwab's army to take possession, which they did peaceably.

"I take this opportunity of reporting how constantly and fully Ibraheem Khan has kept me supplied with intelligence of the Nuwab's and Moolraj's army up to the latest moment; to which I am indebted entirely for having been apprized of the rebels' intended attack on the Daoodpotras, and having been enabled thus to defeat it. But I was not aware how much credit was due to him till I saw the Commander-in-Chief he has had to manage, and whose position at the head of the Nuwab's troops is a source of annoyance to every officer in them; I mean Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree.

"I am very sorry to be obliged myself, thus early, to report his extremely mischievous and unbecoming conduct since the action; but it is necessary that I should do so, in order that you may have an opportunity of judging whether his continuance in command is or is not likely to prevent

any cordial co-operation between our two forces in the most important part of the service which is now before us.

"In my despatch of the 18th of June, I remember (though I have no copy) saying as little as I could about the fact that the great body of the Daoodpotras were not engaged in the real struggle of the day, which commenced at three P.M. upon the left. I thought it invidious and unnecessary to detract from the merit of the Nuwab's troops; neither was I at that time fully aware how far the Daoodpotras had retired out of the hot fire, which had been directed on them all day, having been fully engaged in keeping my own line in its place. Certainly I never thought any blame to attach to them, nor do I now; and I was only glad that we had it in our power to save them from a reverse, which the best and bravest troops must sometimes meet with. At night, however, my men complained bitterly that the Nuwab's troops had followed in our rear, and appropriated all the guns which we had taken and left behind us, except the two last, which remained in our possession. I laughed the matter off, and said it mattered nothing who brought in the guns, or who took them, so that the enemy lost them, and the Maharajuh got them. To my surprise, however, I afterwards learnt that Futteh Muhommud Khan had no idea of making the said guns over to the Maharajuh, considering them as the lawful spoil of his master.

"On the morning of the 19th, therefore, when he called upon me at my tent, I took occasion to mention incidentally that all the captured guns had better be made over to General Cortlandt.

"I have not addressed the Nuwab on the subject, and indeed I feel quite sorry that so sincere and excellent a friend of our Government should endanger the good understanding subsisting between him and every British official by employing in so high a capacity an old man, whom extreme age has deprived of what little sense he may ever have possessed; one, too, who notoriously ruined his late master, Meer Roostum of Khyrpore, by exactly the same course of disingenuous and double-dealing with the British authorities. Peer Ibraheem Khan, a man of temper, and sense, can find no other epithet for Futteh Muhommud than *Ahmuck*! (Fool!) and says he changes his mind so often, that he is obliged to lie to appear consistent! This is not the sort of man to come in contact with straightforward and truth-loving Englishmen; and, for the good of the public service, I would suggest how materially it would tend to infuse good feeling into the united force before Mooltan, if this driveller could be withdrawn under cover of a khillut, and replaced by the Nuwab's eldest son, a man of whom all speak well, and wish to serve under."*

A curious incident in the history of this Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, is worth preserving. In his youth, the country between the Sutlej and Shoojabad was not attached to Mooltan, but Bhawulpoor; and there was friendship between Nuwab Bhawul Khan and the old Nuwab of Mooltan. When the latter went on pilgrimage to Mecca, he deputed the government to his eldest son, Sirfiraz Khan, who was tempted by a deserter from Bhawul Khan's service to make

*See "Blue Book," pp. 230, 1.

an unprovoked and treacherous attempt to seize the country in question, on the deserter's assurance that all the Daoodpotra troops were ready to come over. A most bloody battle ensued, almost on the same ground as that of Kineyree in 1848, and Sirfiraz Khan had the mortification of being driven back with heavy loss by the Daoodpotras, whose fidelity the deserter had so falsely impugned. That deserter was Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree, who fled next to the Court of Sindh; on the conquest of which province by Sir Charles Napier he was received back by his forgiving master, Bhawul Khan, and lived to command that Prince's army at Kineyree; so that Futteh Muhommud had the rare lot to see two pitched battles in one lifetime on the same plain, and fighting in each on different sides, experienced both defeat and victory.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Shoojabad, June 22nd, 1848.

"The rear and baggage cattle of this force having crossed the Chenab yesterday morning, and joined us at Noonar by the evening, we marched this morning from that place to Shoojabad, as did the troops of His Highness the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor from the intermediate village of Bukree; and the two armies, forming a united force of eighteen thousand men and thirty guns (including eight captured), are now encamped together.

"Such a force would present too formidable an obstacle for Moolraj to encounter in the field, even if his troops had not already been disheartened by the result of the battle of Kineyree; and though he has now been actually joined by

three hundred Sikhs of the Churunjeet cavalry regiment from Leia, he has given up all thoughts of contesting anything more than the fort and city of Mooltan, whose defences he is now busily engaged in strengthening.

"The night before last, hearing that the Nuwab's troops had not yet advanced to Shoojabad, a spark of hope revived in the Dewan's bosom, and he dispatched two hundred horsemen and two guns to re-occupy the Shoojabad fort, intending to reinforce them afterwards, and so delay our arrival before Mooltan. When, however, the detachment reached Adee Walluh Bagh, which is midway between Mooltan and this place, they heard of the surrender of the fort to Peer Ibraheem Khan and Sirfiraz Khan, and returned whence they came.

"Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, has now sent me word that Moolraj intends to send him to-night to me with a letter, the contents not mentioned, but they are sure not to be satisfactory. My intention is to forward the letter to you, giving only a verbal reply to Moostapha Khan, to the effect ordered by the Governor-General, viz., that if the Dewan wishes to surrender, it must be unconditionally. Moostapha Khan will probably not like to return to Moolraj with such an answer, having already fallen under suspicion, and will go off to Kummur Kote. He has, I fully believe, done his best to induce Moolraj to surrender.

"Ussud Khan, Nootkanee, has, many days since, fled to Bhawulpoor.

"Two or three Puthans, Khans of note, who had not been concerned in the fight of Kineyree, have come in since;

and though their submission is late, I have not rejected it. The breach between the Puthans and Moolraj has been much widened by the Kineyree disaster, which the Dewan persists in attributing to their treachery. He is so far correct that they showed none of that hot-headed gallantry for which their race is distinguished; and having no heart in the cause, left the brunt of the fighting to the Sikhs, who suffered, in consequence, out of all proportion.

"It is said that Moolraj indeed distrusts the whole force which fought on the 18th, and is not inclined to let them into the fort, but means to encamp them under its walls. So treated, they will probably melt rapidly away.

"In a few days, the task assigned to this army will be accomplished, and Moolraj and his rebels will be confined to the fort of Mooltan. But we all contemplate with regret the prospect of doing nothing for three months. We shall begin thinking of the heat, and get sick. The interval, I think, might be most profitably employed; and should my proposition be entertained, it will most likely obviate the necessity of a British army taking the field at all.

"I would suggest that the siege be commenced at once. We are enough of us in all conscience, and desire nothing better than to be honoured with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations. That brave and able officer is, I believe, at Lahore; and the guns and mortars are, doubtless, ere this at Ferozepoor, and only require to be put into boats, and floated down to Bhawulpoor. Lieutenant Lake, for whose arrival I am

daily looking, is also an engineer, so we should not want science: and every other material is at hand for bringing to a rapid and honourable conclusion the rebellion of Mooltan.

"At present, I may as well mention that, out of thirty guns, we have not one in camp that would make any impression on fortifications, so that we shall be reduced at once to policemen."*

I think it was at Shoojabad that I was joined by Mr. Quin, the soldier turned clerk, who wanted to turn soldier again. The reader will not have forgotten his volunteering to join me in Bunnoo, nor did I; and when the breaking out of the Mooltan rebellion threw so much work on my hands, I requested the Resident to let Mr. Quin come and help me. He arrived accordingly a few days after the battle of Kineyree, girt with an enormous sword, but accompanied with the smallest possible supply of stationery. The following note, which he addressed to me as soon as ever he reached his tent, will show that he was prepared to "make himself generally useful," but to fight by preference.

"CAPTAIN EDWARDES,

"ASSISTANT-RESIDENT.

"Sir,

"I hope you will appoint me to a post where I may fall in when we are engaged. I will only be in the way without

*See "Blue Book," pp. 223, 4.

one. I shall be honoured if you will permit me to be your own orderly, or anything you please.

"I am, Sir,

"Your most obedient servant,

"G. QUIN."

Now also I heard the welcome news of my friend Edward Lake's arrival at Bhawulpoor, after a fatiguing forced march at a time when he was in bad health, in the hope of joining us before the rebels could bring on an action. Failing in that, he proposed to rest a day or two at Bhawulpoor, to recover his baggage, and see Nuwab Bhawul Khan before he proceeded to take command of his army. After congratulating me on "the last victory," he added: "Don't fight any more battles, like a good fellow, till I join you. If there is any *immediate* prospect of work, I will not wait for my traps, and trust to you for board, bed, and shelter;" closing with a "P.S. Let me know if there is any *immediate* prospect of a fight, and I can join you in one night." This was indeed delightful news. Old Futteh Muhommud would be now put upon the shelf; I should get an able colleague in his stead, and many a weary hour would be wiled away in the society of one of my best and most accomplished friends.

During the three days we were detained at Shoojabad making permanent arrangements for our commissariat, General Cortlandt, who was never idle, employed himself in patching up the eight guns we had taken from the enemy, so that, if I remember right, we were able to bring some of them into the very next engagement.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, near Secunderabad,

"June 26th, 1848.

"Difficulties about making arrangements for supplies in future, detained us at Shoojabad till this morning; and I was at last obliged before marching to bind down the Hindoo Punches* of the districts around on both sides of the river in heavy penalties, to forward regular supplies into our camp. The Kuthree class are stanch adherents of Moolraj, and more so the nearer we approach Mooltan. The resources of the country however are now quite in our power, and after the first day or two I anticipate no scarcity whatever.

"I received your letter of the 19th of June on the evening of the 24th informing me of the dispatch of Lieutenant Lumsden to bring the steamer 'Satellite' up the Chenab, to co-operate with the army before Mooltan. The steamer will be of great service if kept plying between Ferozepoor and Bhawulpoor, and used in bringing up expeditiously military stores when required. I heard from Lieutenant Lake on the same subject yesterday morning. His letter is dated Bhawulpoor, June 24th, and he requests my opinion as to the best way of employing the steamer you have been so good as to place at our disposal. In my last letter to you

*The Punches in the Punjab, like their namesake in England, are very great authorities. They are the head men of towns and villages, through whom all business is conducted. In the Mooltan districts they were generally of the same caste as Moolraj, and nothing could exceed the virulence with which they shared in his rebellion. At Leia they collected revenue for him; at Shoojabad they lent him money; and at Jhung, though beyond his frontier, they cast him guns out of their own household utensils.

I suggested the propriety of commencing the siege of Mooltan at once, and applied for some heavy guns and mortar battery for that purpose, and Major Napier to direct our efforts. With a view to the request being conceded, therefore, I think the 'Satellite,' which is now at Bhawulpoor, instead of coming round by the Chenab, had better proceed on to Ferozepoor, to assist in conveying the heavy train; and I take the opportunity of requesting the favour of your ordering the Durbar to send General Cortlandt two hundred maunds of powder, and ten thousand cannon balls of two-and-a-half seers each (as a farther guide I may mention that the bore of General Cortlandt's guns is exactly the same as those belonging to Rajah Tej Sing). These munitions we require as soon as possible, whether the siege is to be prosecuted or merely a blockade. From Bhawulpoor, the train or stores should come by the land route, lately pursued by the Nuwab's army, as it is a great round to go south and enter the Chenab, to say nothing of possible delays in the latter river. But I have ordered wood to be stored on the Chenab banks in case of need.

"It is confidently said that Bhaee Maharaj Sing escaped from the death which so many of his followers met with in the Chenab, and after taking refuge with a Mukhtoom in a Khangah at Ooch, was safely conducted by him a few days ago to Mooltan, where his arrival has so far revived the spirits of the garrison, that Moolraj is determined to try his fortune once more in the field before taking himself to his fort.

"I did not believe this report at first, and can scarcely do so now; but it has reached me from so many quarters,

that it cannot be doubted that either the Bhaee has reappeared, or else some impostor who has assumed his name and character, which comes to much the same thing, for it is the name of a Gooroo which constitutes so powerful an appeal to the Sikh soldiers.

"One kossid, who has hitherto brought very correct information, startled me last evening with intelligence that Sirdar Shumsher Sing and his force had arrived at a place called Mehra, within twenty koss of Mooltan. It is not many days ago since you wrote me word that you had ordered all that force to halt at Chichawutnee; so that if the Sirdar is really at Mehra, it is against orders, and can bear but one construction. At such a moment it naturally occurs to me that Bhaee Maharaj Sing is the disciple and successor of Bhaee Beer Sing, who fell fighting on the side of Uttur Sing, Sindanwalluh (Shumsher Sing's uncle) in Heera Sing's time; and I remember, when Bhaee Maharaj Singh first began to be troublesome at Umritsir, Sirdar Shumsher Sing's name was freely used in connexion with his schemes, which we all attributed to the enmity of Rajah Tej Sing. This chain of circumstantial suspicions involuntarily links itself on to the report now alluded to; but everything I know and have seen of the Sirdar's character is against it, and I should be very sorry to find that I had been deceived in him. The mere existence of the rumour, however, is a useful warning, on no account, and under no aspect of affairs, however favourable, to allow the Sikhs at Chichawutnee to come an inch nearer to Mooltan; for as it is no secret that Dewan Moolraj has invited them to join him, the Sikh troops will show considerable forbearance if they only remain neutral.

"I have before reported to you Dewan Moolraj's intention to send Moostapha Khan, Khaghwanee, a second time as vakeel to my camp. Moostapha Khan arrived on the night of the 24th, and I received him yesterday. His message happily relieves me of whatever responsibility was involved in my former guarantee of a fair trial, even if it had not been forfeited at Kineyree, as I consider that it was. The Dewan persists in asserting his innocence, *but declines to stand his trial, and modestly offers to come in at once, if that form is dispensed with.* I have refused to give any answer, to prevent misconstruction, or to have anything more to do with the Dewan, further than forwarding to you anything he may please to write. Moostapha Khan, as I expected, declines taking back such a rebuff, and says he is very glad to have had the opportunity of getting away safe. He has, I think, behaved and deserved well throughout this affair. Of the risk he ran, we may judge by the news of this morning, that Moolraj has denounced the Puthans in a body, and declared it lawful to kill them wherever found. Sadik Muhommud Khan, who has returned to the south of the Chenab with the Maharajgurh force under Hakim Raee, will probably fall a victim to this proclamation.

"Dewan Moolraj's intentions are, I rather think, to keep his whole force as long out of the fort as he can for his own security, having lost all confidence in them, though the Sikhs have again renewed their vows on the Grunth. For this purpose he has ordered them to Sooruj Koond, three koss from Mooltan, where a nullah, thirty or forty feet wide, which crosses the road, presents an obstacle impassable without boats or pucka bridges. A heavy salute just fired proclaims, I expect, the occupation of this point

by the rebels. It is an able move, and will embarrass us much; but some resource will, of course, turn up. I do not know that we could desire better than another general action in the plain, especially if the Dewan keeps to his promise of heading the troops himself. Under all circumstances, I have written to tell Lieutenant Lake to lose no time in joining the Nuwab's army.

"When we arrived here this morning, the fort of Secunderabad, which is about a koss from camp, was occupied by a garrison of Moolraj's, and a sowar of ours had his horse wounded by a shot from the walls, which he too incautiously approached. I immediately detached six guns (four of the Nuwab's, and two of General Cortlandt's), two companies of regular infantry, as many irregulars, and three hundred cavalry, with orders to summon the garrison to surrender, and if not complied with instantly, to batter in the gate. The demonstration sufficed: the majority of the rebel sepoys absconded by a back door, and the rest surrendered. Much to their surprise, I gave the officers khilluts for their sensible conduct, and a good dinner to the sepoys, returning all their swords. The report of this treatment will shake the resolution, probably, of many soldiers now around Moolraj. Moostapha Khan informs me that the battle of Kineyree diminished his muster-roll (what with deaths and desertions) by upwards of twelve hundred. We have put our own garrison into the Secunderabad fort.

"Sheikh Emamoodeen and Jowahir Mull Dutt have both requested permission to join me. I have told the former to leave all his Sikhs in the district beyond Mylsee, and join me with all his Moossulmans, and the latter to

come down as far as Moozuffernuggur, on the west of the Chenab, nine koss from Mooltan, where I will give him further orders. These precautions I have taken, not so much in case of any further collision in the plain (for which they will not be in time), as to enable me to blockade Mooltan effectually.

"I forgot to report that want of money obliged me to ask the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor for a loan of forty thousand or fifty thousand rupees, which I did without hesitation, as he now holds so much of the Mooltan country. He has very kindly and courteously promised to send the money."*

The reader will remember that Emamoodeen and Jowahir Mull were leaders of two out of the four columns which the Resident tried so hard to persuade to converge upon Mooltan. When that plan was given up, and the blockade confided to my own and the Daoodpotra army, it would have been well if the other columns had been absolutely recalled, or distinctly appointed to other duties. But they remained in the field, watching the progress of the war, and no sooner heard of the defeat of the rebels at Kineyree, than they all made a loyal rush to join my army, and share, as they thought, in the conquest of Mooltan. Fortunately, all Jowahir Mull's Sikhs either went over to the enemy from Leia, or were recalled to Lahore for fear of doing so; and Sheikh Emamoodeen's Sikhs I myself shook off. Consequently the levies they brought up to me remained faithful during the war; but the fatal column of Rajah Sher Sing

*See "Blue Book," pp. 232—4.

there was no avoiding, for they came in spite of orders. The result lost the Punjab for ever to the Khalsa.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT

"Camp, Adee Walluh Bagh,

"June 27th, 1848.

"After writing to you yesterday, a continual stream of ill-tidings poured in upon us all day. The advance of Sirdar Shumsher Sing's force from Chichawutnee was confirmed, and Bhaee Maharaj Sing was stated to have been sent from Mooltan by Dewan Moolraj to bring them. The four guns of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's detachment, which you ordered off from Leia to Jhung, are said to have arrived at Raj Ghat to join Moolraj; and two companies of Colonel Tara Sing's regiment at Leia were positively stated to have reached Mooltan. Late in the evening, a letter came in from Lieutenant Taylor, giving a most unfavourable account of the state of the troops in Bunnoo, among whom conspiracy was at work, and the Colonel of the Sikh cavalry regiment had informed Lieutenant Taylor that his men intended to follow the example of their brethren in the Churunjeet corps at Leia. To crown the whole, there appeared too much reason to believe that many of the Nuwab's Daoodpotras had stolen back to their home since the battle of Kineyree, and that those who remain with us are by no means anxious for a second encounter.

"Such an accumulation of difficulties for a moment seemed to render any further advance impossible, for the energy, loyalty, and even success, of one converging column

would be but a waste of health and life, if all the others, instead of co-operating with their friends, were treacherously to go over to the enemy at the very crisis of the campaign. Retreat there would then be none; and we should reach Mooltan as fresh victims, instead of avengers of the past.

"Reflecting, however, that the treachery attributed to the Chichawutnee force, if really meditated, was not yet accomplished; that it might be arrested by our advance, but would certainly be hastened by our wavering; and that a second blow struck now at the rebels before they can be reinforced would drive them into the fort, and put us in a position to cut off all fresh comers; above all, remembering (as I do night and day) that the lives of all our officers in Bunnoo, Peshawur, and Huzaruh, depend on the speedy reduction of the rebellion to the smallest possible compass, and the complete humiliation of Moolraj in the public eye, I finally resolved to make not a single halt, but trust to the justice of our cause, and the Providence which defends the right.

"This morning, accordingly, we marched at day-break from Secunderabad, with all our cavalry in advance, the infantry and guns in the centre, and the baggage in the rear of all, prepared to dispute the bridge at this point of the main road to Mooltan, should the enemy have advanced from Sooruj Koond in the night. No opposition was however met with, and we have taken up a strong position on the banks of the canal nine koss from Mooltan.

"The news of this morning from that city is of a much more encouraging nature, and rather tends to show that Moolraj is under apprehensions from the Chichawutnee

force; but there is not a moment's reliance to be placed on any Sikh army whatever, and *I heartily wish Rajah Sher Sing and Sirdar Shumsher Sing, and all the Sings with them, were at this moment two hundred miles off, and that I was left alone to cope with Moolraj.* It is now too late however for regrets. All that can be done is to meet the evil boldly, and I have again urged Sheikh Emamoodeen to join me with all his Moossulmans, told Jowahir Mull Dutt to come down to Raj Ghat and block up that approach, summoned General Cortlandt's Poorbeeuh regiment, and two guns left behind at Dera Ghazee Khan, and hope to be able to seize Sooruj Koond ourselves to-morrow morning.

"I expect Lieutenant Lake will join us to-morrow. His presence with the Daoodpotras will strengthen my hands much, and I may as well mention that the Nuwab is sending up more men and military stores, so that if any of his militia have gone back without leave, their places will be filled up by new comers; and this sort of fluctuation must, I suppose, be expected in an army composed of vassals, and not regularly-paid soldiers."*

Lake rightly judged that many days could not pass over without another general action with Moolraj's army, for we were marching right up to their capital, and if they had any pride left they must turn out and dispute the plain once more before they took to walls. Two notes of his, written at this nervous juncture, are now before me. One says: "I am afraid of missing an engagement, so I shall hurry out without waiting for my traps, and I must trust to your

*See "Blue Book," pp. 234, 5.

hospitality even for a bed. Horses have been laid out for me from Bhawulpoor to Shoojabad; thence, to your head-quarters, you must kindly make arrangements both for a riding-horse and a small escort. A native horse and native saddle will answer every purpose."

Horses and escort were duly sent, and on June the 28th Lake started to ride from Bhawulpoor into my camp at one stretch, but was not well enough to accomplish the feat in that burning weather, and wrote as follows:

"My dear Edwardes,

"I tried very hard to get up to you this morning, but by the time I had reached Shoojabad the heat was so great, and the day so far advanced, that I have determined to halt and come on in the evening. *Mind you have a sumptuous entertainment ready for me—no end of iced hock and champagne.* I am sorry to hear that Sher Sing's force is likely to play us false. If we lick them when they are all united, there will be more honour and glory for us. Many thanks for the horses, and believe me.

"Ever yours affectionately,

"EDWARD LAKE.

"Herbert Edwardes, Esq.,
"Commanding the army of invasion,
"Mooltan."

A colleague who could thus crack jokes when he could not move was a very valuable acquisition, with the

thermometer at 120 degrees inside our tents; and when at last he arrived at dusk on the 28th, just as General Cortlandt and I were sitting down to dinner, I regretted very much that instead of iced champagne I had nothing but pump water to give him.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Sooruj Koond,

"June 30th, 1848.

"On the morning of the 28th, we advanced from Adee Walluh Bagh to this place, five koss of the most difficult country imaginable for troops, intersected as it is with broad, deep, and elevated nullahs, only passable by bridges. The most highly disciplined army could scarcely fail to be thrown by them into confusion; and I could not but marvel during the march, at the folly of Moolraj in not turning his local knowledge to account, and attacking us among these dykes.

"Sooruj Koond is between three and four koss from Mooltan; and about half a koss to the east of it, and across the Mooltan road, runs an immense nullah, thirty feet broad, between banks ten feet high.* The bridge over this was in possession of the enemy, who held it with four guns, and from one thousand to one thousand five hundred men. At our approach, they destroyed the bridge, but remained ensconced behind the furthest bank to act as an outlying picket, and convey intelligence of our movements to

*This is the canal marked in the map as Wullee Muhommud's. Pray, dear reader, keep the map before you.

Moolraj. We pitched our camp south of the village, just out of the range of these guns, and proceeded to consider on which side of Mooltan we should finally advance, and pitch our standing camp.

"It was reported on our arrival that Dewan Moolraj had determined to stand one more engagement in the plain before he betook himself to the walls of his fort; and as the soldiers refused to fight unless he headed them himself, it at first sight appeared a highly favourable opportunity of deciding the rebellion. The most suspicious reports also were in circulation as to the disposition of the Sikh force under Rajah Sher Sing, *which, according to orders, should have been at Tolumba, but was said to have arrived within a few koss of Mooltan.* Bhaee Maharaj Sing (it was added) had been deputed to go out, meet, and bring them in. Letters came in in the course of the day from the Rajah and other Sirdars commanding that force, and I sent the soldiers who brought them to eat a good dinner with General Cortlandt's Sikh orderlies, knowing that the result would be a disclosure of the real state of the Rajah's camp. I am sorry to say that the account thus obtained fully justified, though it did not confirm, all the details of the report we had heard. Artillery regiments and Jageerdaree horse were alike declared to be in favour of Moolraj, the very remarkable feeling among the Sikhs being this:

"'As a nation, we are found out; the cloak is withdrawn from our designs; things have been prematurely hurried on; and concealment is no longer possible. As soon as the Mooltan affair is settled, the Sikh army will certainly be reduced as unsafe, and we shall all be thrown

out of employ. Let us, therefore, prevent this rebellion from being settled. If Moolraj makes satisfactory arrangements with us, and will go all lengths for the religion, we will assist him; if he does not, we will not assist in reducing him. We will fire over the heads of his soldiers. If the Sirdars oppose us, we will tie their hands behind them, and send them to Moolraj.'

"Very similar reports reached us of the Sikh portion of Sheikh Emamoodeen's force; and it became apparent that the unhappy re-appearance of the Sikh Gooroo at Mooltan had revived the spirits of all the disaffected, who had not been actually involved in the defeat at Kineyree. While, therefore, Moolraj's own troops were depressed and unwilling to fight again, recruits were coming in with fresh courage from the Manjha, and overtures from every Sirkaree army except ours now converging against Mooltan. The question then arose—could we, by forcing the broad nullah in front of us, and advancing on Mooltan by the eastward, strike another and decisive blow at the rebels before things grew worse, and they are reinforced by desertion from Sher Sing's army and the Sheikh's?

"Lieutenant Lake (who joined us the day before yesterday, having ridden in from Bhawulpoor in expectation of a battle), General Cortlandt, and some of my Puthan officers, were of opinion that we should secure an immediate engagement by crossing the nullah; but the majority argued that, if Moolraj was anxious for a fight, he would not have destroyed the only bridge at which we could cross; that, until reinforced by very large desertions, he was so numerically inferior as to be unable to run so great a risk; that all his

anxiety was to prevent our crossing the nullah; that if we effected the passage he would immediately retreat into Mooltan, and we should be committed, as it were, to take up our stand on the worst side of Mooltan, where there is no ground suitable for a camp, and no grass for the cavalry. These arguments seemed to me good, and were coincided in also by both Lieutenant Lake and General Cortlandt, so that we finally resolved not to attempt to cross the nullah, but make for Abid-Khan-ke-Bagh, directly west of the city of Mooltan, and there take up a permanent position, which should command Raj Ghat, and all our relations with the Sindh Sagur Doab and territories Trans-Indus.

"Sheikh Emamoodeen's force had arrived within twelve koss of us, and was too weak to be left any longer alone; so we halted yesterday to allow them to come up, and they reached Bhawulpoor, a village about four koss to the south of us, that same morning. Unfortunately, their line of march had brought them to Moolraj's side of the nullah instead of ours; and it was necessary to take immediate steps to extricate them from their dangerous proximity to the rebels, five koss from Mooltan, with nothing between them and the enemy, and a wide nullah cutting them off from their friends. I sent a strong party immediately to raise the villagers, and construct a bridge for the Sheikh's passage; but about five P.M. our spies reported that Moolraj's troops were moving down the east side of the nullah towards Bhawulpoor. Great was our anxiety, and I thought it necessary to send two regiments under General Cortlandt to the Sheikh's assistance. The night came on stormy and dark; the detachment lost their way, and wandered about the jungle till daylight, when they found that the bridge had

been completed in sufficient time to allow the Sheikh's troops to cross over before nightfall, and all parties came safely into camp at Sooruj Koond this morning. The rebels finding the birds flown, returned to Mooltan.

"To-morrow morning we intend to go half way to Abid-Khan-ke-Bagh; and there are rumours of the Dewan fighting us, the Sikh Gooroo having fixed to-morrow as an auspicious day."*

The rumour proved more correct than the Gooroo's augury. Next day was fought, and won, the battle of Suddoosam. Night closed upon the field, and I had only time to assure the Resident by a line or two that the victory was ours.

LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss south-west
"of Mooltan,
"July 2nd, 1848.

"My hasty note of yesterday evening will have gratified you with the intelligence of the battle of Suddoosam; the second general action, and second victory, which this force has fought and gained within a fortnight. I now proceed to give you the details.

"Sheikh Emamoodeen's division having joined us on the 30th of June, we marched on the 1st of July (yesterday) to this place, which is about three koss. To make a longer march was not possible, for we had heard that the Sikh

*See "Blue Book," pp. 236—8.

Gooroo, with great forms and ceremonies, had consulted the stars, and fixed yesterday as the happy day, when Dewan Moolraj would be invincible. Inspired with this assurance, Moolraj resolved to fight, and laid his plan to come down to the bridge at Sooruj Koond, and play his guns from behind the high banks of the nullah on our camp. Knowing that if he did so, we should be unable to get at him from want of bridges, and that if a gun was fired on us it would look ill to decline an engagement, we resolved to strike our camp, and march with the first dawn three or four koss nearer to Mooltan, on the west of the nullah, and by thus threatening the city, prevent the rebels from attacking us in rear.

"This plan was pursued, and the whole of our infantry and artillery, under command of General Cortlandt, in order of battle, marched to Tibbee yesterday morning; the baggage of the army being in the centre, behind the infantry, and Lieutenant Lake and I bringing up the rear, with all the cavalry. The expected attack from the Sooruj Koond bridge did not take place, and when, at eleven A.M., we reached Tibbee with the rear-guard, the van had received intelligence that Moolraj no sooner had comprehended our move, than he changed his own, recalled his troops from the Sooruj Koond bridge, and marching them parallel with us on the other side of the nullah, concealed by the banks, crossed the water at a masonry bridge in front of the city of Mooltan, and emerged on the plain a koss and a half in front of us.

"At first, we could scarcely believe that the rebels intended to force on a battle at mid-day, after their morning's

manœuvres, and thought they would merely take up such a position as to prevent our approaching too closely to Mooltan. But messenger after messenger brought in word that they were advancing in line, and at last our pickets retired, with the news that they were close at hand. This was at noon.

"We beat to arms, turned out, formed line, and advanced to meet them in the following order: the Daoodpotra force on the right, commanded by Lieutenant Lake; Soobhan Khan's Moossulman regiment, the Sooruj Mookhee regiment, and General Cortlandt's ten guns, in the centre, commanded by the General; my own Puthan infantry levies, on the left centre, flanked by my Puthan cavalry; and on the left of all Sheikh Emamoodeen's troops, of whose fidelity I was doubtful, and whom I determined to watch closely.

"Lieutenant Lake, seeing some high mounds (the ruins of an old canal) in front of him, with great judgment hurried on, and took possession of them with his Daoodpotras, planting his guns securely behind this natural intrenchment, and from this commanding position commenced the action by a heavy fire on the enemy's left, which was as heavily returned, but was rendered harmless by the protection of the ground.

"The Daoodpotras had been engaged about a quarter of an hour, when the centre and left overtook them, and drew off the enemy's fire. The battle then became general; General Cortlandt's artillery in the centre, that of the Daoodpotras on the right, and Sheikh Emamoodeen's two guns, being all brought to bear upon the enemy, who selected

his ground at the village of Suddoosam, with that defensive cunning for which Sikh soldiers are renowned; planting almost the whole line under jungle cover, and the artillery strongly ensconced in mud villages and date-tree groves. A pause and severe artillery struggle ensued, during which the infantry of both sides lay down behind ditches in line.

"The enemy are variously stated to have had seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve guns, but the best accounts say ten. It was impossible, therefore, for them long to sustain the superior fire of twenty-two, which were brought into action on our side; though justice requires me to pay the tribute of admiration to the obstinacy with which Mooraj's Sikh artillery-men stood their ground. Once moved, the day was ours; for the native army that retires is lost. Proximity to the city however, and the knowledge that they could always take refuge there, added to the desperate courage which Bhaee Maharaj Sing's solemn blessings and promises of victory had inspired in the rebel army: and the rest of the action was a series of struggles in which the rebels were driven back from village to village, grove to grove; and their total rout was much delayed by the nullahs and ditches with which the ground was intersected, the bridges and fords of which were known to the enemy, but not to us. Sheikh Emamoodeen's two guns were thus put *hors-de-combat* very early in the day,*

*These two guns were part of a troop of which the other four were with Rajah Sher Sing, and I had great misgivings as to the fidelity of the gunners. I found the Sheikh manfully urging them to advance, but in vain. On my ordering them to ride out and open on the enemy, they lashed their horses into a gallop, and I thought they had gone over to the rebels, but they wheeled round at last, and opened in a very good

and the Daoodpotras were unable, until very late, to extricate their artillery again from the banks of the canal which they first occupied, so that during the greater part of the day the artillery on both sides was equal.

"At last, Dewan Moolraj, who commanded in person, and who is said to have got a fall from his elephant by a shot catching the howdah, mounted his horse, and retreated precipitately from the field, carrying with him all the guns but two, which remained to mask the movement, and were most desperately served. The Sooruj Mookhee regiment of infantry finally decided the day, by a most brilliant charge against these two guns, which they captured in a style which British troops alone could excel. They were led on by Mr. Quin, my writer, a young man, but old soldier, whose conspicuous bravery deserves special notice. A rush of the whole infantry and cavalry followed, and the broken enemy fled from the hard-fought field in irrecoverable disorder.

"Almost under the walls of Mooltan I halted our fatigued troops, and the failing daylight not permitting us to ascertain whether we were under the fire of the fort or not, I thought it best to return to our own camp.

"The highest estimate of the rebel numbers does not make them above twelve thousand, and I scarcely think they were eleven thousand, though they left hardly any men in the fort, and have been reinforced by large desertions

position. There I left them for about half an hour, and returning found they had run both guns into a water-course, and jammed them hard and fast. At a later period of the rebellion, when the rest of the troop went over with Sher Sing, these showed signs of joining them, and Sheikh Emamoodeen was obliged to seize the guns, and make the gunners prisoners.

during the last three days from the forces of Sheikh Emamoodeen and Rajah Sher Sing; but the majority of Moolraj's troops are old soldiers, many deserters, who fight with halters round their necks, and two-thirds Sikh and Hindoo fanatics, to whom it has become a war of faith to uphold the Khalsa and their Kuthree master. The desperation, therefore, with which they fought, more than counterbalanced the difference of numbers, and I attribute our victory entirely to each division of our line being led and sustained by European officers. Lieutenant Lake will himself give you an account of the share taken in the battle by the Daoodpotras, but it is for me to inform you how much their good service was due to the judgment with which he took up their successive positions, and the confidence which they could not but imbibe from witnessing his personal intrepidity under the hottest fire. To him and General Cortlandt your warmest praise is due. The latter maintained a solid and unshaken centre throughout the day, and handled his regular regiments and artillery like a good soldier and brave man. Sheikh Emamoodeen's troops were hardly engaged at all, though his return shows a list of eighty-one killed and wounded. Several of the Puthan Chiefs made dashing charges against Moolraj's cavalry whenever they showed themselves; amongst them I could distinguish Gholam Surwur Khan, Khaghwanee, who killed several Sikhs with his own hand, and was shot through both bones of his right arm in the midst of the enemy's line. To Foujdar Khan, Alizye, who has throughout these operations acted as my Adjutant-General, and who, in spite of a severe sword wound received at Kineyree on the 18th of June, took command of the cavalry yesterday at Suddoosam, and directed their movements, I feel under the greatest obligation,

and at some future time shall lay his services more particularly before you.*

"We lost some few Puthans of note: Futteh Khan, of Khyssore, Hussun Khan, Moosehzye, and Ruheem Khan, Khoodukka, a relation of the Nuwab of Dera, all brave men, who will be remembered on this frontier with regret.

"In Lieutenant Lake's force, Captain Macpherson, of His Highness the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor's service, fell at the head of his regiment, and we buried him this morning with military honours.

"The total of killed and wounded in the whole force is two hundred and eighty-one.

"The enemy are said to have suffered very heavy loss, increased by a cruel and treacherous act of the Dewan's. Between the field and the city runs the same large nullah on which we were encamped at Sooruj Koond; and there is but one bridge at that part of it which is nearest Suddoosam. No sooner had Moolraj got across this bridge himself with his artillery, than he planted two guns on it to stop his own soldiers from retreating. The majority of the enraged fugitives forced the barrier with some loss, but many of them tried to swim the nullah, and were drowned. Hundreds never re-entered Mooltan, but struck off into the country, and have gone probably to their homes. Of four hundred Goorkhas (who deserted our officers), only one hundred

*An accompanying plate gives capital likenesses of these two gallant fellows, in the costume of their race. Gholam Surwur is supposed to be showing his broken arm to his friend Foujdar.



FOUJDAR KHAN BUHADOOR
(Alizye)
A Mooltanee Puthan

GHOLAM SURWUR KHAN
(Khagwanee)
A Mooltanee Puthan

and fifty answered to their names again at Mooltan. Moolraj's courage, however, seems to remain unbroken. This morning, he mustered his soldiers, invited them to go out with him again to fight, and a poor parade was got up, when the kettle-drums of our cavalry (who in a body swept round the country this morning to reconnoitre) were heard approaching the city, and the soldiers left their ranks in confusion. Baffled, but not disheartened, Moolraj is said to have again consulted the stars, and fixed another "auspicious day" for to-morrow. It remains to be seen whether he can induce his army to come out.

"Peer Buksh, Adawlutee, the worst and most influential adviser of Moolraj, received a severe sword-cut across the back while flying from Suddoosam, from the hand of one of his own men, a Sikh, who declared that Peer Buksh had sold the day to the Sahib log.* This incident, and Moolraj's firing on this own troops at the bridge, gives a very fair idea of the dissension and distrust which pervades the rebel army. They are, indeed, only held together by the fanatic cry of "Dhurum,"† so artfully introduced into the contest. Unfortunately, experience proves that it is the strongest tie by which natives can be bound."‡

The following gives a fuller account of the operations on the right:

*Native armies are never *defeated*, by their own account. They are always *sold!*

†Dhurum means religion generally, but practically the religion of the Hindoos.

‡See "Blue Book," pp. 239—42.

"LIEUTENANT LAKE TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss from Mooltan,

"July 2nd, 1848.

"Nuwab Bhawul Khan's army yesterday took part in an engagement fought against the rebel troops, headed by Dewan Moolraj in person.

"At twelve o'clock, it was reported that the enemy was marching in force against us, and that our pickets had been driven in. We immediately moved to their support, and fell into position. I directed the Nuwab's troops to occupy some high ground on the right of our line, which not only afforded them the advantage of cover, but enabled their guns to fire from a considerable elevation down into the plain. This was a matter of no small importance, in a country abounding with brushwood, behind which the enemy were seen with difficulty.

"The action was commenced by the Bhawulpoor artillery, who opened a steady and well-directed fire on Moolraj's advancing line. This fire was continued, until Lieutenant Edwardes had advanced to some distance beyond my position. The Daoodpotras and regular infantry then came forward, and engaged with the enemy's left, in support of Lieutenant Edwardes, who had attacked the enemy's right and centre. The Dewan's left had occupied a small village, under the cover of which they served their guns, and from which I found it was impossible to dislodge them without the assistance of artillery. Unfortunately, some delay occurred in bringing up the guns. At length, however, their arrival enabled me to drive the enemy out

of this position, and to bring a heavy fire upon the last point at which he seemed inclined to make a stand. Shortly afterwards, a brilliant charge, made by General Cortlandt's regiments, fairly drove the rebels back, and they fled in great confusion. The battle was severely contested to the last.

"All branches of the Bhawulpoor army behaved well. The infantry advanced steadily from point to point, and were never beaten back, although at times the heavy fire of the enemy forced them to halt; the artillery served their guns admirably; and the cavalry checked a body of Sikh horse, who had been sent to outflank our position.

"Peer Ibraheem Khan, the Government Agent, was present during the whole of the action, and was of great service in bringing up the guns which had delayed coming up in support of the infantry.

"I annex a return of killed and wounded; among the former, I regret to say, are Shah Muhommud Khan, a Daoodpotra of some distinction, and Captain Macpherson, the Commandant of one of the Nuwab's regular regiments."*

In the above despatch Lake good-naturedly suppresses his venerable colleague the Daoodpotra General; but remembering his deeds at Kineyree, I was curious to know how he had distinguished himself at Suddoosam; and heard without much surprise that Futteh Muhommud was

*See "Blue Book," p. 242.

invisible until all was over, when he gallopped violently to the front, and embracing Lake, exclaimed: "What a fight we have had! What a victory we have won!"

The Daoodpotras had an amusing custom, after every fight, of demanding a certificate of their gallant bearing, that they might send it to their master the Nuwab. This they called their "Receipt!"—a word which they had probably picked up from the European officers in the Bhawulpoor service. No sooner was the field of Suddoosam won, than poor Lake found himself surrounded by wild warriors, brandishing bloody swords, or baring bloodier wounds, and all screaming furiously: "A receipt! a receipt! a receipt!—look here, and give me my receipt!" To Europeans this may seem inconsistent with true valour; but it was not. When under Lake's able leading, they got fair play, the Daoodpotras, however rude, showed themselves a martial and courageous race. Their eagerness for a "receipt" proves merely how they feared their Khan, and how entirely he has subjugated their liberties to his will and pleasure.

Nothing could well be more different than the battles of Kineyree and Suddoosam.

The battle of Kineyree was for a long while one of endurance; that of Suddoosam, though it lasted from noon till sunset, was one of incessant action. In the former, it was my painful duty to keep still and quiet my men; in the latter, I did nothing but ride up and down the line, encouraging the different divisions to advance from point to point; now driving skulkers out of a village or a corn-field; now reproving a standard-bearer for letting other colours go

ahead of him; now hurriedly thanking Cortlandt for pointing his own guns; now dashing off to keep an eye on Sheikh Emamoodeen. The equestrian vicissitudes I underwent that day are truly ludicrous to remember, though very serious matters at the moment. I commenced the action on a big chestnut Arab, named Zal; but, sulky at being so long without his dinner, he refused to leap a canal, which had brought the artillery to a halt, and fell with me right into the middle. Nor with all my pulling and hauling could I get him out, and I was obliged to leave him till the fight was over. General Cortlandt then got me a bay horse from an officer in his artillery; but I had not gone two hundred yards when over he came backwards, and bruised me dreadfully on the ground. A shot had grazed his nose. Fat Sadik Muhommud Khan, Badozye, who was my aide-de-camp all that day, next put me on a grey belonging to one of his own followers; and this beast I had fairly ridden to a stand-still, when up came one of my *syces* (native grooms) with a grey Cabul horse of my own, called Punch. "What are you doing here?" I asked, for I had mounted Lake on this horse in the morning. "Lake, Sahib, has sent it with his compliments, as he hears you have lost Zal, and he has borrowed another horse for himself!" So I finished the day upon Punch; and when the fight was over I thanked Lake for the timely thought. Lake burst out laughing, and said: "I send the horse back? Never. That villain of a syce walked off with it, and left me without any horse at all!"

I have mentioned Sadik Muhommud Khan, Badozye. He was a servant of the Maharajuh's, appointed to do duty with the Nazim of Mooltan; and when the rebellion broke

out, was drawing pay from both: one hundred rupees a-month from the Crown, and sixty rupees a-month from Moolraj. Moolraj expected him to side with him; but though unable to escape, on account of his house and family, he refused to set his seal to the oath of rebellion in the Koran; and the very day that I arrived before Mooltan, Sadik and his father took their hawks on their wrists, and under pretence of hunting, issued forth from the city and joined me. It is an incident illustrative of those strange, uncertain times, that two days afterwards he was my faithful henchman at Suddoosam, and being well mounted, was often the only man left by my side. Had he been a traitor, he might have killed me at any moment. But I had heard his story, believed it, trusted him, and was rewarded by invaluable service throughout the rest of the rebellion. Yet it was as hard to trust in those days as it was necessary. The very moment before this battle of Suddoosam, I was dipping my head into a pail of water, preparatory to putting on a thick turban, so as to keep my brains cool as long as possible in the sun, when Sadik Muhommud's own uncle insisted on speaking to me.

Lifting my dripping head out of the pail, I listened to the old man's solemn warnings to be on my guard; "for," said he, "all these men, like my nephew, who have come over from the enemy, are here by Moolraj's order and consent. You are drawn into a trap. Half your soldiers are friends, and half are foes; and like rice and split peas, they are all mixed up in one dish. If there is not some treachery in this day's fight, my name is not Surbulund Khan."

The idea was not pleasant, and I soused my head under water again desperately, but soon came up, wrung out the

water, clapped a turban over my wet hair, and thanked the old gentleman for his information, which was too late to be useful, mounted my horse, and never found out any of the traitors from that day to this.

At the conclusion of my despatch of the 2nd of July, I reported to the Resident that Moolraj had again consulted the stars, and been told that to-morrow (the 3rd) would be an auspicious day on which to fight again. The 3rd came, but Moolraj's battalions were in no condition to avail themselves of the augury. The stars had fallen much in their estimation since the battle of Suddoosam, and Bhaee Maharaj, the Sikh Prophet who had promised them victory, kept close within his tower.

Moolraj himself no longer dared to sleep in his garden-house, but retired within the fort at sunset. The dispirited rebel troops collected their dead comrades from the field, and dragged out those who had been drowned in the retreat, then burnt or buried them. Among the slain was the Adjutant of the traitor Goorkha regiment that had deserted Agnew; and his wife, more faithful than he, was burnt upon his funeral pile.

Engaged in these mournful ceremonies, it was evident that the rebel army had for the present resigned all pretensions to the plain; and the pains they took to fortify the bridge over the canal with guns and camel-swivels, showed that they expected soon to be followed into their stronghold. In short, both Moolraj and his garrison were so thoroughly discouraged that I again sat down to urge on the Resident at Lahore the policy of "taking fortune at the flood," and besieging Mooltan at once.

I was in the very act of writing, when a horseman rode in from the picket, and reported that Moolraj's army were crossing the bridge in the same order that they had done before, and were coming on again to give us battle. Astounded, but unable to disbelieve, I beat to arms, summoned the chief officers, ordered the line to be turned out at once, and was holding a hurried conference with Lake and Cortlandt in my tent, while all three of us were jumping into boots, or buckling on swords and pistols, when a second horseman from the picket entered. I had just loaded my pistols, and went on cramming them into my belt while listening to the man's report. The hammer of one got entangled, but, without looking to see what was the matter, I seized the barrel in my right hand, and pulled the pistol into its place. A loud report, a short pang, and I had lost the use of my right hand for life! The ball had passed through the palm, and lodged in the floor at my foot. But there was no time for regrets.

The line had turned out, and Lake rushed to the field to take my duty and his own. Nobly he would have done both; but I must own it was a great relief to me to hear that as our line advanced the enemy retreated again behind the city walls, and proved to have been only a party of cavalry sent out to reconnoitre our position. Had Moolraj given us battle that day, the result must have been more doubtful than it had ever been before. All Lake's attention and guidance was demanded by his own undisciplined Daoodpotras. He had had no time to become acquainted with my men, or they with him; and the accident which had happened at such a critical moment to their customary leader would have been an omen of certain defeat to their

superstitious minds. Even as it was, the occurrence was unfortunate; for while it prevented me from being surrounded by my officers, as I was wont to be all day, and confined me like a prisoner to my bed; in Moolraj's hall of audience it was a subject of loud rejoicing and congratulation. At first I was reported dead, and Moolraj made a present to the messenger who brought the news; burying me with the decent remark, that I was "a stout youth, and it was a pity I should be cut off so young!" On hearing that I had only lost my hand, he probably took the present back again, and thrashed the messenger.

After this accident I was twelve days without a doctor; at least a European one. The native doctor of General Cortlandt's troops sewed up my hand with a packing-needle, and thought he had done a fine thing; but the agony it caused me I never can forget; for what with the laceration of the wound, the tightness of the stitches, and the intense heat of the sun, inflammation ensued, the hand swelled, the stitches grew tighter, and the pain greater, till at last I would have thanked either Lake or Cortlandt, if, instead of nursing me, they had drawn a sword and chopped the limb clean off. One day too, a sympathizing friend in the Indian navy came in to see me, and, intending to seat himself on my bed, sat down on my wounded hand which was stretched out on a pillow by my side, and then asked me—"How I did?"

At last Dr. Cole arrived from Lahore, cut the stitches, and relieved me of all pain in a moment; though it was many weeks before I could even put my hand in a sling; and in spite of all that surgical skill could do I shall never

grasp a sword again.* To a soldier, this is a great loss. On horseback, in subsequent engagements, I have felt quite defenceless; and though it seldom falls to a Commander's lot to be personally engaged, yet it may so happen at any time; and it is not pleasant to know to a certainty beforehand that you have no chance of escape.

In waiting so long for Dr. Cole's arrival, I was only sharing the fortunes of my men. To the wounded of Kineyree were now added the wounded of Suddoosam; and it was a dreadful sight to see them palliating mortal wounds with herbs and simples, or aggravating them with the prescriptions of their ignorant Hukeems. Some instances of their treatment will scarcely be believed, but were gravely persisted in in the face of all remonstrance. If a man's arm was carried off at the elbow, he was made by his "medical adviser" to plunge the stump into a cauldron of hot oil, salt, and blue stone; whereby the flesh shrivelled up like the end of a leg of mutton. Even after Dr. Cole's arrival it was very difficult to induce the wounded to discard their own barbarous surgeons; for they would undergo any sufferings rather than have a limb cut off; and they had heard that English surgeons always amputated, and never attempted to heal a wounded limb. Dr. Cole tried very hard to persuade one man to have his leg off; but he said: "That was a poor cure; there was a fletcher in Mooltan, who could splice his leg with the bone of a goat as neat as

*The consequences of this accident were aggravated by the discovery that I was not entitled to the poor compensation of a pension, "from the wound not having been received in action;" but the Directors of the Honourable East India Company, though unable to break through the regulations, honoured me with "a special grant of one hundred pounds a-year, with reference to my eminent services."

could be." And sure enough the maker of bows and arrows was bribed to come out from Mooltan, and undertook the case with the utmost confidence. Having killed a goat, he extracted the bone of its leg; then laid open the man's thigh, cut out the broken bones, measured off an equal length of the goat's, fitted it in, covered it up, and bound all tightly round with wet sinews as if he had been mending a splintered bow. The patient was dead forty-eight hours afterwards, but nobody blamed the joiner; all shook their heads, and said: "Wonderful! There is no controlling a man's destiny!"

Of all the wounded in my force, the one who caused me the liveliest sorrow was Gholam Surwur Khan, Khagh-wanee. This noble officer had not the rare ability of his friend Foujdar Khan in either camp or council; but for grandeur of stature, personal strength, skill as a swordsman, and reckless bravery in the field, he had no equal among thousands of brave men; and might well be called the Pride of the Border. Yet I have already recorded the close of his active career as a soldier. When our guns at Suddoosam were brought up by the canal, Moolraj's infantry on the right were emboldened to come out, and taunt our cavalry on the left. Surwur Khan called on his fifty men to follow him, and leaping over the canal charged into the foremost body, and drove them back upon their line. He was in the act of cutting down one of the last, when the foot soldier raised his musket, and shot Surwur Khan through the right arm, breaking both bones, and rendering it useless for life. To this case I particularly drew Dr. Cole's attention, and he was of opinion that amputation alone could save Surwur's life; yet he positively refused to lose his good sword arm,

saying that without it, he might as well be dead. "There was a wise man at Ooch," he said, "who would mend his arm with a goat's bone, so that nobody could tell the difference;" and he set out in a dying state. An iron constitution, and implicit faith, carried him through; and though the wound was still open when I saw him last, and the arm hanging uselessly by his side, yet Surwur was quite well, and told me with a hearty laugh that when I returned from England, he would be quite able to wield his sword again. I need not add that in this case, the sage of Ooch dispensed with the experiment of the goat's bone; but doubtless he considers that he established his superiority over the European Doctor Sahib.

Ultimately, however, the wounded men found out that amputation was not the whole of English surgery, and Dr. Cole got plenty to do, and did it well. Young, active, eminently skilful, and enthusiastically fond of his profession, he humanely and bravely laboured to alleviate the horrors of a protracted siege, and was rewarded with the gratitude of hundreds of friends and foes, whose limbs or lives he had saved. His good name followed him into the days of peace; and I have known a sick man travel a hundred miles in excruciating torture to put himself under his care. Among epic poets, why is there none found to sing the victories of medicine over ignorance and prejudice? Among Christian missionaries in barbarous lands why do so few go forth in the persuasive character of the Good Physician?

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII

The following public acknowledgements and marks of approbation, received after the battles of Kineyree and Suddoosam, are too highly and gratefully prized by me to be excluded from this record of the campaign; but are collected in the form of an Appendix, to interrupt as little as possible the thread of the narrative.

"FROM THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT H. B. "EDWARDES, ASSISTANT-RESIDENT

"Lahore, June 22nd, 1848.

"Sir,

1. "I have received this morning with the greatest satisfaction and happiness your letter of the 18th instant, written on the field of victory, so gallantly achieved over the army of the rebel Dewan Moolraj by the united forces under yourself and General Cortlandt, and of our faithful ally Nuwab Bhawul Khan.

2. "I can only now tender to yourself and to your brave comrades my sincere thanks, and the tribute of my grateful admiration of your skill, zeal, and valour.

3. "I feel satisfied that your conduct and that of all concerned, will meet the approbation and praise of the Government of India.

4. "I have forwarded a copy of your letter to the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, by express this day, and I send for your

information an extract of my letter to the Secretary to Government on the occasion.

5. "I have caused a royal salute to be fired by the Durbar from the fort, and have made them issue orders for similar salutes from the fortresses of Govindgurh, and Attock, and the cantonments of Huzaruh, Peshawur, Bunnoo, and Dera Ishmael Khan. I have also directed Maharajuh Goolab Sing to fire a royal salute at Cachmere.

6. "I look with anxiety to your next letter giving further particulars, with the account of loss on both sides, and the subsequent conduct of the rebel army.

7. "It is not to be expected, after the rough handling they got from you, notwithstanding the disadvantageous circumstances under which Bhawul Khan's force was attacked, that they will again meet you in the plain, now that you have your forces united together.

8. "You must give my message, as contained in par. 2, to the officers who were engaged with you. I shall address the Nuwab and the individuals you may point out, after the receipt of your next despatch."

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO THE SECRETARY TO THE
"GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

"Lahore, June 22nd, 1848.

"The Governor-General in Council will, I am sure, consider the zealous and judicious arrangements of Lieutenant Edwardes, for forming the desired junction with Nuwab Bhawul Khan's army, as deserving his Lordship's entire approbation, and the energy, skill, and courage displayed by him in the operations of the 18th of June as entitling him to the highest praise of the Government of India.

"The native agent, Peer Ibraheem Khan, writing from another part of the field, by the same messenger that brought Lieutenant Edwardes's letter, confirms his statement in every particular, and dwells much on the intrepidity and judgment evinced by that officer.

"The troops of Bhawul Khan have also done excellent service, and I shall not fail at a fitting time to claim, for the Nuwab and his army, the favourable consideration of the Governor-General in Council.

"The defeat of the enemy seems to have been complete; he showed more enterprise than I gave him credit for, in marching from his position to prevent the junction of Lieutenant Edwardes's force with that of Bhawul Khan, and in attacking the latter while moving to cover the passage of Lieutenant Edwardes over the Chenab. The best disciplined native army is never attacked to so great advantage as when on the line of march.

"The attack seems to have been well designed, and well executed. The mode in which it was received, the long period for which it was sustained till reinforcements arrived late in the day, and the subsequent advance, with its results, are not unworthy of the glorious anniversary on which the fight took place and the victory was won."*

*"Blue Book," pp. 219, 20.

"THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE "RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Fort William, July 8th, 1848.

"The account of the successful action fought by Lieutenant Edwardes and the troops of the Nuwab Bhawul Khan, against the rebel force of Dewan Moolraj, on the 18th of June, has afforded the highest satisfaction to the Governor-General in Council; and his Lordship in Council desires me to convey to you, and to request that you will communicate to Lieutenant Edwardes, the cordial expression of the approbation with which the Government of India have regarded his proceedings; their recognition of the foresight and skill by which he effected a junction with the Nuwab's troops; and their high sense of the steady gallantry by which he made good his opportunity, and achieved the important success which merits these thanks.

"His Lordship in Council desires also that his acknowledgements of their services may be made to General Cortlandt, and to the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, and to all the troops engaged in the action at Kineyree."*

Sir Frederick Currie had forwarded a copy of my despatch of the 18th of June to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with this remark:

"I have no doubt that your Lordship will be gratified at Lieutenant Edwardes's gallant conduct and success, especially as, if I remember right, this officer was brought by your Lordship to the notice of Lord Hardinge after the battle of Moodkee, where he was wounded, and was at your recommendation placed by Lord Hardinge in his present appointment."

To which Lord Gough replied as follows:

* "Blue Book," page 246.

"HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD GOUGH,
"G.C.B., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA, TO THE
"HONOURABLE SIR F. CURRIE, BART.

"Simla, June 27th, 1848.

* * * * * *

"I received yesterday a copy of Lieutenant Edwardes's letter to your address of the 18th instant; and I beg to congratulate you very warmly on the complete success of all your combinations, which have led to the very important victory gained by Lieutenant Edwardes on the 18th of June—a victory that does so much credit to all employed, especially to Lieutenant Edwardes.

"I feel doubly interested in the career of this officer, who served with so great satisfaction to me upon my personal staff; and the sacrifice I made in giving him up is amply compensated for by the benefit the public service has derived from his ability, energy, and self-devotedness."*

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT EDWARDES.

"Lahore, July 10th, 1848.

"It falls to the lot of few men to have the opportunity of rendering such brilliant and useful service to their country as you have been enabled to perform; and the gallantry, energy, skill, and self-devotion with which

* I landed in India in January, 1841, without either friends or interest; and for the instruction of those who think it is of no use to study either the languages, history, or policy of British India, unless the Governor-General happens to be their grandfather, I record the fact, that at the close of 1845 I was promised the first vacancy in the Judge Advocate-General's Department of the Bengal Presidency; and have good reason to believe that I was to have had the second under the Governor-General's Agent, on the north-west frontier; but before either of those occurred, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, then Sir Hugh Gough, Bart., honoured me by making me an aide-de-camp on his personal staff—a step to which I gratefully acknowledge that I am indebted for all the opportunities of succeeding years.

you have gloriously improved the opportunity afforded you, must command the admiration, while the great value of the services effected will call forth the grateful thanks of the Governor-General of India in Council, as they do in an eminent degree my own.

"You have indeed performed most eminent and valuable servicc, which his Lordship in Council will, I am sure, appreciate as I do, and will greet with the same hearty acknowledgement.

"This second victory is a very important one: it will, I doubt not, have the effect of disheartening the followers and the partisans, open and secret, of the rebel Moolraj; and of enabling you to confine him and his remaining army to the city and fort, till a British force shall put a period to the rebellion by crushing him in his stronghold.

"I shall address your gallant companion, Lieutenant Lake, separately, in reply to his letter reporting the victory and the conduct of the troops of our ally, the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor.

"General Cortlandt has again distinguished himself; his skill in managing his troops, and his intrepidity in action, are in the highest degree creditable to him, and entitle him to the warmest thanks of the Maharajuh and myself.

"Your account of Mr. Quin's gallant conduct is highly satisfactory, and I shall take care that the excellent service which he has so heroically rendered to the Government, on this occasion, does not pass unnoticed or unrewarded.

"To Gholam Surwur Khan, Khaghwanee, whose personal prowess you speak of in terms of praise, my admiration and thanks are due; as also to Foujdar Khan, Alizye, who, though still suffering from the wound he received in the action at Kineyree while gallantly charging the enemy's cavalry, was again at your side at Suddoosam, commanding your cavalry, and rendering you excellent service.

"I request that to the above officers especially, and to all the officers and soldiers who fought with you on this occasion, you will communicate the assurance of my approbation and grateful thanks.

"The Durbar have, at my instigation, addressed a purwanna to the officers and men of General Cortlandt's regiment; and have, in a proclamation to the troops of their army, spoken of the conduct and services of these corps in terms which will, I trust, be gratifying to them; while it is to be hoped that their conduct, with its reward, may have the effect of stimulating the other Durbar troops to the exhibition of similar fidelity to the Government."*

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO LIEUTENANT LAKE

"Lahore, July 10th, 1848.

"I have received the description of this second victory gained by the force of our ally, Nuwab Bhawul Khan, assisted by that under Lieutenant Edwardes, with the highest satisfaction.

"I have addressed to His Highness the Nuwab congratulatory letters, on this second occasion of his army's distinguished success.

"While I request that you will communicate to Futteh Muhommud Khan, Ghoree, and the officers of the force, my appreciation of their courage and services, I feel that to yourself my thanks and admiration are peculiarly due, for the skill and gallantry with which you directed the movements and operations of the force, to which Lieutenant Edwardes bears such ample testimony, and to which the success of the Bhawulpoor army is in an eminent degree attributable.

"I am satisfied that the Governor-General in Council will appreciate and acknowledge the great value of your services on this important occasion.

"I request you will tender my thanks to Peer Ibraheem Khan, and assure him of the high estimation I entertain for his courage and

*"Blue Book," p. 247.

conduct, not only on the field of Suddcosam, but in all the proceedings that have taken place connected with these operations.

"I regret very much the death of Captain Macpherson, and of the other officers of the Nuwab, killed in this action."*

"FROM H. M. ELLIOT, ESQ., THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT
"OF INDIA, TO THE HONOURABLE SIR F. CURRIE,
"BART., RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Fort William, July 29th, 1848.

"I am directed to request that you will convey to Lieutenant Edwardes, and to Lieutenant Lake, the highest approbation of the Governor-General in Council of their conduct in the action; and the strong sense the Government entertain of the gallantry, energy, determination, and skill which these officers have displayed."

"FROM THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR J. C. HOBHOUSE, BART.
"PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL.

"India Board, September 7th, 1848.

"Sir,

"I have great satisfaction in announcing to you, that in consideration of your distinguished services in your late actions with the Mooltan rebels, you have been recommended to Her Majesty by the Duke of Wellington, for a Majority in the territories of Lahore.

*"Blue Book," p. 248.

"I beg you to accept my cordial congratulations on this well-deserved promotion.

"I have the honour to remain,

"Your very faithful servant,

"John Hobhouse."

Major Edwardes,
&c., &c.

"THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE HONOURABLE EAST
"INDIA COMPANY

"At a Court of Directors held on Wednesday,

"September 13th, 1848.

"The Chairman, having called the attention of the Court to despatches from the Government of India and the Government of Bombay, announcing the military operations carried on against the rebel forces of the Dewan of Mooltan, by Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major Herbert B. Edwardes, of the Bengal Army, as communicated to the Court by the Secret Committee, on the 23rd and 30th ultimo:

"Resolved, unanimously, that this Court do present to Major Edwardes a gold medal, in testimony of their high approbation of the important services rendered by him in raising and organizing large forces in a foreign territory, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty; and in wresting, within a very brief period, an extensive tract of country from the power of the rebels; in skilfully combining his forces with those of an ally, and in completely defeating the troops of the enemy in two pitched battles, thus evincing the possession, in the flower of his youth, of all those qualities which form and ennoble the character of the British officer."

The following letter, from the India Board to the Secretary to the Court of Directors, refers to the foregoing resolution:

"India Board, September 21st, 1848.

"Sir,

"I am directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to acquaint you that they cordially approve of the resolution passed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, on the 13th instant, proposing to grant to Brevet-Major H. B. Edwardes a gold medal, in acknowledgement of the distinguished services lately rendered by that officer in the territories of Lahore.

(Signed) "THOMAS WYSE."

"FROM THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR J. C. HOBHOUSE, BART.

"PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL

"India Board, October 24th, 1848.

"Dear Sir,

"I have again much satisfaction in announcing to you an additional honour conferred on you for your distinguished services in Mooltan. The Queen has been graciously pleased to ordain a special statute of the Order of the Bath, for appointing you an Extra Member of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions of that Order.

"I congratulate you cordially on this distinction,

"And remain, dear Sir,

"Your very faithful servant,

"JOHN HOBHOUSE."

Major Edwardes, C.B.,
&c. &c.

CHAPTER VIII

A SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONS—WAS IT, OR WAS IT NOT, WELL TO FOLLOW THEM UP WITH THE SIEGE OF MOOLTAN?—THE AUTHOR'S PROPOSITION FOR THAT SIEGE, AND THE PLAN THAT WAS PREFERRED—THE CONSEQUENT DELAY, AND HOW MOOLRAJ TURNED IT TO ACCOUNT—OPINIONS OF MAJOR NAPIER, SIR F. CURRIE, LORD GOUGH, LORD DALHOUSIE, AND SIR J. LITTLER, AS TO UNDERTAKING THE SIEGE AFTER THE BATTLE OF KINEYREE—SIR F. CURRIE RESOLVES ON THE SIEGE ON HEARING OF SUDDOOSAM—HIS REASONS, POLITICAL AND MILITARY—THE AUTHOR'S DISBELIEF OF A PUNJAB CONSPIRACY BEFORE THE REBELLION OF MOOLRAJ—PATRIOTIC REPLIES OF LORDS DALHOUSIE AND GOUGH TO THE RESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SIEGE—THE AUTHOR IN HOSPITAL—A SINISTER PROTEST AGAINST HUMAN DEXTERITY—A YOUNG VOLUNTEER—NIGHTS AT MESS—HOW RAJAH SHER SING CAME TO MOOLTAN—THE STATE OF HIS ARMY AND MOOLRAJ'S—DEMONSTRATIONS OF BOTH—MOOLRAJ ATTEMPTS TO POISON SHER SING—THE RINGLEADER BLOWN FROM A GUN—EXECUTION OF LONGA MULL—A MEETING IN BUNNOO SUPPRESSED BY FUTTEH KHAN, TOWANNUH—ANOTHER OF THE FUTTEH PULTUN, AT HURRUND, SUPPRESSED BY NASSUR KHAN, POPULZYE—MOOLRAJ'S EMISSARY TO CABUL CAUGHT AT PESHAWUR AND HANGED—SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING'S REBELLION IN HUZARUH—THE AUTHOR JUSTIFIES MAJOR ABBOTT—RAJAH SHER SING'S EFFORTS TO SAVE HIS FAMILY AND COUNTRY—THE IRREGULAR AND SHER

SING'S ARMIES EXCHANGE POSITIONS—INCENDIARY LETTERS FROM HUZARUH—THE AUTHOR ENCOURAGE; THE RAJAH TO BE FIRM—MOOLRAJ ATTACKS GENERAL WHISH IN HIS BED, AND THE IRREGULARS AT DINNER, AND IS DEFEATED IN BOTH PLACES.

CHAPTER VIII

Moolraj rebelled on the 20th of April, 1848. On the 20th of May, the battle of Dera Ghazee Khan lost him all his Trans-Indus dependencies. On the 18th of June, the battle of Kineyree deprived him of the country between the Indus and the Chenab, and nearly all between the Chenab and the Sutlej. On the 1st of July, the battle of Suddoosam shut him up in the city and fortress of Mooltan, whence he never issued, again except to resist the siege of a British army.

Thus by the expedient of levying an irregular army was the warlike Muhommudan population of an important frontier kept, at a difficult crisis, on the side of a Hindoo Government to which it was naturally opposed, and prevented from recruiting the ranks of a formidable rebel. Thus was a province three hundred miles long, two hundred miles broad, and producing at the least twenty-seven lakhs of rupees a-year, recovered to the empire in ten weeks by two undisciplined forces; of which one was borrowed from a neighbour, and the other had no existence before that period, was organized in the midst of hostilities, and almost entirely paid and fed out of the revenues of the country which it conquered. Thus, lastly, was a check given to the Mooltan rebellion; the revolt of the Sikh army put off from

June till September; and Moolraj exhibited in an attitude of humiliation instead of defiance, until a regular British army took the field.

It is the opinion of many whose judgment is to be received with deference, that it would have been better to rest content with having secured these objects, and that it was a mistake to follow them up by the dispatch of General Whish's army to Mooltan. The point, like many others in the history of every campaign, can never be conclusively decided, but it is worth attention; and I shall briefly put before the reader the recorded opinions of the authorities.

It will be remembered that in my letter of the 22nd of June, written from Shoojabad to the Resident at Lahore, I had suggested a plan which might "obviate the necessity of a British army taking the field at all." That was my intention; to dispense with a regular army, not to bring one into the field. The plan was as follows: "I would suggest that the siege be commenced at once. We are enough of us in all conscience, and desire nothing better than to be honoured with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations."

I had certainly not seen the fort of Mooltan when this was written, but I knew from report that it was a place of superior strength, and a reference to my reports will show that I always represented it so to Government; and now that I have seen it, and assisted in two sieges against it, I am by no means sure that the irregular attack I originally

contemplated might not have succeeded, *at that time*, more easily than General Whish's vastly superior force succeeded at a later period, when Moolraj had completed the most formidable preparations for resistance.

In June, and up to the end of July, I am quite sure that Lieutenant Lake's force and my own could have taken the city of Mooltan with the utmost facility; for it was surrounded by nothing stronger than a venerable brick wall, and the rebel army was dispirited by its losses at Kineyree and Suddoosam. On this point neither Lieutenant Lake nor myself, nor General Cortlandt (who was an older, and therefore a steadier soldier than either of us), had ever any doubt. The only difficulty we dreaded was the disorganization of our own army when it had once captured a city whose riches excited such cupidity, and whose rabid hostility so provoked revenge. The veteran chief of the Indian army, who had seen as many fields as we had years, had learnt in the Peninsula to dread the capture of a town even by regular troops; and he considered the taking of the town of Mooltan, as preparatory to an attack on the fortress, "unadvisable," even for a British army, for the express reason that "in such attacks, discipline is rendered almost nugatory."*

We might well be excused therefore, if at the head of two undisciplined armies, we deemed this an obstacle far more insurmountable than the walls of Mooltan. Once in the city we should have pushed up its four main streets from south to north, thrown barricades across their

*"Blue Book," p. 239.

entrances, and commenced the siege of the citadel almost on the *glacis*, which would have been equivalent to beginning at once with the third parallel. In such a position, with our whole force under cover in the city, I cannot see what more we wanted than sappers and miners, heavy guns, and a few more engineers, which was all I asked for.

But this plan (to which the irregular force before Mooltan was best adapted) was never tried. It was declared impolitic to intrust British ordnance to irregular levies; a British army must accompany British guns; and the equipment of this, the collection of carriage, commissariat, &c., prevented the siege from being opened till September.

Meanwhile many things had happened. Moolraj, assisted by the zealous citizens, had lined the wall of the city of Mooltan with an enormous rampart of mud; he had recruited his army with Sikhs from Lahore; and a disaffected Sikh army, under Rajah Sher Sing, had been allowed to enter into alliance with the besiegers. In short, the whole circumstances were altered; and I maintain that it is still an open question whether the united irregular armies could not have reduced Mooltan, if supplied with a siege-train in the month of July.

On receipt of my letter above quoted, we are told by the Governor-General* that "the Resident consulted Major Napier, of the Engineers, upon the feasibility of operations against Mooltan under the present altered position of affairs there. Major Napier has given his opinion that 'operations

*"Blue Book," p. 221.

are perfectly practicable, and may be undertaken with every prospect of success.' A single brigade, with ten guns, and twenty mortars and howitzers, is now considered sufficient."

On the 28th of June, the Resident communicated this professional opinion to the Commander-in-Chief, and urged the political advantages which would arise from reducing the fortress, into which he supposed the rebels to have been driven by the battle of Kineyree.* On the 1st of July, Lord Gough replied as follows to Sir Frederick Currie:

"I beg to state, that I cannot see anything, in the altered position of affairs, which would justify me in taking upon myself the siege of Mooltan at the present moment. On the contrary, the success of Lieutenant Edwardes renders it less necessary, in my opinion, to risk the lives of the European soldiers at this season.

"Moolraj is shut up in his fort; all, I take it, that was contemplated by the movement of the Bhawulpoor force and that under Lieutenant Edwardes.

"The revenues of the whole country will now be collected by us, whilst the Dewan's disheartened followers will, undoubtedly, it may be expected, daily desert from him; and his means of paying and feeding them have been by the recent events greatly lessened, if not wholly prevented.

"Rebellion, although still existing, has been shorn of its worst feature—the probability of extending itself; and

*"Blue Book," p. 225.

I cannot contemplate that the complete success of all your combinations can produce the evil you now apprehend from the forces of the Bhawulpoor Nuwab and Lieutenant Edwardes remaining in contact.* I should conceive that ample employment to occupy their time and thoughts may easily be found, until the proper season for military operations shall arrive."†

On the same day, His Excellency repeated the same sentiments to the Governor-General; adding that, although he should much prefer adhering to the plan of operations hitherto contemplated (viz., to take the field after the rainy season), still if the Governor-General should decide on an immediate movement, the smallest force he could recommend would be two brigades of infantry (containing two European and five native regiments), a brigade of three

*The apprehension alluded to seems to have arisen in the mind of the Resident from the following passage of a letter from Lieutenant Lake, dated 6th July:

"Not only the state of Moolraj's force, but that of our own, makes it incumbent upon us to act immediately. The main strength of this army (as you are, perhaps, aware) is the regular regiments. Hitherto, they have shown no symptoms of dissatisfaction; but, as Moolraj spares no efforts to corrupt them (and they will shortly be joined by Rajah Sher Sing's force, whose fidelity is questionable), it would be in the highest degree imprudent to leave them inactive for the next three months, in the immediate vicinity of Mooltan. As for the irregular Puthan levies, their fidelity is to be depended upon, so long as Lieutenant Edwardes is present to guide them; at the same time, it must not be forgotten, that they are mere mercenary troops; that the personal attachment they feel for Lieutenant Edwardes, and the success which has hitherto attended their efforts, are the only links which bind them to our cause. The Bhawulpoor troops are, as you know, inexperienced, and badly paid; and, although there is no fear of the Daoodpotras going over to the enemy, there is every probability of their returning to their homes, if the contest is a very protracted one."—*Blue Book*, p. 245.

†"Blue Book," p. 238.

native cavalry regiments, and two troops of native horse artillery, besides the siege-train.*

Lord Dalhousie entirely coincided with Lord Gough, and replied on the 11th of July, as follows:

"The Governor-General in Council, having carefully considered the various despatches which have been addressed to him, and having weighed the reasons which have been adduced for the immediate dispatch of a force against Mooltan, entirely concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in adhering to the former determination of the Government, and in abstaining from moving British troops upon Mooltan at this season of the year.

"The Governor-General in Council can perceive no change of circumstances which either calls for, or would justify, a change of the course originally recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, acquiesced in by yourself, and approved by the Government.

* * * * *

"The reasons which chiefly induced the Government to abstain from bringing an army into the field, until after the cessation of the rains, exist in all their original force, while the dangers then contemplated as likely to arise from delay, have been in a great degree removed by the measures which you have directed to be taken, and by the success which has attended the gallant exertions of Lieutenant

*"Blue Book," page 238.

Edwardes and his force, aided by our ally the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor.

"Under these circumstances, the Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion pronounced by the Commander-in-Chief on the military question submitted to him, and does not consider it expedient or wise to depart from the previous determination of the Government upon that question, maturely considered, and deliberately formed. The force which may now be required, in the event of the Dewan continuing to hold out in Mooltan, will probably be very much less than any that has hitherto been contemplated. It will be ready to take the field as soon as the season opens.

"The troops, under the command of Lieutenant Edwardes and the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor, may be advantageously and fully employed in carrying into effect the purposes for which you originally designed them, namely, in occupying the districts of the province of Mooltan, in securing their revenue, and in preventing the spread of disaffection beyond the neighbourhood of Mooltan itself."*

I think it is right also to quote the similar judgment of another high authority—a soldier whose opinions have an historic value on all points connected with the military policy of the Punjab.

*"Blue Book," p. 253.

"MINUTE BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. H. LITTLER, G.C.B.

"July, 1848.

"I entirely concur with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as to the inexpediency of immediate operations against the fort of Mooltan with a British force.

"That fort is now surrounded, and closely invested, by the troops of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor and Lieutenant Edwardes, and they are no doubt strong enough to maintain their ground against any attack that can be made by Dewan Moolraj's party. The revenues and resources of the whole district are thus entirely at their command.

"I therefore cannot anticipate any great inconvenience that would attend the delay of a month or two, until the proper season for operations shall arrive.

"It might probably have been better to have undertaken the siege, in the first instance, rather than to expose European troops in the months of August and September, which must unavoidably be attended with great sickness and loss of life. They are the most unhealthy months in the year.

"If it should be determined upon, however, to undertake the siege forthwith, I would not recommend a smaller force than that suggested by the Commander-in-Chief, that is, two brigades, with an European regiment attached to each, and a proper proportion of artillery."*

*"Blue Book," p. 252.

The above-quoted opinions of Sir Frederick Currie, Lord Gough, Lord Dalhousie, and Sir John Littler, were all given after intelligence of the battle of Kineyree only. On the 10th of July, Sir Frederick Currie obtained the news of the second victory at Suddoosam, and the final retirement of Moolraj's army within the walls of Mooltan. His former conviction of the possibility of bringing the rebellion to a rapid close was now strengthened into certainty; and acting in this instance on his own convictions with a promptitude and courage which was worthy of his high position, on the same day, he directed General Whish to "take immediate measures for the dispatch of a siege-train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force, for the reduction of the fort of Mooltan."*

In reporting this important step to the Supreme Government, the Resident said:

"I have been induced to take upon myself the responsibility of this movement, notwithstanding the remarks contained in the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 1st instant, from a conviction of its political necessity, and military practicability, at the present moment."†

The Resident then entered fully into his reasons both political and military for this conviction. With the former, I have, strictly speaking, no concern: and should pass them by were they not grounded on the supposed existence of "a wide-spread combination and conspiracy throughout the Sikh army, to which very many influential persons were

*"Blue Book" p. 251.

†"Ibid," p. 248.

parties, and of the existence of which scarcely any were, I believe, ignorant, to create a disturbance somewhere, and of some kind (the place and nature of this not being, I think, fully determined), whereby a large portion of the Lahore garrison might be detached, which was to be the signal for a more general insurrection for a final struggle, with a view to the re-establishment of Khalsa independence, and the expulsion of the English."*

The "Blue Book" does not tell us whether, after a longer residence at Lahore, and more full opportunities of forming a correct judgment on a subject so difficult of investigation, even by a man of eminent judicial ability, Sir Frederick Currie retained or abandoned this belief; but as it is a point which possesses considerable historical interest, and has no longer any bearing on current politics, I am unwilling to pass on without expressing my own humble opinion, that nothing deserving the name of a conspiracy against the British existed in the Punjab, previous to the rebellion of Moolraj.

There was the "deep and wide-spread feeling of hostility against us," spoken of by Lord Dalhousie,† and "coals of fire" on the head of every Sikh; for never yet had any nation so offended and been so forgiven. Individually, no doubt every man in the Sikh army would have been glad if circumstances arose to bring on another struggle with their conquerors on the Sutlej. But that there was anything more than this, that any person or persons of influence had

*"Blue Book," p. 248.

†"Ibid," p. 657.

conceived the design of bringing those circumstances about, and banded together to do so—that in short there had been any train laid for Dewan Moolraj to fire, I must ever entirely disbelieve, and have never heard that a shadow of satisfactory evidence has been produced to establish. On the contrary, when Sir Henry Lawrence left the Punjab, at the end of 1847, the worst spirits in it had ceased to hope for a combination; and even Ranee Jhunda, who had more wit and daring than any man of her nation, was weary of scattering "ambiguous voices" where she got no echo back, and of writing incendiary epistles from Sheikhopoora to quondam *mauvais sujets*, who treated them as if they came from Joseph Ady. Her memory survived, for she was not a woman to be forgotten; but her influence had followed her power, and there was no longer a man found in the Punjab who would shoulder a musket at her bidding. The year 1847 left the Sikh army reduced and regularly paid; the people of the Punjab relieved of the exorbitant revenues imposed by a needy ministry and a revolutionary army; and the chiefs of the State more richly endowed than they had ever been under Runjeet Sing. The year 1848 opened on the Punjab with hopes of peace well founded in human judgment; and the Mooltan rebellion was the father, not the son, of the second Sikh war.

From this digression on the Resident's political motives for undertaking the siege in July, let us turn to the substantial military reasons adduced in the following paragraphs:

"At this moment, Moolraj has no troops in the field. His army has been twice beaten in two general actions, by

the forces of Lieutenant Edwardes and Bhawul Khan, and he has been driven to the protection of his fort and fortified city.

"Instead of the state of things in which the rebellion commenced, there is comparative re-assurance throughout the Punjab districts, and we have a faithful army in our interest of above two thousand Muhommudans, with thirty guns, investing Mooltan, and merely requiring the aid of British skill, and British siege *materiel*, to enable them to reduce the fort, which may, as further investigation and better information have established, be approached and attacked at any season of the year.

"An overwhelming force, such as was not available, is no longer necessary. All the troops that can be required are at hand, and carriage in abundance for the transport of the siege-train has been procured.

"The season also is less unfavourable than it was, the rains have, to a certain extent, allayed the fierceness of the heat, and the rising rivers afford water-carriage for the Europeans, to within a short distance of the walls of Mooltan, of which the absence of an enemy in the intervening districts may enable them to take advantage.

"We have but to march, and send by water a British force with siege guns about two hundred and twenty miles, to effect our object at once; and that object is the important one of vindicating our power, by punishing the insulter of our authority, and the murderer of our British officers, and of putting an end to a dangerous rebellion.

"The work done, our European troops may be provided with comfortable shelter in Mooltan, until the season for marching back to their cantonments, without inconvenience or risk to their health shall arise.

"These are the circumstances which have induced me to direct the movement of a British force on Mooltan at this time, and I trust they will be considered by the Governor-General of India in Council, as justifying the measure."*

The reply of Lord Dalhousie to Sir Frederick Currie's announcement that he had undertaken the siege of Mooltan on his own responsibility, is worthy of all honour, and may ever be quoted as an example of the support due from Government to its servants in distant posts, and arduous circumstances, even if the policy involved be doubtful.

"THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE "RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Fort William, July 22nd, 1848.

"Nothing has been advanced by you calculated to weaken the strength of those reasons which induced the Government, notwithstanding the political urgency of the case, to approve of your having refrained from bringing British troops into the field at this season of the year, or which could have induced them to alter the resolution they have conveyed to you that British troops should not move

*"Blue Book," p. 250.

against Mooltan, until the fit season for military operations should commence.

"You inform the Government that you have now ordered the immediate movement of British troops against Mooltan, accompanied by a siege-train, sufficient to effect the reduction of the fort.

"Since you have considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon you, to assume this responsibility, and, in pursuance of it, have issued publicly the orders for carrying your resolution into effect, the Government being anxious to maintain your authority, do not withhold their confirmation of the orders you have issued. Adverting, moreover, to the injurious effects which would be produced by any appearance of vacillation at this critical period, and having regard to the probable consequences in the Punjab at the present moment, of staying the advance of a British force, when once the intention of moving it forthwith against the rebels had been declared, and active preparations commenced, the Governor-General in Council desires me to inform you that if you should, in consequence of the receipt of my despatch of the 11th instant, have countermanded the march of the troops, you should immediately direct the advance you have ordered, and proceed with vigour to carry out at all hazards the policy which you have now resolved upon.

"A letter will be addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, requesting that every exertion may be made to ensure the efficiency of this force."*

*"Blue Book," pp. 258, 9.

Lord Gough, however, had anticipated his instructions, and replied to the Resident in the same patriotic spirit.

"THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Simla, July 14th, 1848.

"The troops having been ordered to move upon your responsibility, I have only to assure you that every facility and aid in my power shall be freely given, so as to carry out to a successful result the operations against Mooltan."*

We will now leave the Commander-in-Chief to supply the Resident with an efficient army, and Major-General Whish to conduct that army to Mooltan, while we return to the allied irregular forces already encamped under the fortress.

The wound in my right hand, from the accident of the 3rd of July, confined me for a long while to my bed; and all the out-door work of the allied armies devolved on Lieutenant Lake and General Cortlandt, whose cheerful assistance and soldierly vigilance seemed only to be doubled by the additional burden.

On the 5th of July, also, Lieutenant Harry Lumsden,† the brave and enterprising Commandant of the Punjab Guide Corps, arrived to assist us all, having ridden from

*"Blue Book," p. 259.

†Since promoted to a Majority, for his services with the army of Lord Gough, in 1848-9.

Bhawulpoor, about sixty miles, through the sun, at one stretch. He, too, was an old friend, and added as much to the happiness as to the efficiency of our little staff. But the in-door, or office work, I still continued; and it is a satisfaction to me to remember that the laborious correspondence, in both English and Persian, which I was obliged to maintain with Government, and the officers European and native along the line of frontier under my charge, was never interrupted for a moment by a loss which I owed entirely to my own folly.

Prostrate on my back, with my hand helplessly stretched out on a pillow by my side, I had indeed only two occupations—to moisten the wound with a wet rag, and think over the changing phases of the war. Thought, under such circumstances, in a canvas tent under a burning sun, with a thermometer too frightful to look at, would have been brain-fever, but for the phlebotomy of writing. So I dictated half the day to Mr. Quin, and half the day to Sudda Sookh; and when the post-bag was made up at sunset, scrawled all the signatures with my left hand.* That operation seemed to end the official day. All our cares and labours, transferred to paper, were sealed up, and departed in the despatches; leaving us as light-hearted and happy a little knot of Englishmen, as if we had been pic-nic-ing on the Thames. Our party was increased early in July by the arrival of a young volunteer, named Hugo James. Quite

*By the bye, why are we not all taught as children to use both hands alike? Nature gives us two hands, and fashion takes one away again. In civilized countries, the whole population are educated cripples. We laugh at the Chinese for robbing women of their feet, and forget that we ourselves cut off the arms of our children as soon as they can hold a spoon.

a lad; he had come out to India in the expectation of a cadetship, for which he was vainly waiting in Sindh when the Mooltan rebellion broke out. He immediately wrote, and volunteered to join me. This was in June; the weather was perfectly awful, and I was living myself on the excitement of a great public duty. That a boy who had no concern in the matter should even put his head out of window at such a season, seemed an act of madness; and I never sent an answer. One day, however, the young gentleman rode into camp at Tibbee, with a face like a boiled lobster from exposure to the sun, and laughing heartily at what he considered the *fun* of the campaign. Nor could I ever cure him of this habit, though, as he came on purpose to learn the art of war, I afforded him every opportunity of doing so, and used to give him a few hundred men to take into any ugly place that wanted stopping up.

This arrival made our numbers up to six, and occasionally our mess party was still farther added to by some of our naval friends (Captain Christopher, or Mr. M'Lawrin) taking a run on shore, from the steamers which were cruising on the Chenab, and seizing the enemy's boats. Thus we had a delightful United Service Club, containing members of the army and navy, and a military surgeon. For some time "Adam's ale" was the most generous potation we had wherein to drink each other's healths; but gradually the immortal Bass, and even such sophistications as Chateau Margeaux and Lafitte found their way into the wilderness of war, and verified the saying that Englishmen will take England with them all over the world.

One day I remember great mirth was excited by the arrival of a boat full of military stores, from the bottom of

which, out of cannon-balls and gunpowder, came four-and-twenty dozens of soda-water, and (of all things in the world!) a "prime Stilton cheese," which Sir Frederick Currie had rightly conjectured would be acceptable under the walls of Mooltan. My wound did not prevent me from joining the merry party which assembled at dinner every evening under the *shumyanuh* (awning) in front of my tent; for the members of the club used to carry me out on my bed, and set me down close to the table where I could hear all the jokes, and contribute my own little share. At Mooltan the nights were always cool after the hottest day, and it was such a luxury to breathe the refreshing night-air, and look up at the mild moon and stars, instead of a flaming sun, that it was generally midnight before we were tired of calling on the doctor to sing "Annie Lawrie," or "The Treasures of the Deep." Happy nights indeed were those, though spent after days of danger and anxious thought, in the midst of a barbarian camp, and within three miles of a powerful and blood-thirsty enemy.

On the 4th of July, I wrote to the Resident as follows:

"Rajah Sher Sing's army has been, and still is, a source of great anxiety to me. Without orders, as far as I can make out, the Rajah seems to have advanced from Tolumba, and *though I have repeatedly requested him to halt*, he has now advanced as far as Gogran six koss from the city of Mooltan. I at first thought this was attributable to the Rajah having no command over his men, and the latter being determined to join Moolraj; but I find that the Rajah has made severe examples of one or two soldiers in his camp

who gave licence to their tongues, and I now believe that his march upon Mooltan is owing to the sanguine hopes raised by the successes of our force, that Moolraj himself would speedily surrender, and still more to the eager desire of the Rajah and the other Sirdars along with him, to prove their own freedom from disaffection. This very morning also, I have been informed that the two hundred Sikhs, who some days ago joined Moolraj, as it was then said, from Rajah Sher Sing's camp, were in reality the re-assembled remnant of Bhaee Maharaj Sing's scattered followers. Of the secret disaffection of the Sikh troops of Rajah Sher Sing, it would be weakness to doubt, after the proofs we have lately had, that no amount of generosity, moderation, justice, and impartial administration which the British Government could bestow, can ever conciliate the good-will of the Runjeet generation.

"But the jageers of the Ghorchurruhs are tolerably good securities for their keeping their opinions to themselves, at least until some opportunity presents itself of revolting with success. The present plight of Dewan Moolraj does not offer so decided an encouragement; and I hear that he yesterday informed his officers that his resources were exhausted, that he could neither lavish on them rewards, or even give them their pay;that those who were not prepared to fight for their mere religion, had better leave him; many are said to have taken him at his word. Under these circumstances, the danger to be anticipated of Rajah Sher Sing's force joining the enemy's is very much diminished. Another danger, however, has risen in its place. Supposing Rajah Sher Sing's army to be true, it becomes the enemy of Dewan Moolraj, and the latter's interest to destroy

it; and should the rebels move against the Rajah, with the city of Mooltan between him and us, we should not be able to go to his assistance, and he would infallibly be defeated, and lose his guns. I cannot, therefore, leave the Rajah exposed alone at Gogran, neither can I order him back; and I have been obliged, therefore, quite against my own will and judgment, to extricate him from his peril, by ordering him to join me. Even this he cannot do without crossing the wide nullah which divides us from Mooltan; and I shall not be free from very great apprehension on his account, until he has crossed this obstacle without a collision."*

The coming of Rajah Sher Sing's army to Mooltan was the immediate cause of the raising of the first siege, and the ultimate cause of the annexation of the Punjab to British India.† It is important therefore to understand how it happened, for I believe that Sher Sing himself is at least as much to be pitied as to be blamed for the catastrophe.

*"Blue Book," p. 244.

†Major Siddons, in his "Journal of the Siege of Mooltan," says: "Subsequent events have shown how much it is to be regretted this Sikh force should ever have been allowed to collect, much more to proceed to Mooltan. How very differently the chapter of accidents would have been read, had: 1st. Sher Sing not come to Mooltan; 2nd. Not joined Moolraj; 3rd. The siege not been interrupted in consequence; 4th. The whole of the Punjab and the Afghans not been brought in the field by the delay which ensued."

The reflection is just, and I agree in it as entirely as in the one which follows: "But perhaps it is better as it is; the Punjab has been annexed, and doubts of the future done away with."—*Third Number of the Corps Papers of Royal and East India Company's Engineers.*

My reader will remember that Sher Sing's army was Column No. 1 in the original plan for blockading Moolraj for the summer with five converging columns, and that the duty intrusted to it was the occupation of the Mooltan dependencies on the left bank of the Ravee river as far westward as Tolumba.

When that plan proved impracticable, was abandoned, and my blockade substituted for it, I repeat what I have said before in a former chapter, that it would have been well had all the superfluous and doubtful columns been withdrawn from the field. But they were not, and it ended in every one of them contributing soldiers to the enemy.

On the 13th of June, it is clear that the Resident still thought Sher Sing's army might be usefully employed as soon as the rebels had suffered a defeat of any magnitude.

"Rajah Sher Sing's force," he wrote to me, "is now at Chichawutnee, and ready to move forward; but, though it is composed of all the Sirdars in the Punjab almost, the Jageerdar horse, Sher Sing's own artillery, and the two regiments supposed to be the best affected and most subordinate, I dare not advance them to a point where there is probability of collision with Moolraj's troops, till Bhawul Khan or yourself have gained some further advantage over the Dewan, and it becomes evident to all that the game is up with him."*

*"Blue Book," p. 213.

By the 22nd of June the Rajah had crept on twenty miles further to Tolumba, and as Moolraj had been defeated at Kineyree, the Resident contemplated advancing him as far as Sirdarpoor, believing that the time was past when his force could be tempted to revolt.

"The ticklish force of Rajah Sher Sing and his Sirdars is now at Tolumba; *its fidelity may now be depended on*, and it will be advanced to Sirdarpoor, about twenty miles from Mooltan.

"This force has been a cause of much anxiety to me; it has required constant judicious handling. The Sirdars are true, I believe: the soldiers are all false, I know. The Sikh army in Peshawur, Bunnoo, and Huzaruh, were watching this force, to take their cue from its conduct. Moolraj was anxious for its approach to Mooltan. My plan was to keep the attention of the Sikh army fixed on it, and to keep it from any position in which its mettle or material could be tried, or in which Moolraj's influence on it could be brought into action, till the rebels' game was lost."*

But it appears from the "Blue Book," in another place, that the Resident afterwards formed a juster estimate of this Sikh division, and not only did not authorize its advance to Sirdarpoor, but positively ordered it to halt where it was at Tolumba. Writing on this subject to the Government of India, on the 8th of August, Sir Frederick says:

"But after reaching Tolumba, Rajah Sher Sing's force was no longer under command. *Though ordered to halt at*

*The Resident to the Secretary to Government, June 22nd, 1848. "Blue Book," p. 220.

Tolumba, it advanced towards Mooltan; the chiefs were, I hope and believe, under the impression that Moolraj would be destroyed by Lieutenant Edwardes and his allies, and were anxious to have a share in the credit of his defeat; the soldiery were impelled by very different feelings, and desired to assist the rebel army. Had not Lieutenant Edwardes's army advanced and fought the battle of Suddoosam, which seemed to render the rebel cause altogether hopeless, *Rajah Sher Sing's army would have joined Moolraj on arriving at Mooltan*."*

It is not impossible that this may be the true history of this fatal move; that the Rajah's soldiers found themselves at Tolumba, within the influence of a whirlpool which they had not the virtue to resist; within easy reach of another revolution, another scene of military licence and political debauchery, such as the Sikh army had learnt to love, and almost to require; and that, remembering how long they had been kept sober citizens by the dull good order of English civil government, they burst their new bonds of discipline, and stretched out their hands toward rebellion like drunkards who wanted wine. But whatever motives impelled the soldiery, the Resident put the same construction that I have always done on the conduct of the three Sirdars.

He believed that no treachery was intended by either the Rajah, or his colleague chiefs; and that they rushed into alliance with the victors of Kineyree and Suddoosam, with motives half selfish, half patriotic, every way natural,

*"Blue Book," p. 274.

to claim for themselves and their tottering country, a share in the suppression of the rebellion. To this measure of exculpation, and the merit of preventing their army from deserting sooner than it did, I have always considered them entitled.

But, however good Sher Sing's intentions were, his intrusion with a disaffected force into a camp hitherto thoroughly loyal, was a very serious matter. On the 5th of July he got within five miles of Mooltan, and requested me to point out a position for his army to take up. I appointed the bridge at Sooruj Koond, about three miles from our own camp at Tibbee, where he would be near enough for his own safety, and far enough away for ours. He arrived there on the 6th of July, and from this time forth until General Whish's arrival on the 18th of August, my own and Lieutenant Lake's armies remained encamped on a plain between Moolraj in our front, and Sher Sing in our rear, *with pickets watching both*; prepared, if needs be, Lake to take one, and I the other, and fight them "fore and aft."

Rajah Sher Sing's army consisted at this time of one regiment of regular and about five hundred irregular infantry, three thousand Sikh cavalry, ten horse artillery guns, and two mortars; total about four thousand five hundred men, which increased ultimately to five thousand or upwards.

In the command of this army the Rajah had two colleagues: Sirdar Shumsher Sing, Sindhanwalluh, and Sirdar Uttur Sing, Kalehwalla; both members of the Lahore Council. The Rajah, I believe, had especial charge of the

infantry, and a troop horse artillery; and the two Sirdars of the cavalry, with two guns each as a support.

The very day after their arrival Shumsher Sing, who was an old friend of mine, told me candidly enough that "had their force been ordered to advance against Moolraj before the battle of Kineyree, it would either have refused, or else gone over to the enemy; so decidedly did the soldiers sympathize with the rebels." It may easily be imagined therefore that when a force thus disaffected was encamped for six weeks within a short walk of their friends in Moolraj's army, the vigilance of a few well-disposed Sirdars was altogether unable to prevent active correspondence, or interchange of visits, between them. Moolraj indeed lost no time in commencing the work of corruption by writing complimentary notes to the three chiefs, and welcoming them to "his poor city of Mooltan!" And when from all three he received severe rebuffs, and messengers sent back with blackened faces, he turned with undiminished politeness to the common soldiers, assured them that his house was their own, and begged that they would come into the bazaars of Mooltan, without ceremony, whenever "the Englishmen" were hard-up for provisions. The following extract from the "Blue Book" gives a faithful picture of the state of things at Mooltan in the middle of July:—

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss from Mooltan,

"July 13th, 1848.

"Rajah Sher Sing so incessantly bullies me to report the presence and good conduct of himself, the Sirdars, and

the force along with him, in order that Sirdar Goolab Sing may wave it before your eyes, that I have at last hit upon the expedient of writing to you in English and sending it through the Sirdar. With respect to the Sirdars, I believe them to be heart and soul on our side, which is the side of jageers, titles, employments, and whole throats. But their force with equal confidence I report to be against us to a man. What is strange, the Poorbeeuh regiment (Colonel Ajoodea Pershad's) is the most disaffected of the whole, and a few days ago before there was any certain tidings of the approach of an English force, they had got so bold in their talk, that I have no doubt they would have gone over had any delay on our part occurred. In Shumsher Sing's graphic language, the news of a British force being positively about to take the field came upon Sher Sing's camp 'like water upon fire.' The expression is so good that, as you read, you will I am sure fancy that you hear mutiny hissing at being extinguished, and dying away into smoke with sputtering curses at the ever-victorious Feringhee. Thus you see that, to the last moment of the rebellion, I and my force are doomed to walk hand-in-hand with treachery, but all their conspiracies are only dangerous when we desert ourselves. Had you hesitated to take the field now, I candidly own that I think my position would have been converted in a month to one of the greatest peril; the advantages I have gained would have slipped through my fingers one by one; and about a fortnight or three weeks hence I should be constrained in self-defence to keep up our *prestige* by taking the city. A general action would ensue; we should be victorious; Moolraj would be driven into the fort; and the city of Mooltan would be disgracefully sacked, perhaps burnt, by the wild mass of ruffians I

have under my command, and I should have the satisfaction of being abused from Lahore to London without having advanced a step towards ending the campaign; all this amid treachery, defections of regiments, squadrons, and artillery, and probably the rising of all the troops in the north-west.

"The very decided nature of your present proceedings in Lahore has, in my opinion, prevented Moolraj from rising superior to his difficulties, and I trust you will not relax until the British force and train are on their way to Mooltan. Moolraj himself, as well as his troops, is at his wits'-end; sometimes he talks of a night attack, and sits up all night in a Hindoo temple near the bridge, cased in chain armour from head to foot, like Don Quixote watching for his knighthood in the cathedral aisle. But nothing comes of it. Another time he talks of cutting the canal, but is restrained from doing so by fear of destroying the fort ditch. One day he fortifies the city, another day he fortifies the fort. To-day he tells all his soldiers to leave him because he has got no money to pay them; and to-morrow keeps up their spirits by assuring them that when iron shot fail he will fire silver on the besiegers. His army I think rather increases than decreases;* many have been deserting, but new recruits from the Manjha are once more beginning to come in by tens and twelves. I estimate his number at six thousand five hundred, he may possibly have seven thousand.

*Moolraj had twelve thousand men before Kineyree. That battle, and Suddoosam, reduced his army one-half. What I mean to say is, that it is now again rather looking up.

"All the Mooltanee Afghans but two have deserted him."

* * * * *

"Let me know when the troops actually start from Ferozepoor, that I may send off all the carriage I can muster to the Ghat opposite Bhawulpoor. We shall be able to render very extensive assistance in this way.

"The Nuwab of Bhawulpoor has at last recalled his incapable General (Futteh Muhommud, Ghoree), but he leaves his office vacant.

"After all I had not the heart to take away the whole ten guns from the Bhawulpoor troops,* and left them five which, to this day, they have not repaired so as to be efficient. Cortlandt has made a very efficient troop of our five.

"You say, 'You see I am not of the reconnoitring parties:' I shall deem myself lucky if I join any reconnoitring party at the end of three weeks or a month. At present I am in my bed and likely to stop there, my hand propped up upon pillows, and kept in the same position for twelve hours at a time; in fact I am quite disabled."†

Thus matters continued until the arrival of General Whish in August, getting worse if anything rather than

*This refers to the ten guns captured at Kineyree; which (as Futteh Muhommud cried for them) I gave him to play with; but on the Resident ordering him to give them up, I left him half out of respect to our faithful ally, the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor.

†"Blue Book," pp. 254, 5.

better; for as time went on, recruits flocked in to the Dewan's standard from the Sikh country, and day by day the defences of the city and the citadel gained strength. Still the Sirdars maintained so much influence over their division, that though individually perhaps every soldier in it had one time or another strolled into Mooltan, and held clandestine communication with the enemy, yet as a body they had not resolved to go over, and readily made any hostile demonstrations that their chiefs directed.

On the 20th of July Moolraj threw out a party to drive in our pickets and grass-cutters, and seemed inclined to bring on a general action; so our line turned out, and advanced along the plain to offer battle; but though Lake, Lumsden, and Cortlandt, who commanded, remained in that attitude for several hours, almost under the fire of the city walls, yet the rebel army declined their invitation to revisit the field of Suddoosam. On this occasion the division of Rajah Sher Sing co-operated with alacrity, by crossing the bridge of Sooruj Koond, and threatening Mooltan upon the south-east, in a style which quite satisfied some Puthan officers whom, under the name of guides, I sent to observe their conduct.

Again on the night of the 26th of July, a large division of Dewan Moolraj's army advanced from the city to within a mile and a half of the Rajah's camp; it was believed on a private understanding with a body of cavalry called the Char Yarees, that the latter should desert, and go over at the enemy's approach. But the Rajah and the Sirdars, having information beforehand, got their whole force under arms, and thus defeated the object in view, whether it was

treachery or surprise. The enemy retired without effecting anything.

The incident, however, proved that disaffection was spreading in the Sooruj Koond division, and was only kept under by the Sirdars. Moolraj observed, and (in his own peculiar fashion) profited by the hint.

The Resident at Lahore had no sooner seen everything in train for the movement of a British army on Mooltan, than he dispatched to me several copies of a proclamation warning "the people in arms at Mooltan to lay down their arms, and depart to their homes;" and the citizens, that it would "be impossible to save their lives, or families, or property, if, on account of armed opposition, it becomes necessary to take forcible possession by storm."* I received this humane proclamation on the 31st of July, and caused it the next night to be affixed to the doors of a Muhommudan Mosque, and a Hindoo Shivalluh, in the city. A third was introduced into the council-chamber of Moolraj himself.

Moolraj seems to have been roused by this to a sense of the toils that were closing round him, and immediately put forth among the soldiers at Sooruj Koond, counter manifestoes of the most inflammatory kind. An immediate inquiry into the means by which these had been circulated was (if I remember rightly) the cause of bringing to light an extensive conspiracy between Moolraj and his well-wishers in the Sikh division, which had for its object the removal

*"Blue Book," pp. 260, 1.

of Sher Sing by poison, and the desertion of the whole of the force.

The ringleader in this dark and dastardly plot was a Sikh Ghorchurruh, or yeoman, named Shoojan Sing, who was seized with two of his accomplices. His papers also were discovered, concealed under the litter of his horse. The three prisoners were formally made over by the Rajah to Lieutenant Lake for trial, and found guilty; but the proceedings in the case were forwarded to the Resident at Lahore for confirmation and sentence. Sir Frederick Currie summoned the members of the Durbar to give judgment on the crimes of their soldiers, and they unanimously sentenced the ringleader to be either "hung by the neck or shot as may be determined by the Rajah and Sirdars commanding the Sikh force, with the concurrence of Lieutenant Edwardes."* Shoojan Sing was accordingly blown from a gun in the midst of the camp he had so largely contributed to corrupt; a sufficient proof, in my opinion, that up to the end of August, Rajah Sher Sing was still loyal, and determined to go any lengths to check the disloyalty of his men.†

*"Blue Book," p. 312.

†It is evident that the Sikhs took the same view of the matter, for they adduced it in their Paper of Grievances (dated Ramnuggur, November 24th, 1848), as a proof that they had been driven into rebellion by unjust suspicions.

"When Rajah Sher Sing, with the Sirdars and the troops, were deputed to Mooltan, to assist Major Edwardes, they implicitly followed the directions of that officer, in no way deviating from his orders. In fact, Major Edwardes, in writing to the Resident, expressed his approval of their behaviour. In accordance with Major Edwardes's orders, Shoojan Sing, Aloowalla, who was a Sirdar, was blown away

The execution of another desperate partisan of Dewan Moolraj took place during this month in my own camp. It will be remembered that when Dera Ghazee Khan was wrested from the rebels in May by Kowrah Khan, Khosuh, and his loyal tribe, the Governor of the province, Longa Mull, was wounded and taken prisoner in the fight. I had special authority from the Resident to hang him on the spot, as a rebel in arms against his Sovereign; but for my own satisfaction, I was desirous that his trial should take place, his defence be heard, and his guilt and sentence be put on record. The evidence was accordingly taken by General Cortlandt at the time, and passed on to me for sentence. More pressing matters interfered, and the forgotten prisoner went with us across the Indus and the Chenab, and arrived at last under the walls of his master's beleaguered stronghold. Here he soon brought himself to my recollection, by commencing an active correspondence with Moolraj, which was only discovered by the sudden change of his guards, whom he had completely corrupted. I immediately resumed his trial, and as there was no doubt about his guilt, sentenced him to death, and he was hanged in the presence of the paraded troops. To the last, he maintained that Moolraj was his master, and that he owed no allegiance to the Maharajuh, whose name (he added with a malignity no danger could repress) was never heard of before at Mooltan!*

from a gun, notwithstanding that such condign punishment is opposed to the customs of the Khalsa. *By this conduct, they hoped to have obtained credit for themselves, but instead, they became objects of suspicion, i.e.*"—*Blue Book*, p. 435.

*It has been said that I hanged a vakeel, or envoy, of Dewan Moolraj's. I did *not*. I hanged his lieutenant; and could I have caught Moolraj, would have hanged

These two executions had a great effect both on Moolraj and Sher Sing's troops, and for a time hushed the voice of disaffection at the capital of the rebellion, but the determination and indefatigable hostility with which Moolraj strove during this interval to light up a flame in every corner of the country, may be judged of by the simultaneous movements which took place about this time in the Punjab, with every one of which he was more or less connected.

Two *emeutes* occurred in the countries under my own charge. In Bunnoo, about the end of July, the Sikh garrison of Duleepgurh mutinied, and were with difficulty put down by the energy of Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh, the Governor, whom I had specially provided for such a contingency. Lieutenant Taylor, in reporting it to the Resident, says: "The programme of the plot was much in the old Sikh style, from all I can hear; the officers were to have been killed, the guns seized, and the army, or body of mutineers, to have marched to Mooltan."*

The other *emeute* took place before the fort of Hurrund, where Moolraj's poetical Kardar, Mohkum Chund, still held out, and still quoted facetious Persian verses when called on to surrender. The story is told in the following letters:

him too. Of the sacred character of envoys, particularly in the East, where they are so virtuous, I am well aware. Moolraj never sent me but one; and instead of hanging him, I asked him to change sides, which he very prudently did, and brought several friends with him.

*"Blue Book," p. 261.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss from Mooltan,
"August 1st, 1848.

"A Puthan Chief, named Nassur Khan, Populzye, has been holding the country Dera Ghazee Khan during General Cortlandt's absence, and blockading the fort of Hurrund. As you are aware, the disaffected Futteh Pultun, which formerly sold my head for twelve thousand rupees, was purposely left behind with Nassur Khan, to get rid of so many secret enemies out of our own camp, and to give the regiment an opportunity of redeeming its character, if so inclined, by performing good service before the fort.

"Hitherto I have heard no complaints of the conduct of the regiment; Nassur Khan has always reported them as engaged in blockading the fort, and obeying his orders. A fortnight or three weeks ago Sirdar Shumsher Sing informed me *that Dewan Moolraj expected to be joined by the Futteh Pultun*; but, as the daily reports from the regiment received by General Cortlandt were satisfactory, I thought no more of the matter.

"This morning General Cortlandt received information from Nassur Khan, that he had detected the Futteh Pultun in correspondence with the rebel garrison of Hurrund; and when he took the intercepted letter to the Colonel of the regiment, and that officer called up all his subordinates to investigate the matter, the soldiers broke out into open mutiny. Nassur Khan retired to his own camp, and the Colonel and Commandant, separating themselves from the men, accompanied him. The mutineers proceeded to beat

to arms, and Nassur Khan followed their example, rallying around him his own cavalry, and several contingents of the neighbouring Moossulman tribes. Seeing Nassur Khan prepared, the Sikhs did not come to a collision; but Nassur Khan concludes his letter by saying that it was their intention, he believed, to join the rebel garrison; if they attempted which, he intended to muster all the Moossulmans he could, and fall upon them.

"In reply, I have instructed General Cortlandt to order Nassur Khan to raise the Muhommudan tribes without delay, and, on the slightest attempt on the part of the Futteh Pultun to join the rebels, to put every man of them to the sword. To induce the Beloochees to give this assistance to Nassur Khan, I have written to tell them that, should Nassur Khan find it necessary to call upon them to destroy the regiment, all the plunder that they take in the Futteh Pultun camp, whether Crown property or private, shall be theirs.

"It is not impossible that matters may have come to a crisis between the two parties before this; in which case, I feel confident that Nassur Khan will have entirely anticipated my orders, and the result will depend upon whether he had time enough to raise the country on his side. He is a brave soldier, and the work is not new to him; for he is the chief, who, with his own sowars alone, charged and defeated the Sikh regiment under Khizan Sing at Leia, capturing two guns. This was in Dewan Moolraj's former rebellion against Rajah Lal Sing, in 1846.

"I trust the decisive orders which I have sent to Nassur Khan, will meet with your entire approbation; and that

you will agree with me in thinking that after their perfidious conduct with me at Leia, in April last, the consideration which has been since shown them, and the encouraging purwanna in which you yourself exhorted the corps to remain loyal to the Maharajuh, they would deserve no mercy, even if their numbers were sufficiently insignificant to admit of our showing it."*

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss from Mooltan,

"August 4th, 1848.

"In continuation of my letter of the 1st of August, I have the honour to inform you that the night after the mutiny of the Futteh Pultun, six companies of the regiment struck their tents, and *commenced their march to the fort of Hurrund, intending to join the rebel garrison.* On hearing this Nassur Khan, with his own sowars, and as many Beloochees as he could collect, made for the fort by a shorter road, and drew up his little band across the line of march of the Futteh Pultun. This gallant manœuvre met with the success which it deserved; for the mutineers, seeing that they were intercepted, and would not be able to execute their purpose without a struggle, marched back again to their former camp, whence they sent vakeels to Nassur Khan to beg forgiveness, attributing their misconduct to the regiment being greatly in arrears of pay. Nassur Khan, however, assigns a much more probable cause, namely, *that a soldier of the regiment had been to Mooltan to make a*

*"Blue Book," pp. 271, 2.

bargain with Dewan Moolraj, and had just returned with an order from the Dewan to the rebel Kardar of Hurrund, to give the regiment a present of two months' pay, and gold bracelets to the officers, if they joined the garrison.

"The Colonel and some few others sided with Nassur Khan throughout, and, strange to say, the other two companies of the regiment, which were on duty in trenches close to the fort, came away, and joined Nassur Khan and their Colonel, instead of joining the mutineers. What is still more curious, these two companies were commanded by Bughail Sing, Commandant, notoriously the greatest intriguer in the regiment. Their good conduct is, perhaps, accounted for by the fact, that the garrison immediately sallied out, and broke up the intrenchments which the two companies had left.

"The whole regiment, subsequently, begged Nassur Khan to intercede for their pardon, and went through the farcical Sikh ceremony of swearing fidelity on the Grunth. The whole affair is eminently characteristic of the treacherous, avaricious, and intriguing Sikh soldier; another proof, added to the many afforded by the Mooltan rebellion, of the imperative necessity of remodelling the Khalsa army, if we wish for security in the Punjab. Lieutenant Lumsden is, I believe, engaged in revising the internal economy of that army, but, paramount to this, is the necessity of totally altering its constitution, which is rotten to the core. This, however, is a subject for after consideration.

"I have instructed General Cortlandt for the present to send the arrears of pay of the Futteh Pultun (which have only just reached this camp from Lahore) to the Kardar of

Dera Ghazee Khan, and write to the Futteh Pultun that the same will be given to them whenever they make over the ringleaders to Nassur Khan. Nassur Khan has also been warned to place not a moment's trust in the regiment, and be prepared to destroy it on the first symptoms of another outbreak."*

Almost on the same date (August 2nd), Major George Lawrence was writing to the Resident as follows from Peshawur:

"*The emissary of Dewan Moolraj having been seized by one of the Euzufzye Khans in the act of inciting to rebellion*, has confessed the act, and I would solicit your orders as to his disposal.

"He says that he was entertained by the Dewan at fifteen rupees per mensem, and *deputed with a hurkaruh to proceed* via *Bunnoo with letters to the Ameer of Cabul, soliciting aid from thence*; that, on delivering the letters, the Ameer declared himself our ally, and declined having anything to do with the Dewan; that he thence came hither, and from this proceeded into Euzufzye, *where he offered Khadir Khan, of Akoo, a jageer of twenty-five thousand rupees, and the people exemption from paying revenue for some years, if they would rise in insurrection* about the 18th or 20th of the month Bhadon, at which date, he said, the Sikhs would be all up in arms against the British.

"The troops are so orderly, and all is so quiet here, that a summary example of this incendiary is not absolutely

*"Blue Book," p. 273.

necessary, though as doubtless there are many others about, ultimately his execution here might seem to you desirable."*

The Resident appears to have ordered this incendiary to be hanged, for we afterwards find the following from Major Lawrence, though without date in the "Blue Book."†

"I have the honour to report the execution this morning of the Fakeer Wazeer Sing, Moolraj's emissary.

"A company (Muhommudans) of Meer Junglee's regiment, with a strong body of police, kept the ground; but there was no demonstration of sympathy made on behalf of the culprit, and I have not heard that it caused any sensation among the troops."

The three movements already mentioned (the *emeutes* in Bunnoo and Hurrund, and the agitation carried on by the emissary to Cabul and the Euzufzye country), had all for their direct object the assistance of Dewan Moolraj. The fourth, took place in Huzaruh; and though evidently originating in the opportunity afforded by Moolraj's rebellion in Mooltan, and probably encouraged by his inflammatory correspondence, yet its object was more remote, and its aim far more ambitious, than the mere procrastination of a murderer's punishment. The outbreak of Sirdar Chuttur Sing in Huzaruh was the first act of that great

*"Blue Book," p. 272.

†Page 275.

insurrection which suggested itself to the Sikh nation, in consequence of the delay which occurred in crushing the Mooltan rebellion;—a delay which, with an ignorance of the character and resources of the British-Indian Government, which has proved fatal to so many native princes, they were unable to comprehend, and therefore attributed to fear and weakness. Sirdar Chuttur Sing and Dewan Moolraj were not allies, although they helped each other's cause. Moolraj had committed murder, and was fighting for his life: Chuttur Sing for the supremacy of his race, and liberty to misrule their country. Moolraj raised the standard of independence, and desired to alienate one of the fairest provinces of the Punjab; Chuttur Sing raised the national standard of the Khalsa, and desired to regain the provinces which had been forfeited by invading India in 1845. Had both Moolraj and Chuttur Sing succeeded against the English, their arms must next have been turned against each other.

The revolt of Sirdar Chuttur Sing in Huzaruh will be found fully detailed by Lord Dalhousie in a letter to the Secret Committee, dated the 7th of September.* It will be sufficient here to state generally that Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Sikh Governor of the Huzaruh province, and Major Abbott his controller and adviser, in the same relation that the Resident at Lahore stood to the Sikh Durbar. Early in August Major Abbott's information led him to believe that a brigade of the Huzaruh force, stationed in a district called Pukli, which had been in a disaffected state for a month past, had at length determined to leave its

*See "Blue Book," pp. 267—70.

cantonments and march upon Lahore, as part of a general insurrection of the Sikh army which Sirdar Chuttur Sing was to head.

Major Abbott proceeded to raise the *posse comitatus* of Huzaruh in the same way that I had done beyond the Indus. He was not merely respected, but beloved by the wild Muhommudan tribes, who rose willingly at his bidding, and drew a *cordon* round the Sikh troops.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing's head-quarters were in the strong fort of Hurkishengurh, in the town of Hurripoor. In the town was a troop of horse artillery commanded by a European named Canora, who had attained the rank of Colonel in the Sikh army. This officer's knowledge of the Sikhs seems to have led him to the same conclusion as Major Abbott as to Chuttur Sing's designs; and he considered that his duty to the Sikh Sovereign required him to support the British administrators of the country during that Sovereign's minority, in compliance with the treaty of Bhyrowal, and not to join even the Prince's father-in-law in trying to expel the English. Accordingly when Sirdar Chuttur Sing, under pretence that the guns were in danger, ordered Colonel Canora to bring them out of the town of Hurripoor, and place them in his power at the fort of Hurkishengurh, the Colonel refused to do so without the order was sanctioned by Major Abbott. The Sirdar sent soldiers to seize the guns; the Colonel planted himself between them with a lighted match, and threatened to shoot any one who approached; when some of the Sikh soldiers got behind him, under cover of some buildings, and shot him dead.

After this, says Major Abbott, "The Sirdar immediately ordered up the Hussun Abdal, Rawal Pindee, and Kurara

forces, in all about five regiments with a body of horse. I have ordered out the armed peasantry, and will do my best to destroy the Sikh army."*

Thus began the insurrection of the Sikh army, which caused the raising of the first siege of Mooltan and ended in the second Sikh war, and annexation of the Punjab to British India.

An important question connected with the event is, whether Major Abbott justly or unjustly suspected Chuttur Sing? whether that officer discovered, or caused, the Sirdar's rebellion?

Chuttur Sing, of course, affirmed the latter; but those who know anything of history, know that even the worst men are always solicitous to give an appearance of justice to their worst actions. That it was politic of him to do so is clear from the fact that, for some time even the Resident at Lahore thought the Sirdar an injured man, and I, at Mooltan, entirely disbelieved that he was conspiring to subvert a state of things in which his own family held so honourable a position. But I now take this public opportunity of acknowledging that I think, on mature reflection, I did injustice in both my official and demi-official correspondence during this early period of the war to Major Abbott's penetration of the Sirdar's designs. That able and upright officer needs neither defence nor eulogium from me; he has received both from the Governor-General of India. But it is wrong to persist in error for the sake of an appearance of consistency, and I own that I gave Chuttur

*See "Blue Book," p. 301.

Sing much more credit than he deserved. I still disagree with Major Abbott, in thinking that there was any organized conspiracy against the English before Chuttur Sing rebelled; but I think subsequent events have fully justified Major Abbott in suspecting the Sirdar himself of rebellion.

This, however, is a point for the consideration of the historian of the second Sikh war; and, having given my evidence as a simple witness, I pass on to that branch of the inquiry which is connected with the siege of Mooltan.

The question with which my reader and I are interested in this Huzaruh mutiny is "how far Rajah Sher Sing, then encamped before Mooltan, was concerned in his father's schemes?" In a few words, my belief is that he was necessarily ignorant of them (because they were non-existing) when he undertook to lead against Mooltan an army which would any day have joined the rebels had he wished them to do so, and so have saved Moolraj from being defeated at Kineyree and Suddoosam. I believe that Chuttur Sing's schemes were only conceived in June; that Sher Sing was early made acquainted with them, was opposed to them (being quite satisfied with that order of things which had made him a Rajah), concealed them for reasons natural but not treasonable, laboured for several weeks to dissuade his father from involving the family and country in ruin, and ultimately succumbed under the pressure of his own mutinous soldiers and his father's awful maledictions.

The Rajah's honest endeavours to extricate his wrong-headed father from a position of mischievous power, commence with the following interview.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Tibbee, two koss from Mooltan,

"July 28th, 1848.

"Yesterday evening Rajah Sher Sing Attareewalluh begged me to grant him a private interview, at which he laid before me the wishes of his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with reference to the celebration of the marriage of his daughter with Maharajuh Duleep Sing.

"He said that *Sirdar Chuttur Sing had enjoined him to tell me* (with a view of course of my submitting the same to you) *that he is anxious to pass the few remaining years of his life in the performance of such religious duties as are becoming one of his age.* Two things remain for him to do in this world: one to perform the prescribed round of pilgrimages, and the other to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. The latter duty he considers to have the first call upon him, but the event is dependent upon the wishes of the British Government. If it is not your intention that the nuptials of the Maharajuh should be celebrated some time within the next twelve months, *the Sirdar would wish to be allowed to lay aside the duties of his Huzaruh Government, and proceed on pilgrimage for two years*; if on the contrary the marriage is to take place this year, the Sirdar would suggest that, with your sanction, the Durbar should appoint astrologers on the part of the Maharajuh to fix an auspicious month and day, in conjunction with other astrologers on the part of the bride; for the Rajah says that after the day has been fixed it will take nearly a year to prepare the costly presents which Sirdar Chuttur Sing will have to give on the occasion.

"The above is the substance of the Rajah's conversation, and he earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you within ten days. The request seems strange at the present moment, but the Rajah particularly explained that his father would not have mentioned the matter had he not looked upon the Mooltan rebellion as a thing disposed of."*

I attributed this application at the time to a desire entertained by the Sikh people, of which the Attareewalluh family might be supposed the mouthpiece, to know whether the British Government considered the treaty broken by the Mooltan rebellion. But by the fuller light of subsequent events I read it differently now, and understand that Sher Sing was desirous either to extract such a confirmation of his sister's marriage with the Maharajuh as might quiet his father; or else to procure his father's recall from Huzaruh, where he was fast becoming involved in the meshes of a military conspiracy. Unhappily the full meaning of the application did not appear; and the only answer it elicited was, that "there was no objection to the marriage being celebrated at such time, and in such manner, as may be most satisfactory to the parties themselves and the Durbar."†

On the 14th of August, Major-General Whish, with the right column of his army, had reached Sirdarpoor, and in three or four days would reach Mooltan. Rajah Sher

*"Blue Book," pp. 270, 1.

†"Ibid," p. 273.

Sing's army, which was encamped at Sooruj Koond between me and the coming British force, had now, by constant tampering with the rebels, been reduced to a most unsatisfactory condition. Daily desertions were taking place to the enemy, although the British army was known to be close at hand; and the news from Huzaruh, which was worse and worse everyday, threatened soon to disorganize the Sikh division altogether. Under these circumstances it seemed to me desirable to lose no time in removing such a disaffected force from between mine and General Whish's; and on the evening of the 15th of August I sent for Rajah Sher Sing, Sirdar Shumsher Sing, and Sirdar Uttur Sing, and communicated my wish that their force and mine should exchange positions on the following morning. They were all somewhat surprised. Sher Sing objected to being put in a corner out of the way of the fighting, which of course, he said, "would be on the side where the British troops are;" and he even warmly entreated me to give him an opportunity of wiping away whatever reproach his father's conduct in Huzaruh might have occasioned. Uttur Sing, Kalehwalla, on the contrary, was alarmed at the prospect of the force being brought into proximity with the enemy; for his own division was the worst in the whole camp. All three Sirdars however agreed; and the march was effected next day as follows:

The object being while exchanging the two positions to maintain possession of both; the whole of our infantry, and artillery, with the exception of one troop, moved off at daybreak from Tibbee (where we had been encamped six weeks,) followed by the baggage; while the whole of the cavalry, with six horse artillery guns, under command of

Lake and Lumsden, made a demonstration to the rear towards Mooltan, so as to give time for Rajah Sher Sing's force to come up, and occupy our old encampment. In like manner Sher Sing's force moved off at daybreak from Sooruj Koond, leaving a division with three guns to hold three bridges over the canal till our arrival.

The propriety of these precautions was soon proved; as scarcely had our main body moved from Tibbee, than a large division of Dewan Moolraj's force moved out across the bridge in front of the Bohur Gate of the city, and advanced towards the plain of Suddoosam, until brought to a standstill by the steady front shown by Lake and Lumsden, who boldly faced the enemy, and held him in check until near eleven o'clock in the day, when, despairing of plunder, he retired again within the walls of Mooltan. As soon as the Rajah had occupied Tibbee, our rear-guard withdrew, and followed us to Sooruj Koond, where we relieved the Rajah's detachments at the Sooruj Koond bridges, and thus completed the exchange of positions without any incident worthy of notice. Our anxiety, however, must have been great respecting the issue; for I remember that we marched to meet the Rajah in order of battle, and halted in firm array to let him and his troops go by. He was on an elephant, muffled up to the eyes, to keep off the dust with which the combined movement of so many men filled the air. I was still unable to mount a horse, and was carried in a palkee. He sent an orderly to ask me how I was, and I sent another to ask how *he* was; we both waited for the answer, then waved a polite "Good-bye," and pursued our respective marches. In my journal I find the following memorandum of a note to the Resident: "It was a delicate

combination, but I thought every post from Huzaruh would make it more so. I am glad it is over!"

That very day a soldier spy of General Cortlandt's reported the arrival of two horsemen with letters from Huzaruh, the contents of which transpired, and threw the whole of Sher Sing's camp into a ferment: Chuttur Sing having written to his son, that he was involved in the mess; that nothing could save their family but the success of Moolraj; to promote which the Rajah was exhorted to go over at once, with all his own force, and as much of mine as he could seduce. Similar advice reached me from the Resident. Now therefore, commenced on my part, a series of earnest and most friendly exertions to save Rajah Sher Sing from ruin. I liked the Rajah: I believe he liked me. He had always behaved well in my judgment, and I reported his having done so. He was grateful for this testimony, and leant on my support in his difficult enterprise to disobey an angry father, and control a rebellious army which had his father's countenance. I can truly say, therefore, that I laboured hard to help him, and could do nothing more than I did, if it were all to come over again.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Sooruj Koond,

"August 19th, 1848.

"The night before last, being apprized by your letters of the critical state of affairs in Huzaruh, and how deeply Sirdar Chuttur Sing had become involved therein, I sent for the confidential servant of Rajah Sher Sing, and told

him that the time was come for speaking plainly to his master, and I begged him to assure the Rajah from me that as far as I could yet understand the disturbances in Huzaruh, Sirdar Chuttur Sing must be considered the victim, rather than the leader, of the Sikh soldiery; that if he was so, nothing could be easier than for him to make satisfactory explanations to either Mr. Cocks or Lieutenant Nicholson; *but that even supposing the Sirdar to be guilty, this ought not to cause the Rajah more than the natural anxiety of a son.* I had heard, I said, in the morning, that messengers had arrived from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in Huzaruh, detailing the Sirdar's desperate position, the length to which he had gone in opposition to Captain Abbott, the murder of Canora, &c., and the impossibility of the credit of the Attareewalluh family being now saved, and there being nothing now left for Rajah Sher Sing but to go into rebellion and join Dewan Moolraj, not only with all his own force, but with as much of mine as he could manage to seduce; and finally, that the receipt of these incendiary letters had caused the utmost excitement in the Rajah's camp; the soldiers calling upon the Rajah to follow his father's advice, and the Rajah hesitating between prudence and mistaken patriotism.

"If, I said, this be true, the Rajah's position is evidently a difficult one, but not too much so for the Rajah's common-sense and loyalty to meet. *Let the Rajah fully believe that no misconduct of his father could ever criminate the Rajah in the eyes of the British Government*; *and take my word, that if Sirdar Chuttur Sing were to attack Captain Abbott sword in hand, it would in no way diminish the cordial approbation with which the Resident at Lahore has regarded the Rajah's*

loyal endeavours to maintain discipline in the Sikh force before Mooltan.

"The Rajah's motbir was, I think, not prepared for so candid a discussion of the question, and confined himself to solemn assurances that no such letters had been received from Huzaruh; adding, that the Rajah would himself call upon me next day, read me the letters he had received, and ask my advice upon the whole affair. I had wished to ride out next morning to meet General Whish, on his arrival at Mooltan with the right column; but considering the conduct of the Rajah at this crisis of the very last importance to the Maharajuh's Government, I readily consented to stay at home to receive his visit.

"I am very glad that I did so, for I had yesterday morning a most satisfactory interview with the Rajah; he *frankly and warmly thanked me for having opened my mind to him on the subject, and relieved him from the embarrassing idea that he must himself naturally be suspected by the British of conspiring with his father.* The letters from Sirdar Chuttur Sing were then produced and read to me;* and from their tone, it was clear that the Sirdar was somewhat offended, but much more alarmed, at being wrongfully suspected of treason; and the Rajah was adjured to exert his influence to set his father's conduct in the right light. As to the murder of Canora, it was spoken of as Canora's own fault, and resorted to only in self-defence. Much stress was laid on

*Subsequent events make it probable that the letters shown to me here were not all that came from Huzaruh, or were even substituted for those which did come. An Asiatic would believe with the Romanist, that such an act would be justified by the good motive of making a father's peace.

Captain Abbott not having consulted the Sirdar, who found himself, and the whole Sikh force, suddenly proscribed and threatened with death by the Muhommudan tribes.

"The Rajah discussed the matter with great good sense, and put it to me, whether all that his father had done to oppose the Moolkias was not perfectly natural and excusable, on the supposition that he was innocent of the plots suspected by Captain Abbott. 'No man,' said he, 'will allow himself to be killed without a struggle.' At the same time, he quite admitted that his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, had been to blame for not keeping up a more friendly communication with Captain Abbott, an estrangement to which he traced all that officer's suspicion.

"One argument which the Rajah often repeated was, that his father had called the Hussan Abdal troops to him in Huzaruh, whereas, if he had wished to assist Moolraj, the Sirdar would himself have left Huzaruh, and taken the Hussan Abdal troops on his way.

"As to himself, Rajah Sher Sing said, that if words and protestations were of any use, he would take all the oaths in the Grunth; but that he thought actions were the best proofs of loyalty. At a time when no Sirdar in Lahore could be found to lead a Sikh army against Mooltan for fear of disgrace, he volunteered for the invidious duty; and that I might judge of the difficulty of the task, even at this moment, he informed me of what I was not previously aware, that he has never been able to intrust the only regular regiment with him with the custody of the guns, sentries for

which have always been furnished by his own Ramgoles,* with orders to fire upon the Poorbeeuhs if they attempted a surprise. 'At Sirdarpoor,' he said, 'when the Ghobarchees† grumbled, it was I who flooged them; at Sooruj Koond it was I who put Moolraj's messengers on an ass, and blackened their faces; it was I who detected and exposed Shoojan Sing's intrigues; it was I whom Moolraj attempted to poison; and it is I who have to bear, on one side, all the suspicion of betraying the English, and on the other, all the odium of betraying the Khalsa.' Finally, the Rajah said, he had many enemies in the Durbar, and that he must put his honour in my keeping: if I doubted him, he was ready to remain a prisoner in my camp, or to fight like a common soldier by my side; but that if I trusted him, he hoped I would assign him an honourable post in the approaching operations, and give him an opportunity of wiping away the reproach which his father had brought on the family.

"The Rajah expressed every confidence in the happy settlement of the Huzaruh affair, if no collision took place before Jhunda Sing's arrival; and hoped that the breach might not be widened by any severe reproof to the regiments who had marched from Hussan Abdal, as they were under the orders of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. After reconciliation with Captain Abbott, the Rajah *begged that his father's resignation of the Huzaruh appointment might be accepted* in such a manner as not to dishonour the Sirdar (*i.e.*, after

*Ramgoles were a kind of irregular infantry in use at Peshawur, of which province Sher Sing had been Governor.

†Ghobarchees are bombadiers.

refusing once or twice to part with so valuable a public servant), and that he might be allowed to go on pilgrimage for three years, and leave the Rajah to celebrate the Maharajuh's marriage.

"I have given but an imperfect account of the Rajah's lengthy arguments, but his manner was earnest and convincing; and I feel assured that if the Rajah is unable to make the Sikh force very active allies in the approaching siege, he will, at least, prevent them from being enemies; his conduct has, as you are aware, given me satisfaction all along; and I shall be glad if he is able to complete his claim to your approbation, by exhibiting a Sikh force fighting for once on the side of government and order."*

Such was the condition of the Sikh force, which had so unhappily been allowed to reach Mooltan, at the time when General Whish arrived to undertake the siege; such still the lingering loyalty of its Commander, the evil influences to which he was exposed, and the good influence on which he might rely to resist them.

The right column of the British besieging army under General Whish, encamped at Seetul-ke-Maree, before the fortress of Mooltan, on the 18th of August, 1848.

On the night of the 16th, Moolraj had a mind to ascertain the temper of his new enemies by a night attack, and dispatched a light detachment of fifteen hundred infantry and three hundred and fifty horse, to beat up General

*"Blue Book," pp. 293—5.

Whish's quarters, then about eleven miles from Mooltan. To be provided for all contingencies, with the insolence of an Asiatic enemy, they took out a quantity of artillery horses, ready harnessed, in order to bring away all the guns they meant to capture. It so happened that, in accordance with the custom of Sikh troops, both Rajah Sher Sing's and our artillery fired a *feu de joie* that night on the occasion of our change of position in the morning, a ceremony which, in our camp at least, was considerably prolonged by General Cortlandt's right loyal gunners, in honour of our approaching friends. This heavy cannonade put the British camp on the *qui vive*, and the General ordered all the tents to be struck, and the troops to get under arms, in case it should be necessary to march to Mooltan, and assist in the supposed engagement with the enemy. Scarcely had this been done than the rebel detachment reached the British camp, and instead of finding all plunged in sleep, except the usual sentries, they were received with such a rattling fire that, after fruitlessly assailing the pickets, they fled in confusion, as many as possible mounting the artillery horses which they had brought for such a different purpose. In this affair the British only had six men and two horses wounded; none killed. The enemy lost forty killed, many more wounded, and some taken prisoners;* but it has never been denied that they carried off with them EXPERIENCE, that battered trophy of every battle of life.

One more attack was made on the allied besiegers ere they could begin their siege. On the evening of the 17th of August, every member of the party which sat down to

*See General Whish's Report, "Blue Book," p. 292.

mess in our camp (which henceforward we must call the Irregular Camp, for distinction), was seized with violent sickness during dinner. One by one we rose and left the table, and when we called for the doctor, found he too was sick, and could not assist any of us. Now that it is all over, I cannot help laughing at the scene, though it was serious enough at the time. There we were—Lake, Lumsden, Cortlandt, young Hugo James, Cole, and myself—all sitting outside our tents in the bright cool moonlight, with servants pressing our foreheads, and every one of our heads in a basin, groaning like passengers in a steamer. In vain every one shouted, "Cole! Cole! come here;" a voice no longer to be recognised for the merry doctor's replied at convulsive intervals: "It's no use your calling—my dear—fellows—you're all poisoned, and—I'm poisoned myself—and, O dear! I am sure I shall die!"

So convinced was Cole that he should never get over it, that he bequeathed his rifle to Lumsden, who was, between his own fits, supporting the doctor. "Take it, my dear boy—it's the two-ounce, and—will reach—O my goodness!" In the midst of all our sufferings (which for the time they lasted were really severe), the unseasonable sound of suppressed laughter reached my ears, and listening for a moment I heard three voices making extremely merry over the sad condition of "the Feringhees." My suspicions were naturally aroused by a tone and language so strange in the midst of my own people, and advancing to the spot I found a barber, a water-carrier, and a scullion, collected round a fire, on which one of them was cooking his dinner. Calling for a light, I scrutinized their faces, and not knowing them, asked who they were? They had become serious

now, and putting up their hands, replied: "We are my Lord's servants." "Why," I said, "I never saw you before in my life." Several old servants stepped forward, and explained that these strangers had been entertained in the place of other servants who were ill; an affair with which they had not thought it worthwhile to trouble me in such busy times. "And where did they come from?" At first nobody knew; but at last it appeared that they had all come out of the city of Mooltan; and that for the last fortnight (during which we had all experienced similar attacks, though much milder), our meals had been cooked, and our water-jars filled, by the assistance of these visitors from the enemy's camp.

There were no means of legally convicting them of a systematic conspiracy to poison us; but I did not hesitate to make the barber shave off the beards of the water-carrier and the scullion, and the scullion and water-carrier shave the barber on the spot; after which I had them all soundly flogged and turned out of the camp, when they ran as hard as their legs could carry them to Mooltan.

We all got over the attack in a few hours—even our good friend the doctor—and were never attacked again, so that we thought we were not uncharitable in the conclusion that our *ci-devant* domestics had been emissaries of Dewan Moolraj—that treacherous host who murdered his two guests in the Eedgah—that dastardly enemy who bribed Shoojan Sing to poison his General at Sooruj Koond.

CHAPTER IX

STRENGTH AND ROUTE OF GENERAL WHISH'S ARMY—STRENGTH OF IRREGULAR CORPS BEFORE MOOLTAN—STRENGTH OF MOOLRAJ—IRREGULARS CHANGE GROUND ON THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER—SKIRMISH AT KUTTEE BYRAGEE—GENERAL WHISH RECONNOITRES—THE IRREGULAR CAMP IS FOUND TO BE UNDER FIRE, BUT IS MAINTAINED—THE REBELS IN MOOLTAN ARE SUMMONED TO SURRENDER—THEIR REPLY—A COUNCIL OF WAR DISCUSSES THREE PLANS OF ATTACK—DEFENCE OF THE ONE CHOSEN—THE SIEGE OPENED ON THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER—NIGHT FIGHT ON THE 9TH OF SEPTEMBER—ANECDOTES OF LIEUTENANT RICHARDSON AND CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER—GLORIOUS CAPTURE OF THE DHURMSALAH ON THE 12TH OF SEPTEMBER—MOOLTAN NOW WITHIN THE GRASP OF THE BESIEGERS—WHY THEY DID NOT GRASP IT—STORY OF SHER SING'S DEFECTION—INQUIRY INTO HIS MOTIVES—GENERAL WHISH'S POLICY TOWARDS SHER SING APPROVED—THE GENERAL'S DESPATCH ON RAISING THE SIEGE MAY BE MISCONSTRUED, AND IS EXPLAINED—THE RAISING OF THE SIEGE DEFENDED—REMOVAL OF IRREGULAR AND BRITISH CAMPS TO SOORUJ KOOND AND ARABY—MOOLRAJ DISTRUSTS SHER SING, AND IS ABANDONED BY HIS COLLEAGUES UTTER SING AND SHUMSHER SING—NOTE ON THE AUTHOR'S TREATMENT OF ALL THREE—SHER SING'S MANIFESTOES—THE AUTHOR TAKES GENERAL CORTLANDT'S REGULARS INTO THE BRITISH SERVICE TO SECURE THEIR FIDELITY—THE RESIDENT AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL

APPROVE IT—SHER SING TRIES TO TAKE THE FORT OF MOOLTAN FOR HIMSELF—A STRATAGEM COMPLETES THE DIVISION BETWEEN HIM AND MOOLRAJ—SHER SING MAKES HIS PEACE BY DEPARTURE, AND BAFFLES PURSUIT BY THE SWIFTNESS OF HIS FLIGHT—THE SIKH ARMY IN BUNNOO REBELS—THE MAIDEN SIEGE OF DULEEPGURH, AND NOBLE DEATH OF THE GOVERNOR.

APPENDIX

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE ALLIED IRREGULAR FORCES DURING THE FIRST SIEGE OF MOOLTAN.

CHAPTER IX

General Whish's army moved down to Mooltan in two columns; one along the left bank of the river Ravee, and the other along the right bank of the river Sutlej.

The right column, with the General's headquarters, marched from Lahore on the 24th of July, and encamped at Seetul-ke-Maree before Mooltan on the 18th of August.

The left column, commanded by Brigadier Salter, marched from Ferozepoor in the British provinces on the 26th of July, and joined headquarters on the 19th of August.

The European regiment, attached to each column, went as far as practicable by water. The siege-train was also put in boats; and, with Major Napier, the chief engineer, left the landing-place at Ferozepoor on the 30th of July. On the 15th of August it reached Bindree Ghat, opposite Bhawulpoor; and was there disembarked by the sappers and miners, who, under the command of Captain H. Siddons, left Loodiana at forty-eight hours' notice on the 13th of July, Ferozepoor on the 26th of the same month and reached Bindree Quay on August the 2nd, where they employed the interval until the arrival of the heavy guns in

"practising field-works, the corps having had no instruction since the cold season of 1844-5"*

The disembarkation of the siege-train and its immense *materiel*, though carried on with unusual energy by Major Napier and a noble staff of young engineers, occupied many days; and the heavy guns did not reach Mooltan until the 4th of September.

Thus assembled, the strength of Major-General Whish's force is thus given by Major Siddons:

*Major Siddons' "Journal of the Siege of Mooltan:" a paper which I shall have occasion to quote frequently in this chapter, as containing in a concise form the facts of the siege, carefully and impartially compiled by its lamented author, from official documents.

ABSTRACT OF THE BRITISH FORCE BEFORE MOOLTAN DURING THE FIRST SIEGE, IN SEPTEMBER, 1848

TROOPS	PRESENT EFFECTIVE				SICK				DETAIL OF THE TROOPS
	Officers				Officers				
	European	Native	Men	Horses	European.	Native	Men	Horses	
Divisional and Brigade Staff*	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2 troops of Native Horse Artillery.	11	3	213	331	—	—	3	2	4th troop of 1st brigade, and 4th troop of 3rd brigade, Horse Artillery.
3 companies of European and 1 company of Native Foot Artillery.	9	4	337	—	—	1	22	—	2nd company, 2nd battalion 3rd ,, 3rd ,, 4th ,, 3rd ,, 6th ,, 7th ,,
5 companies of Sappers and Pioneers.	12	4	399	—	—	1	14	—	3 companies of Sappers and Miners. 2 companies of Pioneers.
1 regiment of Regular and 2 regiments of Irregular Native Cavalry.	23	34	1138	1185	—	1	23	44	11th Light Cavalry. 7th Irregular Cavalry. 11th ,, ,,
2 regiments of European Infantry.	61	—	1680	—	—	—	60	—	H.M.'s 10th and 32nd regiments of Foot.
5 regiments of Native Infantry.	69	74	3746	—	2	1	60	—	8th, 49th, 51st, 52nd and 72nd regiments of Native Infantry.
Total strength	209	119	7513	1516	2	4	182	46	With 32 pieces of siege ordnance, and 12 horse artillery guns.

*Including 9 engineer officers, not attached to Sappers and Miners.

NOTE—There was also a squadron of the 14th Irregular Cavalry present; probably about 200 men.

The following returns will show the strength of the other forces assembled before Mooltan at the beginning of the first siege, independent of numerous detachments from each in the districts round.

	Infantry	CAVALRY		ORDNANCE		
		Regular	Irregular	Horse Artillery Guns	Mortars	Camel-Swivels
General Van Cortlandt's						
3 Regular Infantry Regiments 1 Company of Sappers 1 Troop Sikh Cavalry 3 Troops Horse Artillery	2090	62	—	17	2	—
Irregular Levies of Lieutenant Edwardes.	3074	—	2700	—	—	25
Sheikh Emamoodeen's ditto, ditto, with Artillery Detachment.	1904	—	190	2	—	—
Dewan Jowahir Mull's ditto, ditto.	650	—	181	2	—	—
Total force under command of Lieutenant Edwardes.	7718	62	3071	21	2	25
Nuwab Bhawul Khan's Army, commanded by Lieutenant Lake.	5700	—	1900	14	—	18
Rajah Sher Sing's Sikh Army	909	114	3268	10	2	115
Grand Total of Irregular Camps	14327	176	8239	45	4	158

Major Siddons, in his "Journal of the Siege," estimates the garrison of Mooltan, to which the above forces were to be opposed, at twelve thousand men; and their artillery at fifty-four guns and five mortars. But I see by his Appendix that this statement is made from a return which I myself furnished on the 13th of October; at which period the raising of the siege, and temporary disappointment of the British, had brought numerous recruits to Moolraj's standard. It is my belief that on the 1st of September, the Dewan had not more than ten thousand men, of whom about one thousand two hundred were cavalry.

Having thus ranged the opposing armies, let us now commence the siege.

The British force being encamped at Seetul-ke-Maree, and my own and Lieutenant Lake's at Sooruj Koond, there remained an interval of about six miles between the two camps; and as the siege-train was moving up from the Sutlej, it was desirable that we should close in upon each other, and not leave an opening for the enemy's cavalry to pass through, and get into our rear. Accordingly General Whish ordered me to leave my position at Sooruj Koond, and move to a point in our right front, called Mosum Khan's Well, about two miles nearer to Mooltan.

At daylight on the 1st of September, we defiled over the three bridges at Sooruj Koond, passed through about half a mile of broken ground, and then deploying, moved down in line upon the position we were ordered to occupy. Strong parties of Rohillas and Ukalees had been posted by Moolraj in two walled gardens, called Khooda Yar's, and Kuttee Byragee; but we dislodged them, and drove them

forward over a very strong jungly country, till we had completely cleared the position we required; when we encamped about three hundred yards in rear of Jog Maie (a temple erected by Moolraj's mother), with our extreme right extending half a mile to the eastward of that building, our centre resting upon Kuttee Byragee, and our left upon the great canal of Wullee Muhommud.

This position, which (for lack of water any farther south) was a much more advanced one than General Whish had indicated, was not obtained without a severe and protracted skirmish, in which my friends, Lake and Pollock (the latter a young political officer who had accompanied the British force from Lahore), distinguished themselves, in expelling the enemy from Jog Maie, and the village of Daera. Lumsden's guides also, and the Sheikh's division, bore themselves most gallantly on this morning; and what surprised me greatly, Rajah Sher Sing, without any order, mounted some guns on the high bank of the canal, and assisted our advance by enfilading the enemy.

Besides young Hugo James, another volunteer went with me into this field, and assisted me greatly in carrying orders—poor Christopher, of the Indian navy, whose zeal proved fatal to him so shortly after. On this occasion he rode about with a long sea telescope under his arm, just as composedly as if he had been on the deck of his own vessel.

While this skirmish was going on to the south of the fort of Mooltan, General Whish skilfully availed himself of the opportunity to make a close reconnoissance of its northern face. A small party of the staff, containing the

General and his chief engineer, Major Napier, stole forward, and got into the Eedgah (where poor Agnew and Anderson were murdered), and made a leisurely observation of the great fortress before them; "Proving," says Major Siddons, "that it was no contemptible place of arms." As the party retired, the enemy, for the first time, perceived what was going on, and opened a fire from the fort, but did no injury.

As soon as the dust and smoke occasioned by our move and skirmish had cleared off from Kuttee Byragee, the irregular camp was found to be actually pitched within range of the enemy's guns, on the Khoonee Boorj, or Bloody Bastion, of the city walls; and from that time forth we became a kind of target for Moolraj to practise on; but, as our holding the position was considered essential to the general operations, we continued to do so, a fact which must ever be considered highly creditable to these undisciplined troops; for not only was the camp of their British allies never under fire, but such a thing is unheard of in regular warfare. The men threw up intrenchments, and burrowed in holes, to screen themselves; but it was impossible to prevent loss, both of men and horses, from the shifting fire which harassed us from different points of the fortifications; while at the same time our close proximity kept the pickets constantly engaged with the enemy's matchlockmen in our front. The officers' tents, however, were the favourite mark of Moolraj's gunners. These were pitched, for shelter, under the lee of the Kuttee Byragee garden, which the rebels discovering, skilfully elevated their guns so as to drop the shot just over the tops of the trees. One Sunday morning, I remember, the nerves of our little

congregation were disturbed by about twenty shot falling round the tents, in the space of a very few minutes; and when at length one found its "billet," and smashed a man's thigh at the door, a general rush was made to our own guns, and the whole strength of the artillery bent upon the Bloody Bastion until its fire was silenced. On another occasion, Major Napier came over to me one night to talk over the morrow's plans. We sat together under the awning of my tent, with our feet resting on the table, in the favourite attitude of Englishmen in the East, sipping hot tea, and breathing the cool night-air. Lake, exhausted with his day's work, was fast asleep in his bed under the same awning as ourselves. Presently the rebel gunners seemed to awake, and one shot buried itself hissing in the sand by Napier's side; then another ripped its way by me. A third fell at the head of Lake's bed, and his servant immediately got up, and with great carefulness turned his bed round. Poor Lake gave a yawn, and asked sleepily, "What's the matter?" "Nothing!" replied the Bearer, "it's only a cannonball!" Lake went to sleep again. Five minutes later another shot fell at his feet, and seemed to say "Pish!" as it hit nothing but the ground, when it came for a *man*. Again the good Bearer shifted his master's bed, and again Lake, half asleep, asked "What's the matter *now*?" and was told in reply, "*Another* cannon-ball—nothing more!" on which he said "Oh!" and returned calmly to the land of dreams, while Napier and I finished our conversation. This shows what habit brings us to. If a naughty boy was, at this moment, to throw a pebble-stone through the study window before me, I should probably be unable to think of anything else for an hour.

On the 4th of September the siege-train arrived from the Sutlej; and General Whish immediately summoned the garrison and inhabitants of Mooltan to surrender, by the following proclamation, copies of which, in Persian and Goormookhee, I caused to be introduced into the fort and town.

"PROCLAMATION BY MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. WHISH, C.B.
"COMMANDING THE ARMY BEFORE MOOLTAN, ADDRESSED,
"TO THE INHABITANTS AND GARRISON THEREOF.

"I invite both to an unconditional surrender, within twenty-four hours after the firing of a royal salute, at sunrise, to-morrow (5th of September), in honour of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and her ally, His Highness Maharajuh Duleep Sing.

"I shall, otherwise, in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Government of India, commence hostilities on a scale that must insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents, who, having begun their resistance to lawful authority with a most cowardly act of treachery and murder, seek to uphold their unrighteous cause by an appeal to religion, which every one must know to be sheer hypocrisy.

"If the town be surrendered to me, as above suggested, private property will be respected; and the garrison of the fort will be permitted to withdraw unmolested, on giving up Dewan Moolraj and his immediate associates, and laying down their arms at one of the eastern gates of the town, and fort, respectively.

"Given under my hand and seal this 4th day of September, 1848."

The same proclamation was read next morning at the head of the British force, and a royal salute fired from the heavy guns, which was taken up and faintly echoed by all the artillery of the Irregular and Rajah Sher Sing's camps. "But the only notice taken of it," says Major Siddons, "was a shot from the citadel, which was fired just as the reading was concluded, and must have been fired at an immense elevation, as it pitched into the earth just behind General Whish and staff, from a distance much exceeding two miles!"

On the 6th of September, General Whish assembled a council, whose proceedings are reported as below:

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT

"Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,

"September 7th, 1848.

"By the invitation of Major-General Whish, C.B., commanding the Mooltan field-force, I yesterday morning attended a meeting of officers at the General's tent, to arrange finally a plan of attack on the fort and city of Mooltan.

"There were present, as well as I can recollect, the following officers:

"Major-General Whish, C.B., commanding the Field Force; Colonel Drummond, C.B., Deputy Quarter-Master-

General; Major Napier, Chief Engineer; Major Garbett, Artillery; Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-Master-General; Captain Siddons, Assistant Engineer; Captain Garforth, Engineer; Captain Whish, Assistant Adjutant-General; General Cortlandt, Sikh Service; Lieutenant Lake, Engineers, in charge of the Daoodpotra army.

"Major Napier laid two plans before the Major-General:

"1st. To take first the town of Mooltan by a *coup de main*, at any cost, in one day, by the whole force moving down in line, getting within battering distance of the Khoonee Boorj, and storming the breach as soon as practicable.*

"2nd. To march round to the north, and attack the citadel by regular approaches.

"Major Napier admitted that the first plan must cost life, if successful, and might prove a failure; but he recommended the risk being run, for political reasons, and with reference to the state of the Punjab generally, which renders an immediate moral effect necessary: and this being the avowed reason on which Major Napier advised a *coup de main*, the Major-General called upon me, as in your confidence, to state whether I considered the times demanded that so great a risk, and certain loss of life should be incurred? I respectfully submitted my opinion that, Sirdar

*Here Major Siddons in further explanation adds: "After which the attack of the fort to be carried on from the line of houses bordering the Esplanade on the town side,"—*Journal of Siege*.

Chuttur Sing having advanced from Huzaruh, contrary to all orders, things had gone too far wrong to be rectified by the simple capture of the city of Mooltan; that as the Sirdar had asked for Rajah Deena Nath to be sent to him, and you had complied with that request, it appeared to be Chuttur Sing's object to gain time to feel the pulse of the Peshawur troops before he finally committed himself but that I thought the Peshawur troops would at any rate stand fast, and await the result of the conference between perhaps the two most sagacious men in the Punjab.

"Deena Nath, I have ever regarded as at heart bitterly opposed to our administration; and, ostensibly deputed to bring in Chuttur Sing, I should expect that their discussion will be all as to the possibility of holding out. Yet it is on this alone that I think any hope rests of preserving the peace of the Punjab; for whatever may be Deena Nath's inclinations, they seldom prejudice his judgment. Sympathizing with the Sirdar's aspirations, he will still point out to him that, however the siege of Mooltan may embarrass us for the time, in the end we can crush the Khalsa army as easily as once we spared it; and that the only result of a rebellion would be the final extinction of the Raj. Whether Chuttur Sing will listen to this prudent advice is another question. I merely spoke to the probability that things in Huzaruh will remain in *statu quo*, until Deena Nath's arrival, and consequently that there is no immediate necessity for precipitating the attack on Mooltan. General Whish said, that this being the case, he should reject at once the idea of a *coup de main*, which, in his opinion, would be justified

only by urgent political necessity. The opinion of all the officers present was also against a *coup de main*.*

"Plan No. 2 was then discussed, and Major Napier explained that it was the one most consonant to military science. He wished, however, to know from me whether if we marched to the north of Mooltan, I could undertake to keep open the communication with Bhawulpoor? I replied, that I was willing to do so; but by water, not by land; and therefore the communication would be slow. It would also involve the detachment of a strong body of men, to guard Shoojabad. Colonel Drummond expressed a belief, that there was no water for a camp north of Mooltan,† and almost everybody was of opinion that the change of place would be construed by the natives into a defeat. Under these circumstances, plan No. 2 was given up.

"Lieutenant Lake submitted a proposition, to run a trench from the battery on the extreme right of the Daoodpotra camp north-east, to a point called Ramteeruth, which would be upwards of a mile; and to throw up heavy-gun batteries at such points of this intrenchment as would drive away the enemy without much loss of life, and with certain success.‡ This plan, being generally approved of, was at

*Major Siddons qualifies my word "all" as follows: "The opinion of *the senior military officers* was decidedly against a *coup de main*."—*Journal of Siege*.

†"This afterwards proved a mistake."—*Siddons' Journal of Siege*.

‡Major Siddons better expresses the ulterior object, viz.: "To afford cover from which to advance over the strong ground between it and the town, gradually driving the enemy from their positions in the gardens and clumps of houses between this trench, and some position from which the town wall could be distinctly seen and breached."—*Siege of Mooltan*.

last adopted; and this morning General Whish moved the right of his camp to the left, and I extended my right, so as to bring the two forces closer to each other; and at daylight, the trench was traced, and opened out. Thus the base of operations has been laid down, and I trust that all will now go on prosperously to a happy issue.

"Moolraj has, I think, gained more by recruits from the Manjha, during the last fortnight, than he has lost by desertions; and the corrupt and disloyal conduct of the Kardars between Mooltan and Lahore, in allowing these parties to pass, cannot be too severely censured. No preventive measures which the civil authorities may devise can be effective, if opposed by the whole native executive of the country."*

The plan of attack thus adopted by the General in his first siege has been severely criticised by those who were not aware of the circumstances which rendered it necessary. But the journalist of the siege has successfully defended it in the following passage:

"It was a most unusual proceeding, opening the first parallel one thousand six hundred *yards* from the enceinte attacked; but the features of the ground—thick gardens, villages, brick-kilns, jungle, and ravines—made it reasonable enough in the eyes of the engineers employed. The object was, in fact, to gain knowledge of the ground in front, and at the same time to have a trench of support for the feeling parties; for it was thought rash (and would have been highly so) to have thrown in a portion of the small regular

*"Blue Book," pp. 330, 1.

force to maintain a combat in such ground, while another was employed in throwing up a parallel at the regular distance; this, though the orthodox mode of proceeding, could only have been carried out on a large scale by driving the enemy in from the suburbs *altogether*, and excluding them thence till the town was breached and carried, as was subsequently gloriously effected on the 27th of December; but to this effort General Whish's force in September was considered unequal, if any regard was to be paid to prudence. The plan progressed successfully so far as it went,"*—and it failed only because it was interrupted.

The British and Irregular forces having moved to their left and right respectively, so as to be nearer each other, the siege was opened at daylight of the 7th of September by working parties of one thousand men from the Irregular camp, and one thousand six hundred from the British camp, half of the latter being European soldiers from Her Majesty's 10th and 32nd Foot, who took the night duty to avoid the still burning heat of the days.†

On the night of the 9th it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from a position they had taken up among some houses and gardens in front of the trenches, and "four companies of Her Majesty's 10th regiment, a wing of the 49th Native Infantry, the rifle company of the 72nd Native Infantry, and two of General Van Cortlandt's horse artillery guns accordingly advanced, and a very sharp night-fight ensued; ignorance of the localities, and the darkness and

*Major Siddons' "Siege of Mooltan."

†See General Whish's despatch, September 7th. "Blue Book," p. 341.

confusion consequent on a hastily-planned night-attack, rendered the gallant efforts of the troops useless; and after a considerable loss in killed and wounded, they were withdrawn, the object being unattained."* This attack was conducted with ineffectual gallantry by Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun of the 32nd Foot, and several instances of heroism were elicited by the desperate nature of the midnight struggle. I will mention two.

Lieutenant Richardson, Adjutant of the 49th Native Infantry, an officer of herculean frame, rushed at the barricaded door of the house most strongly occupied by the enemy, and with a mighty effort dashed it in among the rebel inmates, who threw themselves forward to oppose his entrance. Seeing that the party was too strong for him, he seized the foremost Sikh soldier in his arms, and with his body thus shielded backed out of the enclosure, when he hurled the half-strangled rebel back among his friends. In this extraordinary reconnoissance the Lieutenant received numerous wounds over his head and arms, but forgot them all in the applause of his brother soldiers, and the special approbation of a Commander-in-Chief who loved a daring deed.

More fatal was the issue of the other enterprise. Captain Christopher, of the Indian navy, had, from his first arrival with the steamers at Mooltan, shown the usual willingness of his profession to co-operate with his brother officers on shore. On the night in question, he had once already conducted some reinforcements to Colonel Pattoun's

*Siddons' "Journal of Siege of Mooltan."

assistance; but the fighting at the outpost still raged with unabated fury. Another reinforcement came up, but had no guide. "Will no one show us the way?" asked the officer of the party, looking round on the tired occupants of the trenches. "I will," replied Christopher; and putting himself at their head, steered them with the steadiness of a pilot—through ditches and gardens, under a roaring fire of musketry. A ball hit him on the ankle, and shivered the joint to pieces. A few weeks later he was borne by the grateful British soldiers to a rude grave beside a well, near the village of Sooruj Koond, and I myself read the service over him. A better, or braver man, fell not beneath the walls of Mooltan.

The repulse of our night-attack on the 9th of September, increased Moolraj's confidence to such an extent, that on the two following days he still further strengthened these intrenched positions between Mooltan and Seetul-ke-Maree, which had originally obliged General Whish to besiege the suburbs before he could reach either the town or citadel. So there were the two armies throwing up works within a few hundred yards of each other; the rebels, with little science, but unbounded zeal, rearing stockades, and piling up felled trees, and the wood-work of wells and houses, for the defensive warfare in which the soldiers of the Punjab excel; and the British approaching with laborious discipline to the attack, which, at the proper moment, would burst from the trenches like a flood, and sweep all obstacles away.

On the 12th of September, the General determined to clear his front; and called on the Irregulars to create a diversion on his left. As this would involve a mixed attack,

in which the British might mistake their friends for foes, General Whish desired me to attend him to the field; so that Lake, Lumsden, and Cortlandt, divided the glory of the day among them: while I, with the rest of the staff, took a not very cool *coup d'œil* of the engagement from the roof of a house belonging to some rebellious gentleman in the city, who, I am quite sure, found it well ventilated when he regained possession; for it happened to be directly in the rear of the attack, and every shot that passed over the British columns came plump into the building.

The engagement was commenced at seven A.M., by the Irregulars on the left,* to distract the enemy's attention; Lieutenant Lumsden being in command of the troops on the extreme left, or Kuttee Byragee outpost; Lieutenant Lake on the centre, or advanced parallel; and General Cortlandt, with his own regiments, on the extreme right, nearest to the British.

The Irregulars in the centre not content with drawing the enemy upon them by a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, rushed from their trenches, and commenced a struggle for the villages in their front, which could only have ended under the walls of the city; their brave but rash example was immediately followed by their brethren on the left; fresh troops of rebels crowding from the British front, where all was as yet quiet, rallied their retreating soldiers; again the villages in Lake's centre were disputed, and Lumsden's flank assailed by a bold attempt of the enemy to get into the camp behind him; but Lake, though wounded

*See General Whish's despatch, September 13th. "Blue Book," p. 353.

through the thigh, threw quickly in a reserve of two Sooruj Mookhee companies; and Lumsden, assisted by Peer Ibraheem Khan, dragged back the excited soldiers with his own hands; and once more the rebels were repelled, and driven over the plain. While this was doing in the left and centre, General Cortlandt's well-disciplined troops advanced with more uniformity, though not more brilliant courage, to the attack; and were crowned with complete success; expelling the enemy from the extensive and important village of Jumoondon-ke-Kirree, and capturing all the rebels' magazine and hospital. This, I believe I may also add, was the most advanced post taken from the enemy during the first siege of Mooltan.

When the attention of the rebel army had been skilfully distracted by these operations on the left, two British columns advanced to do the real business of the day.

The right column, composed of five companies of Her Majesty's 32nd, and the 8th regiment Native Infantry, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun.

The left column, consisting of five companies of Her Majesty's 10th, and the 49th regiment Native Infantry, was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B.

Three squadrons of cavalry from the 11th Light, and 7th and 11th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler, protected the British flanks, and a single troop of horse artillery which took part in the attack.

General Whish's despatch after this engagement merely says, with Lacedæmonian brevity, that "the position was

a strong one, and stoutly defended; the conflict terminating only in a series of hand-to-hand encounters.

"A troop of horse artillery, under Captain Mackenzie, was brought up at an opportune moment, and prevented an accession of numbers to the enemy, who were repulsed with severe loss in about an hour and a half."*

But I must add to this, that, as Moolraj's troops never before or after fought so well, so the behaviour of the British troops on this occasion was not surpassed during the war for desperate bravery and determination.

On one side, the rebels were encouraged by their successful defence upon the 9th, and the vast works which they had since thrown up, and now deemed impregnable. On the other, the British burned to revenge the comrades they had vainly lost, and to prove that darkness alone had robbed them of their usual victory.

An awful conflict was the result; and of the actual occupants of the enemy's intrenched positions (the chief of which was a Dhurumsaluh), scarcely a man escaped to tell Moolraj how calmly the young English engineer, Lieutenant Grindall, planted the scaling-ladder in the grim faces of the defenders; how vainly they essayed to hurl it back; how madly rushed up the grenadiers of the 32nd; with what a yell the brave Irish of the 10th dropped down among them from the branches of the trees above; and how like the deadly conflict of the lion and tiger in a forest den was the grapple of the pale English with the swarthy Sikh in that little walled space the rebels thought so strong.

*"Blue Book," p. 353.

I myself, ten minutes afterwards, saw full three hundred of Moolraj's dead soldiers in a heap in that enclosure. Beside them, stretched upon his back, with his fist fixed in death upon his faithful firelock, lay a noble soldier of that noble corps—the 10th, with a small round wound in his forehead, but a smile of victory on his lip that could never fade again.

On this day the 10th lost Major Montizambert; the 32nd Colonel Pattoun, and Quarter-Master Taylor; the 8th Native Infantry Ensign Lloyd; and the 49th Native Infantry Lieutenant Cubitt. The Chief Engineer, Major Napier, ever foremost, was among the wounded. General Whish's total loss in the affairs of the 9th and 12th of September, was thirty-nine men and eight horses killed; two hundred and sixteen men and thirteen horses wounded.

The enemy left five hundred dead upon the ground on the 12th alone.

The victory of the Dhurumsaluh gained the besieging army a distance to the front of some eight hundred or nine hundred yards;* the next day and night were spent in securing the acquisition; and on the morning of the 14th, General Cortlandt was enabled to point out to the British engineers a spot in the suburb of Jumoondon-ke-Kirree, "within six hundred yards of the Khoonee Boorj, and from whence the masonry of the tower could be seen for at least two-thirds of its height."† In short, the besiegers had at

*Siddons' "Siege of Mooltan."

†Ibid.

last accomplished the design of their first distant parallel, and driven the garrison so far into the suburbs, that they were now within battering distance of the city walls. A few more hours and Mooltan must have been in possession of the British. Why was it not?

Was it because the season was unfit for military operations? No. The General described his troops "as in high health and spirits, the amount of their casualties and sick not exceeding six per cent of their numbers."*

Was it because Moolraj inundated the country round Mooltan with water, as it was said he had the power to do? No. Lieutenant Glover, of the Engineers, dammed up the whole of the canals by the 7th of September.†

Was it then, as some said, "because the *Politicals* had misrepresented the strength of the fortress?" No. With reference to myself, it so happens that Government never asked my opinion on the point; but, whenever I had occasion to offer it, I uniformly spoke of the siege as a very serious undertaking. And as to the Resident, he himself informs us that "the amount of force sent down by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was by all considered ample. The chief engineer gave me his professional opinion that the reduction of the place was feasible, under the circumstances supposed, *with the aid of a much smaller force.*

This opinion was formed by Major Napier, *after two months of the most constant and searching inquiries into the*

*"Blue Book," p. 354.

†"Ibid," p. 340.

nature and extent of the fortifications, and after the preparation of plans, from the most accurate information attainable by himself and Major Becher of the Quarter-Master-General's department.* And though, in consequence of the delay which occurred in dispatching General Whish's force, Mooltan was much strengthened, after Major Napier's opinion had been delivered; yet it may very fairly be maintained that the opinion was never invalidated, but was entirely borne out by the fact, that on the 14th of September we had the city within our grasp. But, supposing that not to be the case—that Major Napier's inquiries for two months had all deceived him; and that the fortress of Mooltan, whether reinforced or not during July and August, was really much stronger in September than had been represented by either him, me, or Sir Frederick Currie. Then let the poor "Politicals" for once *divide* the blame with the army, and not bear it *all*; let them share it *en camarade* with the General and his heads of departments, not one of whom, after arrival at Mooltan, after reconnoitring the fortress, after seeing its formidable suburbs and gardens, after ascertaining the doubtful state of Sher Sing's camp, thought they had been misled about the strength of the place or the enemy.

As old and experienced officers they would have discovered (if existing) the glaring errors of judgment which civilians and young lieutenants were accused of having committed; they would have exclaimed at once, with soldierly frankness, "We have been deceived; this is a formidable place; our force is too small; we will not be

*"Blue Book," p. 355.

responsible for the siege!" But they did not do so. On the contrary, General Whish, not only "invited the enemy to an unconditional surrender within four-and-twenty hours; otherwise he should commence hostilities, on a scale that must insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents;"* but he "appointed in division orders, prize agents to take charge of the spoils which he believed to be already in his grasp."†

The sole and simple reason why the first siege of Mooltan was raised, was the treacherous desertion of Rajah Sher Sing and his army to the enemy on the morning of the 14th of September.

The following letters written at the time give a faithful account of this remarkable event. The first reviews the Rajah's position in the first week of September, with singular impartiality; considering the atmosphere of battle and treachery in which it was written. There is not a word in it which after-occurrences would make me wish to alter; and it expresses clearly my conviction, that if Sher Sing could not *prevent* his father's ruin, he would *share* it with him.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,

"September 4th, 1848.

"The intentions of Rajah Sher Sing must of course be

*Proclamation of the 4th of September.

†See letter of Resident at Lahore to Government, September 24th, 1848. "Blue Book," p. 371.

a question of the deepest interest to you; and I think it right to lay before you my own impressions on the subject.

"If those intentions are to be judged of by the past conduct of the Rajah, then nothing can be more satisfactory or loyal. Since the Rajah's arrival before Mooltan, he has omitted neither persuasion, threats, or punishments to keep his troops to their duty. He brought to light (about three weeks ago) an extensive treasonable correspondence with Moolraj and his own camp, collected the evidence diligently, and when the crime was fully brought home to Shoojan Sing (a Sikh Jageerdaree horseman of some consideration, and still greater notoriety), he carried the extreme sentence of the law into effect, and caused the traitor to be blown from one of his own guns. The act was extremely unpopular in the Rajah's force, and I rather think that he himself expected resistance; for he begged very hard that the execution might take place in my camp instead of his own; and when, for political reasons, I refused this request, he remarked, 'Very well, I place my honour in your hands, and you must carry me through the consequences.'

"Again, on the 1st of September, when my force changed ground, and was opposed by the enemy's light troops in the jungle before Mooltan, Rajah Sher Sing of his own accord mounted his guns on the high bank of the nullah on our left, and assisted our movement by enfilading the rebels. Of course I praised the Rajah much for this voluntary act of zeal and loyalty; and he followed it up on the 3rd of September, by moving out of his camp, and cannonading Moolraj's troops at the bridge, whom he threw into great confusion; but he was obliged to retire, by the heavy

guns of the fort, and (I fancy) the refusal of Sirdar Uttur Sing and Sirdar Shumsher Sing's division, to share in such heretical proceedings! The Rajah has since acknowledged to me, that 'he never expected to effect anything by this move, but he thought it would be a good thing to get a few men killed on both sides, so as to destroy the good understanding between his own Sikhs and those in the garrison.' That he fully succeeded in this object is evident, from his having gained, in the city of Mooltan, the nickname of "Rajah Sheikh Sing" and the Khalsa of his own camp say, they believe he is a Moossulman after all.

"The Rajah, on the occasion above alluded to seems to have been adhered to only by his new Moossulman troops, the regular infantry regiment of Poorbeeuhs (suspected by him previously), and Sirdars Uttur Sing and Shumsher Sing, who were ashamed of their own men.

"This being the position of affairs, it must be allowed that the Rajah has hitherto put himself very prominently forward on the side of loyalty, and acted not like one under compulsion, but as if anxious to claim the reward of service.

"*It is useless attempting to analyze his motives in so doing; for, should he continue true to the last, few would give him credit for anything but prudence; and, should he join the rebels to-morrow, it would still be as doubtful as it is to-day, whether his past good conduct was dictated by approval or disapproval of his father's projects. In the latter case, he would try to the last to save his family; in the former, it would be his interest to deceive us till all was ripe for revolution.*

It is one of those questions which time itself will not clear up.

"Left thus to conjecture, I must say, that should Sirdar Chuttur Sing succeed in attracting the Peshawur troops to his standard, and raising anything like a national movement against us, *I should not expect Rajah Sher Sing to remain faithful, however well he may be now inclined. It would be expecting too much from a son and a Sikh.* But I believe him hitherto to have taken the sensible view of Punjab affairs; to be convinced of what I have often told him, that another Sikh revolution will annex his country to British India; and that he will only fall away at the last moment, when betrayed by either the reproaches or successes of his father.

"The Rajah and myself are on the best terms. We discuss Chuttur Sing's conduct, as if he was not his father; and I never disguise any bad news I hear of him. Neither do I pretend to be blind to the difficulties of the Rajah's position, but fairly meet them with the best advice and most friendly encouragement I can offer. Lastly, I appeal to his self-interest, and urge him, should his father ruin the State, to save at least his own jageers out of the wreck. The Rajah is, I am sure, quite convinced of my sincere desire to stand his friend, and that I will bear ample testimony to his good conduct, so that he has every inducement to continue it; and it is only justice to him to say that he has latterly, more than once, and with much warmth, declared that, having received from both you and me written assurances that he is not considered responsible in any way for his father, he washes his hands of the projects in which he seems engaged,

considering it the part of a good son to oppose, instead of sharing, his father's folly."*

The second letter, six days later, at last brings us to the point where Sher Sing's fidelity gives way, where "the son and the Sikh" yields to the curses of a father and the prayers of a nation. The document is doubly valuable; first, as recording the testimony of so intelligent a chief as Sheikh Emamoodeen, that Sher Sing did his best to stay the insurrection; and secondly, as exhibiting the Sheikh himself in contrast with the Rajah. Both had seen the same revolutions, but the Sheikh holds fast to his experience of British power; the Rajah lets it go.

In 1846, when Sheikh Emamoodeen was himself the rebellious Governor of Cachmere; Rajah Sher Sing commanded one of the Sikh columns which successfully cooperated against him; and I happened to be the person to whom the Sheikh surrendered. In 1848 we have here the same Sheikh co-operating with me against another rebellious Governor, with a conviction of our ultimate success, which no delay or reverse could shake; while the Rajah, equally convinced, yields weakly to his "destiny," that emasculator of Asiatic virtue.

"LIEUTENANT EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,

"September 10th, 1848.

"Press of business has prevented me from sooner

*"Blue Book," p. 329, 30.

making an official report of the interview which I had with Sheikh Emamoodeen, on the morning of the 8th of September. I now detail the very curious statements of the Sheikh.

"He said that I must be fully aware that Rajah Sher Sing's soldiers had long been in a disaffected state, but that hitherto the Sirdars had stood; *that the Rajah had from the beginning been active in suppressing the bad spirit, and volunteering to do service for the State*; Sirdar Shumsher Sing, acquiescent in the Rajah's arrangements; and Sirdar Uttur Sing, content so long as he was not called upon to fight; that there could be no doubt Sirdar Chuttur Sing had, *two months ago*, communicated to Rajah Sher Sing (by the mouth of Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, who came down from Peshawur, and had an interview with Chuttur Sing on the road) his intention to create disturbance on his side the country, and an injunction that his son should do the same at Mooltan; *that Rajah Sher Sing had up to this time steadily refused to share such projects, and severely reproached his father*, *but was now altering his mind*; that Chuttur Sing's conduct depends entirely on whether or no he gets assistance from two quarters, viz., the Barukzye Sirdars in Peshawur, and Maharajuh Goolab Sing; that Chuttur Sing some years ago exchanged turbans with Sooltan Muhommud Khan, Barukzye, and has always maintained the strictest friendship with him; Chuttur Sing, addressing Khwajuh Muhommud Khan (Sooltan Muhommud Khan's eldest son) in his letters, as 'My dear child!' and Khwajuh Muhommud replying 'My dearest father!' that the benefit promised to the Barukzye is a re-possession of Peshawur; that Maharajuh Goolab Sing is not at all unlikely to instigate Chuttur Sing to ruin himself,

for some secret project of his own, but will never give him an open assistance, or leave the smallest trace of having even interfered against the British; that the Moossulman troops in Peshawur may be relied upon, as also the artillery; and that Goolab Sing, Povinduh, is stanch in our interests; that the Euzufzye are not at all likely to join Chuttur Sing, and thus, all things considered, that the Sirdar is not very likely to succeed in the Peshawur direction; in which case, he will take again to Huzaruh, if Maharajuh Goolab Sing holds out any hopes; and altogether, that the coming in of the Sirdar is more dependent on his getting no assistance from his two great allies, than on the good advice of Rajah Deena Nath.

"After these statements, I asked the Sheikh to explain why he thought Rajah Sher Sing's fidelity had been shaken during the last day or two? He replied, that messengers had come from Chuttur Sing; and the Rajah, after reading the letters, which were in Goormookhee, had carefully put them into water, and obliterated all traces of the contents; and that his motbirs* were beginning to open their mouths, and talk big, like other malcontents.

"I then asked the Sheikh how he thought the Rajah's force would act under these circumstances? He said some would go over to Moolraj; but the majority would only refuse to fight, and encourage the enemy by secret correspondence.

"Scarcely had the Sheikh left me than Sirdar Shumsher Sing sent me word, by a confidential servant, that on the

*Motbir; a confidential servant.

night of the 7th of September the sowars of the Charyarree Dera had held a meeting, at a garden, where their picket is, and sworn on the Grunth to demand their arrears of pay (seven or eight months) from Sirdar Uttur Sing, who would be unable to comply, when they would ask for their discharge, and take themselves off whithersoever they chose. This news was confirmed during the 8th by many people; and as a small treasure party had gone to the Ghat behind the Rajah's camp, to bring away three lakhs of rupees from the steamer, I lost no time in informing the General, who sent out a strong support, and brought the treasure in without any accident. On the morning of the 9th, Rajah Sher Sing and Sirdar Uttur Sing themselves called to report the mutinous meeting of the Charyarree sowars; and I asked Uttur Sing if they had yet come, as agreed, to demand their pay? He said: 'No; but sitting in Durbar, two or three of them had broached the subject of their arrears.' I then asked him if he did not intend to investigate the matter more closely, and punish the ringleaders? The Sirdar as usual was much distressed, conscious of his own vacillating disposition, and the little influence he really possesses in the cavalry force over which he is Commander. At last, he fairly owned that he was afraid that if he took any notice, the matter would only get worse.

"After the Rajah and the Sirdar had taken leave, the former sent back his motbir to say that he would come again to-day, and tell me all about the state of his force. Accordingly, he came this morning, and after confirming almost all the evil reports which I had heard from other sources, added, that last night in Sirdar Uttur Sing's Durbar, a man,

calling himself a Sadh,* but suspected of being a Sikh, stood up, and with a loud voice, said: 'Listen, O Khalsa! This war is not a war between Moolraj and the Durbar, but a strife of religions; and he who wishes to go to heaven, will die a martyr in defence of his faith!' Upon this all the assembly exclaimed: 'Wah Gooroo Jee Kee Futteh!' Sirdar Uttur Sing on this occasion seems to have aroused himself from his apathy, and straightway put the Sadh in confinement. Uttur Sing's motbir came with the Rajah to receive my instructions as to the Sadh. I begged that the evidence of two or three witnesses might be sent to me, and I would hear the case. It seems to me right and necessary that this man, if guilty, should be hung at once; but I cannot trust to the Sirdars to carry out the execution at this moment.

"After the Rajah had exhausted his complaints against the divisions of Uttur Sing and Shumsher Sing (the latter, out of consideration for my friendship with Shumsher Sing, he said was the best of the two;) I asked him what remedy he proposed to apply, and reminded him that he had deliberately undertaken the responsibility of bringing this Sikh army to Mooltan, so that its conduct was a matter personal to himself. This rather alarmed him, and he earnestly deprecated being held responsible for any division but his own, which he still stoutly maintains will do good and loyal service; and he ultimately proposed to put the thing to the proof, by my ordering all three of the Sirdars to advance towards Mooltan, and intrench their respective divisions separately, but near enough to support each other, the Rajah in Sookhee-walla-Bagh in the centre, Shumsher Sing under

*A "Sadh," is a Hindoo Monk.

the nullah on the right, and Uttur Sing in the Sheesh Muhl. 'Then,' said the Rajah, 'you will see how things stand. It is very possible that occupation may prevent the malcontents from holding councils and talking treason over their opium; and if a fight ensues, and some of the Sikhs are killed by Moolraj's guns, it may make them angry and loyal. Those who wish to go over will do so.'

"I need scarcely say how constantly and anxiously the condition of this Sikh force occupies my thoughts; and I can only assure you that I have left nothing undone on my part that could be effected by conciliation, attention to their wants and wishes, polite exchange of courtesies and etiquette, and the weightier matters of good advice to the Sirdars, and seriously and honestly keeping before their eyes the real dangers of their country and dynasty. But the material is rotten, and no good can be made of it. The Rajah's division is almost entirely composed of Moossulmans, and I believe him to have sufficient control over it (with the exception of the Poorbeeuh regiment, which he doubts); but Uttur Sing's and Shumsher Sing's divisions are nearly all Sikhs, and the Sirdars have no influence over them whatever. Open abuse is, I hear, not unfrequently the reply to any loyal advice which a Sirdar ventures to give his men; and Sher Sing is nicknamed 'The Moossulman.'

"The malcontents do not confine themselves to words. Two nights ago, I believe, fifty or sixty sowars, from Uttur Sing's camp, went over to Moolraj's though the Sirdar says only seven or eight. Yesterday, twenty or thirty more walked off; and as I am writing, the band-master of the Poorbeeuh regiment has sent in his brother to acquaint me

that last night the Commandant had induced the 6th, 7th, and 8th companies to desert, but the affair got wind, and the Colonel stopped it. Every Ukhbar from Mooltan mentions the good understanding between the rebels and the Sikhs, and the daily desertions of the latter.

"I have sent to invite the three Sirdars to a conference this evening, when I shall learn more about the Poorbeeuh regiment, and mean to request them to make to-morrow the move suggested by the Rajah. Major-General Whish (whom I consider it my duty to keep fully informed) concurs in thinking that it would be a relief, if those who are ill-disposed would go over at once, in order that we may know our enemies.

"My feeling is, that I should like to decide the matter myself, instead of leaving things to run their course, by surrounding and disarming the Sikh force, which I conceive present circumstances would most fully justify; but unfortunately, they are in such a position that it is impossible to turn their flank, either right or left; and if I was to move straight down on their rear, they would, in self-defence, be driven into Mooltan.

"It becomes therefore necessary to consider it a probable contingency that Moolraj's army will be swelled by two-thirds of Sher Sing's numbers; and without for an instant permitting myself to doubt of the result, or to look on this large defection as more than an additional difficulty, calling for additional exertion, I would yet respectfully venture to suggest that we should do well to neglect none of our resources."*

*"Blue Book," pp. 343—5.

The last gives the catastrophe.

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, before Mooltan,

"September 14th, 1848.

"The question of the intentions of the Sikh force under Rajah Sher Sing, has this morning been settled by the camp moving bodily off to Mooltan, and joining the rebels, the Rajah putting himself at the head of the movement, and ordering the 'Dhurum Ka Dhosa,' or religious drum, to be beaten in the name of the Khalsa.

"My private notes have already informed you that the Sikh camp had arrived at so dangerous a pitch of insubordination to the Sirdars (and above all to the Rajah, who acted his part so well as to be reviled as a Moossulman, up to the last moment, by the Sikhs of his own camp), that I considered it my duty, three days ago, to take the instructions of Major-General Whish concerning them.

"It being impossible to turn the flank of the Rajah's position, between two nullahs, and close to Mooltan in front, there was no hope of disarming the Sikh force, and the only alternative which remained was to induce them, if possible, to withdraw towards the capital, where the strength of the British army would render them harmless. The General, therefore, concurred with me that the only thing to be done was to direct the Sirdars to march.

"I then sent for the three Sirdars, and informed them of the General's wishes. None of them liked the idea of

encountering, as they said, the sneers of their enemies in the Durbar, at the failure of their attempts to keep a Sikh force to their duty. They also said that many of their men would not obey an order to march. I asked them, if they stayed here at Mooltan, would they be answerable for the same men not going over to the enemy? They said, 'No; it is very certain, if we remain here, the whole force will go over gradually; there is no dependence on any one of them.' Then, I said, it was better to make an effort to save them, and give the well-disposed, at all events, an opportunity of escaping. Sirdars Uttur Sing and Shumsher Sing agreed in this view of the question; but Rajah Sher Sing warmly expostulated at his division (chiefly of Moossulmans) being sent away, when they were ready to give their lives in the cause of the Maharajuh. General Cortlandt also had a good opinion of the Poorbeeuh regular regiment in the Rajah's division; and as Major Napier, chief engineer, was already of opinion that we had not men enough to prosecute the siege of Mooltan, I agreed to the Rajah remaining behind. It was then settled, with the full consent and approval of the three Sirdars, that Sirdar Uttur Sing's division should be ordered to Tolumba, under pretence of keeping open the road and stopping the influx of recruits; Sirdar Shumsher Sing's division to Kurrumpoor, for the same purpose; and Rajah Sher Sing's to take up a position to cover and protect the ferry. This morning was fixed for the march.

"Last night, Sirdars Uttur Sing and Shumsher Sing came to take their leave, and both, separately, had interviews, in which after begging for letters to the Resident, exculpating them from blame, and expressing a belief that the majority of their men would march with them, they

both took occasion to speak disparagingly of the Rajah; Sirdar Uttur Sing asking, how long I thought the three or four hundred Sikhs of the Rajah's division would remain faithful to their duty; and Shumsher Sing warning me, in plainer language, that before three days elapsed the Rajah's Sikhs would be off to join Chuttur Sing.

"I believed this to be spleen at the Rajah remaining behind, and thought it was rather in the Rajah's favour than otherwise; but immediately after the departure of the Sirdars, *Sheikh Emamoodeen came, and positively declared the Rajah had at last thrown off the mask, assembled his officers, and taken their oaths to stand by him in rebellion.* In this, he was said to be advised by Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, the same person as was reported to have, upwards of two months ago, brought the injunctions of Chuttur Sing to the Rajah to rebel. Sheikh Emamoodeen belongs to the party in the State opposed to the Attareewalluhs, and I was still loth to believe his report, nor (by this morning's *denouement*) do I think the matter was decided, for it is acknowledged that the three Sirdars tried to move off, and lead their camp in the right direction, but were surrounded by fanatic orators, who roundly abused them for deserting the cause of their religion, and stirred up the passions of the Sikh soldiers, till opposition to their will was no longer safe. Then Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, took the lead, harangued the crowd, half-pushed and half-persuaded the Rajah, until in a fit, as it were, of confusion and desperation, he consented to adopt the popular side, and put himself at the head of the mutineers. Then Sirdar Uttur Sing betook himself to his horse, and fled to my tent, followed by Kirpal Sing, Mulwaee, and Kiher Sing, Sindhunwalluh; and later in the

day, one or two small Sirdars. Shumsher Sing, Sindhunwalluh, is said to have been surrounded, and carried off by the Rajah's people.

"The revolted camp moved straight down on the city of Mooltan, *but was denied admittance by Dewan Moolraj who said he doubted the Rajah meant treachery* (an additional argument, for my view of the question) and ordered him to go and encamp in the Huzooree Bagh, under the guns of the fort, until he (the Dewan) was satisfied of his intentions.

"This being the aspect of affairs, I hastened to lay the same before Major-General Whish, and begged him to consider us as no longer engaged with a rebel Kardar alone, but with the whole Sikh army, in another struggle for independence.

"The Major-General adjourned to the tent of the chief engineer, where several senior officers were also called together, and an unanimous opinion come to that the siege was no longer practicable. Colonel Franks even said that he had come to that conclusion two days ago. It was therefore decided to concentrate the troops, and assume a defensive yet dignified position, until the Government can organise its measures for the Punjab war, into which we are thus launched.

"I cannot conclude this painful report, without expressing a hope that my past labours to keep together this Sikh force since its unhappy arrival at Mooltan will be now sufficiently understood, and exonerate me from any blame in its final defection. I can conscientiously say that I have

exhausted both health and faculties in endeavouring to save both the Sirdars and their followers from an act of national insanity and suicide."*

The question with which I am concerned in this event is, "When did Sher Sing resolve to join his father?"

I have no hesitation whatever in stating that it is now as certain as anything in this world can be, that it was on the 12th or 13th of September; certainly within forty-eight hours of the fatal step being taken.

On the morning of the 11th of September I received General Whish's orders to direct the disaffected Sikh division to march from Mooltan. On the evening of the same day I conveyed those orders, as delicately as could be done to the three chiefs; and came to a friendly arrangement with them as to the most honourable way of carrying them through.

This seems to have first shaken the Rajah. He conceived that I, his last support in his adopted line of loyalty, had now yielded to suspicion; and instead of proving those suspicions unjust, he resolved to justify them. That he was wrong in thinking I suspected him, the reader knows from my letters. To the last I believed the Rajah personally true. I only distrusted his troops; which was no more than he did himself. But how far more seriously did he err in resolving to *be* a villain rather than to *seem* one!

*"Blue Book," pp. 357, 8.

It was probably on the 12th of September that the Rajah formed his plans; for he finally communicated them to his brother in the following note, and enclosure; both of which were again enclosed in another letter, giving an account of the interview of (as I understand it) the previous night, wherein I had ordered the Sirdars to march. The Resident, however, thinks the covering letter (which is not given in the "Blue Book") "describes the meeting on the 13th"* between me and the other two Sirdars; in which case of course the letters were written on the night before the catastrophe occurred:

"RAJAH SHER SING TO SIRDAR GOOLAB SING.

"To my dear brother, Goolab Sing.

After professions of affection—"You have frequently written to me to remain firm in my fidelity to Captain Edwardes, and to act in all things according to his instructions. I have in no wise deviated from this counsel. The Sing Sahib (Sirdar Chuttur Sing) has several times written to me, stating that he constantly obeyed Captain Abbott's directions; but that that officer, acting according to the suggestions of the people of Huzaruh, has treated him most unjustly, and caused him much grief and trouble; and that he has also exerted himself to destroy and disperse the Khalsa troops. The Sing Sahib writes to me, that I had nothing to do with the treaty made with the English; and that, if I wish to preserve my existence, and the religion of our country, I must act accordingly, and join him.

*"Blue Book," p. 358.

"Hitherto, Captain Edwardes has treated me with great kindness; but, within the last week, his feelings towards me have changed. *I resolved, therefore, yesterday* to join the Sing Sahib, and devote myself to the cause of our religion.

"If you have any regard to the directions of the Sing Sahib, or my advice, prepare immediately, on the receipt of this, to join the Sing Sahib, or to go to Jummoo, or any other place you may think fit. If you disregard my advice, act as you please; but remember, that it is incumbent upon sons to obey the instructions of their father, for life is short.

"Do not wait for another letter.

"God is between us. If we live we shall meet; if not, God wills it."

ENCLOSED IN THE PRECEDING.

"The matter is this:—I shall enter the fort of Mooltan with my troops on the 1st Assoj (14th of September). If you are with me and the Sing Sahib, make your escape as you best can; if you are not with us, act as you think fit.

"It is useless to write more; make arrangements regarding our family as the Sing Sahib has directed you. Delay not an instant."*

Now, if language conveys any meaning at all, these two private and secret notes (enclosed in a third, written to be

*"Blue Book," p. 359.

given up and shown) communicate a sudden resolution to rebel, which the writer knows will be new, and fears will be unwelcome, to a still loyal brother, who, like himself, has hitherto withstood their father's grave injunctions.

But, fortunately, we are not left to draw our own conclusions on this matter; *for I have the direct evidence of the parties concerned, that Sher Sing only finally resolved to go over the very day before he went*!

In the autumn of 1849, Rajah Sher Sing again entered into conspiracy with the surviving malcontents of the army which Lord Gough dispersed for ever at Goojurat; it became apparent that he could no longer be left at large with public safety; and advantage was taken of his having broken his parole to confine him.

In attendance on Mr. John Lawrence, who was conducting a political investigation, I had one or two very interesting interviews with the Rajah in confinement; and in the presence of Mr. Lawrence, and Dr. Login, the Superintendent of the Palace, I took the opportunity of asking the Rajah his reasons for going over to the enemy? He replied, throwing up his hands: "My evil destiny! It all took place in one night. My mind was distressed by the Sikh force being ordered away from Mooltan; more pressing letters than ever came in the very next day from my father, imploring me to join the movement; and *I wrote off to Moolraj, for the first time, to say that I would march to him next morning.*"

This is the Rajah's account of his own defection. Now let us have Moolraj's.

Moolraj's religious adviser and private secretary (his Jesuit, in short) was one Misr Kool Juss, a high caste Brahmin. This man's trial succeeded his master's, and was conducted by me. Amongst other questions, I asked him how long Rajah Sher Sing had been in correspondence with Moolraj before going over? He replied "that the Rajah never wrote but one letter to the Dewan all the time he was at Mooltan; and that was *the night before he came over*. We were astonished; for though we knew all the Rajah's soldiers were our friends, we believed the Rajah himself was our enemy. He had previously rejected all overtures, punished all traitors in his camp, and fired upon our troops. When, therefore, all at once he proposed to join us, we suspected treachery; and would not admit him within the walls; but made him encamp under the guns of the fort and up to the very day when he marched away again to join his father in Huzaruh, the Dewan and the Rajah never came to a good understanding."

The power of evidence cannot go farther than this; and impartial history is in my opinion bound to record this verdict: that Rajah Sher Sing Attareewalluh was opposed to the rebellion of Mooltan and the second Sikh war; did what he could to stop them both; but failing, sided with his family and nation.

For my own part, I pity him for giving way at last, as much as I execrate his father for leading him astray.

One other question remains concerning this event; for we should try to draw from the past some lesson for the future.

Were the circumstances all to come over again, could any better line of policy be pursued towards Rajah Sher Sing's force?

A more decisive and brilliant course might undoubtedly have been adopted, but none so unquestionably honest at the time, and consequently so satisfactory to reflect upon hereafter.

General Whish was fully aware of the condition of the Sikh division when he arrived at Mooltan, both from my reports and his own inquiries; and he had been told by the Resident at starting that "the Sirdars were faithful, and the troops might be annihilated in a couple of hours if they committed themselves by any treacherous proceedings."* He would, therefore, not have been exceeding his authority had he disarmed Rajah Sher Sing's army before commencing the siege.

The measure was feasible without violence. Instead of removing the Sikh division from Sooruj Koond, it was only to keep them there, between the Irregular and British armies; and the two latter might any day have advanced simultaneously from east and west, and called on the Sikh troops to abandon their artillery, and throw down their arms. Resistance would have been impossible.

As things have turned out, we know that the measure would also have been just. But the point is this: that had it been adopted, General Whish himself, to his dying day, could never have known that it was so, nor ever have justified

*"Blue Book," p. 251.

it to others. The proof was wanting; he could only have proceeded on suspicion; and it would probably have been reprobated by both the Sikh and English nations as an act of treachery to an ally unworthy of the British name. By adopting the plain, straightforward course of conciliation, General Whish suffered the mortification of a temporary defeat, but he saved himself and his country from the reproach which rests for ever upon Rajah Sher Sing and his army.

Let us now return to the narrative. The reader will remember that on hearing of Sher Sing's defection, I conveyed the intelligence to General Whish who "adjourned to the tent of the chief engineer, where several senior officers were also called together, and an unanimous opinion was come to that the siege was no longer practicable."

The General's own despatch on this occasion is as follows:

"MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL

"Camp, Mooltan,

"September 14th, 1848.

"The circumstances of this morning induce me to begin a letter that gives me much pain, by observing that, on the 9th instant, the chief engineer expressed his opinion that the force under my command was inadequate for the reduction of the town and fortress of Mooltan. In this I entirely differed with him. On the 11th instant, when talking of Sher Sing's force to Lieutenant Edwardes and of the expediency of getting rid of it, he said he would try and so

arrange, and yesterday reported that, after a long discussion, it was settled that one Sikh division should go to Tolumba to patrol the road, and all others to Kurrumpoor.

"In the evening, at the request of Major Napier (who I regret to say has been wounded by the graze of a cannon-ball in the leg), I met Lieutenant Edwardes at his tent, when it was again urged that our force was inadequate to prosecute the siege, which I was exceedingly averse to acquiesce in, seeing that the troops were in high health and spirits, that our sick and wounded did not exceed six per cent, and that our artillery had not yet seriously opened their fire; but on my return from our advanced posts at eight o'clock this morning, I was surprised by a message from Lieutenant Edwardes to the effect that Sher Sing, at the head of his whole forcc, was in full march to join the enemy.

"I met that officer shortly after again, at Major Napier's tent, the officer commanding the artillery being present, as also the officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department; and I requested the attendance of Colonel Franks, who was near at hand. Having explained the circumstances above-mentioned, and noticed that the last accounts from the Resident mentioned Chuttur Sing's being in open rebellion, it was the unanimous opinion that the operations of the siege could not be continued, and I learnt from Colonel Franks that he had come to that conclusion some days ago; and thus, when within breaching distance of the walls of the town, I have had the mortification of abandoning my advanced positions (obtained with considerable difficulty and loss) as we had no prospect of keeping the town after taking it, the enemy being ten thousand strong, in its immediate suburbs.

"I have directed our troops to be withdrawn this evening except a strong picket, with two horse artillery guns, at a post in our first parallel (Ramteerut), and shall leisurely change my position to Tibbee, where I shall await the arrival of such reinforcements as the Commander-in-Chief may think proper to send."*

Although the sentence, "it was the unanimous opinion," of course includes the General, yet a perusal of the whole letter (unintentionally no doubt), conveys the impression that the General was himself averse to the raising of the siege, but yielded to the opinion of others. It was thus understood by the Governor-General, who wrote to the Secret Committee as follows:

"From his (General Whish's) own statement, it would appear that this step was taken, not so much from his own conviction of its necessity, as from an acquiescence in the opinions of those whom he consulted."†

As one of the Council of the 14th of September, I think it right to explain that if the General thought the siege still practicable, he did not express that opinion. One by one, he asked the opinions of the members, who all conceived it necessary *now* to raise the siege, and some (not the worst soldiers present,) thought it had been necessary some days before. General Whish differed from those who thought it had been necessary on the 11th, but with those who thought it could not now be avoided, he entirely concurred.

*"Blue Book," 376, 7.

†"Ibid," p. 336.

My own humble opinion was precisely the same as General Whish's, though again his despatch may be misunderstood to mean that I agreed with Colonel Napier on the 11th of September, in urging "that our force was inadequate." I did not do so. I thought our force was ample; but I also felt that the chief engineer was the proper man to judge how many men his trenches wanted, and, as reinforcements could do no harm, I advised the General to apply for them. Injustice to my friend Colonel Napier (than whom a braver or more chivalrous soldier does not exist), I must add that, to the best of my belief, he never advocated the *raising* of the siege until Sher Sing went over; though, on the 9th and 11th of September, he expressed a professional opinion that more men were wanted for the work.

And with reference to the general question of the raising of the siege on the 14th of September, though the wisdom of that measure was at the time doubted by many distinguished military men in India, yet I know that some, at least, changed their opinions when they saw the resistance of the fortress of Mooltan to a second siege, after General Whish's army had been doubled. The necessity may indeed be demonstrated by figures.

According to the laws of military science, a besieging army should be at least three times as numerous as the garrison besieged.

Moolraj had fifteen thousand men when Sher Sing joined him, and General Whish twenty thousand.

Of that twenty thousand, thirteen thousand were Irregulars, who would willingly intrench their own front, and

advance it wherever required; but thought it unsoldierly and unworthy of Puthans, to furnish working-parties to dig in any place for the protection of others. Consequently they were allowed to carry on a separate set of parallels of their own;* and this false pride reduced General Whish's engineers to the five thousand eight hundred men composing the infantry and sappers of the British division.† General Whish therefore must be considered to have acted wisely in raising the first siege of Mooltan.

This discontinuance of the siege being decided on, the British troops were recalled from the trenches; and as the empty parallels only afforded cover to the enemy's skirmishers to creep up and annoy the pickets, it was thought advisable to withdraw altogether from that side of Mooltan, and to take up a position which should secure our communications with Bhawulpoor and the countries west of the Chenab, whence my army drew both its food and pay.

Accordingly on the 15th of September,

"Agreeably to the orders of the Major-General commanding the field-force, my own and Bhawul Khan's force changed ground to Sooruj Koond. The movement was executed most deliberately, for we had little or no carriage, and our camels, &c. had to perform three journeys before all the stores and ammunitions were removed; but I was

*This separate attack was conducted by (then) Lieutenant Lake, assisted by Lieutenants Pollard and Maunsell, two young engineers, whose cool bravery and indefatigable zeal won the admiration of us all. The same remark would, however, apply to the whole Engineer Staff at Mooltan. A finer body of men was never collected in any Indian army.

†Siddons' "Journal of the Siege."

resolved not to leave one cannon-ball or handful of meal to the enemy; and our whole line remained cheerfully under arms from sunrise till two P.M. to cover the operations. Only once did the enemy try to turn our flank and get at the baggage, with about one thousand horsemen of our late faithful ally, Rajah Sher Sing Attareewalluh, but General Cortlandt opened his guns upon them and put them instantly to a disorderly flight."*

On the 16th of September, General Whish's own force followed; and as the enormous siege *materiel* to be removed required very numerous guards, two thousand of our irregular horse, and six of General Cortlandt's guns, under command of Lieutenant Pollock, were ordered to cover the removal of the park, a duty which they very efficiently performed, though much harassed by the enemy; and occupied throughout the day the honourable post (in a retreat) of the rear of the rear-guard. One of the many advantages of irregular troops came out prominently on this occasion. There was not enough carriage for all the heavy shot, and fifteen hundred of the two thousand Irregulars were told off to carry in their hands, or across their saddles, eighteen-pounder cannon balls! Regular cavalry would have left them on the ground.

General Whish at first encamped after this move on the field of the battle of Suddoosam; but a few days later he took up a permanent position, with his left resting on the grove of Araby, and his right within a short distance of Sooruj Koond. In this position (in the very suburbs of

*"Blue Book," p. 361.

Mooltan), the British and Irregular armies remained till the renewal of the siege; though an idea prevailed that General Whish retired twenty or thirty miles towards the Sutlej.

Moolraj could not believe that Sher Sing had come over in good faith. He therefore caused him to encamp his traitor army under the guns of the fort; summoned the Rajah and all his officers to a Hindoo temple outside the city, and made them swear upon the Holy Grunth, that they had no treacherous design; and, still not satisfied, withdrew all his own soldiers within the walls of Mooltan, and ordered the Rajah's army to take their places in the British front.

Thus fallen in all men's esteem, good or bad, friend or foe, Rajah Sher Sing applied himself with desperation to the organizing of a revolution which was to involve the whole Punjab in war. His two colleagues, Sirdar Uttur Sing, and Sirdar Shumsher Sing, had abandoned him, and escaped to me;* and some few other Sikh Sirdars who

*Sirdar Uttur Sing fled at the very moment of defection, and was the first man to bring me the news of the mutiny; begging me to see that *he* had not betrayed me. Sirdar Shumsher Sing was carried off by the soldiers, and kept a prisoner in his own tent, but got out under the walls of the tent instead of the door on the second night, and, in common clothes, and barefooted, made his way to my camp, a distance of several miles, killing on the road one of Sher Sing's vedettes. Thus did two out of the three leaders of the Sikh division justify my belief in their fidelity, and reward my long endeavours to save them. Yet, strange to say, I had shown more kindness and honour to Sher Sing than either of them. Still stranger, I have been accused of having driven the Rajah into rebellion by my *harsh treatment!* In General Whish's camp I had to bear the odium of not having been *harsh enough*; of having made the Rajah a friend when I ought to have made him a prisoner. My reply to both is, that it was my *duty* to be conciliatory, and (in the opinion of the Government I serve) I *did* it. If this is not satisfactory, I would refer to Æsop's fable of the Old Man, his Son, and the Ass.

foresaw the end of a struggle with the British, came over one by one, as they found opportunity, and robbed the movement of many noble names. But the Rajah could spare a few Sirdars. He was now on the side of the Khalsa, and he could appeal with confidence to his nation.

The following is one of the many manifestoes in which he announced that he had "mounted the cockade:"

MANIFESTO ISSUED BY SHER SING.

Seal
of
Sher Sing.

"It is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjab, to the whole of the Sikhs, and those who have been cherished by the Khalsajee, and, in fact, to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny, and undue violence, the Feringhees have treated the widow of the great Maharajuh Runjeet Sing, now in bliss, and what cruelty they have shown towards the people of the country.

"In the first place, they have broken the treaty by imprisoning and sending away to Hindoostan, the Maharanee, the mother of her people. Secondly, the race of Sikhs, the children of the Maharajuh (Runjeet Sing), have suffered so much from their tyranny that our very religion has been taken away from us. Thirdly, the kingdom has lost its former repute. By the direction of the Holy Gooroo, Rajah Sher Sing and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Moolraj, on the part of Maharajuh Duleep Sing, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty Feringhees. The Khalsajee must now act with all their heart and soul. All who are servants

of the Khalsajee, of the Holy Gooroo, and the Maharajuh, are enjoined to gird up their loins and proceed to Mooltan without delay. Let them murder all Feringhees, wherever they may find them, and cut off the daks. In return for this service they will certainly be recompensed by the favour of the Holy Gooroo, by increase of rank, and by distribution of rewards. Fourthly, let all cling closely to their religion. Whoever acts accordingly will obtain grace in this world and hereafter, and he who acts otherwise is excluded from the pale of the Sikh faith.

Seal of Sookha Sing.	Seal of Soorutt Sing.	Seal of Urjun Sing.
Seal of Baluk Sing.	Seal of Jeer Sing.	Seal of Rutun Sing.
Seal of Futteh Sing.	Seal of Sahib Sing.	Seal of Lal Sing.

Manifestoes such as these were introduced by the Rajah's agents, in the disguise of beggars, into both my own and General Whish's camp. In the latter they could do no harm; and from my Puthan Irregulars and Lake's Daoodpotras they elicited either a hearty laugh, or muttered imprecations against the "Sug!" or "Kafir!" who wrote them.*

But to General Cortlandt's regiments and artillery they were full of danger. These were the soldiers of the

*"Sug," a dog; "Kafir," an infidel.

Durbar, and they naturally inquired of each other "For whom or what are we fighting? It is now a war between the Sikhs and the British; and by helping the British to thrash the Sikhs, are we not hastening our own disbandment, and throwing ourselves out of employ for life?" I felt the difficulty of the position in which these brave men were placed, and hastened to extricate them from it by a decisive step which, fortunately for both them and me, met the full approbation of my superiors.

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Sooruj Koond,

"September 22nd, 1848.

"Appended to this letter is one out of the many incendiary proclamations, with which Rajah Sher Sing, Attareewalluh, and his accomplices, ever since their own desertion to the enemy, have been endeavouring to seduce those troops in my camp, which are still faithful to the real interest of Maharajuh Duleep Sing.

"The following is a literal translation of the document.

"PROCLAMATION.

"To all the officers of the sepoys, and Sikhs, and Moossulmans, and regiments, and all others that eat the salt of the Sovereign of the Khalsa, Maharajuh Duleep Sing, Bahadoor; such for instance as Sheikh Emamoodeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, and General Cortlandt, Sahib Bahadoor,

and Colonel Budri Nath, and Soobhan Khan, and Commandant Lahora Sing, &c. &c.

"A religious war being now on foot, it becomes every public servant, whether he be Sikh or Moslem, at sight of this document, to march without delay and join the camp of the Khalsa, along with Rajah Sher Sing, Bahadoor, and Dewan Moolraj, in the work of eradicating the Feringhees from this country of the Punjab.

"1st. For their own religion's sake.

"2nd. For the salt they have eaten.

"3rd. For the sake of fair fame in this world.

"4th. For promotion's sake.

"5th. For love of the jageers and dignities which are to be obtained. And whoever shall not join in this religious war,

"1st. He is unfaithful to the salt of the Sirkar.

"2nd. An outcast from religion.

"3rd. Worthy of any punishment that may be inflicted on him.

"(*N.B.*—Sealed by Rajah Sher Sing, Dewan Moolraj, Sirdar Khooshal Sing, Morareea, and others.)

"The pithiness of this effusion is only equalled by the art with which it addresses itself to both the good and the bad feelings of native soldiery; and it is necessary that it should be counteracted at once. I would gladly have

referred the matter to you; but the danger is immediate, and the mischief might be done in the interim of my writing and receiving your reply.

"The defection of Rajah Sher Sing's force has already obliged General Whish to raise the siege of Mooltan. A further defection of three regular infantry regiments, and seventeen guns, would perhaps compel him to retreat altogether, which could only be considered as a disaster.

"Under these circumstances, I have thought it my bounden duty to take on myself the very great responsibility of assuring all the regular troops of Maharajuh Duleep Sing, now under my command, that, if the conduct of the Sikh nation should oblige the British Government to declare the treaty null and void, and to annex the Punjab to Hindoostan, every soldier who, to the last, shall have faithfully performed his duty to the Maharajuh, shall pass as a matter of course into the service of our Government, and enjoy the same privileges as he does now.

"I beg to assure you, that I have not been induced to take this step from observing the smallest sign of disaffection in the troops alluded to. In their conduct, whether in the camp or in the field, during two years' intimate acquaintance with these regiments, under very trying circumstances of fatigue and exposure, I have seen nothing but the most cheerful endurance and soldier-like subordination; and it was these very qualities which prevented me now from hesitating as to how I should act towards them; for, if our frontiers must necessarily be extended, and this large country be taken still more closely under our charge,

the local knowledge and rough-and-ready qualities of these troops will make them invaluable to us as frontier locals, if not in the line.

"One of the three regiments (Soobhan Khan's Moossulman Pultun) has a peculiar claim to our protection; having accompanied General Pollock's army to Cabul, and done good service there.

"The other two regiments are chiefly men of our own provinces, raised, drilled, and disciplined, by General Cortlandt, in the same manner as our own sepoys.

"For honourable testimony to the conduct of them, I would refer to Major-General Whish, or any British officer in the Mooltan field force."*

"THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE TO MAJOR EDWARDES

"Lahore, September, 27th, 1848.

"In consideration of the late excellent service which has been rendered by General Cortlandt, and his regiments, and artillery, during the whole period of these disturbances, and especially in the hard-fought battles of the 18th of June and the 1st of July last; and in reference to the present state of revolt of nearly the whole Durbar army; you were justified in giving to General Cortlandt, and the corps under him, the assurance described in your letter; and I have no hesitation, as the representative of the British Government in these provinces, in confirming the pledge you have made to these corps, on the conditions you have prescribed.

*"Blue Book," 376, 7.

"I am quite satisfied that the Governor-General in Council will ratify this promise. The British Government will act justly, and will always make a marked distinction between those who serve them, and those who serve them not: on this occasion, faithful service will stand contrasted with treachery and perfidy of the deepest dye; and the British Government will make the reward both signal and exemplary."*

Lord Dalhousie did ratify it; one only out of many occasions on which I have to be deeply grateful for his Lordship's vigorous support during a long series of political and military operations, at a distance too great for either orders or advice.

No man can stand firm with a quicksand underneath him.

Sher Sing's activity in stirring up an imperial insurrection did not win him the confidence of the provincial rebel. As hitherto, the Rajah and Moolraj had been antagonists, so now that they had become allies, they felt that their ends were different. Moolraj, indeed, suspected Sher Sing of a design to get the fortress of Mooltan into his hands; and whether it was for the English or the Sikhs, such a transfer was equally foreign to the views of the son of Sawun Mull. One day, the Rajah went to pay a visit to Moolraj, in the citadel, and took a regiment of infantry as his guard of honour.

*"Blue Book," p. 377.

The Rajah was admitted; but the regiment sent back from the gates. This misunderstanding was quickly reported by my spies in the city; and I resolved to turn it to account.

There was a spy of mine, named Bhumboo, whom I well knew took back to Moolraj the news of my camp, in return for the news which he brought me of Moolraj's. For this I did not care. So long as I was kept acquainted with the movements of the rebels, they were at liberty to draw any comfort they liked from hearing that we were all very happy and comfortable, making up fascines and gabions for a second siege, and awaiting fresh reinforcements. One day I sent for Bhumboo in haste, and excluding everybody from the tent, said to him, with great mystery: "I want you to take this little bit of paper to Rajah Sher Sing. If you deliver it to him safely, without letting another human being see it, I will make a man of you; but if you let it fall into the hands of Moolraj, I'll slit your nose as sure as your name is Bhumboo! Now go, and here are twenty rupees for you."

Bhumboo swore solemnly that Moolraj should never get even a *bo* (smell) of the matter; and of course took the note to him straight. "There," he said to the Dewan, "if there is not something in that, there is not a nose on my face, and Edwardes, the Englishman, has not said that he'll cut it off."

Moolraj opened the little inch of paper, and smoothing its many creases, read as follows; (as another spy reported, "turning yellow as he read"):

"My dear Rajah,

"What you say about the prey falling into the net has pleased me much. In fact, it is the best joke I have met with for some time. I expected no less from your discretion and management. I must mention to you, that I have been obliged, for the sake of appearances, to issue a proclamation calling you a *nimuk-huram* (traitor) which, among friends, I trust will be excused. Let me know often how you get on."

Moolraj immediately called a Cabinet Council to take this letter into consideration. A few of the councillors thought it was a trick; but the majority were of opinion that it was a genuine piece of correspondence, and "no more than they always expected."

Accordingly Sher Sing was sent for; the letter laid before him; and a kind of court-martial held upon him. The Rajah got violently angry, and abused me in good set terms; but as Moolraj observed, this might be all "among friends!"

At last, Moolraj declared that the only thing to satisfy his mind would be the Rajah marching down his whole army, and fighting whichever he chose of the besieging camps. Sher Sing, in his passion, agreed; selected my army as the weakest, and actually moved some distance through the jungle to attack us; but when we turned out, and our guns began to pommel his advancing line, he thought better of it, and hastily retired into Mooltan. This set the seal to Moolraj's suspicions and Sher Sing's disgust; and a few days afterwards the Rajah offered to go off to

his father in Huzaruh, if the Dewan would advance some pay to his soldiers. Moolraj gladly lent the money, and the Rajah about the end of September commenced his preparations for departure.

The prospect of speedy separation restored such an appearance of harmony between the two rebel armies, that during the first week of October a general impression prevailed that they were maturing measures for a combined attack upon the British. The 7th of October was the Dusseruh, or great military festival of the Hindoos and Sikhs; and Moolraj gave out that he meant to celebrate it in the English camp!

The day arrived, and Moolraj and the Rajah, with their armies, moved out from Mooltan, and assembled round the Kuttee Byragee Garden, where my camp once was. Here they set up their demon images, and destroyed them; fired volleys in honour of the victory of their god; and filled the air with such fanatic yells, that I expected nothing more than a general attack when the ceremony was over. But having burnt an immense quantity of gunpowder for nothing, the excited host seemed satisfied, and faded gradually away from our telescopes among the trees of the many-gardened city.

At dawn of the 9th of October Rajah Sher Sing marched away from the fortress which he had tried in two characters to take, and halted at Goggran, ten or twelve miles north-east of Mooltan.

I reported this move to General Whish the same morning, before breakfast; but the late good understanding between Sher Sing and Moolraj made it still doubtful whether

the Rajah had made a *bona fide* departure, or was only manœuvring with the Dewan to draw the British troops into a snare.

At three P.M., however, the General informed me that he should pursue the fugitive Rajah with nine hundred cavalry and eight horse artillery guns, and asked what assistance I could render? I replied, any that he chose to order; but gave my voice against the plan. About eight P.M. one of two spies I had sent after the Rajah's camp returned with the intelligence that the Sikhs had struck their tents again at sunset, and would push on that night from Goggran to Sirdarpoor.

When therefore about nine P.M., General Whish again wrote to me that he had finally determined to pursue Sher Sing, and nine hundred cavalry and eight guns were now getting ready for the chase, I rode down to the General's tent and communicated the intelligence that had just come in from Goggran. The pursuit, which had been barely practicable before, was now abandoned as impracticable, and very justly so; for nothing could have been more rash than to attack a body of between five thousand and six thousand Sikhs, possessed of twelve pieces of artillery, and in their own camp, with a mere detachment of nine hundred cavalry and eight guns, exhausted by a double march. Failure, if not disgrace, could alone have been the fate of such an expedition.

I have been particular in stating the facts of this matter, because it has been said that I *prevented* the pursuit. It was impossible for me to *prevent* General Whish from doing anything he thought proper. My *advice* was against the

pursuit; but it was not taken. The pursuit was ordered; the cavalry were in their saddles; the guns were limbered; and the pursuit was only not made because the object of it was already out of reach. General Whish would undoubtedly have pursued Sher Sing had there been the slightest hopes of overtaking him.

I will now add the reason why I gave my voice against the pursuit, even when the Rajah was within reach. It was simply because the detachment that made it must (from the position of the several parties) have put itself between Sher Sing's army and Moolraj's; to do which, in military prudence, it should have been adequate to thrash them both. No such adequate detachment could have been furnished either by General Whish or myself, or both combined, for a service so far from camp, and with such an enormous siege-train as we had to protect.

Reader, we have now seen the last of Rajah Sher Sing. He is no longer the ally of Dewan Moolraj, but the rebel General of the second Sikh war. The historian of that war will find no difficulty in following his line of march to join his father. It is marked by the plundered villages, fined merchants, murdered priests, and defiled mosques of the Muhommudan country through which he passed.* For all these barbarous aggravations of a bloody war we may safely leave him to account with Lord Gough at Goojurat.

But there is one episode of his defection from the besieging army at Mooltan, in which I trust I do not err in

*See "Punjab Blue Book," p. 400.

believing that the reader of these volumes will take an interest. It is the revolt of the Sikh division in Bunnoo; and the maiden siege of my poor fort of Duleepgurh.

It will be remembered, that in June I conceived it my duty to recall Lieutenant Taylor from Bunnoo; and appointed Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh, Governor in his place. The Mullick's noble behaviour in this capacity will not be understood without I explain what I owed *him*, and he owed *me*.

When I was deputed in 1846 to proceed to Jummoo and assist Maharajuh Goolab Sing in putting down the rebellion of Sheikh Emamoodeen in Cachmere, it was through Futteh Khan, Towannuh, that I carried on a successful negociation with the Sheikh, for the delivering up to the British Government of Rajah Lal Sing's written orders for the rebellion. This revelation of the Prime Minister's treachery procured for Futteh Khan the undying enmity of the Sikh Durbar, and especially of Dewan Deena Nath, the Rajah's friend and defender.

Deena Nath brought forward a heavy debt due by the Mullick to the State, and the Mullick was put in irons, and thrown into the fort of Govindgurh till he should pay it—in other words, for his life. The Mullick's mother and female relatives sold all their jewels, and raised a pitiful instalment of the debt, which enabled me to petition Sir Frederick Currie for his release. Sir Frederick did release him, and sent him to me as a man whose courage and abilities might make him useful during the rebellion. But my camp was full of his enemies, and for the sake of peace I was obliged to send him away. He was of all others the man for

desperate times; and in sending him as Governor to Bunnoo I frankly said to him: "Mullick, my object is to save the life of Lieutenant Taylor; for assuredly the Sikh troops in Bunnoo will rise, and then no Englishman will have a chance. If you think you can control the Sikh garrison of Duleepgurh, either by keeping them from rising, or bringing the Vizeerees down on them when they have risen, go; and when the war is over, your reward shall be proportioned to the service."

The Mullick was very thin and worn by the fretting of high passions in a prison; and I shall never forget the ghastly smile with which he replied, clasping me by the knees: "I would have wished to go with you to Mooltan; but as there is work to do in Bunnoo, I will go. I owe you both life and honour, and as there is a God in heaven I will pay the debt!"

He went. The Sikh army in the cantonment, or outer fort, of Duleepgurh, as soon as they heard the joyful news of Rajah Sher Sing's desertion to Moolraj, rose and besieged the Mullick in the citadel. The tank of water I left in the fort had been drawn off to make a permanent well in the same place. The well was incomplete when the mutiny broke out, and the faithful followers of the Mullick began deepening it to get water. They dug, and dug, till they came to *mud*, but were too exhausted to dig more, or fight longer without water. They told the Mullick he must surrender. Futteh Khan put on his sword and shield, and ordered the gate of Duleepgurh to be thrown open; then walking out, he cried aloud to the mutineers: "I am Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh! Do not shoot me like a dog;

but if there are any two of you who are equal to a man, come on!"

One yell broke from the Sikh soldiery: "Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh! You are he who murdered our Prince, Peshora Sing, and *we* will murder *you!*"

A hundred bullets pierced the body of the Mullick. Nobly, fatally, he had redeemed his pledge. In the war of 1848-9, I met with many instances of attachment and gratitude, which raised my estimate of the natives of India, but none more truly touching than the death of Mullick Futteh Khan, Towannuh, on the threshold of the fort he promised to defend.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE ALLIED IRREGULAR FORCES DURING THE FIRST SIEGE OF MOOLTAN, FROM THE 1ST TO THE 16TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1848.

Under whose command	Troops	MEN		HORSES	
		Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Lieutenant Edwardes	Edwardes's Irregulars	10	22	11	19
	Cortlandt's Regulars	7	55	9	2
	Sheikh Emamoodeen's Division	18	98	6	9
	Jowahir Mull's ditto	0	3	0	0
Lieutenant Lake	Bhawulpoor Army	9	53	1	1
Lieutenant Lumsden	Guide Corps ..	0	7	3	2
	Totals ..	44	238	30	33
	Grand total of loss ..	282		63	

CHAPTER X

THE TEMPORARY REVERSE AT MOOLTAN A LASTING BENEFIT TO BRITISH INDIA—DELAY IN REINFORCING GENERAL WHISH ACCOUNTED FOR—HOW THE INTERVAL WAS USED BY BESIEGERS AND BESIEGED—MOOLRAJ MAKES OVERTURES TO THE AMEER OF CABUL AND SIRDARS OF CANDAHAR—HE BESIEGES HIS BESIEGERS AT SOORUJ KOOND—NOTE ON THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM OF SIKH WARFARE EVEN IN AGGRESSIVE WARS—MOOLRAJ'S ARMY NOT TO BE TURNED OUT OF THEIR INTRENCHMENTS BY ARTILLERY—GENERAL WHISH DETERMINES TO TRY THE BAYONET—PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SOORUJ KOOND—DEFECTION OF SOME OF GENERAL CORTLANDT'S REGULARS—NARROW ESCAPE OF LIEUTENANT POLLOCK—DISHEARTENING EFFECT ON THE IRREGULAR CAMP—COUNCIL IN GENERAL WHISH'S TENT—NEW PLAN OF BATTLE—THE ENEMY TAKE THE INITIATIVE—BATTLE OF SOORUJ KOOND—ANECDOTES OF DR. COLE AND PRIVATE HOWELL—BRIGADIER MARKHAM'S DESPATCH—ADVANTAGE OF YOUNG COMMANDERS—CAPTURED GUNS—FATE OF THE KUTHAR MOOKHEE RINGLEADER—HOW TO RECOVER IN ONE BATTLE THE LIMBS WHICH WERE LOST IN ANOTHER—NEWS OF THE REVOLT OF THE SIKH TROOPS AT PESHAWUR—STORY OF SOOLTAN MUHOMMUD KHAN'S TREACHERY—REINFORCEMENTS REACH GENERAL WHISH FROM BOMBAY—SOME MILITARY CRITICISMS THEREON—LORD GOUGH SAVES GENERAL WHISH FROM SUPERCESSION—BRIGADIER CHEAPE BECOMES CHIEF ENGINEER—ABSTRACT OF BRITISH FORCE BEFORE

MOOLTAN IN SECOND SIEGE—IRREGULAR FORCE REDUCED BY DETACHMENTS—MOOLRAJ'S ARMY REDUCED BY DESERTION, BUT STILL STRONG—SIEGE OF MOOLTAN RESUMED—CAPTURE OF THE SUBURBS—THE IRREGULARS VOLUNTEER, AND THEIR SERVICES ARE ACCEPTED—SIR HENRY LAWRENCE WITNESSES THEIR BEHAVIOUR—MR. MACMAHON KILLS THE REBEL LEADER IN SINGLE COMBAT, BUT IS MADE PRISONER BY HIS OWN MEN—EXPLOSION OF THE ENEMY'S MAGAZINE IN THE GRAND MOSQUE—THE CITY OF MOOLTAN ASSAULTED AT TWO BREACHES AND CARRIED AT ONE—MOOLRAJ EXCLUDES THREE-FOURTHS OF HIS ARMY FROM THE FORT—THEY DISPERSE TO THEIR HOMES—ASPECT OF THE CITY NEXT DAY—MOOLRAJ ON THE 5TH OF JANUARY DEMANDS A PARLEY, AND IS REFUSED—AGAIN ON THE 8TH, AND IS AGAIN REFUSED—AMPHIBIOUS CO-OPERATION OF THE INDUS FLOTILLA—A SORTIE FROM THE FORT—ON THE 19TH MOOLRAJ AGAIN WISHES TO NEGOTIATE, AND IS TOLD TO SURRENDER—HIS EXTREMITY—HE GIVES HIMSELF UP TO JUSTICE—TIME, LOSS, AND EXPENDITURE OF THE SIEGE.

CHAPTER X

MORTALS are proverbially too short-sighted to see the good that lies latent in misfortune; and our countrymen at that time very naturally lamented the failure of the first siege of Mooltan. But when the cold historian comes to look back on all this turmoil, will he not pause over this temporary check, and apostrophise its felicity for British India? Had Mooltan fallen in September, Chuttur Sing would not have been joined by his son's, the Bunnoo, and the Peshawur armies; every petty Sikh horseman would not have raised his head, and seized his own village in the convenient name of the Khalsa; there would have been in short no national insurrection; and perhaps the kingdom of Maharajuh Duleep Sing might have weathered the storm. Beholding the passions that broke loose when Sher Sing broke faith; and the unconquered animosity of the Sikh army against the victors of the Sutlej, not even the best friend of the Treaty of March, 1846, would perhaps wish that the matter could have been patched up. It is clear that we never could have been safe; and the rebellion would only have been deferred till the young Maharajuh was old enough to head the ungrateful movement. Far better was it then that the nation, by our temporary reverses, was tempted into sincerity—into thinking that the ripe time was come for ejecting us. With a good cause, and a clear

conscience, we have now completed the unfinished vengeance of 1846; and instead of, at the end of a glorious experiment of magnanimity, retiring in 1854 across our own border, the Beas, and leaving a mighty and implacable enemy in our rear, we have in 1849 rid ourselves for ever of the last enemy between the shores of the Hindoo, and the mountain barrier of the Moslem.

The siege of Mooltan, which was raised on the 14th of September, was not resumed till the 27th of December. An operation which had been suspended in consequence of Sher Sing's desertion to the enemy, might doubtless have been proceeded with, without any farther reinforcements, as soon as the Rajah deserted Moolraj. But there was no necessity for doing so; and therefore it was wiser to wait for reinforcements, and make all sure. The first siege had been undertaken, under considerable difficulties, to prevent a Sikh insurrection from growing up out of the Mooltan rebellion. That hope had been disappointed; the Sikh insurrection had occurred; a second Sikh war had become inevitable; and the siege of Mooltan sank at once into a secondary consideration, as a mere detail of the campaign.

It was probably some such reflection as this which induced the military authorities to delay three months in reinforcing General Whish, and to forbid him to resume the siege of Mooltan till reinforcements should arrive.

The interval was not thrown away by either the besiegers or besieged.

General Whish's Engineers employed it in mapping the whole country round Mooltan; making elaborate plans

of the interior of the fort and city, from good local information; and practising the troops in the erection of field-works and model batteries.

Major Siddons makes justly honourable mention of Lieutenant A. Taylor, the officer in charge of the Engineers' park, who "with a singular zeal and ingenuity, prepared all kinds of contrivances for facilitating siege operations; making his park quite a show."*

Major Siddons himself was sent on the 2nd of October with the sappers and miners to Shoojabad, to make up siege materials; and returned thence on the 21st of December "with twelve thousand gabions and eight thousand fascines, besides smaller articles of siege equipment."† General Cortlandt's sappers, and Lieutenant Lumsden's guides, were similarly employed, in their own camp; and the second siege of Mooltan was commenced with the enormous number of fifteen thousand gabions, and twelve thousand fascines.‡

While the besiegers were thus actively preparing for the second siege, the beleagured rebel strained every nerve to render it as abortive as the first. When Sher Sing went off from Mooltan, he took with him not only his own army, but a great many of Moolraj's Sikhs; who, seeing clearly that the great battle of the Khalsa would now be fought between the Jheylum and the Chenab, turned their backs upon Mooltan at once. It is this strong feeling of

*See "Siddons' Journal of the Siege of Mooltan."

†Idem.

‡Idem.

to Bunnoo, and the chiefs of Candahar prepared another to descend on Hurrund.

It is impossible to withhold our admiration from the ability here displayed, or to deny that had these diversions been made with the energy which planned them, the second siege of Mooltan might have been at least postponed till the end of the second Sikh war; General Whish's and Brigadier Dundas's divisions might have been called across the Indus, and Lord Gough have had to fight the battle of Goojurat without the assistance of the victors of Mooltan. But Dost Muhommud frittered away his strength in rendering a cold assistance to Chuttur Sing, and sent his son into Bunnoo at the head of a weak division, which Lieutenant Taylor, with a mere detachment from my army, was able to keep in check.

The Candaharee army never came at all. They assembled, were striken with fever, and dispersed.

But these failures came later in the day; and the movements, in their rise, were towers of strength to Moolraj, and sources of reasonable hope and encouragement to his soldiers.

The last fortnight of September was spent by the garrison of Mooltan in "licking the wounds" of the defeat at the Dhurumsaluh; October in recruiting their numbers, and fortifying all the works. In November their insolence revived, and they proceeded to lay siege to the besiegers.

If the reader will glance again at the map of the Mooltan province, he will see that a large canal, called Wullee

Muhommud's, runs past the western side of the city of Mooltan, and the eastern side of the village of Sooruj Koond.

The width of this canal was about thirty feet, and its total depth about the same; of which ten feet may have been below the level of the surrounding country, and the remaining twenty raised above it by embanked sides, for purposes of irrigation.

The water had been all drained off by Lieutenant Glover damming up the canal mouth at the Chenab river, in the first week of September; and the canal was, at the time I now speak of, an immense dry ditch.

The position taken up by General Whish after raising the first siege was directly at right angles with this canal, and his extreme right was distant from it a little less than a mile.

It is obvious, therefore, that had the enemy been in possession of this canal, at the point of Sooruj Koond, he could have planted guns on the embankments, and have enfiladed the British line. In short, the position would have been untenable.

This objection was removed by the occupation of the village and bridges of Sooruj Koond by the Irregular army, which encamped under the western side of the canal, and thus held the key of General Whish's position.

Half a mile from the Irregular camp, higher up the canal, a water-course branched off to the fields on the westward; and half a mile still farther north (or one mile from

At last, when this artillery expedient had been allowed a trial of forty-eight hours, and the camp of the Irregular troops had been a second time under the enemy's fire for five days; it was determined to do at last, what had much better have been done at first;—viz., expel Moolraj's army at the point of the bayonet.

The plan now decided on was a very good one. The enemy was to be simultaneously attacked on the 7th of November, at daylight, on both sides of the canal, by a strong British brigade on the east, where lay their chief strength and guns; and by the Irregular force on the west; each division carefully keeping to its own side of the canal, to prevent the friendly Irregulars from being mistaken for the foe.*

It was a part of this plan for the Irregulars to relieve the British battery on the evening of the 6th of November; so as to make as many as possible of General Whish's men available for the next morning's fight.

Some delay occurred, and it was not till eleven P.M. on the 6th, that Lieutenant Pollock occupied the British battery with five hundred of my Irregulars, one thousand of Lake's, and General Cortlandt's regiment, called the Kuthar Mookhee. (This regiment was chiefly composed of Hindoos, and entirely, I believe, of Poorbeeuhs, or men of our own provinces. It was the only one of General

*Many plans were thought of during these operations to do away with this anxiety, such as a turban of peculiar colour; but it was justly apprehended that the device would become known to the enemy, and occasion some disastrous treachery. The way in which the face was turned became, therefore, the simple but generally sufficient sign of "with us, or against us."

Cortlandt's regiments which had not been with me in the fights of Kineyree and Suddoosam. Reports had more than once reached me that it was disaffected, and looked on the war as a religious one; but as General Cortlandt himself thought the rumours groundless, I dismissed them from my mind.)

This detachment had not been above two or three hours in possession of the battery, when, as by a preconcerted signal, the enemy attacked it, and shouted out to some officers of the Kuthar Mookhee regiment, by name, that, "Now was the time!" The officers called on their men to drive back the enemy; and the whole regiment seems to have jumped over the intrenchment with this intent, when they found that the attack was a false one, and that many of their comrades were fraternizing with the assailants, and trying to take over the whole corps. On this the loyal majority faced about, and recovered their own post; but two hundred and twenty traitors had gone off to the rebel trenches.*

On the nights of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th of November, I had slept in the eight-gun battery in front of the Irregular camp, to encourage the men in that exposed position. On the night of the 6th, I spread my rug and cloak in the trenches

*On inquiry it appeared that they had packed up all their valuables, and taken them with them to the battery from camp, rolled up in their bedding. It was part of the conspiracy, also, to carry off Lieutenant Pollock; but the faithful Irregulars, who suspected something wrong, had from the first surrounded that gallant young officer, who was a great favourite with them, and would not allow the Regulars to come near him; thus saving him from the sad fate of Agnew and Anderson. In spite of this defection, Lieutenant Pollock (assisted in a true comrade spirit by Lieutenant Bunny of the Artillery, and Lieutenant Paton of the Engineers), held the post with unflinching constancy till day.

32nd; than whom there was no better soldier in that army.

These modifications had scarcely been effected than the whole aspect of affairs was changed by the enemy rashly assuming the initiative, and receiving the glorious repulse recorded in the following letter:

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH

"Camp, Sooruj Koond, November 9th, 1848.

"I have the honour to report such details of the action of the 7th of November as concerned the Irregular auxiliary force under command of myself and Lieutenant Lake.

"You will remember that it was decided, at a meeting of staff-officers in your tent, between four and six A.M. on the 7th of November, that as about half of one of General Cortlandt's regular regiments had deserted to the enemy during the night, from the battery in front of your camp it was not advisable to risk intrusting to the Irregular force that part of the British attack for which they had been told off over night; while at the same time an immediate victory was deemed so indispensable as to require a single attack by the British column, which was finally arranged to come off at ten A.M.

"I left your tent at about half-past six, and had scarcely reached my own, before a sharp musketry fire opened at our advanced battery on the nullah, and growing hotter and hotter, soon proved to be an open attack upon that post by the rebels, in such force as at one time to drive completely back the five hundred Puthans who held it, and turn the

inner flank of the eight-gun battery at the well, four hundred yards in front of our camp. The conduct of the gunners at this trying moment deserves mention. They drew back their guns from the embrasures, and bringing them to bear on the enemy issuing from the nullah, discharged grape so rapidly among them as to check the attack. It was only transferred, however, to the bed and banks of the nullah; and though I poured reinforcements on the point, the enemy also received such accession of numbers, that I deemed it right to let you know that the issue was doubtful, and an immediate diversion necessary.

"Scarcely, however, had Dr. Cole taken you this message when General Cortlandt called on his other two regular regiments to prove themselves free from the treachery of the Kuthar Mookhee Pultun; a call readily answered by several companies leaping over their intrenchments. Mr. Quin, my writer, as usual led them on, and received a spent round shot in his chest as he mounted the nullah, but one rib only was slightly injured. A close hand-to-hand conflict ensued in the nullah; but a large body of Daoodpotras belonging to the army of Nuwab Bhawul Khan, at this moment, gave such timely assistance that the tide was turned; and after a sharp fight of about half an hour the rebels were expelled from the nullah, and in full retreat upon their own intrenchments, up to which they were chased by the victors.

"This successful repulse completely counter-balanced the effect of the defection of the Kuthar Mookhee, and when (in a shorter time than we could have expected) your column came down to the rescue, I was able to promise Brigadier Markham that when he had made his *detour* and closed with

the enemy's left flank on the east of the nullah, our force should assist him, by taking that share of the attack which was assigned it over night. Accordingly when after a lengthened flank movement through the broken ground, most beautifully executed by the British troops, and watched from the highest banks of the canal by all our Irregulars with enthusiasm and admiration, the brigades deployed upon the rebel flank; we waited only to give one hearty cheer to the cavalry as they charged Moolraj's Ghorchurruhs, and then ourselves formed into line and advanced up the west side of the nullah to the right of the enemy's intrenchment, in itself a most difficult position, but carried with feeble resistance in consequence of the rebels being disheartened by one repulse already, and distracted by the British attack upon their left, which they had fondly deemed impregnable.

"I regret to say that the head of the British line reached the east side of the nullah as our Irregulars arrived at the passage in the canal, which connected the intrenchment on the east and west; and a party of Sheikh Emamoodeen's Rohillas disregarding, in the heat of the action, the order they had received to keep on their own side of the nullah, crossed over, and had captured a gun on the eastern bank, when they were mistaken by the sepoys for Moolraj's troops, and two were shot down before the error could be explained.

"I deem it my duty to bring to your notice the noble conduct of a private of Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, who at this juncture, perceiving what was going on, leaped down the canal, and putting himself in front of my Puthans, faced the British troops, and waved his shacko on the end of his

bayonet, as a signal to cease firing: thus many friendly lives were saved. The name of this brave man is Howell.*

"It is only justice for me to mention that Lieutenant Lake, in command of the Daoodpotras, and Lieutenant Pollock and Mr. Hugo James, at the head of the regular regiments, led their men over and into the enemy's works before General Cortlandt could extricate the artillery from the water-cuts in our front, so that the position was carried, without a round shot being fired.

"Dewan Chunda Mull, in civil charge of the Nuwab's army, was present throughout the fight. Sheikh Emamoodeen behaved very well with his men, as did also Dewan Jowahir Mull.

"The whole of my cavalry was, along with your reserve troop of horse artillery, on the right rear of the enemy, and I trust gave you satisfaction.

"Our loss on this day was, I regret to say, severe (thirty-nine killed and one hundred and seventy-two wounded); and during the cannonade from the rebel intrenchment, from the 1st to the 6th of November, thirty-seven killed and one hundred and forty-three wounded. The patient fortitude with which this annoying fire, day and night, was

*I afterwards sent Howell a small present of fifty rupees, which was presented to him by Brigadier Markham, with a few soldierly remarks, at the head of his regiment. To my great surprise the other day, private Howell paid me a visit at Sansaw, in Shropshire: he had bought his discharge; and I was enabled, through a friend, to get him a situation in the police.

endured, until the fitting moment for action arrived, was very creditable to an irregular force.*

"I cannot close this report without acknowledging the indefatigable services of Mr. Assistant-Surgeon Cole, who has since July last had upwards of four hundred wounded men of this force under his hands, and won gratitude and admiration for European medical skill in many a mountain home on the banks of the Indus. His humanity, however, was perhaps never more conspicuous than yesterday, when

No. 1.

RETURN OF KILLED IN THE IRREGULAR FORCE, FROM THE 1ST TO THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER

Name of Camp	Killed		Wounded	
	Men	Horses	Men	Horses
Sheikh Emamoodeen's	10	4	37	—
Foujdar Khan, Futteh Sher Khan, and Kaloo Khan's infantry	9	—	43	—
Ditto cavalry	—	—	—	1
General Cortlandt's three regiments and artillery	8	2	26	—
Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt	5	1	14	1
Misr Sahib Dyal's camp of Rohillas . . .	3	—	8	—
Nuwab Bhawul Khan's force	2	1	15	—
	37	8	143	2

*The nature of our position may be judged of, when I mention that a six-pounder shot came right into my tent, and rolled itself up in the carpet, while I was conversing inside with four other officers, not one of whom was touched.

he saved the lives of many wounded Sikhs upon the field.*

No. 2.

RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED ON THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER, 1848, IN THE ACTION OF SOORUJ KOOND.

Name of Camp	Killed		Wounded	
	Men	Horses	Men	Horses
Sheikh Emamoodeen's	5	4	30	—
Foujdar Khan, Futteh Sher Khan, and Kaloo Khan's infantry	11	—	41	—
Ditto cavalry	4	1	10	—
General Cortlandt's three regiments and artillery	12	—	49	—
Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt	2	5	3	—
Misr Sahib Dyal's camp of Rohillas . .	—	—	1	—
Nuwab Bhawul Khan's force . . .	5	—	38	—
	39	10	172	—†

The following is Brigadier Markham's own more detailed account of the proceedings of the British column.

*Dr. Cole, upon this occasion, put an extempore tourniquet, with a stick and handkerchief, on the smashed thigh of a Sikh rebel, who fell in our advance. Such an act can only be performed by one who adds the courage of a soldier to the humanity of a physician; and I rejoice to learn that Her Majesty's Government have, at last, accorded military distinctions to a branch of the profession which has long enjoyed them in foreign armies.

†"Blue Book," pp. 421—3.

Major-General, who accompanied me in that capacity during the whole affair, I beg to convey my fullest sense of the service he rendered."*

The battle of Sooruj Koond may be described as the most gentlemanly battle ever fought. A mere manœuvre of fine soldiership turned a large army out of a strong intrenchment, and routed them, with the loss of five guns, before they even understood the attack. It was the triumph of discipline over an irregular army. A *regular* army in the same intrenchment would have *changed its front*; but the rebels not being attacked, as they intended to be attacked, were unable to fight at all.

Another peculiarity of the attack was this; that it was conducted entirely by young men; of the four leaders (Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, who commanded one brigade of infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, who commanded another; Major Wheeler, who commanded the cavalry and artillery; and Brigadier Markham, who commanded the whole), not one of them being forty years of age, to the best of my belief; all certainly in the very prime of their bodily and mental strength.

This is no small matter. There was in this business of the 7th of November, on the part of the British column, a celerity of movement in advance, a correctness of eye in seizing the right point to wheel, a decision in wheeling, and a dash in the charge, which I never saw troops equal before or since. And there must be a reason for it.

*"Blue Book," pp. 409, 10.

The ordnance captured by the British troops on this occasion, were as follows:

Two brass six-and-a-half-pounders.

Two brass six-pounders.

One brass two-and-a-half-pounder,*

trophies which were gained with the loss of only three men and twenty-five horses killed; four native officers, fifty-three men, and thirty horses wounded; a result which will appear still more astonishing when I add that, after Mooltan itself fell, I was assured by Moolraj's Commissary that he had sent rations for no less than fifteen thousand men down to the trenches, everyday of that first week of November.†

Among the enemy's slain, our soldiers were not ill-pleased to recognise, by their green uniforms, a large proportion of the Kuthar Mookhee traitors; whose ringleader met an infamous death at their head, within six hours of his desertion.

I cannot help telling one more anecdote of this brilliant day. Brigadier Markham says briefly, "We then destroyed their batteries, and returned to camp." But this is a case

*Major Siddons says: "All the enemy's guns, *except three*, were taken possession of;" but all Moolraj's people that I conversed with afterwards, believed that we had captured *six*, and when I said that we only took *five*, declared that none ever came back to Mooltan. It is possible that one may have been thrown down a well in the retreat.

†When the troops of a native power are engaged in field-works, or maintaining a siege, they expect to be supplied with cooked rations at their posts.

Sing; and hurried the whole party back to his father's stronghold at Kohat. Here Mrs. Lawrence was detained, under similar pretence of the disturbed state of the country, until her husband joined her, after the mutiny of the Peshawur troops. Mrs. Lawrence had, meanwhile, contrived to send intelligence to me at Mooltan, of her doubtful position, and desire to get away; and Lieutenant Reynell Taylor undertook the chivalrous enterprise of going to her rescue. To assist the design, I sent the 'Meanee' steamer up the Indus; and was in hopes that it might bring away the whole Peshawur party in safety; but no sooner did Sooltan Muhommud hear of Lieutenant Taylor's arrival at Esaukheyl, than he removed all his "guests" to Peshawur, and deliberately *sold* them to Chuttur Sing for a grant of the Peshawur province!

This is bad enough; but it will scarcely be believed that the man who could thus act was, when the English came to Lahore, a state hostage at the Sikh capital, had been so for years, and was released from this bondage, and allowed to return to his native country and estates at Peshawur—who by?—by Sir Henry Lawrence, whose own brother and sister-in-law he now basely sold into the hands of their enemies!

He is now a dishonoured exile at the Court of Cabul—a beggar, dependant for bread on his brother's very unwilling charity. But he still keeps an eye on his lost inheritance at Peshawur; and as he and his half hundred hungry sons are the real fomenters of the excitement still existing among the tribes around that outpost, it is by no means impossible that they may one day try to recover it, and meet the just

reward of their complicated crimes on the very spot where they were committed.

After many changes of plan for reinforcing General Whish, it had at last been decided to do so from the Bombay Presidency, of which the frontier military station was indeed nearer to Mooltan than that of the Presidency of Bengal.

The rear of the Bombay column arrived at Mooltan on the 21st of December. Finer troops than were in this division never perhaps took the field in India. They had been long looked for, and our soldiers crowded out to welcome them as they arrived in camp.

They were the first troops of the Bombay army which I had ever seen, and I beheld them with admiration. Their native material was inferior, but their marching order, dress, and general *set up*, was a closer approach to the British soldier than I had ever seen made by the Bengal sepoy. After seeing the two divisions work side by side in the second siege of Mooltan, I would also give the palm of discipline to the Bombay sepoys. When it came to actual fighting, there was little difference perceptible between the two; but with equal bravery and constancy, the Bengal sepoy must necessarily derive an advantage from his superior size. There was one part of the accoutrement of the Bombay division which struck me forcibly. Every man in it, European or native, carried a canteen for water. This is a most soldierly and serviceable custom, which we should do well to imitate. Most gladly also would I see the Bombay system of promotion for non-commissioned officers extended to our army. Whatever laxity of discipline there may be in the Bengal

Native Army, is in my humble judgment attributable to the grade of native non-commissioned officers, who are inefficient from age before they arrive at responsibility. By the time a sepoy has lived himself into a soobuhdarship, he is, without any metaphor, quite ready to die at his post. Instead of being promoted, he ought to be honourably discharged. There is only one objection which can be urged against the Bombay system of *selecting* non-commissioned officers, viz., that it fosters military merit among the natives, which we had better, if possible, confine to our own countrymen. Equally glad should I be (if, as an infantry officer, I may venture an opinion on artillery) to see the Bombay, or rather Royal, system, introduced into the Bengal Horse Artillery; though I think the Bombay *heavies* might take a few lessons from their brethren of Bengal, both as to the equipment and practice of siege guns.

I make these remarks in no party spirit, but as the impressions of one equally interested in the efficiency and success of every branch of the Honourable Company's army.

The Bombay division was commanded by Brigadier the Hon. H. Dundas, C.B., of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles.

The Bombay Government had appointed Major-General Achmuty to the command; but as he was senior to General Whish, and would consequently have superseded him, Lord Gough, with the good feeling which stamped every act of his military life in India, set aside the arrangement.

One supercession, however, could not be avoided. The Mooltan field force was only a division of the "Great Army of the Punjab" assembled under the Commander-in-Chief; and of that army the Chief Engineer was Colonel J. Cheape, C. B., who of course proceeded immediately to Mooltan—the point where his department was most actively engaged. Major Napier, therefore, lost the honour of directing the second siege; but in zeal and gallantry in its prosecution, he continued as of old, second to none.

Colonel Cheape assisted in the reduction of Bhurtpoor, and has therefore had the rare good fortune to see the two most remarkable sieges in the history of British India.

With these additions, and the return to the Bengal column of fifteen sepoys per company, with non-commissioned officers, from their annual furlough, General Whish's force, stood as follows:*

*"Siddons' Journal of the Siege of Mooltan."

ABSTRACT OF THE BRITISH FORCE BEFORE MOOLTAN AT THE SECOND SIEGE

TROOPS	PRESENT EFFECTIVE				PRESENT SICK				DETAIL OF TROOPS
	Officers		Men	Horses	*Officers*		Men	Horses	
	Euro-pean.	Native			Euro-pean.	Native			
Division and Brigade Staff . . .	59*	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	
1 troop of European and 2 troops of Native Horse Artillery.	16	5	380	532	—	—	34	12	3rd troop, Bombay Horse Artillery. 4th troop, 1st brigade, Bengal Artillery. 4th troop, 3rd brigade, Bengal Artillery.
5 companies of European and 3 companies of Native Foot Artillery.	29	11	676	229	—	—	42	11	2nd co. 1st battalion, Bombay Foot Artillery. 2nd co. 2nd battalion, Bengal ditto. 3rd and 4th cos. 3rd battalion, Bengal ditto 4th co. 2nd battalion, Bombay ditto. 11th co. 4th battalion, Bombay ditto. 6th co. 7th battalion, Bengal ditto.

7½ companies of Sappers and Pioneers.	17†	11	701	—	1	2	76	—	1st, 2nd and 3rd cos. of Bengal Sappers and Miners. 1st and 4th cos. of Bombay ditto. 2nd and 3rd cos. of Bengal Pioneers, with detachment of 6th and 7th cos.
2 regiments of Regular and 3½ regiments of Irregular Native Cavalry.	40	69	2,197	2,251	—	4	63	97	2nd Bombay Light Cavalry. 11th Bengal ditto ditto. 7th ditto Irregular Cavalry. 11th ditto ditto ditto. Scinde Irregular Horse, and squadron of 14th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.
4 regiments of European Infantry.	130	—	3,408	—	2	—	155	—	H.M.'s 10th, 32nd and 60th Rifles, and 1st Bombay Fusiliers.
9 regiments of Native Infantry	145	141	7,612	—	19	6	389	—	8th, 49th, 51st, 52nd and 72nd Bengal Native Infantry. 3rd, 4th, 9th and 19th Bombay ditto.
	436	237	14,975	3,012	25	12	759	120	

* Including 15 European Officers attached to Sappers and Miners.

† The return of the Sappers may be slightly incorrect, as the Bombay return available was not very clear in details.

NOTE—67 pieces of siege ordnance.
18 horse artillery guns.
12 Bombay light field-battery guns.

97 guns in all.

The Irregular force on the contrary, was much weaker now than during the first siege. I had sent, one thousand men under Moostapha Khan to Rungpoor on the right bank of the Chenab, to watch the ferries, and prevent either recruits or supplies from reaching the garrison in Mooltan; where the scarcity of food was aggravated by Moolraj having expended all his silver, and being compelled, in consequence, to coin small rupees of gold, wherewith to pay his soldiers.*

The protection of the Bengal *depot* at Shoojabad, and the Bombay *depot* at Ooch; the keeping open of the road between Mooltan and the Sutlej, and the charge of the bridge of boats over that river, all devolved upon my own and Lieutenant Lake's forces; and these heavy duties kept three thousand of our men in constant employment.

At the end of November, too, I dispatched Sheikh Emamoodeen with all his force—upwards of two thousand men, and two guns—to drive the rebels out of the adjoining province of Jhung; and though Moolraj immediately sent them a reinforcement of one thousand men, under Nurayun Sing, one of his most active officers; yet the Sheikh drove them out of Jhung, and pursued them to Chundniot, on the Chenab where they shut themselves up in a stout fort, and surrendered afterwards to General Whish, on his way to join Lord Gough.

*The inscription on these rupees was "The Pure and Omnipotent God;" as if the cold-blooded murderer of our countrymen was under the special protection of Providence. The die used to stamp these rupees fell afterwards into my hands, and is very curious.

The strength of the enemy had also sensibly diminished during the month of December. It was clear, even to the most sanguine of Moolraj's troops, that the preparations now nearly finished for the renewal of the siege, were on a scale that no fortress could resist.

The Sikhs, therefore, betook themselves to the more hopeful standard of Chuttur Sing; and many mercenaries who had no heart in the cause, and no bond of old attachment to Moolraj, began to slink away to their homes. It was no uncommon thing to hear of a hundred men letting themselves down over the walls at night, and being vainly pursued next morning by Moolraj's cavalry. Still Moolraj was rich; if he had no silver, his coffers were full of gold; and it was a favourite boast of his, that when all the iron shot were expended, he would fire this precious metal upon the presumptuous English. So long as a native leader has money, he is always certain to find an army; and making allowance for the large defections that took place from Moolraj's standard, between the battle of Sooruj Koond and the second siege, he must still have been at the head of twelve thousand men.

On the 25th of December, the Bengal division marched from its three months' camp, at Araby,* to its old position at Seetul-ke-Maree, and sent back all its carriage cattle the same night, to enable the Bombay division to follow the next morning.

On the 27th, the united British force resumed the long-suspended siege of Mooltan.

*This must not be confounded with Arabia Felix!

These unexpected successes confined Moolraj's army almost within the city walls, and induced General Whish to modify his plan of operations; by extending his attack to the city, instead of limiting it to the fort, a project which had already been entertained by Brigadier Cheape, but was rejected by the General as likely to cost great loss of life in obtaining possession of the suburbs. The suburbs were now happily ours; and it was resolved to take the city also. For if the city were left with Moolraj, he could within it maintain a large army to the last; and keep open a retreat for the garrison whenever they should lose the fort; whereas by taking the city first, not only would Moolraj's army be dispersed, with the mere exception of the garrison of the fort, but the fort itself would be attacked from the city with less labour to the besiegers than from any exposed point outside.

It would be out of place in a work like this to follow that gallant British army through all the details of the siege which followed. The student of military science will find the operations of each day and night full narrated in Major Siddons' "Journal of the Siege;" and civilians will, I am sure, prefer a more general account.

It was not intended (now that there was a sufficient British force) that the Irregular troops should take any share in the actual operations of the siege. On them devolved the duty of keeping open the communications with the rear, protecting *depots*, and escorting military stores to the army. But finding that the Bombay division could not, without a harassing amount of duty, maintain possession of the long line of suburbs it had seized, Lieutenant Lake and I volunteered to relieve it of the charge of Seedee-Lal-Ke-Beyd,

and thus leave the whole of the British force at liberty to prosecute the siege without fear of its left flank being turned. The offer was accepted, and handsomely acknowledged, by General Whish;* and in this position the besieging armies remained throughout the siege, with the Bengal division on the right, the Bombay in the centre, and the Irregulars on the left.

On the 29th, two thousand of the enemy, among whom the Kuthar Mookhee deserters were conspicuous, made a sally from the Delhi Gate of the city, and attacked the Irregular position, but were dislodged from the gardens they had occupied, and driven back within the walls, after an hour and a half's hard fighting, in which Lieutenants Lake, Pollock, Pearse, and Young,† all distinguished themselves; and my writer, Mr. Quin, once more led on the Sooruj Mookhee regiment. But the palm was this day carried off by a new volunteer, Mr. MacMahon, who had joined me only a few days before, and who now "earned his title to be brought especially to notice, by encountering in single combat the leader of the enemy's infantry, a powerful Sikh, whom he killed with one blow which divided his head."‡

So kindly indeed did this gentleman take to the work, that the men I had given him to command, and who thought themselves responsible for his safety, proceeded to take

*"Blue Book," p. 516.

†Lieutenant Pearse of the Madras Artillery, and Lieutenant Ralph Young of the Engineers, were kindly appointed by General Whish to do duty with the Irregular force.

‡"Blue Book," p. 521.


him prisoner, and brought him back with bent and dripping sword, to the spot where, side by side with Sir Henry Lawrence, I was directing the movements of the troops.

Sir Henry Lawrence, who had gone on sick leave to England, no sooner heard of the Punjab war than he set off on his return; and after making his way up from Bombay in an incredibly short period, reached Mooltan just in time to see the opening of the second siege. The reader may believe how glad I was to show him the *posse comitatus* I had raised to preserve the peace he left, and their wild, but gallant bearing in the inevitable war.

On the 30th of December, a shell from a mortar laid by Lieutenant Newall of the Bengal Artillery,* pierced the supposed bomb-proof dome of the Grand Mosque in the citadel, which formed the enemy's principal magazine, and descending into the combustibles below, blew the vast fabric into the air.

Slowly, almost reluctantly, rose up that mass of smoke and costly ruin, followed by an explosion which seemed to shake both armies at their posts. The dark volume expanded as it mounted in the sky, and hundreds of separate circles (each with its own tale of perished arch or minaret) might be seen wheeling with the varying rapidity of the impetus they had received, and the burden that they bore. Then at a vast height the heavy cloud stood still, like some great tree, and its shadow fell as night over the camps below. All action was suspended; not a gun was fired; every eye was turned up with awe, and watched the strange vision

*"Blue Book," p. 521.



J. Arrowsmith.

gradually sink and disappear. And when it passed away, and of that late lofty but desecrated fane of the Moslem not a single vestige was to be seen, the besieging army raised one long shout of triumph, and again plied the instruments of destruction.

In this explosion five hundred of the garrison, and about four hundred thousand pounds of powder, were said to have been destroyed. A glance at the plan of the fort annexed to this chapter will give an idea of the damage it inflicted on the upper works of the citadel.

On the 2nd of January the breach in the Khoonee Boorj, or Bloody Bastion of the city, was declared practicable; and a second at the Delhi Gate was thought "sufficiently good to allow of an attempt being made upon it as a diversion."* General Whish determined to try both; and a party from the Bengal division was told off for the Delhi Gate breach, and one from the Bombay division for the breach at the Bastion. The Irregular force was to assist both by a diversion on the left. The diversion was commenced at one, and the assault by a sign from the batteries at three P.M.

The storming party of the Delhi Gate (which was led by a fine soldier, Captain Smyth, of the Grenadier Company of Her Majesty's 32nd), had no sooner emerged from the suburbs, than they found themselves on the edge of a deep intervening hollow; after crossing which, under a heavy fire of matchlocks, they "found to their surprise the city wall in front, about thirty feet in height, unbreached, and

*"Siddons' Journal of the Siege."

totally impracticable,"* which the hollow had hitherto concealed from both the breaching battery and the engineers. They had the mortification, therefore, of retiring; but repaired at once to the breach at the Bloody Bastion to assist their more fortunate comrades in the city.

The Bloody Bastion was assaulted by three companies of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, under Captain Leith. They found the breach easy to be surmounted, but it was retrenched inside, and a most bloody struggle ensued for victory, in which the gallant Leith was severely wounded, and carried off the field; but his place being taken by Lieutenant Gray, and Colour-Serjeant John Bennet of the 1st Fusiliers having planted the colours of Old England on the very crest of the breach, and stood beside it till the flag and staff were riddled with balls,† the Fusiliers remembered the legends of their ancient corps, and closing with the rebels, soon made the city of Mooltan their own. Then arose from every crowded height and battery, whence the exciting struggle had been watched, the shouts of applauding comrades; and through the deafening roar of musketry, which pealed along the ramparts, and marked the hard-earned progress of the victorious columns through the streets, both friend and foe might distinctly hear that sound never to be forgotten—the "Hurrah!" of a British army after battle.

Thus fell the blood-stained city of Mooltan. Where are now the citizens who hooted on the murderers of Anderson

*"Blue Book," p. 524.

†"Ibid," p. 527.

and Agnew?—the idolators who, with fresh-painted foreheads, and garlands of flowers in their hands, prostrated themselves with joy before their unconscious gods, and thanked them for the death of the Christians? Silent—shame-stricken—hiding in holes and corners—invisible, or kneeling in the mud for mercy—mercy from the Christian conqueror, to whose countrymen they had shown none!

* * * * * *

No sooner did Moolraj see that the breach in the city walls was carried by the British, than he closed the gates of the fort upon the unsuccessful defenders of the city, and thus left three-fourths of his army at the mercy of their enemies. He retained with himself in the citadel only the three thousand picked men required for its defence.

The indignant garrison of the city, deserted on one side by the master whose miserable existence they had prolonged, and pursued on the other up every street and alley by the British, saw no hope left for them in Mooltan; and scrambling over the western walls, or issuing at the Loharee gate, concealed themselves till night among the Afghan suburbs; then, under cover of the darkness, dispersed and fled, without gain or honour, to their distant homes.

Never did broken vessel, left high and dry on some inhospitable shore after a storm, exhibit a more perfect wreck than the city of Mooltan, on the 3rd of January, 1849. Its streets were strewn with slain, chiefly Sikhs, whose long religious locks spread wildly out on the bloody ground, gave their dead a demonaic look, which no one who has walked

over a Sikh battle-field can forget. So might some Michael Angelo portray the hosts whom "the spirits of devils" shall gather together, to be destroyed at Armageddon.

There was scarce a roof or wall in the city which had not been penetrated by the English shells; and whole houses, scorched and blackened by the bombardment, seemed about to fall over the corpses of their defenders. A more awful scene of retribution I never saw!

Soon, however, was this City of the Dead alive again with armed men. It was determined to attack the fort from the city side, as well as the north-east; and British regiments were poured in to occupy the various posts pointed out by the engineers.

On the 4th of January, a brigade of the Bombay division marched round, and encamped on the north of the fort; and communicating by pickets and patrols with the Bengal division on the east, and with a detachment of Irregulars on the west, completed, for the first time, the investment of Mooltan. Fast now were the toils closing round Dewan Moolraj; his heart began to fail, and on the evening of the 5th of January he made a first overture to surrender.

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Mooltan, January 6th, 1849.

"I forward an *urzee* (petition), received by me yesterday evening from the rebel Dewan Moolraj, together with a copy of my reply.

"I trust the tenor of the latter is in strict conformance with your wishes, and the instructions of the Governor-General.

"The garrison of Mooltan is now in the last extremity. The gunners are unable to serve their guns from incessant shelling; the buildings are almost all unroofed from the same cause, and afford but little shelter; Dewan Moolraj himself has sought refuge in the gateway of the Sikhee Gate; and every soldier is obliged to grind the wheat for his own dinner, all the flour having been blown up in the explosion of the Jumma Musjid. In this state of things, Moolraj's chief advisers are urgently pressing him to surrender; and he has promised either to do so or take poison, if no succour reaches him in the course of three days. I regard the present overture from Moolraj, therefore, as a sign that his pride is broken down at last, and that he wants the courage to play out his part."*

"DEWAN MOOLRAJ TO MAJOR EDWARDES

"January 5th, 1849.

"Having sundry representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, I will send a confidential person of my own to wait on you who will tell you all."

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO DEWAN MOOLRAJ

"January 5th, 1849.

"I have received and perused your urzee. You say

*"Blue Book," p. 530.

you have sundry things to represent, and with my leave will send a confidential person for that purpose. This I cannot assent to. It is quite impossible. The time for that was April last. You then preferred war—now go through with it; or, if you are unable, surrender yourself to General Whish. After that, you can represent anything you like."*

Thus refused a parley by me, he appealed to the General; but still made me the medium of communication.

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Mooltan, January 7th, 1849.

"The rebel Dewan Moolraj had no sooner received my purwanna of the 5th instant, refusing to receive his vakeel, and informing him that no representation on his part would be listened to until he had surrendered to General Whish, than he addressed a similar request (to be allowed to send a vakeel) to the Major-General, and sent it through me, begging that I would procure him an answer.

"I immediately waited on the General, and by his desire sent the answer, which is appended.

"There can be little doubt that the Dewan will send a vakeel to-day or to-morrow; and as little, I should think, that this will be followed by the surrender of the Dewan. I shall of course be present at the interview with the motbir,

*"Blue Book," p. 531.

and will take care that he thoroughly understands that his master's surrender is unconditional."*

"MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH TO DEWAN MOOLRAJ

"January 6th, 1849.

"I have received your urzee through Major Edwardes. It is impossible to grant your request to be allowed to send a confidential servant to me to make certain representations; indeed, Major Edwardes told you yesterday, that until you come in to me nothing you have to say will be listened to.

"You are informed that if the object of sending a confidential person is simply to state: 'My master wishes to come in, and will do so at such an hour, and will come out from the fort at such a gate, and by such a road,' then he may come; but if he has anything else to say, on no account send him."†

Over this second repulse Moolraj brooded till the evening of the 8th; when finding new batteries opening within two hundred yards of his citadel, and the trenches enfolding him with the snake-like movements and grasp of a Laocoon; he again attempted a parley under pretence of a surrender.

*"Blue Book," p. 531.

†"Ibid," p. 532.

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Mooltan, January 9th, 1849.

"Yesterday, Dewan Moolraj again addressed letters to General Whish and myself, accepting gratefully the General's permission to send a motbir; and asking for arrangements to be made to let the said motbir be received at the Delhi Gate, or any other the General might prefer, and honourably treated. In reply, the General appointed nine o'clock this morning for the motbir to come to the Delhi Gate. He came about eleven, but there was considerable commotion in the fort, and it is supposed some party opposed the mission. Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-master-General received the motbir (Dya Buksh Khan, a confidential adviser of the Dewan), and conducted him to the General's tent, where I was in attendance on the Major-General.

"Dya Buksh presented his nuzzur, and then commenced an oration, which I immediately stopped, and requested him to confine himself to a simple statement of the Dewan's wish to surrender, and at what time he would come in. He replied, 'Dewan, Sahib, hazir hy!'—equivalent to 'the Dewan submits!' Adding—'But only hear the representations he has told me to make!' and showing clearly that he had come charged with a budget of questions and doubts to be resolved; in short, that he wished to stipulate not to surrender unconditionally. I again stopped him, therefore, and asked him plainly, from the General, whether he had authority to tender his master's submission, and arrange for his coming in? Dya Buksh was not prepared for this literal interpretation of the conditions on

which he had come, and acknowledged that he had not authority to go at once into such final arrangements; but said he would, if allowed, go back, and relate to the Dewan that nothing else would be listened to. The General then gave him his leave, and he retired evidently much disappointed at his reception.

"A new battery of seven eighteen-pounders had just been opened in our trenches, and played heavily on the fort during this interview, so that conviction must have reached the Dewan that his diplomacy was not likely to gain either time or terms.

"I still think the Dewan will submit, and avoid the last crisis of the siege."*

It was a peculiarity of this siege of Mooltan, that it was not only shared in by regular and irregular troops, but by British seamen. Commander Powell, of the Honourable East India Company's Navy, had from the very commencement largely assisted the operations against Mooltan, by rapidly conveying troops and military stores, and cutting off the enemy's boats by means of the steamers of the Indus flotilla under his command. No sooner had the second siege been regularly begun, than this indefatigable officer conceived the design of assisting the artillerymen, by volunteering to work one of the heavy batteries with sailors of the Indian navy. The gallant offer was accepted; and throughout the siege these "jolly tars" took watch and watch with their comrades on the shore. It was a fine sight to see their manly faces, bronzed by long exposure to the burning

*"Blue Book," p. 533.

sun of the Red Sea, or Persian Gulf, mingling with the dark soldiers of Hindoostan, or contrasting with the fairer, but not healthier, occupants of the European barrack. They looked on their battery as a ship; their eighteen-pounders as so many sweethearts, and the embrasures as port-holes. "Now, Jack, shove your head out at that port, and just hear what my little girl says to that 'ere pirate, Moll Rag!" was the kind of conversation that you heard *on board* of the sailor-battery as you passed.

Either the "pirates" derived more than usual annoyance from this amphibious attack, or the sailor-battery had been erected in a position most galling to the garrison; for, on the 9th of January, they bent such a storm of shells on it as to set fire to the fascines of which it was composed, and burn the battery to the ground. "The guns were with the greatest difficulty withdrawn, and powder saved, by the exertions of the seamen."*

On the night of the 12th of January, the garrison made an unsuccessful *sortie* on the British trenches, and were repulsed by Major Napier, the Directing Engineer on duty, and Lieutenant Galloway, at the head of a party of Her Majesty's 10th Foot. This was the only exhibition of enterprise made by the garrison during the siege, though their defence was desperate.

On the 14th, the British Sappers crowned the crest of the glacis at the north-east angle of the citadel with a

*"Siddons' Journal." Both General Whish and Brigadier Dundas acknowledged, and the Governor-General recognised, Commander Powell's important services during the siege; and I am sure there is not one soldier of the Mooltan field force who does not yet hope that he will share in their honours as largely as he did in their dangers and fatigues.

cavalier, only fifteen feet from the edge of the ditch, and so close to the enemy that they threw brickbats into it from the neighbouring bastion.*

On the 19th, General Whish examined two breaches which had now been effected by the artillery in the vast fortress before them, one on the north face and one on the south, and both seemed very nearly practicable. The same evening Moolraj once more asked permission to send a confidential agent to the General; and he was told in reply that, if his object was surrender, he had better do so at eight A.M. next day, and any messengers sent with any other communication would be immediately made prisoners. No answer being received to this, orders were issued for storming both breaches on the morning of the 21st; but the counterscarp on the city side not having been blown in, the assault was postponed till six A.M. on the 22nd.†

Moolraj was now reduced to the last extremity. The interior of the fortress was a wreck; a constant storm of shells was falling into it day and night, rendering it impossible for a man inside to move; and two breaches had been made so practicable, that dogs and horses, whom the rebels drove over as an experiment, walked up and down with ease. Large numbers, too, of the garrison had deserted, and either surrendered to me, or been taken prisoners by the investing cavalry; while those who yet remained told the Dewan plainly that he must either sally out at the head of his troops, and cut his way through the besiegers, or

*"Siddons' Siege."

†General Whish's despatch, January 21st, 1849, "Blue Book," p. 551.

immediately surrender, as flesh and blood could stand the British fire no longer.

In this desperate condition, Moolraj at last made up his mind to surrender. He had fought thus long because to fight was to live; now to fight longer was to die, and he loved life still. To live one more month, or even week, he would consent to die on the gallows, rather than fall tomorrow in the breach, and be remembered with mingled infamy and honour.

This was his submission:

"DEWAN MOOLRAJ TO MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH

"You yesterday ordered me to come in, and surrender before nine A.M., but I was prevented by sickness from complying sooner. I am now ready to come in, and for this purpose have sent my vakeel to arrange with you; your slave desires only protection for his own life, and the honour of his women. The whole of this disturbance was set on foot by my soldiers, and all my endeavours failed to quell it; now, however, I surrender myself. I ask only for my own life, and the honour of my women. You are an ocean of mercy—what more need be said?

("NOTE—The letter apparently was intended to end here, but is continued in a hurried, and seemingly different, hand as follows:)

"This whole affair originated in accident, and my own force was ready to kill and insult me; of my own free-will I would never have done what I have; nevertheless, I confess

myself an offender in every way. If you grant me my life, and protection to my women, I surrender: otherwise,

" 'It is better to die with honour than to live with disgrace.'

"You are a sea of compassion; if you forgive me, I am fortunate; if you do not, I meet my fate with contentment."*

And this was the British General's reply:

"MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH TO DEWAN MOOLRAJ

"I have received your urzee. In it you write that you only ask for your own life, and the honour of your women. This is my answer: That I have neither authority to give your life, nor to take it, except in open war. The Governor-General only can do this: and as to your women, the British Government wars with men—not with women. I will protect your women and children, to the best of my ability. Take notice, however, if you intend to come in at all, you had better do so before sunrise to-morrow, and come out by the Dowlut Gate. After sunrise, you must take the fortune of war."†

The overtures of the rebel were not allowed to arrest the progress of the siege. All night the guns still thundered at the breaches, and the shells still burst over the

*"Blue Book," p. 553.

†"Ibid."

heart-broken garrison. At daybreak, the British troops took up their final positions to storm the broken fortress of Mooltan. At seven A.M., Dewan Moolraj intimated his wish to come out and surrender, and the British batteries ceased firing.

At nine A.M., the murderer of Agnew and Anderson gave himself up to justice.

The following brief note announces the event:

"MAJOR EDWARDES TO THE RESIDENT AT LAHORE

"Camp, Mooltan, January 22nd, 1849.

"It is with heartfelt satisfaction that I announce to you the surrender of Dewan Moolraj to Major-General Whish, C.B., at nine A.M. this morning, and the occupation by British troops of the strong fortress of Mooltan, without the bloodshed of an assault.

"The morning opened with a severe storm of thunder and rain, which did not interfere, however, with the arrangements for assaulting the citadel by two breaches, should the rebels fail to surrender by the hour appointed; and the determined attitude of the besiegers, undismayed by the raging elements, must have had no small share in convincing the garrison that further resistance was in vain.

"The flag of Old England is now flying out in a fresh breeze and bright sunshine from the highest bastion of the citadel.

"Dewan Moolraj is a prisoner in the tent of the Chief Engineer.

"The troops intended for the assault are now disarming the garrison, and protecting the women and children.

"I congratulate you, and the Government of British India, on the extinction of the firebrand which raised this flame in the Punjab."*

Thus ended the second siege of Mooltan. It occupied twenty-seven days, and effected two practicable breaches. In it the British loss was, two hundred and ten killed, and nine hundred and eighty-two wounded; and upwards of thirteen thousand shot, and twenty-six thousand shells, were poured into the fort and city.

The besieging army did not march away to other fields without performing its last melancholy duty to the memory of Agnew and Anderson.

The bodies of those officers were carefully—I may say affectionately—removed from the careless grave where they lay side by side; and wrapped in Cachmere shawls (with a vain but natural desire to obliterate all traces of neglect), were borne by the soldiers of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers (Anderson's own regiment), to an honoured resting-place on the summit of Moolraj's citadel. By what way borne? Through the gate where they had been first assaulted? Oh, no! through the broad and sloping breach which had been made by the British guns in the walls of the rebellious fortress of Mooltan.

*"Blue Book," pp. 555, 6.

"The troops intended for the assault are now disturbing the garrison, and protecting the women and children.*

"I congratulate you, and the Government of British India, on the extinction of the firebrand which raised this flame in the Punjab."

Thus ended the second siege of Mooltan. It occupied twenty-seven days, and effected two practicable breaches. In it the British loss was two hundred and ten killed, and nine hundred and eighty-two wounded; and upwards of thirteen thousand shot, and twenty-six thousand shells, were poured into the fort and city.

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* See Book I. ch. III.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X

"MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL

"Camp, Mooltan, January 22nd, 1849.

"I have the satisfaction of reporting to you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, in accordance with the expectation I expressed in my letter of yesterday, Dewan Moolraj came into my camp this morning, in charge of Major Becher, Assistant Quartermaster-General, the garrison at the same time, between three thousand and four thousand, surrendering, and laying down their arms to the columns under Brigadiers Hervey and Capon, that had been in orders for the assault of the citadel. This peaceful and successful termination of our siege operations, after the laborious and gallant exertions of the troops since the 27th ultimo, will, I have no doubt, be very gratifying to His Lordship and to the Government; and I am grateful to Divine Providence for having permitted in this way the accomplishment of such an important result.

"On the 1st instant, with my letter, I had the satisfaction of forwarding Brigadier the Honourable H. Dundas's report of the conduct of the troops of his division, engaged in the attack on the suburbs on the 27th ultimo, of the left column of which he took personal command, particularising many officers in command of corps or departments, and on the staff, whose services had been valuable. Also on the 7th instant, with my letter, I transmitted similar reports of the proceedings of the two columns under Brigadiers Stalker and Markham, that had taken the city by assault on the 2nd instant, and which will, I trust, meet the favourable consideration of his

Lordship. But not having hitherto availed myself of any occasion to notice in just terms of commendation various officers of the Bengal division, who have been with me the last six months, I beg permission to do so now.

"To Brigadier Cheape, C.B., Chief Engineer of the army of the Punjab, and Major Napier, Chief Engineer of the Bengal division, to Captains Abercrombie, Western, and Siddons, to Lieutenant Garforth, Brigade-Major of Engineers, dangerously wounded on the 2nd instant, and to all the officers of the Engineer department, and of the corps of Sappers and Pioneers, I am much indebted for their zealous, scientific, and persevering exertions, as also to Major Scott, Chief Engineer of the Bombay division, and to the officers under him.

"The practice of the artillery was the theme of admiration with all. My thanks are particularly due to Majors Garbett and Leeson, respectively commanding the artillery of the Bengal and Bombay divisions, and to the officers under them—Brevet-Major Blood,* and Captains Turnbull, Daniell, Anderson, Master, and Mackenzie. Lieutenant Mill, Brigade-Major of the artillery of the Bengal division since July, has been particularly brought to my notice by Major Garbett, for his useful services, and as contributing essentially to the advance of our operations. I must particularly commend those of Captain Hicks, Bombay Artillery, and Lieutenant P. Christie, Bengal Artillery, Commissaries of Ordnance, who were unremitting in their attention to their important duties. The services of Brigadiers Hervey and Markham, commanding infantry, brigades, and of Brigadier Salter, commanding the cavalry, as also of their Brigade-Majors Captains Wiggins and Balfour, and Lieutenant Warner, have been very valuable; and it will be in the recollection of his Lordship that Brigadier Markham had the good fortune, on the 7th of November last, and on the 2nd instant, to command columns of attack that were eminently successful.

*In a P.S. to this despatch, General Whish informed the Adjutant-General that, by a clerical error, the name of Major Day had not been inserted "immediately before that of Major Blood." In this protracted siege, during which all branches of the besieging force did well, no branch was more distinguished than the artillery, and in the artillery no officer more distinguished himself by zeal and science than Major Day.

"In my letter of the 7th instant, I noticed the gallant proposition of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., commanding Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, for a party being given him to escalade the citadel on the 2nd instant, and I am much indebted to that officer on other accounts.*

"It is also proper for me to notice in terms of commendation the other officers commanding corps in the Bengal division, and under canvas the last six months, namely,—Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment; Major Farquharson, commanding 8th Native Infantry; Major Lloyd, commanding 49th Regiment; Major Finnis, commanding 51st Native Infantry; Captain Jamieson, commanding 52nd Native Infantry; Captain Lloyd, commanding 72nd Native Infantry (relieved on the 30th of November by Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, C.B., who was severely wounded in the attack of the 27th ultimo); Captain Inglis, commanding the 11th Regiment Light Cavalry; Major Wheeler, commanding 7th Irregular Cavalry; Captain Master, commanding the 11th Irregular Cavalry; and Lieutenant Robarts, commanding squardon of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, who relieved from that charge, on the 30th of November, Lieutenant Plowden, of the 50th Native Infanry.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond, C.B., Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Major Becher, Assistant Quartermaster-General, have uniformly given me the most efficient aid, and with a willingness that much enhanced it; and the Assistant Adjutant-General, Brevet-Captain Whish, has performed his laborious duties with a promptness, intelligence, and zeal, that has much lessened mine.

"Captain Lloyd, in charge of the Commissariat department (assisted by Captains Cooper and Turner, Lieutenants Tombs, Robertson and Willes), has uniformly made such excellent arrangements that the troops have never been inconvenienced for want of supplies; and that department has in every respect been conducted most satisfactorily.

*Colonel Franks' proposition was to escalade the citadel, while the assault on the city was going on; and the number of men he asked for was five hundred of each regiment of his own brigade. General Whish declined the offer, but reported it with the high praise which it deserved. If any man could have performed so desperate a deed, it was Colonel Franks.

"The Superintending Surgeon, Dempster, has uniformly and successfully applied his talents and assiduity to the promotion of the health and comfort of our sick and wounded, and been ably supported by the medical officers of every corps and department.

"The officers of my personal staff, Captain Clarke Kennedy, Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, and Lieutenant Need, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, Aides-de-Camp, have been so unremitting in their exertions to promote the service, that I cannot convey a correct idea of the grateful feeling their conduct has impressed on me. They both merit my warmest commendations and thanks.

"I have written this despatch in much haste, and fear I have omitted the names of some to whom I feel much indebted, in which case I shall not fail to repair the omission.

"It is very satisfactory to me to add in conclusion that I have always experienced from Brigadier the Honourable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Bombay division, and from the brigadiers and officers in command under him, the most willing assistance.

"The services of Commander Powell, of the Indian navy, with the steamers under his orders, have been of much value to the objects of the expedition and a detail of seamen from the vessels has afforded material relief at the batteries on several occasions.

"I have had the greatest satisfaction in directing a royal salute to be fired from the citadel at noon, in honour of his Lordship's victory over the Sikhs on the 13th instant; and I shall order another to be fired at sunset, for the happy termination of military operations in this quarter."*

"MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL

"Camp, Mooltan, January 23rd, 1849.

"Although I have in due course taken leave to bring to the notice of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, from time to time, the

*"Blue Book," pp. 554, 5.

services rendered by the allied troops under Major Edwardes, C.B., Assistant Resident, as I am about to part with that officer, whose willing and valuable aid I have frequently experienced since our first encamping before Mooltan, I will venture upon a brief recapitulation of what has been done by the forces under him and Lieutenant Lake, Engineers, respectively; the latter officer having had unassisted charge of the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor troops, until he was wounded on the 12th of September last, when he was for a month relieved by Lieutenant Taylor, 11th Light Cavalry, Assistant Resident, who was prevented from continuing during the siege by a chivalrous expedition he undertook to recover our captives from Peshawur. General Van Cortlandt commanded the regular regiments and artillery of the Durbar, and, as far as came under my observation, executed an arduous trust, under occasionally critical circumstances, with much judgment and zeal. Lieutenant Lumsden, Assistant Resident, with a detachment of the Guide Corps, performed useful service for the two months he was in the allied camp. Lieutenant Pollock, 49th Regiment Native Infantry, Assistant Resident, has more than once distinguished himself at the head of a detachment during the siege, and joined his corps for the storm of the city on the 2nd instant. Lieutenant Young, Engineers, had charge of the Irregular Sappers and Miners, and, under the orders of Major Scott, Chief Engineer, Bombay division, was eminently useful on the line of attack on the city side. Dr. Cole has been, as usual, foremost in the cause of humanity; and, after attending to his own sick, a very large hospital of the wounded of the enemy experienced the benefit of his skill and care.

"Before I conclude this brief notice of the officers attached to the allied forces that, exclusive of on various occasions having been successfully engaged with the enemy, maintained our communication with the Sutlej and Chenab, and furnished escorts for our supplies, &c., I beg to notice two gentlemen, at present non-military, who have done good service, Messrs. Hugo James and MacMahon, volunteers; the former having joined Major Edwardes, in the hot season, and thence done duty with three companies of infantry, that he had raised and drilled; the latter having joined early last month, and on the 29th ultimo distinguished himself, when the enemy twice unsuccessfully attacked the troops commanded by Major Edwardes and Lieutenant Lake, by cutting down the leader of the Sikh

infantry in single combat, and by joining the storming column of Brigadier Markham, in the assault of the city, on the 2nd instant."*

"GENERAL ORDER BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA

"Ferozepoor, February 1st, 1849.

"The Governor-General having received a despatch reporting the surrender, on the morning of the 22nd ultimo, of the citadel and garrison of Mooltan, directs that, together with other despatches relating to the operations against the city and fort, it shall be published for the information of the army and of the people of India.

"The capture of this important fortress, which, during a protracted period, has resisted the powerful armament brought against it, and has been defended with gallantry and endurance, is a just subject of congratulation to the Government of India and to the army.

"The Governor-General desires to convey to Major-General Whish, C.B., his warmest thanks for the valuable service which has thus, under Providence, been rendered to the Government by the united forces which he commands, for the steady, and skilful, and successful prosecution of a siege, which, at comparatively small loss to ourselves, has inflicted most heavy loss upon the enemy, and has utterly destroyed his strongest fortress.

"Brigadier Cheape, C.B., the Chief Engineer of the army, is entitled to the best thanks of the Governor-General, for the zeal and ability with which he has fulfilled the important duty intrusted to him, and in the discharge of which he has been well supported by Major Napier, Chief Engineer of the Bengal division, and Major Scott, Chief Engineer of the Bombay division of the force.

"To Brigadier Markham, whose services have been conspicuous, to Brigadier Salter, and to Brigadier Hervey, the Governor-General tenders his warm acknowledgements.

*"Blue Book," p. 556.

"To Brigadier the Honourable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Bombay division, to Brigadier Capon, and Brigadier Stalker, the best thanks of the Governor-General are due, for the ready and effective assistance they have rendered upon all occasions, as well in the attack upon the suburbs, on the 27th of December, as in the assault of the city, which their troops were the first to enter, and in all the subsequent operations of the siege.

"To Major Garbett and to Major Leeson, commanding the artillery of the Bengal and Bombay divisions, to Commander Powell, of the Indian navy, and to the heads of the various departments, the Governor-General offers his thanks.

"And to all the troops of each division, European and Native, to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, the Governor-General renders his hearty thanks for the gallantry, perseverance, skill, and discipline, which they have displayed throughout the service on which they have been employed.

"With equal cordiality, the Governor-General offers his best thanks to Major Edwardes, C.B., with the Irregularf orce under his orders, and to Lieutenant Lake, who has commanded the forces of our ally, the Nuwab of Bhawulpoor. The Governor-General congratulates these officers on their having been enabled, with their native troops, to witness, in the capture of Mooltan, the complete vindication of the supremacy of British power, which, during the past summer, their own gallantry and enterprise so materially contributed to sustain.

"The Governor-General will have the utmost satisfaction in bringing the services of the force at Mooltan under the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government and the Honourable East India Company.

"A salute of twenty-one guns has been ordered to be fired at every principal station of the army in India."*

*"Blue Book," p. 561.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

I COULD have wished, dear reader, not to close this book without deducing from it a chapter on Irregular troops of India, and their legitimate uses; but if you read what I have already written—you will pay me a very high compliment. I shall now only farther trespass on your patience to tell you in a few words how my own Irregulars were *raised, fed, paid, disciplined, made to fight, and kept together* and lastly what became of them, and all the other principal actors in this book, after the war was over.

1st. The army was raised by personal influence; such influence as it becomes every political officer to have in the country under his charge—such as I am proud to think every other Assistant to the Resident at Lahore had acquired in his own district. See how the Huzaruh tribes took James Abbott for their Khan. See how the Eusofzyes loved Lumsden. See how the men of Rawul Pindee followed Nicholson. When the Mooltan rebellion first broke out, I had been, off and on, about a year among the Trans-Indus people. I had gone to them at the head of great armies, on great errands, and met with great success. A master who had confidence in me, intrusted me with almost despotic power, for good or evil; and I trust the people never saw me wield it except for good. I found five different

countries oppressed by one tyrant; and removed him. I found three chiefs in exile; and restored them. Those countries and those chiefs rallied round me in my hour of need, and were my army.

There was one other source of influence which should not be forgotten by any one who reads this book with a view to profit. It was fixedness of purpose—a determination to make many barbarian wills give way to one that was civilized. In British India, the mind of Government is registered in laws and regulations for the people's good. The people know them, and obey them. If they do *not*, the mildest youth who fills the magisterial chair may reduce the offence to a certain page of a certain thick book, and clause 4, section 5, chapter 6, gives the sentence without any painful effort of either judgment or resolution.

All contingencies are provided for in the Code of Regulations, and, like Babbage's calculating machine, you have nothing to do but throw in the question, turn the handle, and outcomes the result. Far different is the condition of the half-subdued frontier of an ill-governed native state. There laws exist not, and he who rules, must rule the people by his *will*. If his will be evil, the people will be far more miserable than it is possible for any people to be in the corner of British India which is administered with least ability; but if his will be good, as well as strong, " happy are the people who are in such a case;" for a benevolent despotism is the best of all governments. In my little sphere, I gave my whole soul to the establishment of that vast and priceless blessing—Peace; and can truly say that no man assisted me without being rewarded, and no

man opposed me without being punished. This was well known; and when I held up my hand for soldiers, the soldiers came; and when I turned my back upon the province during an imperial war, peace still reigned undisturbed behind me.

2nd. The army I thus raised was *fed and paid out of the revenues of the country which it conquered.* I commenced the war with a few thousand rupees in hand, and maintained it for nine months at an expenditure, civil and military, of two lakhs of rupees a month, without receiving more than one lakh from the Sikh, and another from the British Government. Commissariat I had at first none; but the war was in a fat country, and to find corn, we had only to find money. In the extensive financial arrangements which such wants and expenditure required, I was assisted more than I can sufficiently express by General Cortlandt, one of the best coadjutors ever man had. He kept the civil, and I the military accounts; and the way I did them was this. The last thing at night—generally when I was in bed—I had in the black Chancellor of the Exchequer, and made him read out the disbursements for the day in Persian; I then signed them, and wrote down the sum total, *in English*, at the bottom of the page. At the end of the war, all these accounts were classified, and the totals being forthcoming, there could be little or no roguery. The soldiers, being poor, were paid regularly every fortnight throughout the war.

3rd. As to discipline. There was no time to attempt what regular soldiers call discipline. The men had to fight the day after they were enlisted; and they could only fight their own way. All I did was to make the best of their

way; to draw tight such discipline as they had. First of all I encouraged the enlistment of brotherhoods; fifty or a hundred clansmen, with their own chief at their head. There was a subdivision, and a company at once. Then I asked a dozen brotherhoods which of my chief officers they would follow? They picked their own, according to their border feuds and friendships; and thus I got together bodies of five hundred, one thousand, and two thousand, each with its responsible leader, who took his orders straight from me, and saw them carried out. The tribes of the country I had under my charge were divided into two great parties—the partisans of Futteh Khan, Towannuh, and the partisans of Dowlut Raie; and it was impossible to conceive hatred more bitter and deadly than raged between them. But I had need of every soldier the frontier could produce; and could neither afford to adopt one party myself, nor allow the other to side with Moolraj.

So while Foujdar Khan gathered all the Mooltanee Puthans around him, I encouraged the Towannuh's son to summon his father's friends.

Separate ends of the encampment were assigned to each; and morning and evening, when I held Durbar, native-fashion, on the ground, to please my men, the various officers of either party ranged themselves behind the young Mullick, or Foujdar, on opposite sides of the carpet, and viewed each other with subdued resentment. Occasionally a rush would be made by both parties to get on my right hand; but by equal kindness and access to both, by equalizing their pay, and advising them in their squabbles, I soon got them to lie down together like the lion and the lamb;

and at last little more of their former enmity remained than a useful rivalry in the field.

There was one part of the discipline of a regular army which was more strictly enforced among us than in any regular army I ever served with, and that was, abstinence from plunder. Had the smallest offence of this kind been overlooked, the whole force would have become a band of robbers; and I made instant and severe examples of every offender. If a soldier wanted his discharge without pay, he had nothing to do but go to a field and steal a sugarcane, when he was followed by the screaming husbandman to my tent, and took the consequences. It is a pleasing reflection to me, that, under the protection of the Irregular force, while blockading Moolraj, Moolraj's tenants sowed the fields around Mooltan.

4th. As to fighting them. This is a very easy matter if men are brave; and on the Indus frontier the population lived in a state of feud. You might put a quarrel in any light you chose, and it would, in their opinion, be "a very pretty quarrel as it stands." The difficulty was not to get them on, but to keep them in hand. My grand and sole manœuvre was "*Form line*!" To facilitate this, and preserve it when formed, I gave every brotherhood a flag, and let them make it up after their own fancy, with a * * * * hand, or a scimitar, or the Crescent, or the Koran, upon it; anything so that they and I could distinguish it from others. Then I gave this as an immense honour to the champion of the brotherhood, and gave him more pay to make him appreciate the distinction. When the order to "form line" was issued, every brotherhood rushed to its accustomed position, under its accustomed chief; and then the flags

regulated the advance, and kept the whole line even. As for a reserve, I never permitted such a thing. A regular army may rally and return to the charge. I have seen my own glorious corps, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, return a third time to the attack of a Sikh intrenchment higher than their heads, after two cruel repulses, and with two hundred of their men and officers down upon the ground. That was at Sobraon. Did they get in? *Of course* they got in. Such troops *must* get in. But it is a very different thing with undisciplined armies. They are either successful, or defeated at once. There is no middle course; no doubt about the matter. No reserve will ever stop their flight; but the reserve will turn and run with the advance that has been repulsed. So I threw my whole strength into the advance, and never let them stop, but kept them always moving, if it was but an inch.

5th. The force was kept together during nine months of varying success, by regular pay and kind treatment. The officers sat twice a day with me in Durbar; I learnt to know them all, their characters, their circumstances, their prejudices, and their wants; and by living the same life that they did, wearing the same dress, talking the same language, and sharing with them all dangers and fatigues, they became attached to me, and I to them. I believe that when the war was over, and we had seen our mutual enemy subdued, to part was a mutual sorrow.

Wild, barbarous, indifferent to human life, they were yet free, simple as children, brave, faithful to their master,*

*During the whole war I never lost, by desertion, one man of all whom I had enlisted.

sincere towards their God. The crowded city has its virtues, but so has the desert and the mountain; and he who walks the world aright will find something good wherever he finds Man; and nothing barren from Dan to Beersheba.

And now, dear reader, let me close my story by telling you what became of all the actors.

Dewan Moolraj was brought to Lahore, and tried for his life. By a singular process of reasoning which could have taken place only in the mind of an Asiatic, he applied for me to defend him. I had been previously asked to prosecute him; and was allowed to decline both. I believed him guilty, and would not defend him; but I had hunted him with an army in the field, and had no wish to follow him into the dock. He was tried by three distinguished British officers (two civilians, and one soldier), found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged; but recommended to mercy as "the victim of circumstances." Lord Dalhousie accepted the recommendation; and Moolraj was ordered to be banished across the seas.

The remnant of Moolraj's army, about three thousand men, were made prisoners, their arms and their ill-gotten gains were taken from them, and they were marched into the British provinces, where the worst characters were confined, and the rest sent penniless and honourless to their homes, with the tale of Moolraj's crime, their own folly, and the slow but certain justice of the British Government.

Not less striking was the example held out by the Governor-General to well-doers, in his rewards to the Irregular forces.

To Nuwab Bhawul Khan, whose fidelity had never swerved, but who had assisted the British with his whole military resources, Lord Dalhousie gave a yearly pension of a lakh of rupees for life, and a lakh for every month his army had kept the field.

To eight of my principal officers Lord Dalhousie gave princely pensions, and two thousand of my best men were taken into the permanent service of the British Government; thus preserving in every tribe along the Indus frontier an equal conviction of our gratitude and power.

And here I must express my own belief that a newly-conquered population, to be pacified, must be employed. Recent accounts from India tell us that Lord Dalhousie has thrown open the ranks of the native army to all the people of the Punjab without distinction. We know also that he is cutting vast canals, to bring into cultivation the arid centres of the Punjab deltas. These are measures at once bold and wise. A very short calculation tells us that the disbandment of the conquered Sikh army cannot have thrown less than one hundred thousand men out of employment. Follow these men to their homes, to which they have been for years remitting money, and where they have now gone to be an additional burden on the land, and we have a fearful glance into the disorganization which is inseparable from conquest. The conqueror who sought not to provide a remedy for the disorder which he made, would be a conqueror only, not a ruler. Voltaire said well:

"Il n'y a point de grand conquerant qui ne soit *grand politique*." All the great conquerors of all times have recognised the necessity of employing the military population of their conquest. It is far easier than to destroy them. Their fidelity is secured at the outset by severing them from their old associations. When Hannibal prepared to invade Italy, Carthage poured her Africans into Spain, and defended Africa with Spaniards.*

The English in India have done more. They have often pacified countries by employing the indigenous tribes to hold them. It is one of the most remarkable and humane experiences of the British power in the East. The Bheel corps in Candeish, Malwa, and Meywar; the Mair corps; the Coolie corps in Guzerat; the Mug corps in Arracan; the Sylhet Local Infantry, are all military bodies which have reclaimed wild tribes while they pacified wild countries.† Had the lesson been applied to our new frontier, we might not have had these disturbances at Kohat. Burning a village will never pacify a tribe; but entertain some of their number, and the whole are satisfied. Oftentimes I have found it sufficient to give a cloak of gold brocade to a chief who had no shirt. Both the giver and receiver gained respect.

The permanent employment, therefore, of two thousand of my men was as wise as it was generous and grateful; and I feel sure that they have already done good service to the

*The readers of the "Delhi Gazette" may perhaps recognise some of these sentiments, but no one has a better right than the Author to give them wider circulation.

†Let me recommend any one interested in such questions to persue "A Sketch of Mairwara," by Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon. Smith and Elder, 1850.

civil officers to whom they have been attached. They have a good proverb on the subject: "Take a country dog to catch a country hare."

Of the European officers, General Cortlandt was taken by Lord Dalhousie into the British service on the same pay that he enjoyed in the Sikh army (two thousand rupees a month); and is now the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan.

My gallant companion, Lake, was made a Major; so was Lumsden; so was Taylor.* Lieutenant Young was rewarded with an Assistant Commissionership for his energetic reduction of the fort of Hurrund; and Lieutenant Pearse with another, for his zealous service with the Irregulars during the war.

Young Hugo James was in the handsomest manner presented with a cadetship, by my ever kind friend and patron, Colonel Sykes; and if a second could have been of any use to him, it was offered by Sir Richard Jenkins, Bart., who ten years ago gave me my own, and first put me in the way of usefulness and honour.

The brave MacMahon has, I believe, been cared for by Sir Henry Lawrence, who witnessed his single combat; and Mr. Quin has obtained (if he did but know it) that best of all rewards—a wife!

Thus, having seen our enemies punished, and our friends rewarded, let you and I, dear reader, also lay down

*Would that I had space to tell how he besieged and took the fort of Lukkee, and saved the whole Derajat from falling into the hands of the Afghans; but he must write a book for himself.

our arms; trusting humbly that we have obeyed the injunction inscribed by the Persian on his sword:

> "Draw me not without cause:
> Sheathe me not without honour."

Into "One Year on the Punjab Frontier," have been crowded the conquest of an Afghan valley and two independent tribes, two attempts at assassination in my tent, three pitched battles, two sieges, and innumerable skirmishes. Very earnestly do I hope that all my future life may be given to the less glorious, but more useful arts of Peace.

THE END.